

**BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD AND PERCEPTIONS OF FAIR  
TREATMENT BY POLICE**

**2006 ANES PILOT STUDY REPORT: MODULES 4 and 22**

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## Report on 2006 ANES Pilot Modules 4 and 22

### PART I. REPORT ON MODULE 22

#### Introduction

Module 22 of the 2006 American National Election Survey Pilot Study seeks to measure the *perceived* level of fair treatment accorded by the police to criminal suspects. While there is evidence that disadvantaged ethnic minorities perceive greater injustice in police behavior—and mixed evidence that socioeconomic factors play a role in perceptions of police fairness as well—the relationship of these perceptions to voting behavior has not been examined (Hagan et al 2005; Henderson et al 1997; Tuch and Weitzer 1997).

Accounts of the 2004 presidential election have not focused on issues related to criminal justice. Scholarly explanations of vote choice center on voters' demographics, party identification, and ideology; views on the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism; opinion on abortion, gay marriage and other “hot-button” social issues; assessments of recent national economic conditions, candidate personality traits, and candidates' actual and potential performance on salient issues (see for example Weisberg 2007; Weisberg and Christensen 2007; Malhotra and Krosnick 2007). That is not to say that criminal justice-related issues have never been thought important in determining election outcomes: few accounts of the 1988 presidential election fail to mention George H.W. Bush's devastating portrayal of Michael Dukakis as soft on crime through the infamous “Willie Horton ads” (Mendelberg 1997; Hagan et al. 2006, 1).

Hagan and his colleagues (2006) proposed Module 22 for inclusion on the ANES Pilot. They hypothesize that perceived police fairness is a function of demographic variables, political conservatism, racism, contact with the criminal justice system, and the salience of crime.<sup>1</sup> Perceived police fairness is hypothesized to mediate the effect of these variables on voting behavior. The hypotheses are not explicit in terms of the nature of the effect on voting behavior, but insofar as “the criminal justice system may be the most salient point of contact with government institutions for a large segment of the U.S. population, particularly among poor blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans,” perceptions of systematic unfairness within the criminal justice system—and associated feelings of system illegitimacy—may transfer to the government as a whole, presumably leading to a decreased propensity for voting. Too, insofar as perceived police fairness mediates demographic and politico-ideological variables, perceptions of police fairness ought to have an effect on vote choice consistent with the direction of the effects measured for those variables (i.e. the demographic and politico-ideological variables) (Hagan et al 2006; see also Hagan et al 2007).

#### Item wording, and experiment on item ordering

All respondents to the 2006 American National Election Survey Pilot Study were asked four questions on how often different groups of people are treated fairly by the police. The exact wording of the items is: “What percent of [ALL the/ all the BLACK/ all the WHITE/ all the POOR] people who are suspected of committing a crime in America do you think are treated fairly by the police?” Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: the *forward* condition or the *reverse* condition. In the forward condition, respondents were asked first about **all** people, followed by **poor**, **white**, and **black** people. In the reverse condition, respondents were asked first about **black** people, then about **white**, **poor**, and **all** people.

#### Response rates

Each of the items in module 22 was answered by at least 665 of the 675 pilot study respondents.


#### Distribution of responses to Module 22 items

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<sup>1</sup> *Contact with criminal justice system* was measured by neither the 2004 ANES or the 2006 ANES pilot; *salience of crime* was not directly measured either.


Distributions of responses to each of the four items in module 22—aggregated over the two experimental conditions—are reported in the graphs below. The distribution of responses when disaggregated by experimental condition do not differ materially from those reported here, and can be found in the appendix.

Figure 1-a.




N=665

Figure 1-b




N=666

Figure 1-c



N=667

Figure 1-d



N=666

The distributions deviate moderately from the normal distribution. Compared to normally distributed data with the same mean and standard deviation, respondents are somewhat more likely to select a response of 80-90%, and somewhat less likely to select a response of 30-50% for each of the four items.<sup>2</sup>

### Means, by experimental condition

Table 1 reports means and standard errors for responses to each item, by experimental condition. The differences in means between experimental conditions do not approach statistical significance. Finding no question-order effects, I use response data aggregated over both experimental conditions in subsequent analyses.

