

**COMPASSION AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NES HUMANITARIANISM SCALE***

**Report to the Board of Overseers of the
National Election Studies**

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Abstract:

This paper introduces humanitarianism, a sense of responsibility for other people's well-being and needs, as a distinctive and politically relevant value that can be used to understand attitudes toward public policy in a wide variety of domains. A Likert and forced-choice version of a humanitarianism are developed and evaluated. It is demonstrated that humanitarianism can be measured meaningfully through Likert-items and that the resulting scale has strong predictive potential for attitudes in the domains of social welfare policy, criminal justice, and foreign aid. The paper concludes with recommendations for inclusion of the humanitarianism items in future American National Election Studies.

In recent years much has been said about the individualistic nature of American society. According to many social critics, too many Americans are concerned just about themselves or their immediate families, and too few care about remote others. The spirit of "civic humanism" (Herzog 1986), which entails concern for one another's conditions, has given way to preoccupation with oneself – one's rights and freedoms as an individual citizen. Compassion with the plight of others has lost out to concern for the self, so the critics say.¹

On first sight there indeed appears to be "compassion fatigue" (Kozol 1995) in American society. This is indicated, for example by the denial by political and cultural elites (including self-professed liberals) that there is a moral obligation to be compassionate.² Other indicators include the hardening of public opinion on issues like

crime and welfare, and the rather strong attempt by the 104th Congress to dismantle the social safety net (an attempt that has seen the backing of many Democrats). Abandonment, not compassion, seems to characterize American society as it prepares itself for the next century.

There is another side to American society, however. As Wuthnow has eloquently documented, Americans talk individualism but often behave in the spirit of compassion. Few Americans want to part with freedom and autonomy, but this does not render them selfish, even narcissistic individuals. On the contrary, large numbers of Americans are quite willing to help out others and their community, joining voluntary associations that often require substantial investments of time and energy. Either we witness here a classical example of a weak correlation between attitudes and behavior, or the gap between individualism

and compassion is just not very large in people's minds.

There is good reason to believe that the latter explanation may be more accurate. For one, the coexistence of individualism and compassion is not a novel feature of American culture. Writing in the 19th century, Tocqueville (1990) commented on the spirit of compassion in the United States. He observed that Americans were quite willing to offer assistance to those in need, in spite of their emphasis on the norm of self-reliance. Apparently, individualism and compassion were not viewed as mutually exclusive values; on the contrary, they were conceived of as complementary. Individualism pushed people to solve as many of their own problems as they could. However, if problems became too difficult to solve alone, other should give a helping hand.³

Quite apart from Tocqueville's careful observations, historical analysis also suggests that individualism and compassion coexist in the United States. As Haskell (1985a, b) has pointed out, both values grew out of a single institution: capitalism. By its very nature, capitalism requires individual freedom and self-reliance, requisites that are captured by the value of individualism. However, capitalism also requires that freedom is used responsibly – that freedom of action is associated with a sense of responsibility for the outcomes of this action. As this sense of responsibility became stronger, its scope was widened. That is, in addition to feeling responsible for oneself, people started to feel a responsibility for the plight of others. Thus, the spirit of compassion was born. In light of this analysis it comes as no surprise that Adam Smith, one of the leading philosophers of capitalism, championed both individualism and compassion. Neither is it surprising that a distinctive body of economic theory developed in the U.S. that contained a synthesis between both values

(see Spiegel 1960; also see the essays in Burlingame 1992).

There is, then, considerable evidence that the American public does not just value individualism but also compassion, or what I will call humanitarianism. However, most of this evidence remains anecdotal in nature. To date no systematic inquiries of humanitarianism exist, at least none that use representative nation-wide samples. As a consequence, we neither know how widespread humanitarianism is, nor do we know (reliably) what its implications are for a wide variety of policy-related attitudes.

The 1995 NES Pilot Study changes this situation as, for the first time, a measure of humanitarianism was administered to a representative sample of Americans. The present report discusses the performance of this measure and makes recommendations for its use in future surveys. The report addresses four questions: (1) is the humanitarianism measure reliable and internally consistent; (2) is the measure distinctive from measures of other values; (3) what are the determinants of the measure; and (4) how well can it predict policy attitudes?

THE HUMANITARIANISM ITEMS

The measure of humanitarianism that was included in the NES Pilot Study taps the importance that respondents attach to the quality of compassion in their relations with others. The measure, which I will label Humanitarianism Scale, is cognitively oriented: it captures beliefs about how people should behave toward one another. Humanitarianism is therefore best conceived of as a value, comparable to individualism or equalitarianism, although conceptually distinct (see Feldman and Steenbergen 1996).

Table 1:
Humanitarianism Items with Response Percentages – Likert Version^a

Item	1 ^b	2	3	4	5	DK	RF, NA
<i>Willingness to Help:</i>							
- One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself.	49.8	43.7	0.0	4.1	2.0	0.4	0.0
- All people who are unable to provide for their own needs should be helped by others.	39.7	42.1	0.4	14.2	2.8	0.4	0.8
- It is best not to get too involved in taking care of other people's needs.	8.5	30.4	0.4	31.2	27.9	1.6	0.0
<i>Concern for Well-Being:</i>							
- The dignity and well-being of all should be the most important concerns in any society.	51.4	34.4	0.0	9.7	4.1	0.0	0.4
- One of the problems of today's society is that people are often not kind enough to others.	67.6	27.5	0.4	2.0	2.4	0.0	0.0
- A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others.	55.5	35.6	0.0	6.5	2.0	0.4	0.0
- It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness will only be abused.	10.9	18.6	0.0	29.6	40.5	0.4	0.0
- People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should.	6.5	14.2	0.8	46.6	31.6	0.4	0.0

Notes: ^a n = 247; ^b 1 = Agree Strongly; 2 = Agree Somewhat; 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree (volunteered); 4 = Disagree Somewhat; 5 = Disagree Strongly; DK = Don't Know; RF, NA = Refusal or Not Applicable.

Humanitarianism has several qualities, as is revealed by *Webster's College Dictionary's* (1992: 654) definition of humanitarian: "having concern for or helping to improve the welfare and happiness of people." This definition suggests that humanitarianism involves both a concern for the well-being of others and a willingness to help them. The first of these components entails kindness as well as

beliefs about the importance of human well-being.

The NES Humanitarianism Scale measured both conceptual domains of humanitarianism through a series of statements, to be evaluated by respondents. Three of these statements concerned willingness to help, while the remaining statements measured concern for human well-being (see Table 1). All statements had

previously been tested with data collected in the New York metropolitan area in 1991 and were found to produce a reliable scale with high discriminant validity (see Feldman and Steenbergen 1993; Steenbergen 1994).

For purposes of the NES Pilot Study two versions of the Humanitarianism Scale were developed. In one version respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the eight statements. This Likert version of the scale was suggested in the initial proposal to the NES Pilot Study Committee. This is the version that was tested with survey data from the New York

metropolitan area.

A second version of the Humanitarianism Scale was developed on request of the Pilot Study Committee because of concerns over acquiescence bias.⁴ This version used forced choice items that pit a humanitarian response alternative against a non-humanitarian alternative, having respondents choose between them. This question format has the advantage that it makes acquiescence less likely, as respondents are forced to weight the pros and cons of one response alternative against the pros and cons of the other alternative.

Table 2:
Humanitarianism Items with Response Percentages – Forced Choice Version^a

Item ^b	Humanitarian Response	Non-Humanitarian Response	DK	RF, NA
<i>Willingness to Help:</i>				
- One, it is best not to get involved in taking care of other people’s needs; or Two, all people who are unable to provide for their own needs should be helped by others.	77.4	19.7	2.5	0.4
<i>Concern for Well-Being:</i>				
- One, one of the problems of today’s society is that people are often not kind enough to others; or Two, it is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness will only be abused.	77.8	18.8	2.1	1.3
- One, a person should always be concerned about the dignity and well-being of others; or Two, people tend to pay more attention to the dignity and well-being of others than they should.	82.4	14.2	2.1	1.3

Notes: ^a n = 239; ^b humanitarian response alternatives are printed in boldface.

Based on recommendations by Dr. Larry Bartels, the humanitarian and non-humanitarian response alternatives were taken from the original set of eight items,

producing the three items listed in Table 2. As can be seen from this table, one of the forced choice items concerns willingness to help, while the remaining items tap concern

for human well-being.

