

## Examples of Lessons Learned from ANES Data Illuminating Voter Decision-Making

**Jon A. Krosnick:** We do very much want you all to start talking. And, in fact, you're going to talk completely after we stop, but we did want to get you up to speed on what you're talking about. And, so the last presentation here that we're going to do before we go through a series of questions for you is to give you a sense of the findings that come from this work.

And we certainly don't expect, since I know a number of you really well, and I know what your professional lives are like, so we don't expect you to subscribe to all the academic journals and to read all of the new ones — not to mention, to read all of the old ones — and so there's a sense in which we as academics and the National Science Foundation in funding what we're doing struggle in our busy schedules to try to disseminate our findings to help you, but we probably don't do very well at that. We could do little nuggets better.

So, I'm a big in restaurants of smorgasbords and so I thought we would just do a little smorgasbord very quickly here of some findings. *[inaudible]* Skip is going to be an iron hand on my timing. But, I'm going to try to go very quickly through the following issues, just to give you some highlights of some of the 5,000 publications and accumulation of knowledge.

So, we'll start by talking about the causes of turnout that we've identified, and by the way, each one of these little nuggets is going to have a conclusion that we would like to suggest — I mean many conclusions, but at least one that you might say, "Oh, that's a useful thing for me; I could use that in my work." That's the goal.

Secondly, we talked about issue publics; third, about the news media impact on presidential evaluations. Fourth, I'm sure you're all familiar with the asymmetric nonlinear model; perceptions of candidate personalities; emotional reaction to candidates; derivational rationalization; ideology in the general public; online versus memory-based candidate evaluation; sociotropic voting. So, forgive me, I want you to see a lot, so I'm going to go fast. But I think the points are relatively simple.

First of all, the causes of turnout; we've been studying turnout for a long time, and this is unfortunately, unreadable, so I will read them to you, *[inaudible]*

**Frank Newport:** There's a typo in the right column.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** My favorite is the right column actually. But, so what I'm going to do is tell you about the most variance that we can explain in turnout with an implication for you in your pre-election surveys.

So right up at the top here are variables that are typically not included in likely voter models, which is to measure attitudes towards each of the competing candidates and look at how big the gap is between them and whether they're both above the neutral point or both below the neutral point. And the reason because the bigger the gap — the more you like one over another — the more likely you are to vote, but especially if one of them is below the midpoint. So, if you hate both of them, or you hate one of them, you're more likely to vote. Like, so a 15-point spread on a 100-point scale going around zero has more impact on turnout than say 70 to 85 out of 100, where they're both above.

So just think about a likely voter model. Have you ever seen one in which you ask people to rate the candidates on a "zero to 100" likely scale, or something like that, you computed a gap between them, and you looked at whether either of the candidates was below the midpoint? Probably not. It turns out it's a very powerful predictor of turnout.

In addition, we have education, external political efficacy and internal political efficacy. These are two questions that ask about how well do you think you can understand what happens in government, and therefore are prepared to talk about what to do? And secondly, how much do you think government cares about what people like you think? Those are not typically likely voter models, and they predict turnout. Then there's age and age squared, so the older people get, the more likely they are to vote, but the impact of additional years levels off after a certain point.

Blacks are less likely to vote; Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans, Southerners are less likely to vote; people who live in border states are less likely to vote. The higher the income goes up — this is a regression, by the way, so these are all separate effects. Homeowners are more likely to vote; people who have lived in the same community for more years are more likely to vote. People who more strongly identify with a political party are more likely to vote. People who have been contacted by a party, and people who say they care about the election outcome are more likely to vote. Now, think just for a second, I'll pick on the Gallup model. Are any of those questions in the Gallup likely voter model? I don't think so. And, so if we were to think just for a second — Sorry, am I wrong? *[inaudible]*

*Unidentified Speaker: "Years lived in the community" and "have you voted in this location before," it would be similar dimensions, wouldn't it?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, absolutely, and so there's a little taste there. Just imagine that you've taken the Gallup questions and adding these measures as well. Could we actually do better at identifying who will vote? It's a question, maybe We don't do that, but you could do that. And, that's a thought.

**Frank Newport:** What's the dependent variable in this analysis?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** It's actual turnout.

**Frank Newport:** Based on verified turnout, or self-reported?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Actually, it turns out that, this analysis was done three ways— once with reported turnout; secondly we validated turnout where we went to official government records and looked at those, which turns out are not always right, and then we did the analysis with only the subset of cases where the two agreed. And, you get the same results regardless.

Now, I'll just tell you, a very exciting new study that we've just done in California where we got the latest voter records. Well over 90 percent of respondents who report in our surveys agree with what the State of California says about turnout. I don't think our problem is typically people lying and saying that they've voted when they didn't; I think our problem is our samples overrepresent voters. And the challenge is how do we decide which ones of those people *[inaudible]*?

*Unidentified Speaker: When did you validate turnout? This isn't from the NES, is it?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** This is NES, sure.

*Unidentified Speaker: It's from validation?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yeah, we did validation starting in the '80s.

**Susan Pinkus:** It may not overrepresent turnout, but it may overrepresent who they voted for.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, let's set that aside, because we're not on the topic at the moment, but absolutely, telephone surveys overestimate turnout. We know that. Either weighted or unweighted, you have way more people on telephone surveys saying that they've voted after an election than actually voted —

**Susan Pinkus:** And voted for the winner.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yeah, and that's a different issue, which we won't get into today. Okay, so the conclusion is that you might consider adding some of these additional measures to likely voter models. The second issue is issue publics. You all saw *The New York Times* front-page story—very exciting to see survey research on the front page, always—talking about what is influencing primary voters' choices, and so there's been decades of work done on this question, of how do policy issues and other considerations influence voters' decisions.