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<sup>2</sup> Note also that statistically significant differences exist between the mean score of whites and non-whites for *blacks treated fairly* and *poor treated fairly*. Whites believe that the poor and blacks are treated more fairly more often than do non-whites (see Table A1. in appendix).

Table 1. Means, module 22 items, by experimental condition

<i>Condition:</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>std error</i>	<i>95%LB</i>	<i>95%UB</i>
<i>Proportion of time ____ people treated fairly</i>				
<i>Forward: BLACK</i>	.540	.023	.494	.585
<i>Reverse: BLACK</i>	.545	.022	.497	.593
<i>Forward: WHITE</i>	.722	.017	.687	.757
<i>Reverse: WHITE</i>	.711	.021	.667	.755
<i>Forward: POOR</i>	.552	.024	.502	.601
<i>Reverse: POOR</i>	.551	.018	.513	.589
<i>Forward: ALL</i>	.666	.021	.623	.709
<i>Reverse: ALL</i>	.654	.019	.614	.693

**Means, by item**

Table 2 reports means and standard errors for each item, aggregated over the experimental conditions. All differences of means are statistically significant ( $p = .000$ ), except for the difference between *blacks treated fairly* and *poor treated fairly*, which is not significant ( $p=.293$ ).

Table 2. Means, module 22 items

<i>Proportion of time ____ people treated fairly</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>std error</i>	<i>95%LB</i>	<i>95%UB</i>
<i>WHITE</i>	.716	.014	.687	.746
<i>BLACK</i>	.542	.017	.509	.577
<i>POOR</i>	.551	.016	.517	.585
<i>ALL</i>	.660	.016	.627	.692

**Inter-item correlations**

Inter-item correlations range from .83 (between *blacks treated fairly* and *poor treated fairly*) to .66 (between *blacks treated fairly* and *whites treated fairly*).<sup>3</sup> Hagan et al (2007, p. 3-4) acknowledge that a two-factor model fits the data better, but recommend using a single-factor to predict vote choice and turnout, due to a lack of discriminant validity between the two factors.<sup>4</sup> I compute an additive index of the four items in module 22, but report the effects of the responses to the individual items as well when they differ significantly from those of the additive index.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> A complete table of correlations is presented in the appendix.

<sup>4</sup> One factor combines *blacks* and *poor treated fairly* and the other includes *all* and *whites treated fairly*.

<sup>5</sup> The Cronbach's alpha statistic measuring scale reliability for the four-item index is .92

### **Effect of demographic and political variables on perceptions of fairness by police**

Party ID and gender were significantly related to perceptions of fairness by police in general as measured by the additive fairness index. Specifically, males and the more strongly Republican were more likely to believe that suspects are often treated fairly by the police. Other variables were also important, however, in predicting responses to the individual Module 22 items. Males, whites, the more ideologically conservative, and the more strongly Republican were more likely to believe that *blacks* are often treated fairly by the police. The more strongly Republican and the better-educated were more likely to believe that *all* people are often treated fairly. Party ID was the only variable associated with beliefs about how often *whites* are treated fairly by the police: the more strongly Republican were more likely to think that whites are often treated fairly. Lastly, whites, and the more strongly Republican, were more likely to believe that the *poor* are often treated fairly. Complete results from all five OLS regressions can be found in the appendix.

### **Bivariate relationship of perceptions of police fairness to turnout and vote choice**

Bivariate relationships were estimated by OLS regression with vote choice or turnout as the independent variable, and beliefs about police fairness as the dependent variable.

Of the four items in Module 22, *poor treated fairly* was related to reported turnout for both the 2004 and the 2006 elections; *all treated fairly* was related to reported 2006 turnout. Voting was associated with the belief that *poor people* and *all people* are more often treated fairly by the police.

All Module 22 items were related to vote choice. Those voting for Kerry in 2004, for a Democratic U.S. House candidate in 2006, and choosing Bill Clinton over George W. Bush in a hypothetical match-up in 2006 were less likely to believe that *all*, *white*, *poor*, and *black* people are frequently treated fairly. Full results are in the appendix.