Half of the respondents (selected randomly) received the Likert version of the Humanitarianism Scale, while the remaining respondents received the forced choice version. Using this split-half procedure it was possible to prevent carry-over effects from one version of the scale to the next. This permits a “clean” analysis of the two scale versions.

Table 1 presents the Likert items and percentage of respondents endorsing each of the response alternatives: agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree (volunteered), disagree somewhat, and disagree strongly. As can be seen from this table, the responses are skewed in a humanitarian direction. This is congruent with the behavior of the scale items in my New York metropolitan sample, which showed almost identical response distributions as the Pilot Study, despite a time span of four years separating the two studies.

The results for the forced choice Humanitarianism items are displayed in Table 2. Although skewness for these items as a whole is slightly less than for the Likert items, humanitarian responses continued to dominate. Apparently, confronting respondents with a choice between compassion and the lack thereof did not produce considerations that pushed away from humanitarianism.

If we believe the results in Tables 1 and 2, then the vast majority of Americans are compassionate individuals who are concerned about others and quite eager to help them, regardless of whatever other values are espoused. The fabric of community is not unraveling, as some pessimists would have us believe. On the contrary, civic humanism is alive and well ... or is it?

There is good reason to be cautious about interpreting the response distributions for humanitarianism. It is very likely that

some portion of the humanitarian responses is due to a social desirability bias.⁵ It is inherently difficult to admit, especially in front of an unknown interviewer, that one lacks compassion and does not care too much about fellow human beings. Even if one is truly uncompassionate, there may be a strong socially induced impulse to provide a humanitarian response. In this light, providing a non-humanitarian response alternative, as the forced choice items do, may not improve skewness very much. While the presentation of an alternative may point out to respondents that compassion is not the only state of the world, it may also make them painfully aware of how cold and unpleasant the alternative to compassion is. To admit to such coldness may be a very difficult thing to do.

What are we to make, then, of these initial findings? Clearly, humanitarianism is not as widespread as Tables 1 and 2 suggest. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that the preponderance of humanitarian responses that we observe is solely caused by social desirability effects. Rather, it appears that Americans do value compassion but this appearance may be exaggerated in the NES Pilot Study data by social desirability.

RELIABILITY AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY

Having explored the overall distribution of the Humanitarianism items, we now turn to the question of whether these items constitute a reliable unidimensional scale. It turns out that much depends on the nature of the items. From a psychometric perspective, the Likert Humanitarianism items perform quite well. However, the performance of the forced choice items is rather disappointing and casts doubt on whether these items should be grouped into a single scale.

Table 3:
Scale Reliability Statistics for Likert Humanitarianism Items

Item ^a	Scale Statistics If Item is Deleted		
	Corrected Item-Total Correlation ^b	Average Inter-Item Correlation ^c	Reliability ^d
(1) One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself.	.541	.313	.761
(2) The dignity and well-being of all should be the most important concerns in any society.	.418	.333	.778
(3) One of the problems of today's society is that people are often not kind enough to others.	.445	.333	.778
(4) All people who are unable to provide for their own should be helped by others.	.268	.367	.802
(5) A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others.	.575	.300	.750
(6) It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness will only be abused.	.387	.370	.804
(7) It is best not to get too involved in taking care of other people's needs.	.528	.320	.767
(8) People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should.	.492	.347	.788
Scale:			
8-Item Scale	- Average Inter-Item Correlation - Reliability	.336 .802	n = 238
6-Item Scale ^e	- Average Inter-Item Correlation - Reliability	.407 .805	n = 240

Notes: ^a items are listed in the order in which they appeared in the survey; ^b corrected item-total correlations are polychoric correlation coefficients between an item and the total score on a scale that is based on all items except for the item under consideration; ^c average inter-item correlations are based on polychoric correlation coefficients; ^d all reliabilities are based on the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula and use the average inter-item correlations reported in column 3; ^e the 6-item scale excludes items 4 and 6.

Scale Reliability

Table 3 provides reliability information for the Likert Humanitarianism items. Most of the items show sizable corrected item-total correlations, indicating that they hang together well with a scale formed from other

items. The inter-item correlations paint a similar picture: for all eight items this correlation is .336, yielding a respectable scale reliability of .802.⁶ This reliability is better than that of many other measures of values. For example, the equalitarianism

items included in the 1994 NES Post-Election survey have an inter-item correlation of .281, yielding a (Spearman-Brown) reliability of .701.

While the 8-item Likert version of the Humanitarianism Scale has adequate reliability, I recommend using a 6-item version of the scale. As Table 3 shows, items 4 and 6 stand out from the remaining items because of their weak item-total

correlations. Elimination of these items reduces the length of the scale (always an important consideration in overcrowded surveys like the NES), while improving its quality: the average inter-item correlation is .407, yielding a scale reliability of .805. Because of the good reliability of the 6-item Humanitarianism Scale, subsequent sections will report results for this scale as well as the 8-item scale.

Table 4:
Scale Reliability Statistics for Forced Choice Humanitarianism Items

Item ^a	Scale Statistics If Item is Deleted		
	Corrected Item-Total Correlation ^b	Average Inter-Item Correlation ^c	Reliability ^d
(1) One, it is best not to get too involved in taking care of other people's needs; or Two, all people who are unable to provide for their own should be helped by others.	.140	.345	.513
(2) One, one of the problems of today's society is that people are often not kind enough to others; or Two, it is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness will only be abused.	.353	-.018	-.004
(3) One, a person should always be concerned about the dignity and well-being of others; or Two, people tend to pay more attention to the dignity and well-being of others than they should.	.215	.249	.399
Scale:	- Average Inter-Item Correlation	.190	n = 223
	- Reliability	.413	

Notes: ^a items are listed in the order in which they appeared in the survey; ^b corrected item-total correlations are polychoric correlation coefficients between an item and the total score on a scale that is based on all items except for the item under consideration; ^c average inter-item correlations are based on polychoric correlation coefficients; ^d all reliabilities are based on the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula and use the average inter-item correlations reported in column 3.

If the performance of the Likert Humanitarianism items appears good, the performance of the forced choice items is a different story. As Table 4 shows, the average correlation for the three forced

choice items is only .190, yielding an unacceptably low reliability of .413. Further exploration of the table reveals that this reliability is almost entirely due to item 2. Without this item the entire scale would fall

apart, giving rise to a negative reliability coefficient. This suggests that we might as well just use the second forced choice item, because the remaining items do little to strengthen the scale (item 1 even detracts from it).

What is particularly bothersome about the forced choice items is that there seems to be a division between the two conceptual components of humanitarianism, willingness to help and concern for well-being. The worst item concerns willingness to help; in fact, by dropping this item the reliability for the remaining two items can be boosted to .513. Thus it appears that the forced choice items perform better in measuring concern for the well-being of others than in measuring willingness to help. However, even in measuring concern for well-being the forced choice items are at best mediocre (especially in comparison with the Likert items).

It is perhaps worthwhile to speculate a little about possible causes of the breakdown of the forced choice items. The problem may be that the internal consistency of forced choice items hinges on more factors than is the case with Likert items. Internal consistency of the latter type of items depends on conceptual congruence of the statements presented to respondents. Internal consistency of forced choice items does not only depend on conceptual congruence, it also requires that the trade-offs presented in the items are compatible. That is, for forced choice items to be internally consistent they have to present trade-offs that are similar in nature.

In hindsight, it may be that the trade-offs presented by the forced choice humanitarianism items is not similar enough. For example, the trade-off presented by item 1 concerns the needs of others and how much one should get involved into catering to those needs. By contrast, the other two items do not trade-off personal involvement; they are more concerned with the negative repercussions

of humanitarianism (item 2) and the normative value of caring for the well-being of others (item 3). If these speculations are correct than one's ability to ensure internally consistent (i.e., reliable) forced choice items clearly depends on the similarity of trade-offs that are presented. It is perhaps useful to investigate this in future research.

The conclusion that I draw from the reliability results is that the forced choice Humanitarianism items are not a good alternative to the Likert items. Thus, I advise against the use of a forced choice Humanitarianism Scale. If one wants to use this scale it should consist of just items 2 and 3. However, even in this case the scale reliability remains low (at .513). This compares rather poorly with the Likert items, which appear to produce a less noisy scale for humanitarianism. Moreover, this scale is not contingent on the "exceptional" performance of one item, whereas the performance of a scale based on the forced choice items is.