And, a starting point in a sense for this work was Gabe Almond, who happened to be from Stanford, in 1950 suggested the idea that really at the top of the American public is a little slice of 15 percent of people who pay attention to the news, who have real opinions on policy issues and who use those policy issues to make vote choices. And everybody else might pretend to have policy opinions, but they don't really have them and they don't really use them.

But, instead, it seems pretty clear at this point that there is an alternative view to describe the data much better. And, the view goes like this: it has a series of premises. The cognitive burdens entailed in learning about policy issue are substantial, and people only become informed about an issue when they're motivated to do so. And that motivation is what has been called "passionate engagement."

So, in other words, you might think about when news stories talk about crime-crime-crime over and over again, that makes Americans learn about crime and become opinionated about crime, and maybe use crime in making a vote decision. The idea here is, no, actually, news stories don't do it. You have to get people passionate about the issue, in order for them to want to read and code and retain and use that information later.

And, emotional and cognitive resources are limited. People can only become deeply engaged in a small handful of issues; they can't manage a large group. And, being engaged, in some sense, is like sort of being married to the issue. It's like you get up every day, and you say, "Ooh, another day, another opportunity to influence government on abortion [*unintelligible*]."

So, that's the vision here, and so in this sense, emotion is not the enemy of reason. It's not that when people become passionate that they lose the ability to judge. It's that you have to become emotional in order to become a thoughtful judge on an issue. And this ties into Antonio Damasio's ideas you may have heard about, the idea that emotion brings wisdom; it doesn't actually compromise it.

So the way surveys, and the National Election Study, in particular, have been identifying this passion is to identify people who say, "This issue is important to me, I really care a lot about abortion." And, the idea in this theory is that people who say that want to nurture their attitude by feeding it with information and protecting it from attack, and they want to express that attitude whenever they can — in a vote choice, in a letter to a congressman, in a phone call, joining a protest on the mall and so on.

So, the idea is that there isn't merely one little attentive public at the top of the pyramid — that 15 percent — but there are lots and lots of issue publics, and this is Phil Converse's term — each issue getting its little group of people, different subsets passionate about each issue.

And, psychologists have gotten very involved in the study of this idea and have developed this model, which says there are three things that cause an issue to become important to people — either their material self-interest is at stake, like gun owners care about gun control. Or they identify with some group, let's say like the Catholic Church which tells them to care about an issue. Or they have values let's say having to do with women's rights where they say, "I think abortion is about women having freedom and control of their bodies." And that's what gets them passionate about the issue. Any of those three sources.

And, what that does is to lead people, essentially, to be selective in reading *The New York Times* and every other newspaper and television program that you can be exposed to, where they hone in just on those stories that they care about, and not just read them, but think carefully about them.

So, we all probably read like most of the paper, but we're not passionate about every single story and attentive to it. We might read the beginnings of some and not the details of others. The idea is that these folks are really reading everything, and it leads to a series of outcomes in the end that can be summarized as "real, solid, stable attitudes informed by information and influencing vote choice."

I just want to show you very quickly, that if you ask people how important are these issues to you personally over these years — this is just a subset of the ones we've looked at — this is the percent of people that put

themselves in the very top category. They say, for example, in 1980 these are people who put themselves at 100 on a scale from “zero to 100.” Those are the people who are in the issue public. It turns out that the vast majority, and you’ll see a little exception to this, but most of these folks who put themselves in the lower categories of importance don’t use the issue. You’ve got to be way at the top.

These numbers simply show you that over a period of four and three months that there is terrific stability to these importance ratings, and it’s even higher for the people in the top category. If you say you’re in the top category now, you’re there a year later and two years later.

Just in the interest of time, let me just show you that these are coefficients predicting vote choice with stands on the issue — separately for people varying in importance. And, the key thing is, look down this right-hand column; you will not see in published research unstandardized regression coefficients with variables coded from “zero to one” as strong as this, documenting the relationship between issue positions and vote choice. These are the people who are using the issue.

Now, there’s an interesting little exception. Notice the abortion row here; that in 1980, even among the really passionate people, there’s no relationship between their abortion opinions and their vote choice. And, the reason, it turns out, is because in 1980, you might remember, the candidates never talked about abortion. So, there’s another moderating factor here. The candidates actually have to say something, to take a stand, and they have to take different stands, and that moderates these relationships as well.

You might be interested to know there’s a relationship of importance to age, such that importance is for a variety of different political issues—we see this for issue after issue—is highest at midlife, and it’s low for young adults and it’s low for the elderly. So, the conclusion here is that you might want to think about measuring issue public membership to identify people who will use an issue to vote. *The New York Times* in their cover story did it a little differently than we do it, and I’ll show you a little bit later in the afternoon, a contrast of measures [inaudible]

Sorry I’m running fast. [inaudible] News media priming. So, the idea here of news media priming is the following: that in the period of 1985 to 1987, of course, you remember that Ronald Reagan’s approval ratings plummeted, and you know that perhaps the reason for that was at this very moment here the Iran-Contra scandal was revealed. And, as it turns out, this is a graph of the amount of news coverage to the Nicaraguan Contras on the front page of *The New York Times*, and so there had been essentially no coverage prior to the revelation and lots of coverage after the revelation.

The hypothesis of news media priming says that this heightened news media attention to the issue changed the accessibility of people’s attitudes on the issue—that maybe some people had opinions about the Contras in Nicaragua before all this happened, but they were sort of off in the recesses of long-term memory. Only after this happens do they sort of come to the forefront.