### **Relationship of perceptions of police fairness to turnout and vote choice—multivariate analysis**

Perceptions of police fairness as measured by the additive index were correlated with vote choice in the 2004 Presidential election, the 2006 U.S. House election, and a hypothetical contest between Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, even when taking party identification, ideology, belief in a just world, political efficacy, and a number of demographic variables into account.<sup>6</sup> Each of the individual Module 22 items were statistically significant predictors (at the .05 level) of 2004 vote choice. *All* and *poor treated fairly* were significantly related to 2006 U.S. House vote choice. Of the individual items, only *all treated fairly* significantly predicted vote choice in the hypothetical Clinton-Bush match-up. Table 3 reports estimates for the model with the additive index and the control variables predicting vote choice. Estimates for models with the individual Module 22 items predicting vote choice can be found in the appendix.

Clearly, beliefs that police often treat people unfairly are associated with a greater probability of voting for the Democratic candidate in the three contests examined here. The size of the change in probabilities is substantial. For example, a white, non-Catholic married male who is a moderate Democrat and weakly liberal is predicted to vote for Kerry with a probability of .72 when he is at one standard deviation above the mean on the additive fairness index (that is, he believes the police treat people fairly more often than the average person).<sup>7</sup> That probability increases to .87 as the score on the fairness index shifts to one standard deviation below the mean.

Another example: A white, non-Catholic married male who is a moderate Republican and weakly conservative is predicted to vote for a Democratic House candidate with a probability of .27 when he is at

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<sup>6</sup> Respondents were asked about the hypothetical Clinton-Bush contest in 2006. A description of the variables can be found in the appendix.

<sup>7</sup> Other variables were set at their median value. Specifically: *education* at “some college,” *household income* at \$45,000 - \$49,999, *age* at 52, *political efficacy* at .375, and *belief in a just world* at .5.

one standard deviation above the mean on the fairness index.<sup>8</sup> Shifting the score on the index to one standard deviation below the mean increases the probability of voting for the Democratic candidate to .48.

There are also indications that perceptions of fairness mediate the effect of race on vote choice. Models of vote choice with the measures of perceived fairness *excluded* show a greater substantive effect of race on vote choice than do models with measures of perceived fairness *included* (see column 5, Tables A5-A7, Appendix).

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<sup>8</sup> Other variables were set at their median value. Specifically: *education* at “some college,” *household income* at \$50,000 - \$59,999, *age* at 54, *political efficacy* at .375, and *belief in a just world* at .5.



Table 3. Dependent variable: Vote Choice (President '04; House '06; Hypothetical Clinton-Bush contest)  
 [Logit estimates, standard errors in parentheses]

**Note:** Kerry ('04), Democrat ('06), Clinton (hypothetical) =1

	<i>President (2004)</i>	<i>U.S. House (2006)</i>	<i>W J Clinton vs G W Bush</i>
<i>Fairness Index</i>	-2.43** (.78)	-2.37* (1.05)	-1.94* (.80)
<i>Party I.D. (Hi= Strong Rep)</i>	-5.32** (.93)	-4.50** (.61)	-4.10** (.62)
<i>Ideology (Hi = Very Cons)</i>	-4.58** (.85)	-3.79** (.58)	-3.19* (1.29)
<i>Male</i>	-.51 (.48)	.14 (.44)	.35 (.33)
<i>Education</i>	.40 (.87)	-.60 (.71)	1.01* (.40)
<i>Married</i>	.03 (.31)	-.53 (.43)	.04 (.31)
<i>Catholic</i>	.46 (.65)	.52 (.43)	.57 (.29)
<i>Household Income</i>	.50 (.98)	.93 (.85)	.91 (.89)
<i>Age/100</i>	.32 (.86)	.60 (1.60)	.60 (.78)
<i>Non-white</i>	1.15** (.38)	.85 (.55)	.62 (.57)
<i>Efficacy Index (Hi= More Eff)</i>	.43 (.73)	-.41 (.69)	.43 (.69)
<i>Just World (Hi=World is More Just)</i>	-1.29 (.83)	-.15 (.69)	-1.09 (.65)
<i>Constant</i>	6.39** (.87)	6.42** (1.80)	4.28* (1.65)
N=	578	578	578
Pseudo- R <sup>2</sup>	.625	.548	.428