Factor Analysis

Further evidence concerning the psychometric qualities of the two versions of the Humanitarianism Scale can be obtained through confirmatory factor analysis. This methodology is particularly useful for determining internal consistency, i.e., the extent to which items measure the same construct. If we find that items load on a single factor with reasonably sized loadings, this is evidence that the items are internally consistent.

We will explore internal consistency first for the Likert version of the Humanitarianism Scale. For this version I estimated three alternative factor models. The first of these models is a one factor model, which would normally be the model of choice if internal consistency of the scale items is assumed. However, for the NES Pilot Study data this model is not very plausible. The Likert Humanitarianism items were presented to respondents in two

distinct clusters: a cluster of five items (1 through 5) that are worded in a humanitarian direction and a cluster of three items (6 through 8) which are based on non-humanitarian statements. Given this structure it is conceivable that a two factor model with one factor per cluster will fit the data better. This model does not necessarily invalidate the internal consistency of the Likert items, provided that the two factors are not orthogonal.

The clustering of Humanitarianism items can also be addressed through a three factor model, which in a sense is a hybrid specification of the first two factor models. The three factor model postulates that all Humanitarianism items load on a single conceptual factor (or trait). However, two additional factors are specified in order to capture the different formats of the items. One of these factors subsumes all items that are worded in a humanitarian direction, while the other factor captures the items worded in a non-humanitarian direction. We could conceive of these factors as “methods” factors. Equality constraints are imposed on the effects of each method factor, as is customarily done in this kind of factor model. Another constraint is imposed on the factor-intercorrelations: the three factors are considered to be orthogonal.

All three factor models were estimated using LISREL 8.⁷ Because of the non-nested nature of the models it is hard to compare their fit to the data. The best one can do is to use Fornell and Rust’s (1989) pseudo-Bayesian model comparison approach, which gives the posterior probability for a set of models given the data and prior probabilities. In this case, I set the prior probability for the one factor model to .2, whereas the two and three factor models received prior probabilities of .4. This captures my conjecture that a single factor model may not be very plausible for the Pilot Study data.⁸

Table 5:
Comparison of Factor Models

Model	χ^2	df	<i>p</i>	posterior prob.
1 Factor	60.78	20	.000	.000
2 Factor	28.15	19	.081	.211
3 Factor	23.51	18	.170	.789

Table 5 presents the test statistics and posterior probabilities for the three factor models. As this table indicates, the two and three factor models both fit the data ($p > .05$). However, the posterior probability for the three factor model is the highest, making this the model of choice. The factor loadings for this model are given in Table 6.

Table 6:
Three Factor Model for Likert Items^a

Item	Humanit.	Method 1	Method 2
1	-.55**	.55**	
2	-.45**	.55**	
3	-.49**	.55**	
4	-.20 ⁺	.55**	
5	-.62**	.55**	
6	.43**		.54**
7	.71**		.54**
8	.44**		.54**

Notes: ⁺ $p < .10$; ^{**} $p < .01$.
^a Loadings are standardized.

As Table 6 shows, the effect of the two “methods” factors is quite large, at times overpowering the loadings on the substantive factor. Nonetheless, all items load significantly on the substantive factor, indicating that there is internal consistency.⁹ The table also shows that the weakest loadings on the substantive factor occur for

items 4 and 6 (after controlling for “methods” effects). This reinforces my earlier conclusion that these items can be safely removed. The resulting subset of items fits a two factor model ($\chi^2 = 11.25$, $df = 8$, $p = .19$).¹⁰ The factor-intercorrelation for this model is $-.58$ ($p < .01$).

The results so far indicate internal consistency for the Likert Humanitarianism items. The next question is how the forced choice items behave. With only three items only a limited number of models can be specified. An unconstrained one factor model is one of these models (it would have 0 degrees of freedom) but estimation for this model failed due to a lack of convergence of the algorithm. This often implies that a model does not fit the data.

An alternative model placed equality constraints on the factor loadings, turning it effectively into a parallel test model. This model fits the data ($\chi^2 = 4.27$, $df = 2$, $p = .12$) but the factor loadings are very low (.48). This implies item reliabilities of only .23, which are not acceptable.

These results strengthen the conclusion I drew earlier, namely that the forced choice version of the Humanitarianism Scale performs below standard. The low factor loadings obtained for this scale suggest low internal consistency, just like the disappointing reliability did. At best, the forced choice Humanitarianism Scale is a very noisy scale. However, it is probably safer to say that it is not a scale at all.

DISTINCTIVENESS OF HUMANITARIANISM

The discussion so far has demonstrated that it is indeed possible to form a scale with the Likert version of the Humanitarianism items. The next question is whether this scale is distinct from other scales and items that are used in political behavior. In other

words, how much novel information does the Humanitarianism Scale contain?

The Pilot Study data provide us only with a limited opportunity to explore this question, as very few value measures were included in either the Pilot Study or the 1994 Post-Election survey. Nevertheless, certain key variables were included, allowing me to draw some conclusions about the Humanitarianism Scale. In what follows I will mainly focus on the Likert version of the scale, as this appears to be the best measure of humanitarianism.

A first issue that needs to be explored is the relationship between humanitarianism and equalitarianism. Past discussions of humanitarianism have sometimes grouped this value in the same category or scale as equalitarianism, implying a homogenous value cluster (Katz and Hass 1988). If we agree with this conceptualization we should expect that humanitarians also value equality and that those striving for equality are also compassionate. In the extreme, humanitarians cannot be distinguished from equalitarians and the whole distinction between the values of compassion and equality becomes void. If this is true we should obviously not bother with measuring humanitarianism and stick with the NES equalitarianism items.

Elsewhere I have provided extensive theoretical arguments for why we should not expect a redundancy between humanitarianism and equalitarianism (Feldman and Steenbergen 1993, 1996; Steenbergen 1994). To summarize these arguments, humanitarianism is a definition of oneself in relation to others, whereas equalitarianism is a definition of an ideal distribution of resources which can be formulated regardless of how a person views him or herself in society (to paraphrase Lane [1973]). I will return to the implications of this distinction when we consider the predictive validity of the Humanitarianism Scale.

Empirically, humanitarianism and equalitarianism appear to be distinct as well. In my New York metropolitan area sample the Pearson product-moment correlation between both values was only .23 (Feldman and Steenbergen 1993), illustrating their non-redundancy.

The NES Pilot Study data also suggest that humanitarianism, as measured by the Likert version of the Humanitarianism Scale, is distinct from equalitarianism: the Pearson product-moment correlation is only .208 ($p < .01$) for the 8-item version and .221 ($p < .01$) for the 6-item version.¹¹ Even with a correction for attenuation, the upper bound on the correlation between humanitarianism and equalitarianism would be .277 for the 8-item version of the Humanitarianism Scale and .294 for the 6-item version. Neither correlation suggests a strong overlap between humanitarianism and equalitarianism.

How about the relationship between humanitarianism and other predispositions? If we look at the relationship between humanitarianism and party identification we find that the polyserial correlation is -.137 ($p < .10$) for the 8-item version of the Humanitarianism Scale and -.147 ($p < .10$) for the 6-item version.¹² The polyserial correlations with ideology are -.195 ($p < .05$) and -.218 ($p < .01$), respectively for the 8 and 6-item scale. Thus, Republicans and conservatives tend to score lower on the Humanitarianism Scale than Democrats and liberals. However, again the correlations are too small to suggest redundancy between humanitarianism and party identification or ideology.

In conclusion, the Humanitarianism Scale is distinct from several other core political predispositions. Indeed, the correlational patterns found here are remarkably similar to those found in my New York metropolitan area sample. This is reassuring in two ways. First, there appears to be a certain measure of stability in how

humanitarianism correlates with other predispositions. Second, the correlation is such that it is feasible, in fact desirable, to distinguish humanitarianism from those predispositions.¹³

CORRELATES OF HUMANITARIANISM

Who are the humanitarians in this country? The answer to this question is important in two ways. First, it can help us understand where humanitarianism comes from. Second, an explanation of humanitarianism that is theoretically compelling may bolster our confidence in both the construct of and the measurement instrumentation for humanitarianism.