So when I call you on the phone and I say, “Could you tell me how good a job you think President Reagan is doing, or do you approve or disapprove of President Reagan’s performance?” you’re likely to grab the first issue you can think of. And the first issue you can think of is the Contras at that point, or at least it’s more likely to have appeared in your consciousness. So, as a result, that issue has more impact on presidential evaluations.

Now, the idea here is that there is what psychologists call “spreading activation,” that if you think of each of these little pockets as little nodes in your long-term memory, that news stories about Nicaragua and the Contras hook this node—activate it—you might even think of it electrically. And there’s some spreading activation, to some other nodes of related concepts, but there is no spread to concepts that are not essentially related to it. So, you might actually see an increase in the impact of these considerations on presidential evaluations as well. Sorry, my little conversion screwed up the column [inaudible] here.

But the key point to look at is, we divided the National Election Study data set into people interviewed before the revelation and people interviewed after the revelation, and we regressed evaluations of President Reagan’s performance on a series of judgments about the Contras and Central American involvement with

the U.S., general opinions about whether the U.S. ought to stay at home or not, general opinions about whether the U.S. was losing a sense of strength internationally, and economic assessments and beliefs about aid to blacks.

And, the key thing to notice here is that two coefficients become significantly stronger after than before, so this issue is more of a predictor and this issue is more of a predictor. And, in fact, aid to blacks is less important of a predictor. So, in some sense, there is sort of a zero sum game and as the media focus pulls people's attention over to the Nicaraguan international forum, they are less likely to base presidential evaluations on this criterion.

Actually, this is another example that shows the same thing, but it turns out that in the series of studies we've now run through, the first picture I've told you was wrong — in a very important way. It is not the case that people simply grab whatever issue is most accessible to them; instead what happens is that news media attention leads some respondents to infer that news personnel — writers and editors — believe that the issue is important. Otherwise, why would we keep seeing all these stories? And, if those people are trusted, then the belief that the issue is more nationally important increases. So, in other words, the idea is, "Gee, there are a lot of stories about crime lately. Those people writing the stories obviously think it's an important issue; otherwise, they wouldn't be writing all of those stories. I trust them, and so I guess it must be a more important issue.

And, as a result, people choose to place weight on that issue, because they have attached national importance to it. So answers to the most important problem question are key to this process; they are the mediator at work here. The media impact only happens among the people who then inflate that importance.

*Unidentified Speaker: Isn't that the hypothesis that trust in the media is critical to that—?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** No, we have data.

*Unidentified Speaker: When public trust in the media goes down, then the media is less influential in affecting public opinion?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** That's a great question. The way it's been trusted is within the sample. You ask people how much do you trust the media to be accurate, honest and unbiased. The people who trust the media show the effect, the people who don't trust the media don't show the effect. What we have not yet done is tracked changes and trust over time. Frankly, I'm not sure how much change there would be over time, but there might be, and you know that would be useful.

*Unidentified Speaker: [inaudible] trust in the media has gone down considerably, but I don't see any evidence that the public is less likely to name an issue as most important problem that's been, you know, brought out in the news, and it never was.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yeah, that's worth looking at. Yeah, absolutely. OK, so this just suggests the idea that when you look at the determinants of presidential evaluations, you might want to take this into account. OK, now, your favorite moment, I'm sure. The asymmetric and nonlinear model of candidate evaluation. Here's, I think, maybe the model that's implicitly in your head when it comes to thinking about how voters evaluate candidates. And, it was an idea that Kelley and Mirer put forth in 1974. We think of it as the symmetric linear model. And essentially, what it says is: a voter has a series of favorable beliefs about a candidate and a series of unfavorable beliefs about a candidate, and you sort of sum up all of the likes and you subtract off all of the dislikes, and maybe you give it some kind of regression wave and that produces your overall attitude towards the candidate. It's very simple. It's just likes minus dislikes; positives minus negatives.

And, there's a lot of research in psychology saying this is probably not the way that people do this, actually. There are three particular challenges. First of all, people are slightly positive towards neutral objects. So, you might think this is silly, but if I bring you into the lab and I say to you, "I'm going to give you some information about a person, and I'm going to ask you to make a judgment about whether you think you like them or dislike them on this scale. Here's the first person. The person breathes air. What's your judgment?" Well,

you might think there's no information. You've learned nothing, other than the person is alive and so they should be right at neutral. People don't do that. They say, "Oh, it's a normal human being. Okay, I'll give them the benefit of the doubt," a little positive information.

So, in some sense, people are sort of hopeful that this person, optimistic that this person will be likeable. Secondly, it turns out first impressions, you won't be surprised to know, anchor perceptions — what you learn first about somebody — colors the way you interpret what you learn later about that person, so the order in which you get information matters.

Lastly, there's lots of research showing that negative information outweighs positive information. You can say 20 positive things about a candidate, one negative thing will have more impact than any one of those 20 positive things, so this is the asymmetric nonlinear model. What it says is that there's this little exponent up here that says, "The impact of favorable information decreases — this is less than one we assume — decreases the more information you get, and this little exponent means the impact of unfavorable information decreases the more information you get, because you solidify your first impression."

But we propose two separate coefficients here to allow for the possibility that negative information has more impact than positive information. The predictions are here. This is the number that comes out from analyzing, I think, maybe ten National Election Studies surveys together, so this is maybe 20,000 respondents. I won't walk you through it, but sure enough, these exponents are less than one. This one is bigger than this one; this coefficient is bigger than this coefficient, these are all standard errors down here, and this intercept is greater than 50 on a scale from zero to 100.

So what that means is in the absence of information, people are slightly positive, and negative information has more impact than positive information and first impressions solidify voters based early in a campaign. Okay, now, sorry, I should go through this, but this is just showing you 1972, '76, '80, '84 — I'll send you guys these slides. You get exactly the same pattern election after election. This is a basic aspect of judgment. It's not something that varies based on time—

*Unidentified Speaker: Jon, can first impressions change?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, by definition not after you have one.