\* = p < .05 \*\* = p < .01 (two-tailed test)

There is no relationship between perceptions of police fairness and reported turnout in either the 2004 or the 2006 election. Among the variables used to predict vote choice (see Table 3), only age, household income, and education have a statistically significant impact on turnout in 2004 and 2006: older people, the better educated, and the wealthier were more likely to vote in both elections.<sup>9</sup>

## Conclusion

The set of items measuring perceived police fairness was a significant predictor of vote choice even when controlling for demographic and political characteristics. There is also evidence that, as hypothesized, perceptions of police fairness partially mediate the effects of race on vote choice. However, it is important not to overstate the case. No controls for any *issues* were included in the multivariate models, and given that not a single respondent named “police brutality” or “police not doing their job properly” as the most important issue facing the country in the last four years, it is difficult to claim that any single vote choice was “caused” by perceptions of police unfairness in a meaningful sense.<sup>10</sup> Nonetheless, the relationship of the Module 22 items to vote choice was fairly consistent across the three contests considered, and is worthy of further study.

Although beliefs about police fairness were positively correlated with political efficacy ( $r=.11$ ,  $p=.005$ ), neither variable had a discernable effect on turnout, once demographics were controlled for. This appears to imply that either (a) questions about the legitimacy of police behavior does not automatically result in questions about the legitimacy of the federal government or (b) questioning the legitimacy of the federal government does not result in a decreased likelihood of turnout. Whichever the case, it is safe to say that (at least for the two elections considered here) the impact of perceptions of police fairness on voting behavior is limited to the domain of vote choice.

## PART II. REPORT ON MODULE 4.

### Item wording, and experiment on response option ordering

Module 4 is designed to measure “belief in a just world.” Respondents were asked: “How much of the time do people get what they deserve?” The five response options were “always,” “most of the time,” “about half the time,” “once in a while,” and “never.” In the *forward* experimental condition the options were read in the above order; in the *reverse* condition, the reading of options was reversed.

### Response rate

672 of 675 pilot study participants responded to Module 4.

### Means and distribution of responses

Table 4 reports the number of responses in each response category, by experimental condition. Differences are apparent between conditions are for the *most of the time* and *once in a while* response categories. When *once in a while* is read to as the next-to-last response option, respondents are more likely to select it than

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<sup>9</sup> Interestingly, the more politically efficacious were not more likely to vote. Whites, and those who believed in a more just world, were more likely to vote in 2004, but not in 2006. See Table A7 in the appendix.

<sup>10</sup> Of course, it is not particularly surprising that police behavior was not mentioned as *the* most important problem the U.S. faced from 2000-2004, considering it was in competition with issues like the War on Terrorism and the Iraq War. The point is, though, that one would want a measure of how important “fair treatment of suspects by police” is relative to other issues for respondents (either in general, or specifically in the vote choice decision-making process), before making a definitive claim about the strength of the issue’s impact on vote choice.


when it is the second option. Similarly, respondents are more likely to select *most of the time* when it is the penultimate option, as compared to when it is read second. This suggests a response-option order effect. However—when the responses are placed on a 0 to 1 interval scale—the difference between means over experimental conditions (*forward* mean = .514; *backward* mean = .489) is not statistically significant ( $p = .225$ ).

Table 4. Responses to Module 4 item, by experimental condition

<i>People ___ get what they deserve</i>	<i>forward condition</i>	<i>reverse condition</i>	<i>total</i>
<i>always</i>	6 (1.75%)	10 (3.03%)	16 (2.38%)
<i>most of time</i>	97 (28.36%)	112 (33.94%)	209 (31.10%)
<i>half of time</i>	131 (38.30%)	133 (40.30%)	264 (39.29%)
<i>once in while</i>	104 (30.41%)	70 (21.21%)	174 (25.89%)
<i>never</i>	4 (1.17%)	5 (1.52%)	9 (1.34%)
<i>(total)</i>	342	330	672

Figure three shows the distribution of responses aggregated over experimental conditions. Distributions disaggregated by experimental condition do not differ markedly, and can be found in the appendix. The distribution of Module 4 responses approximates the normal distribution quite closely.