Table 7 displays results from regressions on the 8 and 6-item versions of the Humanitarianism Scale. These regressions include mainly demographic predictors, although I also included party identification and ideology. This minimal specification of the regression analyses prevents confusion over the exact causal order between humanitarianism and its predictors: none of the predictors (with the possible exception of party identification and ideology) can be plausibly viewed as outcomes of humanitarianism.

As Table 7 shows, only two predictors are statistically significant (at the .10 level, 2-sided): church attendance and PID. Those who attend church score higher on the Humanitarianism Scale than those who do not. Further, the more a person identifies with the Republican party, the lower the Humanitarianism score tends to be. (This is a reflection, perhaps, of the current policy platform of the Republican party.)

Table 7
Predictors of Humanitarianism^a

Predictor ^b	8-Item	6-Item
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	Scale	Scale
Male	-1.14	-.97
White	2.38	1.64
Income	2.38	2.06
Education	2.37	.55
Age	-.54	-.01
Attends Church	2.05*	1.79**
Liberal	.62	.91
Conservative	-.92	-.79
PID	-2.48 ⁺	-2.01 ⁺
Constant	28.31**	22.36**
n	177	178
adj. R ²	.054	.070
s.e.	5.01	3.88

Notes: ⁺ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

^a Table entries are unstandardized OLS estimates; ^b all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

Several other predictors are close to achieving statistical significance. For the 8-item Humanitarianism both race and gender are significant at the .15 level. The effect of gender is congruent with Gilligan's (1982) claim that women place greater emphasis on caring and compassion than men. The effect of race is harder to explain, although one could speculate that African-Americans have hardened under the harsh realities of what many of them perceive to be a racist society. However, it should be pointed out that race comes close to achieving statistical significance only for the 8-item Humanitarianism Scale. Gender exerts a close to significant effect in both versions of our measure of humanitarianism.

The emphasis on demographics in Table 7 does not imply that other factors are unimportant in shaping people's level of humanitarianism. However, the direction of causality may be harder to establish for these factors and a regression framework may not be the best to determine their relationship with the Humanitarianism items.

One such factor may be media

exposure. Compassion fatigue and the denial that compassion is a virtue are particularly prevalent among conservative media elites, in particular on talk radio. Media personalities like Rush Limbaugh have been quite adamant in ridiculing the ethic of caring or, what they consider, liberal softness. We would expect, then, that people who listen to Limbaugh's talk show (or other conservative shows) may score lower on humanitarianism than those who do not listen.¹⁴

This expectation is borne out by the data. Although the sample size is small ($n = 66$), the biserial correlation (calculated in LISCOMP) between the 8-item version of the Humanitarianism Scale and a dichotomous measure of whether a respondent listens to Limbaugh is $-.361$ ($p < .10$). For the 6-item Humanitarianism Scale the biserial correlation is $-.422$ ($p < .05$). These correlations are among the highest we can find for humanitarianism.

Another possible correlate of humanitarianism may be religious beliefs. The regression results in Table 7 already indicate that religion, in the form of church attendance, matters for humanitarianism. Can we say more about the nature of people's beliefs that makes religion relevant for humanitarianism?

Again, the data are limited and hence I can only offer tentative suggestions. However, the 1994 NES post-election survey contained an item measuring whether people view the Bible as the actual word of God or as a product of man that just contains an interpretation of the word of God. The polyserial correlation of the 8-item Humanitarianism Scale with this question is $.212$ ($p < .01$); it is $.226$ ($p < .01$) for the 6-item Scale. Apparently, humanitarianism goes along with a rather literal interpretation of the Bible. This connection is understandable because the Bible contains many references to compassion. At the same time, one wonders if the religious underpinnings of humanitarianism may not

render the effect of this value contingent on whether targets of compassion comply with Biblical norms. (For example, would compassion be forthcoming to homosexuals suffering from AIDS, as opposed to other AIDS sufferers?) This is an important question for future research (although we should keep in mind that the correlation with Biblical interpretation is not so overpowering that humanitarians almost by definition interpret the Bible literally).

All in all the results concerning the correlates of humanitarianism are intriguing. We have seen that several factors may account for humanitarianism, including religion, partisanship and (depending on one's view of the effect of media) exposure to conservative talk radio. However, perhaps almost as intriguing is what does not account for humanitarianism. Major schisms in society such as income, education, age, ideology and even race, seem to have no or almost no effect on humanitarianism. This result undoubtedly should be attributed in part to the skewness of the Humanitarianism Scale. However, the lack of significant predictors of humanitarianism also reflects an important aspect of this value: humanitarianism is widely shared. It is not a value of socioeconomic or racial elites. It is not the prerogative of certain ideological factions. Quite the contrary, in many respects humanitarianism appears to be almost consensual, as we would expect if this value is truly part and parcel of American political culture.¹⁵

HUMANITARIANISM AS A PREDICTOR

It is now time to consider the predictive validity of the Humanitarianism Scale. At stake is whether humanitarianism can help us account for a variety of policy attitudes. In other words, what is the utility of humanitarianism in understanding public opinion?

I will answer this question by

focusing on three distinct policy domains: social welfare policy; criminal justice; and foreign aid. In each of these domains we can develop clear hypotheses concerning the effect of humanitarianism that should be expected. The extent to which the Humanitarianism Scale conforms to these hypotheses helps us determine how much confidence we can have in this measure.

Social Welfare Policy

My previous work on humanitarianism focused on people's attitudes toward social welfare policies. Humanitarianism has been a powerful motivation for poverty relief since the Roman empire (Hands 1968) and we might expect this to be the case for social welfare policies as well. Of course, many policies of the modern welfare state go much beyond poverty relief and extend into the sphere of economic regulation and redistribution. We should not expect that all of these socioeconomic responsibilities of the government are motivated by humanitarianism or even justified in terms of this value. However, as far as basic safety net measures like Social Security and public assistance are concerned, we should find particularly strong support for them among humanitarians. Prior evidence from my New York metropolitan area sample lends support to this expectation (Feldman and Steenbergen 1993; Steenbergen 1994).

To assess the effect of humanitarianism on attitudes toward social welfare policies I considered three sets of dependent variables: (1) support for the principle of welfare; (2) support for spending on social welfare policies; and (3) attitudes toward proposals for welfare reform.

In addition to these policy measures, I also explored the effect of humanitarianism on feelings toward the target groups of poverty relief. Because humanitarianism is about compassion in one's relation to others, feelings toward those others should be explainable in terms of humanitarianism.

Thus, if a humanitarianism measure bears no relationship on feelings at all, this should caution us about the measure. Because a relationship with group affect seems to be a minimal requirement for a valid humanitarianism measure I will consider this relationship first.

Feeling Thermometers

Table 8 reports the results of regression analyses on feeling thermometers for people on welfare and the poor. The analyses consider the effects of humanitarianism, equalitarianism, ideology, party identification and a range of demographic control variables (gender, race, income, education and age). Amidst these controls, we should expect humanitarianism to have a strong positive effect, promoting warm feelings toward the poor and people on welfare.

As the results indicate, this expectation finds support in the data. Both versions of the Humanitarianism Scale have strong (and statistically significant) positive effects on feelings toward the poor and people on welfare. Indeed, the effect from humanitarianism is stronger than the effect of any other predictor. All else being equal, humanitarianism can make the difference between feeling negatively and feeling neutrally in the case of feelings toward people on welfare. In the case of the poor, humanitarianism can make the difference between feeling neutral or warm.

It is also important to point out that humanitarianism is the only predictor that performs strongly for both feeling thermometers, showing remarkably similar effects for each. This suggests that humanitarianism is more consistently associated with warm feelings toward those in need than other predispositions such as equalitarianism.

These regression results are reassuring. If humanitarians are indeed compassionate fellows they should feel warmly toward those in need. This is what

we find in the NES Pilot Study using the Likert version of the Humanitarianism Scale. Therefore, the scale behaves as we would expect.

Apart from validating the Humanitarianism Scale, the regressions on feeling thermometers are interesting in their own right. Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock (1991) have argued that people may evaluate policies on the basis of affect toward the target groups of those policies. If this theory about the “likability heuristic” is true, it becomes very important to explain where group affect comes from. In the context of social welfare policies we have now found one such explanation: humanitarianism.