*Unidentified Speaker: Well, I mean, it's a first impression of that candidate, but through the campaign can that first impression — ?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Oh, yes, absolutely. What this says is that as you get more and more information, you will adjust your impression of the candidate, but the fiftieth piece of information has a lot less impact than the second one. Okay, so conclusions. First impressions and negative information have especially powerful impacts. And you'll see in a minute why if you put this together with something else, you might be able to reconsider one of your common practices.

Okay, so quick and helpful little tidbits. Perceptions of candidate personalities. Certainly, you ask every so often questions about how intelligent or competent [*inaudible*] are. A group of scholars began studying this issue with a very large set of personality traits drawn from psychology to say, you know, which of these traits do voters use in decision-making, and do we need to ask 16 questions, or can we reduce this set down to a core set of judgments? And the very quick answer is, "Yes, you can."

There are four dimensions. People evaluate candidates in terms of their competence, in terms of their integrity, in terms of the strength of their leadership potential and in terms of their empathy. And so this is like how intelligent is she, how honest is she, how strong of a leader is she and how much does she care about people like you, you know those questions. The good news here is that that's all you have to ask; just ask those four and you're all set.

Okay, emotional reactions to candidates. I think it's pretty uncommon for me to see in your surveys questions saying, "Has George W. Bush ever made you angry, or when you think about George W. Bush,

how angry does he make you feel?" It turns out that emotional reactions are very powerful predictors of candidate evaluations and vote choice.

And, let me tell you, that it turns out you can do this pretty easily. Here's a factor analysis where in the National Election Study surveys people were asked about how angry they feel towards a candidate, how afraid that the candidate makes them feel — uneasy, disgusted, hopeful, proud and sympathetic.

And, in this factor analysis, what you can see is that there are essentially two factors that emerge. This is not my factor analysis, but it's the negative bunch and the positive bunch. And it turns out in particular that in a lot of work we'll see in a moment that the key is being afraid. So, let me just show you: this is a regression, "Predicting Vote Choice in 1984."

So, these are all comparable regression coefficients. So here's Reagan's job approval. It's a .27 coefficient; his moral leadership gets a .05; party identification gets a .09. And, look here at this mastery coefficient. It's almost as big as rating approval, and it's bigger than party ID. So, mastery, "the candidate made me feel hopeful, proud and sympathetic." And, in addition, there's a feeling that negative emotions, here called "threat" that decreases the likelihood of voting for that candidate. So, these are pretty powerful effects, but there is a much more interesting effect of emotion. And, it's described in this picture. I just want to make it simple for you. What this argument says — coming from psychologists, actually — is that when people experience signals of punishment or non-reward, when things are going badly, it increases their attention to information.

So, the idea is like you're walking in the woods and some bear comes up and goes "Arrr," the first thing that you do is pay much more attention to what's going on around you. And, in the political context, what this equation shows you in this very strong interaction is that party identification has a lot less impact among people who are afraid — made afraid by a candidate.

So, we think of party ID as an incredibly powerful anchor; for example, forgive me, I'll talk about *The New York Times* again, but I guess last Sunday the "Week in Review" story about brain scans of 20 people. You might have seen that story. What the story said was, "We focused on people who have not decided who they're going to vote for yet— not Republicans, not Democrats — but who are undecided."

And, the argument here is that actually it doesn't make sense to simply view party identification as a fixed predictor of vote choice; that even people who are strong party identifiers when they get afraid, they abandon that standing decision, engage in information and make a judgment more thoughtfully.

OK, and let me just show you very quickly this very interesting finding that I think very powerfully documents the impact of this hypothesis. So, these are percentages ranging from January through October of 1980. In the percent of National Election Study respondents who correctly recognized that Reagan was more conservative than Carter on these particular issues, and you can see that these are like well below 50 percent in January; that people, you know, it might have been "amazingly" didn't realize where the candidates stood relative to one another.

And, as you go across, they got better and better. But the most important thing is that this growth from January to June and from June to October is bigger for people who are more afraid of the candidates, made afraid by the candidates. As it turns out, better educated people get better. People who knew a lot in the beginning improved the least, because they already knew a lot. And people who were most interested in the campaign also learned. But on top of all of that, being afraid led people to engage more in the information flow and make a more information-based judgment.

So, you might want to consider measuring perceptions of threat, and you can do it probably with one question, "How afraid does this candidate make me feel?" And add them together for the two leading candidates, and there you have a measure of anxiety. You might get some very interesting things out.

Okay, derivation over rationalization. When you write reports from your surveys, often you will correlate two variables together where conceptually it seems fairly obvious that one ought to be the cause of the other.

So, for example, if I say, "How good of a job is Ronald Reagan doing as president, and by the way, how well is he handling the economy?" if they're correlated, you tend to say, "Well, that's because people are deriving their overall evaluations from his performance on the economy."

Is it possible, though, that maybe some of that association goes the other way; that people say, "Yeah, I like Ronald Reagan, so therefore he must be doing a good job with the economy, otherwise I wouldn't like him." So, let me just show you, here are a set of correlations between a series of well-established predictors in 1996 of vote choice and vote choice. So, party ID is a very good predictor, whether Dole made me feel hopeful is a good predictor, whether he is empathetic was a good predictor, whether Clinton gets things done was a good predictor — all of these coefficients are in the theoretically expected directions.

And the question is, "Might they be partly due to rationalization as opposed to derivation?" Is it possible that instead of these things causing vote choice, in some cases people formulate a vote choice and then adjust these to come into line? So, the hypothesis essentially is here's a group of possible predictors of vote choice, but those predictors may actually be also the result of vote choice.