Figure 3.



N=672

### Effect of demographic and political variables on belief in a just world

Of standard demographic variables and two political variables (ideology and party identification), only education is significantly correlated with belief in a just world: the better-educated believe that the world is more just. The appendix contains a table of the coefficients estimated via ordered logit.

### Relationship between vote choice, turnout, and belief in a just world—bivariate and multivariate analyses

Though bivariate regressions indicate that belief in a (more) just world is positively correlated with an increased likelihood of voting and choosing a Republican candidate, these relationships are only statistically significant at the .05 level for turnout in the 2004 election and vote choice in a hypothetical election between Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the correlation with vote choice in the hypothetical Clinton-Bush contest becomes statistically insignificant once ideology, party identification, and demographic factors are controlled for. On the other hand, the relationship between belief in a just world and reported turnout in 2004 remains statistically significant even when the demographic and political controls are included.<sup>12</sup>

### Conclusion

Belief in a just world is not significantly correlated with any of the standard demographic and political predictor variables save education. It is also a very weak predictor of vote choice, and an inconsistent

<sup>11</sup> See Table A9, Appendix. The relationships between belief in a just world and 2006 turnout, 2004 presidential vote choice and 2006 U.S. House vote choice are statistically insignificant.

<sup>12</sup> See Table 3, also Tables A3-A7 in the Appendix.

predictor of turnout. If a similar question is included on future surveys, randomly assigning respondents to response-option-order conditions is recommended.

## References

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**Report on 2006 ANES Pilot Modules 4 and 22**  
**APPENDIX**

**Description of variables**

(Note: variables recoded from items prefixed by **V06** indicate responses from the 2006 ANES Pilot Study. The prefix **V04** indicates responses from the 2004 pre- or post-election ANES study).

Vote Choice and Turnout

U.S. House Vote Choice 2006—recode of V06P785. (=0) indicates reported vote for Republican candidate in 2006 House election. (=1) indicates vote for Democrat. Nonvoters dropped.

Hypothetical G.W. Bush vs. W. J. Clinton Presidential Contest Vote Choice—recode of V06P774. (=0) indicates a vote for Bush. (=1) indicates vote for Clinton.

Presidential Vote Choice 2004—recode of V045026. (=0) indicates vote for Bush. (=1) indicates vote for Kerry. Nonvoters dropped

Voted in 2006—recode of V06P775x. (=1) indicates respondent reports voting in 2006 election.

Voted in 2004—recode of V045018x. (=1) indicates respondent reports voting in 2004 election.

Further Variables

*The following were recoded as interval-level variables on a 0 to 1 scale:*

Party ID—recode of V043116, a seven-point party ID scale. The categories are **Strong Democrat** (=0), **Weak Democrat, Independent (Lean Democrat), Independent, Independent (Lean Republican), Weak Republican, and Strong Republican** (=1).

Ideology—recode of V043085 and V043085a, a seven point ideology scale. The categories are **Extremely Liberal** (=0), **Liberal, Slightly Liberal/Moderate (Lean Liberal), Moderate, Slightly Conservative/Moderate (Lean Conservative), Conservative, and Extremely Conservative** (=1).

Education—recode of V043254, a seven point education scale. The categories are **8 Grades or Fewer** (=0), **Some High School, High School Degree/GED, Some College, Junior/Community College Degree, College (Bachelor's) Degree, and Advanced Degree** (=1).

Household income—recode of V043293x, a twenty-three point household income scale. The categories range from **\$0-\$2,999** (=0) to **\$120,000 or more** (=1).

Efficacy Index—items V06P650 – V06P653 (measuring political efficacy) were recoded (if necessary) so that higher scores indicated more political efficacy. An additive index of political efficacy was created, and constrained between 0 and 1. The index is a nine-level variable with **0** indicating least political efficacy and **1** the highest level of efficacy.

Belief in a Just World—recode of V06P512: “How much of the time do people get what they deserve?” The five response categories are **always** (=1) **most of the time, about half the time, once in a while, and never** (=0).

Blacks/Whites/Poor/All Treated Fairly—recodes of V06P733-736, the quasi-continuous scale measuring the perception of the percentage of the time criminal suspects belonging to each group are treated fairly by the police.