Support for Welfare Principles

To what extent does humanitarianism generate support for basic principles that underlie the welfare state? If compassion characterizes humanitarians we should find that they want to help the poor. In as far as the welfare state is viewed as a collective attempt at poverty relief, we may therefore expect strong support among humanitarians for the principle of public assistance.

To test this hypothesis I analyzed responses to the following choice question:

Some people say the government should make sure that everyone who needs welfare payments gets them, even if some people abuse the system. Others say the government should make sure there is no abuse of welfare, even if that means that some people who truly need help don't get it. Which is closer to your view – that the government should make sure that everyone who needs welfare payments gets them or that the government should make sure there is no abuse of welfare?

Responses to this question were coded as: 0 = government should make sure that there is no abuse of welfare; and 1 = government should make sure that everyone who needs

welfare payments receives them. Our hypothesis is that higher scores on the

Humanitarianism Scale increase the odds of a response in category 1 as opposed to 0.¹⁶

Table 8:
Feeling Thermometers for People on Welfare and the Poor^a

Predictor ^b	People on Welfare		Poor People	
	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale
Humanitarianism	36.45**	37.86**	31.87**	33.38**
Equalitarianism	12.24	12.89	28.02**	27.21**
PID	-5.60	-5.28	1.97	1.95
Liberal	2.68	2.13	4.08	3.50
Conservative	2.52	2.79	8.81*	8.66*
Age	-1.70	-1.94	17.19**	16.21**
Male	8.59*	8.65*	.47	.90
White	-7.86	-7.53	-6.78	-6.74
Income	-5.48	-6.10	-2.73	-3.67
Education	3.11	4.20	-32.79**	-31.28**
Constant	13.00	10.50	47.77**	46.24**
n	167	168	172	173
adj. R ²	.088	.097	.210	.218
s.e.	21.38	21.21	17.52	17.39

Notes: + $p < .10$; ** $p < .01$.

^a Table entries are unstandardized OLS estimates; ^b all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

Table 9 shows the results of a logistic regression of the abuse question. As this table shows, the coefficient of the 8-item Humanitarianism Scale is quite large and in the correct direction: higher scores on humanitarianism make endorsement of welfare despite abuse more likely (although only slightly). The coefficient for the 6-item scale is also sizable, although not as large. These coefficients are obtained while a large number of control variables is included in the model. This includes equalitarianism, a predictor that has often been used in explaining public opinion toward social welfare policies.

Support for Welfare Despite Abuse^a

Predictor ^b	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale
Humanitarianism	1.39	.81
Equalitarianism	1.66	1.82 ⁺
PID	-.24	-.22
Liberal	-.50	-.51
Conservative	-.28	-.23
Waste	.05	-.03
Age	.79	.91
Male	.13	.07
White	.28	.32
Income	-.34	-.25
Education	1.86	1.90
Constant	-4.75*	-4.51*
n	171	172

Table 9:

χ^2	8.97	8.37
df	11	11
<i>p</i>	.63	.68
% correct	74.85	74.42

Notes: ⁺ *p* < .10; ^{*} *p* < .05.

^a Table entries are unstandardized maximum likelihood logit estimates; ^b all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

Of course, contemporary concern over welfare abuse is such that very few respondents favor welfare payments despite abuse. Although humanitarians are more likely to hold this view than non-humanitarians, the effect is relatively small. For example, setting all other continuous predictors to their means, race to 1 (white), waste to 0 (not very much or some waste) and ideology to moderate (liberal and conservative are both 0), a change in the 8-item Humanitarianism Scale of one unit increases the likelihood of supporting welfare from .12 to .35 for women and from .13 to .38 for men. For the 6-item scale the effect is even smaller: an increase in probability from .19 to .34 for women and from .20 to .36 for men. Of course, the other predictors (with the exception of equalitarianism) tend to produce even smaller changes in the probability of supporting welfare payments. Thus, the Humanitarianism Scale stands out positively.

It should be noted that neither the 8 nor 6-item version of the Humanitarianism Scale achieves statistical significance. Although this should normally be considered a problem, it is no great cause of worry in the present case. The logit models reported in Table 8 are probably overloaded with control variables, bringing the ratio of observations to predictors down to about 17:1. Under these circumstances it will be quite difficult to achieve statistical significance in a logit analysis, even if

predictors have large coefficients. Therefore, it seems appropriate to downplay the issue of statistical significance and to place greater emphasis on the size and the direction of the coefficients.

I also conducted an analysis of responses to the following question:

Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

The responses to this question were coded 1 (government should just let each person get ahead on their own) through 7 (government should see to it that everyone has a job and a good standard of living).

The relevance of humanitarianism for this question stems primarily from the lower end of the scale. Compassion does not necessarily imply support for government guaranteed jobs and a good standard of living (see Steenbergen 1994). However, it does imply that people are not just left to their own devices, for this would mean that economic hardships are carried solely by those who suffer them. Given a choice between unabated self-reliance and welfare policies that go beyond the safety net, as is the case with government guarantees for jobs and a good standard of living, we would expect humanitarians to prefer the latter.

Table 10:
Support for Government Guaranteed Jobs and a Good Standard of Living^a

Predictor ^b	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale
Humanitarianism	1.30 ⁺	1.78 [*]
Equalitarianism	2.63 ^{**}	2.51 ^{**}
PID	-.65	-.65

Liberal	.26	.22
Conservative	-.07	-.10
Age	.13	.03
Male	-.13	-.07
White	-.40	-.44
Income	-.24	-.34
Education	-1.47	-1.39
Constant	2.93*	2.67*
n	165	166
adj. R ²	.208	.218
s.e.	1.52	1.51

Notes: ⁺ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

^a Table entries are unstandardized OLS estimates; ^b all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

This prediction is borne out by the data. As Table 10 shows, the 8 and 6-item versions of the Humanitarianism Scale have statistically significant and strong positive coefficients, second only to the effect of equalitarianism.¹⁷

Support for Social Spending

If humanitarianism generates support for the basic principles underlying a safety net-type welfare state, we would expect it to also produce support for social welfare spending. It is important to point out that such an effect would not necessarily be tautological. To be sure, social spending may be considered a form of helping, which is a key component of humanitarianism. However, social spending takes the act of compassion out of the private sphere of charity, putting it squarely in the public domain. Not all humanitarians may approve of this shift in responsibility for poverty relief. On the contrary, conservatives have since long argued that opposition to the welfare state does not mean a lack of compassion. The question is whether humanitarians see opposition to welfare spending as compatible with their values. Having seen that they endorse basic principles of the welfare state, this does not seem likely.

I explored the effect of humanitarianism on support for social spending in three domains: Social Security; welfare; and foodstamps. In each domain respondents were asked whether federal spending should be increased, decreased, or kept at the same level. In the analysis the “increase” and “keep the same” responses were grouped together and coded 1, whereas the “decrease” response was coded 0. Thus, the logit analyses predict the probability of a person favoring at least the same level of spending on a particular program (as opposed to decreasing spending).

Table 11 gives the results for spending on Social Security. It appears that there is a strong (and statistically significant) effect of humanitarianism that is surpassed in magnitude only by the effects of education and age. This result holds true regardless of whether the 8 or 6-item version of the Humanitarianism Scale is considered.

Table 11:
Support for Spending on Social Security^a

Predictor ^b	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale
Humanitarianism	6.97*	8.05*
Equalitarianism	2.36	2.86
PID	1.32	1.55
Liberal	.50	.37
Conservative	-.60	-.59
Waste	.71	.60
Age	13.84**	14.20**
Male	-1.72	-1.78
White	3.34*	3.68*
Income	-3.55	-3.54
Education	-15.40*	-14.15*
Constant	5.37	2.71
n	169	170
χ^2	45.25	47.27
df	11	11
p	.00	.00
% correct	94.08	95.29

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

^a Table entries are unstandardized maximum likelihood logit estimates; ^b all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

We can get a better impression of the effect of humanitarianism by calculating changes in the probability of support for Social Security spending that are due to changes in the level of humanitarianism. Setting all other continuous predictors to their mean values, liberal, conservative and waste to 0 and considering white respondents only (white = 1), we find that an increase of one unit on the 8-item Humanitarianism Scale increases the probability of supporting spending for Social Security from .93 to 1.00 (rounded) for women and from .70 to 1.00 (rounded) for men. For the 6-item scale a one unit change increases the probability of support for Social Security spending from .86 to 1.00 (rounded) for women and from .50 to 1.00 (rounded) for men. Thus, the impact of humanitarianism is considerable.