Let me show you how we analyze this. So if you have respondents interviewed on two occasions — pre-election and post-election — and pre-election in the National Election Studies we ask people to predict whom are you going to vote for in this election. And this is in September. And at that same time, we measure party identification, and then again in November, we measure party identification after the election.

And what we're looking at when we compute this regression is the—controlling for the stability of party identification, does vote choice explain any adjustment, pre-election vote choice any adjustment in party after it happens? In other words, if I know you're going to vote for Reagan, does that make you more Republican over time? And the answer is yes. All you have to do is look at these coefficients. There are lots of asterisks on them, they're all positive. These are lots of tests, and every single case we looked at, people are partly rationalizing judgments about candidate preferences they formed months before. And here is the last one. More asterisks, and all of these tests, same thing.

I will just tell you that the people who are most likely to rationalize in these data are people who are really interested in politics, who form a vote choice early and who then pay lots of attention to the information flow later. So, they have a stronger preference for their candidate, they decided to vote early, they care a lot about who wins and they have a big thermometer of different scoring and ratings of the candidates. So, the bottom line is we need to be cautious about assuming that cross-sectional correlations reflect the impact of one variable on another, because at least to some degree it goes the opposite way.

I'll skip this in the interest of time. But I'll tell you the conclusion, if you want to know, which is from lots and lots of work we should be very, very, very cautious in assuming that Americans can describe themselves as liberals or conservatives; that they know what those terms mean; they're happy to tell us they don't know what those terms mean, or that that judgment if we press people into answering, means anything we can interpret. Because from lots and lots of work, most Americans decline to call themselves liberals or conservatives unless forced. If you ask them what they meant when they called themselves a liberal or a conservative, we get definitions all over the board. So, I urge caution there.

This is really important, and so I want to tell you this. The idea here is to contrast two different models of evaluating people. This comes from psychology. So, the idea is this: if you watch me do this presentation and then we were to give you a form that says, "Could you evaluate the quality of this presentation?" there are two ways you could make that judgment. One would be where you'd say, "Okay, well, let me think back to the presentation and think about how do I evaluate the pieces of it that I can remember. And anything I've forgotten is irrelevant; it's not going to have any impact, because I can't remember."

But a second model, the online model says that people collect information over time and form overall evaluative impressions — positive or negative — and at the time you get the questionnaire, you don't have to build that judgment. You've already got it, long-term memory; you just need to pull it out and report it. Similarly, during a presidential campaign, you could imagine people walk into the voting booth and they say,

“Okay, fine. Here it is, Election Day. What can I remember about these candidates and let me make my vote choice decision now?”

But the psychologist says, “That’s preposterous!” People have been forming and updating this judgment on a daily basis for months. They don’t have to remember what influenced it. In fact, they can’t remember what influenced because it goes way back. So to ask people, “How did you make the judgment, why did you make the judgment this way versus that way?” is hopeless, because people can’t actually access that information.

And so, I’ll just tell you about a very simple study that was done to get at this where *[inaudible]* and colleagues had a group of participants read 32 policy statements in a brochure about a candidate — so this is a candidate’s position on 32 issues. And each time the candidate articulated a position on an issue, the respondent evaluated it, said, “I like this or I don’t like it.” And they read all 32, then they add a distracter cast for a while that got them thinking about other things. Then they were asked to remember as many of those policy statements as you can, and they remembered some of them but not all of them. And then they were asked to evaluate the candidate.

And it turns out, that when you take the 32 evaluations done at the time of reading and you predict the final evaluation, you do quite well. But when you try and use just the evaluations people can remember, you can’t predict at all. The idea is that from psychology that what people remember about a campaign or a candidate isn’t what determines their evaluation.

For example, we might all remember Michael Dukakis looking silly in a tank, or we might remember Bob Dole accidentally falling off of a platform, or we might remember Gerald Ford tripping on steps — but what makes them memorable is because they were striking. It doesn’t mean just because we can remember them that they have impact, and if we can’t remember them, it doesn’t mean they won’t have impact because the judgment has been updated throughout the campaign. And by the way, this is particularly true for people who are sophisticated about politics, or tend to be informed. *[inaudible]*

The last one. *[inaudible]* Sociotropic voting. So, you, I’m sure know that dating back to the 1970s, political scientists produced gorgeous graphs that show a very strong relationship between the domestic economy and the likelihood of the incumbent being reelected, so when the economy is good and getting better, the incumbent party typically stays in. When the economy is bad and getting worse, then the incumbent is thrown out.

And the logic of this said initially, as I’m sure you would intuit and economists would tell us, this is pocketbook voting. This is voters who are suffering economically saying, “I want those people out, because they’re ruining my life.” And the worse the economy gets, the more such people there are, right? So a very straightforward idea. In fact, economists would say has to be true.

But Don Hender *[phonetic]* said, “You know, maybe it’s not true, actually, that people are quite so selfish; maybe it’s that they are sociotropic.” And what that word means is, they’re looking out for the good of the country, not for their own pocketbooks.

And so imagine the idea that voters when they’re asked to vote for a candidate, they don’t look at their own wallets. They look at your news stories about how the economy is doing for the country as a whole, and people make the judgment there. Well, if they did that, those aggregate numbers would look exactly the same, so you have to do survey analysis where you actually, *[inaudible]* that when you look at survey data that asks people “how are you doing economically and how do you think that the country is doing economically?” both of them predict vote choice. But when you put in a regression together, the effect of pocketbook disappears completely, and what’s left over is a judgment about the country and its status.