Fairness Index—an additive index of **Blacks/Whites/Poor/All Treated Fairly**.

*Dummy Variables:*

Catholic—recode of V043247. (=1) indicates that a respondent's religion is Catholic.

Male—recode of V06P005. (=1) indicates that a respondent's gender is male.

Married—recode of V043251x. (=1) indicates that a respondent is married.


Non-white—recode of V043299. (=0) indicates that a respondent identified as white, in combination with no other ethnicity or race; (=1) indicates that a respondent identified as some other ethnicity or race besides white—including identifying as such an ethnicity or race *as well as* white.

*Other:*

Age/100—recode of V06P006, the variable indicating age. The rescaled variable ranges from .2 to .92.


**Distributions of responses to module 22 questions, by experimental condition**

*Figure A1-a*




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Figure A1-b



N=307


Figure A1-c



N=307




Figure A1-d




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Figure A2-a




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Figure A2-b




N=359

Figure A2-c



N=360

Figure A2-d



N=359

**Perceptions of police fairness—differences between white and non-white respondents**

Table A1. Proportion of the time \_\_\_\_\_ people are treated fairly: means

	<i>Black</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>All</i>
<i>R White</i>	.57	.73	.59	.68
<i>R Non-White</i>	.44	.68	.42	.60
<i>Difference (Sig.)</i>	.14 (.001)	.04 (.265)	.17 (.000)	.08 (.067)

### Inter-item correlations

Table A2. Proportion of the time \_\_\_\_\_ people are treated fairly: correlations

	<i>Black</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>All</i>
<i>Black</i>	1			
<i>White</i>	.66	1		
<i>Poor</i>	.83	.68	1	
<i>All</i>	.75	.74	.78	1

### Background correlates for fairness index and Module 22 items

Table A3. Dependent variable: Proportion of time each group is treated fairly.  
[OLS estimates, standard errors in parentheses]

	<i>fairness index</i>	<i>blacks fair</i>	<i>whites fair</i>	<i>poor fair</i>	<i>all fair</i>
<i>Party ID</i>	.10* (.04)	.10* (.05)	.09* (.04)	.11* (.04)	.12* (.03)
<i>Ideology</i>	.07 (.05)	.17* (.07)	-.01 (.06)	.13 (.07)	.00 (.06)
<i>Male</i>	.04* (.02)	.07* (.03)	.02 (.02)	.05 (.03)	.04 (.02)
<i>Education</i>	.08 (.04)	.06 (.06)	.09 (.05)	.06 (.05)	.11* (.04)
<i>Married</i>	.04 (.03)	.07 (.04)	.02 (.02)	.04 (.03)	.05 (.04)
<i>Catholic</i>	.02 (.04)	.02 (.05)	.02 (.03)	.03 (.04)	.02 (.04)
<i>Household Income</i>	.01 (.04)	-.03 (.05)	.02 (.05)	.07 (.06)	-.01 (.07)
<i>Age/100</i>	-.01 (.09)	.02 (.10)	-.07 (.08)	.04 (.12)	-.01 (.11)
<i>Non-white</i>	-.06 (.04)	-.09* (.03)	.01 (.04)	-.12* (.05)	-.04 (.04)
<i>Constant</i>	.44* (.10)	.32* (.11)	.63* (.11)	.31* (.12)	.52* (.10)
$R^2$	.142	.160	.069	.160	.113

N=589 \* = p < .05 (two-tailed test)

**Relationship between perceptions of fairness, vote choice, and turnout—bivariate analysis**

Table A4. Dependent variable: perception of proportion of the time each group is treated fairly  
[OLS estimates, standard errors in parentheses]

	<i>fairness index</i>	<i>blacks fair</i>	<i>whites fair</i>	<i>poor fair</i>	<i>all fair</i>
<i>Vote Choice House '06 (1=Dem)</i>	-.11** (.02)	-.14** (.02)	-.06** (.02)	-.15** (.02)	-.10** (.02)
<i>Vote Choice Pres '04 (1=Kerry)</i>	-.15** (.03)	-.18** (.04)	-.11** (.03)	-.18** (.03)	-.13** (.03)
<i>W. J. Clinton vs. G. W. Bush (1=Clinton)</i>	-.12** (.02)	-.13** (.02)	-.08** (.02)	-.15** (.02)	-.11** (.02)
<i>Voted in '06</i>	.05 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.05 (.02)	.06* (.02)	.06** (.02)
<i>Voted in '04</i>	.07 (.03)	.08 (.05)	.03 (.04)	.12** (.04)	.03 (.05)