Humanitarianism also exerts a strong effect on support for welfare spending. While this effect is not statistically significant for either version of the Humanitarianism Scale,¹⁸ it is sizable. Indeed, only income has a larger coefficient than the 8-item scale, while the 6-item scale has the largest coefficient (see Table 12).

Table 12:
Support for Welfare Spending^a

Predictor ^b	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale
Humanitarianism	1.39	1.52
Equalitarianism	1.15	1.10
PID	-1.23*	-1.23*
Liberal	.08	.05
Conservative	-.50	-.52
Waste	-.66	-.64
Age	.16	.09

Male	.47	.50
White	.12	.11
Income	-1.41 ⁺	-1.47 ⁺
Education	.78	.85
Constant	-1.05	-1.13
n	172	173
χ^2	30.02	30.63
df	11	11
p	.00	.00
% correct	71.51	69.94

Notes: ⁺ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$.

^a Table entries are unstandardized maximum likelihood logit estimates; ^b all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

The magnitude of the humanitarianism effect becomes once again apparent when we calculate the change in probability of favoring welfare spending under a unit change of the Humanitarianism Scale. Using the same values for the other predictors as I used in previous probability calculations, we find that a one unit increase on the 8-item Humanitarianism Scale increases the probability of support for welfare spending from .27 to .59 for women and from .37 to .70 for men. For the 6-item scale the probability increase is from .24 to .59 for women and from .34 to .71 for men. Again, these effects are substantial and show the importance of humanitarianism for attitudes toward social welfare spending.

Table 13:
Support for Spending on Foodstamps^a

Predictor ^b	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale
Humanitarianism	.39	.88
Equalitarianism	2.12*	2.12*
PID	-.34	-.29
Liberal	.06	.05
Conservative	-.62	-.58

Waste	-.24	-.34
Age	.35	.43
Male	.97**	.95**
White	-.41	-.43
Income	-.85	-.85
Education	.95	.95
Constant	-1.47	-1.81
n	171	172
χ^2	25.89	25.87
df	11	11
p	.01	.01
% correct	61.40	62.21

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

^a Table entries are unstandardized maximum likelihood logit estimates; ^b all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

Finally, let us consider support for spending on foodstamps. As Table 13 indicates, the coefficients for the 6 and, in particular, 8-item versions of the Humanitarianism Scale are not very big for this dependent variable. Most of the action appears to be in equalitarianism and income, both of which have strong coefficients. Nonetheless, humanitarianism can still induce some movement in the probability of supporting spending on foodstamps: from .40 to .50 for women and from .64 to .72 for men for a one unit change in the 8-item Humanitarianism Scale, and from .33 to .54 for women and from .56 to .76 for men for a one unit change in the 6-item scale. While not as impressive as the earlier effects, these shifts in probability are still worth considering.

In conclusion, the results indicate that humanitarianism promotes support for spending on Social Security and welfare and, to a lesser extent, also on foodstamps. These programs are classical examples of safety net welfare policies and it is here that we should expect the greatest effect of

humanitarianism. That we found such strong effects, then, reassures us that the Humanitarianism Scale behaves as it should.

Support for Welfare Reform

Let us now consider the effect of humanitarianism on support for some recent proposals for welfare reform. If humanitarianism causes people to endorse social welfare programs, as we have seen, does it at the same time prevent support for far-reaching welfare reforms that could severely limit access to those programs?

The 1994 Post-Election survey contained two questions about welfare reform that allow us to explore the effect of humanitarianism. The first of these questions asked whether women on welfare should be denied additional benefits if they have another child. The second question asked whether a two-year limit on welfare benefits should be imposed. In both cases the prediction is that compassionate individuals oppose the proposal for welfare reform. This opposition was coded 1, while support for welfare reform was coded 0.

Table 14:
Opposition to Denying Women Additional Welfare Benefits^a

Predictor ^b	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale
Humanitarianism	5.87*	5.66*
Equalitarianism	.11	.31
PID	.05	.13
Liberal	-.12	-.24
Conservative	-1.52*	-1.60*
Waste	-.53	-.44
Age	-1.52	-1.52
Male	.03	.03
White	.26	.36
Income	-1.25	-1.48
Education	-.88	-.82
Constant	-3.49	-3.57
n	111	112

χ^2	18.86	18.75
df	11	11
<i>p</i>	.06	.07
% correct	82.88	83.93

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.
^a Table entries are unstandardized maximum likelihood logit estimates; ^b all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

As Table 14 shows, both versions of the Humanitarianism Scale increase the likelihood of opposition to a proposal that denies additional benefits to mothers on welfare when they have another child. This effect is quite strong: a one unit increase in the 8-item Humanitarianism Scale increases the likelihood of opposition from .01 to .65 for women and from .01 to .66 for men, while a one unit increase in the 6-item Humanitarianism Scale increases the likelihood of opposition from .01 to .62 for women and from .01 to .63 for men (the coding of the other predictors is as before).

Table 15:
Opposition to a Two-Year Restriction on Welfare Benefits^a

Predictor ^b	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale
Humanitarianism	3.66*	4.12*
Equalitarianism	1.01	.95
PID	-.24	-.20
Liberal	-1.27*	-1.37*
Conservative	-1.61**	-1.63**
Waste	-.12	-.10
Age	-.02	-.10
Male	2.50**	2.53**
White	.40	.39
Income	-3.05**	-3.15**
Education	-.65	-.47
Constant	-2.87	-3.32
n	173	174

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Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.
^a Table entries are unstandardized maximum likelihood logit estimates; ^b all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

Similar results are obtained for opposition to a two-year limit on welfare benefits (see Table 15). Humanitarianism makes opposition to this plan more likely and this effect is again strong. A one unit increase in the 8-item version of the Humanitarianism Scale produces an increase in the probability of opposition from .01 to .36 for women and from .14 to .86 for men (coding the other predictors as before). The corresponding changes in probability for the 6-item Humanitarianism Scale are: .01 to .36 for women; .10 to .88 for men.

The bottom line of these results is that humanitarians appear to be very suspicious of proposals for welfare reform. It may well be that humanitarians would like some form of welfare reform, but it is clearly not the kind of reform that is tapped by the NES questions. It seems that humanitarians are opposed to any type of welfare reform that limits access of people to benefits. This finding comes as no surprise: compassionate individuals should be worried about proposals that may aggravate the condition of those who are already in need.

Conclusions

On theoretical grounds one would expect humanitarians to be favorably disposed to the welfare state, at least when the latter is conceived of as an instrument of poverty relief. Compassion should make humanitarians sympathetic to the plight of the poor and should provide a powerful

motivation for providing assistance. Although such assistance could be organized both privately (through charity) and publicly (through public policies), the latter option is probably more effective and less arbitrary (Goodin 1985) in mass societies like the United States. Thus, we should expect humanitarianism to increase support for social welfare policies.

The findings that I have reported lend strong support to these expectations, reassuring the predictive validity of the Humanitarianism Scale. We have seen that humanitarianism is associated with warm feelings toward those in need (people on welfare and the poor). We have also seen that humanitarianism is associated with favorable attitudes toward social spending and a general endorsement of the basic principle that people in need should be helped through public policies. Finally, we have seen that humanitarianism tends to be associated with suspicion of proposals that seek to reform the welfare system drastically, perhaps at the expense of those who truly need welfare.

These results pertain to the Likert version of the Humanitarianism Scale only. When the forced choice version of this scale is used as a predictor the effects of humanitarianism appear considerably weaker, in some cases vanishing altogether. This is to be expected given the noisy nature of the forced choice humanitarianism items. However, it is important to note that on the whole similar conclusions can be drawn from the forced choice items. This makes it implausible to attribute the effects reported here to the nature of the Likert items.

Policies Toward Crime

Does compassion extend beyond the domain of social welfare policy? Is it strong enough to reach even those groups for which sympathy may be hard to generate such as criminals? It is to these questions that we will turn next.