Now, why would this happen? Why would people not use—they have information. If they had just become unemployed, why wouldn’t that be useful information? Well, it turns out, this has been documented as well. The reason is attributions to the cause; that people don’t attribute what happens in their personal lives and what Washington does. They see a huge gap both physically — many, many miles and many, many

connections — between what happens in their workplace and what happens in Washington. And the idea that President anybody could influence what my salary is or whether I get laid off is just not plausible, and so that's the reason.

Now, there definitely are exceptions. There is a small group of people who do say, "Dammit, I lost my job because of that guy in the White House!" And those people actually do use their pocketbooks in addition to the sociotropic judgment, but for the most part, it's a judgment about the state of the country.

So, the conclusion here is, you know, I don't see this too often in what you do, but if you do ask people how are they doing economically and want to use that to predict vote choice, you will probably convey the wrong impression to your readers. And if you instead ask for judgments about the country's economy, that will be applicable towards voter choice too, and it will give you a better sense of how people really make the judgment.

OK. *[inaudible]* So, let me summarize. This is a tiny drop in the bucket of findings that this study has produced over a period of decades. We didn't want to drown you in it, but we did want to give you a feel for the idea that there is way, way, way more of this stuff. And some of it's right and some of it's wrong, and you may actually point out ways in which this is wrong.

Gary Langer and I have ongoing discussions, and he corrects my misunderstandings regularly, and so I now owe him about \$150 for his latest insights. You may see insights there too, we'd love to get those insights, and we ourselves may provide some of this. Some of this literature goes through debates where people say something, and somebody else says, "No you analyzed the data wrong, and we reached some other conclusions." But I've focused today on findings that I think have very solid, empirical backing, and might have some practical value for you. And so, we would love to find ways to keep feeding this stuff to you, and we would be happy to do that.

But, more importantly, now that you know what we do kind of for ourselves in a way for the community of scholars, we want to change the whole pace here and have you start talking to us about how to do this work differently, how to do it better and so on. But, I think that we're going to take a little break first, five minutes.

**Frank Newport:** Jon, one question. Who's going to win the Republican nomination? *[Laughter]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Can I tell you who will win the Democratic nomination? That's easy.

**Frank Newport:** No, I mean, leading to a serious point; does all of this help us in our task, which we may talk about? **(Yes.)** I'm trying to understand ahead of time, at least the demands on us often are trying to help readers and viewers come to a conclusion about who might have a higher probability of winning.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yeah, absolutely. So, I could do an hour presentation on that where we would say, "What does the academic literature have to say about it?" We did a little taste of the likely voter models, could get expanded a bit. I would love to do that with somebody and see whether it would work or not, and then the second question is. "How do we use all of this stuff about the causes of candidate choice to inform?" And so, the argument I would make is, that typically polling believes that the respondent has insight into their own thinking. We say, "Who do you think you're going to vote for?" Actually, we don't say that. We say, "If the election were held today, who would you vote for?" despite the fact that we all know that the elections are not being held today, and that's not a meaningful question.

So, for me, personally, I did a survey in 2000 where in June I asked people to predict who they're going to vote for in November. And then in November we recontacted them and asked them "Who did you vote for?" and 96 percent of people voted for the candidate they predicted they would.

So, that raises a really interesting question. That, you know, maybe we shouldn't be asking if the election were held today; maybe we ask them, "Who will you vote for?" And maybe a lot of what's going on is rationalization. And this is not a new idea; there's an old book from the 1950s *[unintelligible]* *Dissention*, saying that all campaigns do is take people's predispositions and activate them rather than change them;

that it seems like people are being pushed around, but they're not. So, that's a great topic, and I would love to do it— [inaudible]

*Unidentified Speaker: But one of the things that we should acknowledge though is that not all elections are the same. If you did that in 2000, you'd probably come out [technical difficulties]. If you did it in 1976, you're going to come out with an entirely different result, so there is some logic to this subjunctive question, which has served this profession very well. [inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Oh, absolutely. I would not disagree at all. Of course, I mean, I used your success as a little badge of accomplishment whenever I give talks on how great surveys are, and the spectacular accuracy of that question — at the last minute when you ask it a few days before the election — is terrific. But bear in mind it's a few days before the election, so the question is not so predictive, so you say, if the election were held today. I'm sort of talking about now—

*Unidentified Speaker: [Technical difficulties] Let me point to the fact that trend line from that subjunctive question in June says an awful lot about the dynamics of elections. Some elections have very small [inaudible], with 2000 being the case, but others — 1980, 1976 —have substantial [inaudible] well tracked by that survey question.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Forgive me for saying this, but I believe what you just said. I believe that there are trends over time, and trends over time relate to events. But I also believe we're really good at making up stories. When we see a trend of a line going up or down, we can find some reason. We can say, "Well, that thing that happened, people liked that, or that very same thing that happened, people didn't like that." So, the idea that there would be trends and that they would make sense to us is, to me, not compelling [inaudible]

*Unidentified Speaker: Yeah, but Jon, if you look at those trend lines and you look at the course of events that occur within these campaigns as the people that we work, political journalists [inaudible]. Here's a bloody correspondence. (Absolutely.) I mean, we're not writing stories in some vacuum. People look at the things that happen. They see numbers go up and down, correct and recorrect. I mean, these aren't random fluctuations around which we're writing stories.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** I don't mean to suggest that. I totally agree with you, but what I'm suggesting is, imagine, I mean, just, let's consider doing it sometime — maybe now — asking respondents two different questions — [inaudible]