\* =  $p < .05$  \*\* =  $p < .01$  (two-tailed test)

## Relationship between perceptions of fairness and vote choice—multivariate analysis

Table A5. Dependent variable: vote choice in 2004—President

[Logit estimates, standard errors in parentheses]

**Note:** Kerry=1; Variables with attending coefficients statistically indistinguishable from zero at the .05 level for all five model specifications not reported.<sup>13</sup>

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Blacks treated fairly</i>	-1.76* (.68)	-	-	-	-
<i>Whites treated fairly</i>	-	-2.18* (.85)	-	-	-
<i>All treated fairly</i>	-	-	-1.79* (.78)	-	-
<i>Poor treated fairly</i>	-	-	-	-1.96* (.82)	-
<i>Party ID (Hi= Strong Rep)</i>	-5.47** (.93)	-5.39** (.96)	-5.23** (.94)	-5.37** (.95)	5.53** (.99)
<i>Ideology (Hi=Very Cons)</i>	-4.35** (.81)	-4.40** (.81)	-4.50** (.87)	-4.29** (.81)	-4.38** (.84)
<i>Non-white</i>	1.15** (.37)	1.11** (.31)	1.21** (.37)	1.06* (.38)	1.26** (.31)
N=	581	582	580	581	587
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	.623	.613	.613	.616	.606

\* = p < .05 \*\* = p < .01 (two-tailed test)

<sup>13</sup> That is, *education, household income, political efficacy, belief in just world, age, and Catholic, male, and married dummies.*

Table A6. Dependent variable: vote choice in 2006—U.S. House

[Logit estimates, standard errors in parentheses]

**Note:** Democratic candidate=1; Variables with attending coefficients statistically indistinguishable from zero at the .05 level for all five model specifications not reported.<sup>14</sup>

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Blacks treated fairly</i>	-1.12 (.73)	-	-	-	-
<i>Whites treated fairly</i>	-	-1.86 (1.35)	-	-	-
<i>Poor treated fairly</i>	-	-	-2.36** (.77)	-	-
<i>All treated fairly</i>	-	-	-	-2.34* (1.13)	-
<i>Party ID (Hi= Strong Rep)</i>	-4.58** (.61)	-4.54** (.61)	-4.57** (.62)	-4.49** (.61)	-4.68** (.61)
<i>Ideology (Hi= Very Cons)</i>	-3.81** (.59)	-3.83** (.55)	-3.72** (.59)	-3.90** (.61)	-3.87** (.57)
<i>Non-white</i>	.86 (.53)	1.04* (.50)	.82 (.53)	.82 (.57)	.99* (.42)
N=	581	582	581	580	587
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.542	.543	.558	.548	.537

\* = p < .05 \*\* = p < .01 (two-tailed test)

<sup>14</sup> That is, education, household income, political efficacy, belief in just world, age, and Catholic, male, and married dummies.

Table A7. Dependent variable: vote choice in hypothetical Presidential contest—W.J. Clinton v. G.W. Bush

[Logit estimates; standard errors in parentheses]

**Note:** Clinton=1; Variables with attending coefficients statistically indistinguishable from zero at the .05 level for all five model specifications not reported.<sup>15</sup>

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Blacks treated fairly</i>	-.76 (.76)	-	-	-	-
<i>Whites treated fairly</i>	-	-2.81 (1.53)	-	-	-
<i>Poor treated fairly</i>	-	-	-1.15 (.76)	-	-
<i>All treated fairly</i>	-	-	-	-2.30* (1.07)	-
<i>Party ID (Hi=Strong Rep)</i>	-4.10** (.60)	-4.19** (.61)	-4.06** (.60)	-4.06** (.63)	-4.16** (.61)
<i>Ideology (Hi=Very Cons)</i>	-3.25* (1.25)	-3.34** (1.22)	-3.23* (1.27)	-3.36** (1.23)	-3.39* (1.29)
<i>Education</i>	.90* (.38)	1.15** (.43)	.90* (.38)	1.09** (.39)	.89* (.38)
N=	581	582	581	580	587
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	.419	.436	.422	.434	.416