It is unlikely that humanitarians will

have as much sympathy for criminals as they have for the poor. Nonetheless, we may still expect a different approach to the problem of crime among those who score high on humanitarianism than among those who score low. The call for getting tough with criminals, which has now pervaded both political parties and probably all segments of the ideological spectrum, may not be a call that finds strong support among humanitarians. On the contrary, when given a choice we would expect humanitarians to prefer addressing the underlying causes of crime over tough sentencing of criminals. The former approach is clearly more in keeping with the compassionate nature of humanitarians.

We can evaluate this conjecture by considering the following question on the NES Pilot Study:

Some people say the best way to reduce crime is to address the social problems that cause crime, like bad schools, poverty and joblessness. Other people say the best way to reduce crime is to make sure that criminals are caught, convicted and punished. Which do you think is most important to do: address conditions that cause crime, or get tough with criminals?

Responses to this question were coded as: 1 = get tough with criminals; and 0 = address the causes of crime. Humanitarianism should have a negative effect on this dependent variable.

Table 16 reports the ML logit estimates for the crime variable. Consistent with my expectations, both versions of the Humanitarianism Scale have a sizable negative coefficient,¹⁹ greatly reducing the probability of supporting toughness with criminals. Indeed, a one unit change in the 8-item version of the Humanitarianism Scale reduces the probability of endorsing toughness on criminals from .76 to .38 for women and from .80 to .44 for men. The

corresponding changes for the 6-item Humanitarianism Scale are .76 to .43 for women and .81 to .51 for men. In both cases all continuous predictors were set to their mean value, while race was set to white and ideology to moderate.

Based on these findings, it appears that the effect of humanitarianism extends beyond the domain of poverty relief. It would probably go too far to say that humanitarians have a strong sense of compassion for criminals. However, it does appear that humanitarians' compassion is strong enough to cause uneasiness with proposals for getting tough on criminals. Toughness on criminals may be the preferred approach of many Americans, including some politician's, but it is generally not for humanitarians.²⁰

all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

Foreign Aid

A final analysis that I wish to report here concerns support for federal spending on foreign aid. Typically, Americans have not been favorably disposed toward this kind of spending, but does this also hold true for humanitarians? Does the compassion of this group extend beyond American borders into foreign territory?

It is plausible to assume that the answer to these questions is affirmative. Much of foreign aid is used to help the people of developing countries. Those people are clearly in need and their well-being can be improved through foreign aid. Humanitarians should be very sensitive to these concerns and should generally look favorably upon foreign aid. This is also suggested by Ray's (1994) finding for Western European countries that people with a sense of moral obligation are more likely to support foreign aid.

The 1994 NES Post-Election survey contained a question concerning foreign aid, asking respondents whether federal spending on this program should be increased, kept the same, or decreased. For purposes of the analysis the first two of these responses were grouped together and coded 1, while the "decrease" response was coded 0.

Table 17 displays the logit estimates for the foreign aid question. As this table shows, equalitarianism is a much stronger predictor of support for foreign aid than humanitarianism. This suggests that foreign aid may be more an issue of equal opportunity than of compassion.

Nevertheless, humanitarianism is not entirely irrelevant to the issue of foreign aid. Moving from the lowest possible to the highest possible humanitarianism score (a one unit change) increases the probability of support for foreign aid spending considerably. (In this calculation all continuous predictors are set to their mean

Table 16:
Support for Toughness on Criminals^a

Predictor ^b	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale
Humanitarianism	-1.64	-1.39
Equalitarianism	-.48	-.55
PID	.78	.78
Liberal	-.93 ⁺	-.92 ⁺
Conservative	.14	.11
Age	-1.47 ⁺	-1.51 ⁺
Male	.27	.20
White	1.14	1.23
Income	.41	.37
Education	-4.24 ^{**}	-4.25 ^{**}
Constant	3.65 [*]	3.64 [*]
n	166	167
χ^2	34.79	34.14
df	10	10
p	.00	.00
% correct	66.27	67.07

Notes: ⁺ $p < .10$; ^{*} $p < .05$; ^{**} $p < .01$.

^a Table entries are unstandardized maximum likelihood logit estimates; ^b

value, race is set to 1, and ideology and waste are set to 0.) For the 8-item version of the Humanitarianism Scale this increase is from .25 to .45 for women and from .47 to .69 for men. For the 6-item scale the increase is from .24 to .47 for women and from .46 to .70 for men.²¹ These increases are quite large, especially when we judge them in the light of strong tendencies to dislike foreign aid.

In sum, humanitarianism does not only promote willingness to help those in need in the United States, it also promotes willingness to help those in remote foreign countries. This is what we should expect. True compassion knows of no boundaries. Although it may be felt more strongly as one gets closer to home, it should not be absent when remote strangers are considered.²²

maximum likelihood logit estimates; ^b all predictors have a range from 0 to 1.

Conclusions

We have explored the role of humanitarianism in a variety of policy domains, linking it to attitudes on a wide range of policies. These policies were chosen such that one could reasonably expect a humanitarianism effect for each of them. Low and behold, this is what we have found. The 8 and 6-item versions of the Humanitarianism Scale display strong effects for most of the policy attitudes and in many cases are among the most important predictors of an issue attitude. This should greatly bolster our confidence in the scale, in particular because the findings correspond so closely to ones I reported earlier (Feldman and Steenbergen 1993; Steenbergen 1994).

Two possible caveats of the analyses should be noted. First, skeptics may point out that very few of the humanitarianism coefficients achieve statistical significance. I once again want to stress that this should be expected. The ratio of observations to predictors is very small for the kinds of analyses that have been reported here. This makes it difficult to achieve statistically significant results. The reader may verify this by noting that humanitarianism is not the only predictor that fails to achieve statistical significance: many other predictors have sizable effects, yet fail to be significant.

Rather than stressing statistical significance, it is more important to emphasize substantive significance, i.e., effect size. The Humanitarianism Scale generally has strong effects, suggesting that it is a substantively important predictor. In a larger sample it is very likely that many of these effects would achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. This would make humanitarianism an even more powerful predictor than it already is.

Table 17:
Support for Spending on Foreign Aid^a

Predictor ^b	8-Item Scale	6-Item Scale
Humanitarianism	.94	1.02
Equalitarianism	2.71**	2.76**
PID	.03	.06
Liberal	.06	.05
Conservative	-.15	-.11
Waste	-.75 ⁺	-.82*
Age	.81	.89
Male	.99**	.97**
White	-.11	-.10
Income	.01	.03
Education	3.65*	3.70*
Constant	-5.87**	-6.02**
n	172	173
χ^2	29.46	29.88
df	11	11
p	.00	.00
% correct	62.21	62.43

Notes: ⁺ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

^a Table entries are unstandardized

A second caveat concerns possible tautologies in the analyses. Skeptics may argue that the Humanitarianism Scale is so close in content or spirit to the dependent variables that it is inevitable to find humanitarianism effects. (Indeed, these skeptics may wonder why the effects are not stronger.) We have come up with a good predictor of policy attitudes but does it truly enhance our understanding of those attitudes? Are not we just demonstrating that people who want to help others are inclined to support instruments for help?

In my view, this criticism of humanitarianism is most powerful when we consider attitudes toward social welfare policies and foreign aid, domains in which the dependent variables are undeniably about assisting others. However, even here the criticism is not very powerful.²³ While an important characteristic of humanitarians is that they want to help those who are in need, it is not inevitably true that this characteristic should cause humanitarians to support public assistance policies. On the contrary, charity may be the preferred mode of assistance to humanitarians, as it has been for most of history. One could have easily come up with explanations for why humanitarianism should have a negative effect on support for social welfare policies and federally funded foreign aid. In fact, such effect precisely captures the sentiment of many conservative philanthropists. It is a sentiment that conservative politicians often allude to when they justify proposed cuts in welfare spending.

In light of the historical link between humanitarianism and private as opposed to public aid, the findings in this report seem much more surprising. The analyses are not exercises in tautological explanation, but rather explorations of how humanitarianism translates into public opinion. One may be surprised how strong of a predictor humanitarianism really is.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the results in this paper I have the following recommendations for the NES Board of Overseers.

(1) A measure of humanitarianism should be routinely included in the National Election Studies. Humanitarianism appears to be a distinct value and an important determinant of a variety of policy attitudes. Having a measure of this construct available in the NES may allow researchers to specify better models of policy attitudes, which may then be used to understand voting behavior or other forms of political action.