*Unidentified Speaker: I'm sorry to cut you off, but we use a variety of different kinds of questions that look at the way that you feel about the candidates — the voter choices —not just the sort of payoff for a series of questions. (Of course.) The idea that we're sitting there with one question, and that's our only basis for the evaluation just is not —[inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, all right, I'm not being clear. Let me say what I'm trying to say. I won't disagree with you at all. What I'm saying is that with a question that says —this is just a hypothesis, I have absolutely no data to support it—that with a question that says, "If the election were held today, who would you vote for?" you might get very nice responsiveness to recent events. Whereas if you were to say, "Setting everything aside, think about Election Day, and who do you think that you will vote for?" that might be much flatter—

*Unidentified Speaker: Jon, I'm sorry, but your assumption is that we're asking that question now in order to predict —*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** No, I'm not making any assumption. I'm not making that assumption. I'm not making that assumption —

*Unidentified Speaker: And that's not why we're asking. We ask people who they vote for if the election were today, because that's exactly what we want to know.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Which is fine, I don't disagree with you. I don't disagree with either of you guys are saying. What I'm saying is, if you were to ask this question, it might turn out it was much flatter and much less responsive to recent events, and that would be interesting too. It doesn't discredit anything that you've done; it just raises another possibility.

**Gary Langer:** Jon, surely the answer to this matter is "sometimes," and we don't, just again, ask one question in the election stuff *[Inaudible]* pre-campaign surveys that we do, we ask all sorts of stuff above that whether they've made up their mind yet and so forth. I think that there are sort of two things. There's *[inaudible]* question wording, sort of manipulating *[unintelligible]* vis-à-vis *[unintelligible]* the real poll, the opinion and so on. But there's another question here, and I think that we need to separate it out. And that is the question about using the Election Studies to try and answer questions about things like the election as an event *[unintelligible]*, and those are two separate sort of things.

I hear sort of a measurement debate about question wording, but I hear a larger debate about using the Election Study to study election campaigns, which is, we think, sort of a fundamentally interesting thing to do. So, I just wondered if you could sort of separate that out in your comments. Jon, can you sort of separate that out?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes. I mean, first of all, I don't think it's about measurement. I think that we're talking about making two different judgments. And, I guess what I would suggest is, think about a boxing match. If after the second round of a boxing match if you said, "As of now who's winning the boxing match," versus "who do you think is going to win the boxing match at the end?" it's very possible that people would give different answers. And they're both interesting, and they're maybe both worth measuring.

And, I think that the argument of let's measure today if the election were held today — let's ask that question — is interesting to readers, because it does forecast something about that *[inaudible]*. And, that's an empirical question too, and I'm just not sure that I know of any research looking at it.

**Susan Pinkus:** But polling is not a predictor. I mean, what Gary said is true, but I think even if you're saying at that point, "Okay, thinking about the November election, who do you think you'll vote for?" I think the event of what's happening right now — I don't think people can extrapolate out without seeing the events that are happening right now. So, I think that will determine who they think that they will vote for in November, number one. Number two, I would think you would get a really high "don't know," I think, if you say, "Who do you think that you're going to vote for in November."

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, you do, and then if you ask people and say, "Look, of course it's far away, but if you don't mind, we'd like your best guess anyway." Then in 2000, 96 percent get it right.

**Susan Pinkus:** But then we do ask another question, "Whom do you think has the best chance of winning? Regardless of your vote, who do you think has the best chance of winning? So, I mean, that goes hand-in-hand, and so we do ask more than one question. *[inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Right, so in the interest of time, we're going to go on here, but I guess, I'm sorry. I hear like lots of defensiveness as if you think that I've attacked, and I haven't. I don't mean to, but I just mean to suggest something else to think about and that's all —

**Andy Kohut:** I don't think that it's a question of us feeling attacked; I think it's a question of your misunderstanding of the breadth of what we do —

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Oh, Andy, forgive me, but I read your stuff really carefully. It's of no disrespect from me —

**Andy Kohut:** *[Inaudible]* I'm talking about the kinds of measures that this group has taken about *[unintelligible]* with their feelings about candidates over the course of this time. I'm not saying that this question might not be interesting, but we're asking lots of different types of questions about candidates other than the horserace question. *[Background noise]* lots of insights.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, absolutely. Okay, David has an announcement.

**David Howell:** Yeah, I have two brief administrative announcements. First of all, Matt DeBell here at the end of the table, some people have reimbursements that they need to submit, and he has hopefully brought both the paperwork and a self-addressed envelope that people might want to get in touch with him and get a copy of that so that you can submit your receipts as appropriate.

And the second thing is that a lot of people have been asking about email. Gallup has four terminals out in the hall. If you don't have your computer with you, and you can do Internet-based email. On the other hand, if you have your laptop with you, they actually have a guest wireless network, if you have a wireless card. The network is called "wdcguest." It will come up on your wireless list, and the password/ID is "Communication" with a capital "c." It's case-sensitive, so it's "Communication with a capital "c." It's very easy to connect. If you have any problems, let me know.

**Arthur Lupia:** We'll take a five minute break, and then we'll come back a quarter after, and when we come back we're going to ask you to talk to us about things you'd like to see us cover on our *[inaudible]*

**Arthur Lupia:** —set of Americans before the election, and then another hour afterwards. In fact, it may be closer to an hour and a half after the election. So, we're going to have to meet two and a half hours with these folks. Now, the way that the time series study is put together is that about 60 minutes of that time will be devoted to the ANES core. The idea there is that you're going to ask questions that have been asked, in some cases, back to the 1950s. So we don't have a lot of maneuverability with that. The field expects us to ask those questions.

But the remainder of the time, which could be another 60 minutes or 90 minutes — that's within the range of our discretion. So we're taking proposals from the Online Commons, which we're happy to look at or read, but at least in this session it's all a brainstorm of information for us. If you had two hours, where you had discretion over an hour and a half, what would you want them to survey in 2008, if that's the premise?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** So, we'll just tell you what the core is, and then you can start talking. So the core is we ask about are they registered, and we ask eventually do you think you will turn out. And after the election, we ask whether they will turn out; we ask who they think they will vote for, and then who they did vote for. We measure attributes for the candidates; reasons to vote for and against the candidates in open-ended questions; perceptions of their personalities; the emotions evoked by the candidates, predictions of their performance.