\* = p < .05 \*\* = p < .01 (two-tailed test)

<sup>15</sup> That is, *household income, political efficacy, belief in just world, and age, and Catholic, male, non-white and married dummies.*



**Relationship between perceptions of police fairness and turnout—multivariate analysis**

Table A8. Dependent variable: reported turnout in 2004 and 2006


[Logit estimates; standard errors in parentheses]

	<i>Voted in 2004</i>	<i>Voted in 2006</i>
<i>Fairness Index</i>	.11 (1.00)	.23 (.65)
<i>Party ID (Hi=Strong Rep)</i>	-.35 (.64)	-.54 (.40)
<i>Ideology (Hi=Very Cons)</i>	.62 (.64)	.42 (.53)
<i>Male</i>	-.21 (.31)	-.08 (.22)
<i>Education</i>	2.11** (.74)	1.10* (.44)
<i>Catholic</i>	-.46 (.41)	-.06 (.41)
<i>Married</i>	-.18 (.40)	-.13 (.35)
<i>Non-white</i>	-.74* (.31)	-.55 (.33)
<i>Age/100</i>	2.12* (.97)	2.37** (.87)
<i>Household Income</i>	1.70** (.58)	1.41** (.51)
<i>Efficacy Index</i>	.54 (.79)	-.40 (.57)
<i>Belief in a Just World</i>	1.83* (.77)	-.04 (.57)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.06* (.88)	-1.14 (.93)
N=	578	578
R <sup>2</sup>	.161	.075

\* = p < .05 \*\* = p < .01 (two-tailed test)


**Distribution of responses to Module 4, by experimental condition**

Figure A3-a.



N=342

Figure A3-b.



N=330

**Background correlates for Module 4—belief in a just world**

Table A9. Dependent variable: Belief in a just world (higher score indicates belief world is more just)

[Ordered logit estimates; standard errors in parentheses]

<i>Party ID</i>	-.01
<i>(Hi=Strong Rep)</i>	(.35)
<i>Ideology</i>	.87
<i>(Hi=Very Cons)</i>	(.46)
<i>Male</i>	.13
	(.20)
<i>Education</i>	1.21**
	(.27)
<i>Household Income</i>	-.31
	(.45)
<i>Catholic</i>	.18
	(.25)
<i>Married</i>	.28
	(.21)
<i>Non-White</i>	.01
	(.33)
<i>Age/100</i>	.10
	(.51)
<i>Cutpoint 1</i>	-2.77
	(.93)
<i>Cutpoint 2</i>	.57
	(.60)
<i>Cutpoint 3</i>	2.23
	(.63)
<i>Cutpoint 4</i>	5.18
	(.75)
N=	589
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	.021

\*\* = p < .01 (two-tailed test)

**Relationship between vote choice, turnout, and belief in a just world—bivariate analysis**

Table A10. Dependent variables: Reported turnout 2006 and 2004; Presidential vote choice 2004; U.S. House vote choice 2006; choice in hypothetical Clinton-Bush contest  
[Logit estimates; standard errors in parentheses]

	<i>Voted 2006</i>	<i>Voted 2004</i>	<i>Vote 2004 (Kerry=1)</i>	<i>Vote 2006 (Dem=1)</i>	<i>Hypothetical Vote (1=Clinton)</i>
<i>Belief in Just World</i>	.45 (.47)	1.41* (.55)	-.88 (.70)	-.52 (.49)	-1.18* (.47)
<i>Constant</i>	.80** (.25)	.96** (.34)	.41 (.41)	.61 (.34)	1.02* (.27)
N=	672	672	672	672	672

\* =  $p < .05$  \*\* =  $p < .01$  (two-tailed test)

**Relationship between vote choice, turnout, and belief in a just world—multivariate analysis**

See Table 3 in main body and Tables A3-A7 in appendix.