(2) When choosing between alternative measures of humanitarianism, the use of the current set of Likert items is preferable over the use of the current set of forced choice items. Although the latter produce a less skewed scale, their psychometric qualities are clearly problematic. In contrast, the psychometric qualities of the Likert items are quite good, making them preferable.

(3) The 6-item Likert version of the Humanitarianism Scale is preferable over the 8-item version. The psychometric qualities and predictive power of the 6-item scale are as good and sometimes better as those of the 8-item scale. Therefore, there appears to be no reason to take up additional survey space by using the 8-item scale. (On the other hand, further reduction of the number of items in the Humanitarianism Scale may be imprudent as this would reduce scale reliability.)

APPENDIX: ORIGIN AND CODING OF VARIABLES

Legend:

PO94: 1994 Post-Election Survey
PI95: 1995 Pilot Study

Dependent Variables:**- Feeling Thermometer for People on Welfare:**

V309 (PO94)
No recodes

- Feeling Thermometer for Poor:

V312 (PO94)
No recodes

- Support for Welfare despite Abuse:

V2271 (PI95)
Recodes: 1=1, 2=0

- Support for Government Guaranteed Jobs and Standard of Living:

V930 (PO94)
Recodes: 1=7, 2=6, 3=5, 4=4, 5=3, 6=2, 7=1

- Support for Spending on Social Security:

V819 (PO94)
Recodes: 1,2=1, 3=0

- Support for Welfare Spending:

V820 (PO94)
Recodes: 1,2=1, 3=0

- Support for Spending on Foodstamps:

V822 (PO94)
Recodes: 1,2=1, 3=0

- Opposition to Denying Women Additional Welfare Benefits:

V946 (PO94)
Recodes: 1=0, 5=1

- Opposition to Two-Year Restriction on Welfare:

V948 (PO94)
Recodes: 1=0, 5=1

- Support for Toughness on Criminals:

V2264 (PI95)
Recodes: 1=0, 2=1

- Support for Spending on Foreign Aid:

V818 (PO94)
Recodes: 1,2=1, 3=0

Predictors and Correlates:**- Humanitarianism (Likert):**

V2236 to V2243 (PI95)
Recodes: items V2236 to V2240 are reverse coded.

- Humanitarianism (Forced Choice):

V2244 to V2246 (PI95)
Recodes: V2244: 1=0, 2=1; V2245 and V2246: 1=1, 2=0.

- Equalitarianism:

V914 to V919 (PO94)
Recodes: items V914, V916, V919 are reverse coded.

- PID:

V2263A (PI95)
No recodes

- Liberal, Conservative:

These variables are based on V2256A (PI95). Liberal takes on the value 1 if V2256A is 1 and is 0 otherwise. Conservative takes on the value 1 if V2256A is 5 and is 0 otherwise.

- Waste:

Waste is based on V1034 (PO94). Waste takes on the value 1 if V1034 equals 5 and is 0 otherwise.

- Age:

Age is based on V1202 (PO94)

- Male:

Male is based on V1434 (PO94). Male takes on the value 1 if V1434 is equal to 1 and is 0 otherwise.

- White:

White is based on V1435 (PO94). White takes on the value 1 if V1435 is equal to 1.

- Income:

V1404 (PO94)
No recodes

- Education:

V1206 (PO94)
No recodes

- *Attends Church:*
V1123 (PO94)
Recodes: 1=1, 2=0.
- *Interpretation of Bible:*
V1047 (PO94)
Recodes: reversed coding.
- *Listening to Limbaugh on Talk Radio:*
V2333 (PI95)
No recodes

ENDNOTES

* This is a revision of the Pilot Study Report that was submitted to the NES Board of Overseers. The author wishes to thank Stanley Feldman for his valuable contributions to the larger project of which this report is a part.

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¹ For a summary of this literature see Bellah *et al.* 1985; Conover, Crewe and Searing 1991; Herzog 1986.

² An example of this denial by conservatives can routinely be found on Rush Limbaugh's talk shows. For a liberal example see Anne Roife (cited in Kozol 1995).

³ This same sentiment pervaded open-ended responses to a probe in the NES for why someone supported social welfare policies. A large number of the respondents commented that sometimes problems are too big to be solved by a single individual. In this case it was quite natural that someone should be helped by others (see Feldman and Zaller 1992).

⁴ One way to address this problem is to generate items that are worded in different directions and counterbalance them. Unfortunately, no counterbalancing was used in the Pilot Study. This has methodological implications that will be discussed later.

⁵ I should point out that previous explorations of this possibility did not turn up much. In the study

I conducted in the New York metropolitan area I spent considerable time looking for social desirability and self-monitoring effects, finding none. However, I am enough of a skeptic about the social desirability and self-monitoring scales to remain cautious about potential confounds between social desirability and humanitarianism.

⁶ Because of the categorical nature and skewness of the Humanitarianism items I refrained from using Pearson product-moment correlations, using polychoric and tetrachoric correlations instead. As a result of this scale reliabilities were calculated using the Spearman-Brown formula. The model underlying this formula is the same as for Cronbach's alpha, which is more conventionally used as a reliability measure (see Suen 1990).

⁷ The factor analyses were based on polychoric correlation coefficients and used a weighted least squares estimation procedure to insure correct estimates of the standard errors and likelihood ratio test statistic.

⁸ Lest the reader is suspicious, alternative specifications of prior probabilities have very little impact on the posterior probabilities. For example, had we considered the three models equally likely a priori, the conclusions about the performance of each model would not have changed.

⁹ The result also implies that my earlier distinction between different conceptual domains of humanitarianism is merely of heuristic value. This distinction does not appear to loom large in the minds of Americans.

¹⁰ For the six Humanitarianism items the three factor model is underidentified.

¹¹ Because of the skewness of the Humanitarianism Scale it may be more prudent to use a non-parametric correlation coefficient like Spearman's rank correlation. However, this does not drastically change the results: Spearman's rank correlation is .176 ($p < .01$) for the 8-item version of the Humanitarianism Scale and .203 ($p < .01$) for the 6-item version.

¹² Estimates of the polyserial correlations reported in this section were obtained in LISCOMP (Muthén 1988).

¹³ The forced choice version of the Humanitarianism Scale behaves very similar. However, because of its noisy nature this version displays even weaker correlations with

equalitarianism, party identification and ideology.

¹⁴ As I suggested, cause and effect may be hard to disentangle. Are people less humanitarian because they listen to Limbaugh? Or do they listen to Limbaugh because they are not humanitarian to begin with and enjoy the kind of entertainment that Limbaugh provides?

¹⁵ The usual caveat is in order: to the extent that there were social desirability effects in responding to the Humanitarianism items this may be one reason why we do not find more significant predictors.

¹⁶ It should be noted that the abuse question poses a rather strong test of the role of humanitarianism in the domain of social welfare policy. After all, even the most compassionate individual may find it difficult to endorse a policy that is abused.

¹⁷ This comes as no surprise. As I have argued elsewhere (Steenbergen 1994), equalitarianism is much more compatible with government guarantees for jobs and a good standard of living than humanitarianism. The reason is that equalitarianism generally implies support for a much more economically activist government, one that actually tinkers with the distribution of wealth. Humanitarians do not necessarily want much intrusion of the government in the economy, except for providing a basic safety net for the poor.

¹⁸ Again, I should remind the reader that it is difficult to achieve statistical significance with the Pilot Study data, because of the small sample size and the large number of predictors that is considered.

¹⁹ These coefficients become statistically significant when we reestimate the model after removing any predictors with a p-value greater than .2.

²⁰ As always, the forced choice Humanitarianism Scale is a much weaker predictor of policy preferences for crime.

²¹ In these calculations all predictors are set to their mean values except for liberal, conservative and waste, which are set to 0, and white which is set to 1.

²² Again, the forced choice Humanitarianism Scale performs much worse as a predictor of attitudes toward foreign aid than the Likert Humanitarianism Scale.

²³ Another reason why I am confident that the results are not tautological is that most dependent variables were located in the 1994 Post-Election survey, whereas the humanitarianism items were located in the 1995 Pilot Study. This makes it more difficult to find effects for humanitarianism.

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