If George Bush is elected, what do you think will happen to the economy; attitudes towards lots of government policies — abortion, defense spending, blah, blah, blah, blah. Perceptions of the candidate's positions on those issues; evaluations of the incumbent's performance in handling the economy, international relations and other things. Perceived recent changes in national conditions, have they gotten better or worse, the economy and so on. Identification of political parties, liberal conservative, yes we do measure liberal or conservative ideology.

Values of various sorts, individualism, egalitarianism and so on; policy issue priorities which are those importance questions. Participation in the campaign. "Did you try to talk somebody into voting a particular way? Did you go to a rally? Did you give money to a candidate?" Exposure to the news media is measured in some depth, attitudes toward social groups with how much do you like or dislike men, women, and so on.

Perceptions of social groups' attitudes towards policies. "Do you think African-Americans like or dislike affirmative action; desired government spending on specific issues — patriotism, religion, religious behavior, religious beliefs, interest in politics; possession of political information; social networks for talking about politics; racial prejudice; preferred size of government, and *[inaudible]* lots more. So this is only a small subset, so you don't have to talk about those things, cause we're going to get to them. *[laughter]* So the question then becomes, what else in this election should we be sure to measure?

*Unidentified Speaker: Well, Jon, we could talk about some of that, because, you know, the ANES has made some funny decisions about some of those areas as well. Just for example, you used, for many years, to ask if they were evangelical [inaudible], which to many of us, is something we find fairly essential in evaluating political opinions. But in '02 or '04 you stopped asking, and just went along the lines of church attendance, which is less satisfying to us.*

[00:03:30]

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, so this is one of the key pressures the study feels, which is to continue the time trend over as long a period as we can. And Matt actually has been investigating this very issue in response to the fact that Gary earlier detected the disappearance of this question, and one of the things you should know about this study is, you know, Skip and I are very much on the outside in the sense that we didn't design any of the questions that are in this survey. They've been going for a really long time.

And so, we feel no sort of ownership or defensiveness of them, but we also have some limits to our knowledge of why did that question drop out in 2000, but Matt did a little investigation. Maybe you can tell us where we stand on that.

**Matt DeBell:** *[Portion inaudible due to proximity to microphone]*

*Unidentified Speaker: Matthew, it's hard to hear you.*

**Matt DeBell:** So, I was saying that the born again question, it didn't attack exactly what we wanted it to, because we have some cognitive interviewer reports that say that some people have interpreted it to basically be asking them if they're baptized — which is not really what we were aiming at. But some religious scholars have expressed enthusiasm for a question about whether The Bible should be taken literally. So that's sort of on the top of our list of possibilities. And we're also going to continue looking into whether to ask questions specifically about whether people identify as evangelical Christians. If you have suggestions about what else would be good to ask, we'd love to hear them.

**Susan Pinkus:** We regularly ask like three questions. Church attendance, which really helps. The literal interpretation of the Bible — it's a three-way question, and born again as your Savior. Using the word "Savoir" in the question, and then we do a combination table to get at evangelicals, white fundamentalists, conservatives, and so that really religious right — *[Technical difficulties]* It's really interesting when you look at it with religious right versus just white Christian conservatives. They have different opinions of their candidate, and so you can really see the difference.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Do you combine the three into something?

**Susan Pinkus:** Yes.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Okay, and we can read about that, or do we have to ask you about it?

**Susan Pinkus:** I can send it.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Okay, great.

*Unidentified Speaker: I have a question about it. How extensive was this evaluation of the problems and the whole born again question. You said that there were some reports that people were misinterpreting it, given that fuzziness area. At its core, was it measuring something meaningful with some problems, and if that is the case, why wasn't it continued? If that's not the case, then what was the evidence that it was just simply a bad question?*

**Matt DeBell:** Well, I don't want to speculate too much. This is based on a conversation that I had with Ken Wald at the University of Florida. And, I think it would be going too far to say that the born again question is

no good; it's just that it might not be as good as for instance the biblical literalism question, if we only had to do one.

**Frank Newport:** Going back, was this dropped? Give us the history. Was the born again left, on what survey did it disappear? '04?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** No, Gary definitely knows that it was not in either '00 or '02, right?

**Gary Langer** You know, I can send it in an email. I can't recall. It was asked from the mid '70s, '76 or something like that, through — the real issue is that there may be something fundamental changing about, you know, social conservatism, it's impact on politics, something that became very important in the '90s, but now maybe in recession, or not — without that question how do we tell that story?

**Arthur Lupia:** Let me, if I could, let me add a procedural point. The late 1990s and in early 2000 is when the ANES underwent huge budget cuts relative to what it was. And the length of the questionnaire shrank dramatically, and so there were these moments at which they were trying to figure out, "What do we not ask anymore?"

Now, if you take that dynamic, there wasn't a good means of scholarly communication for people to say, "Well, here's why you need to keep this question, or here's why you don't need to make it." So the unfortunate thing for us was not just that the questions were kept, but there's not a good record of why things were dropped. The decisions were made kind of under duress by a small group of people, who probably had good intentions, no doubt, but any questions that were dropped in this era — I think the budgets went in the early '90s from somewhere in the eight to nine million range down to two or three [million], and so that was rather substantial. *[inaudible]*

*Unidentified Speaker: So, actually we have that question in 2000, if you're a born again Christian, and then it was dropped in 2004, and what Skip said was true. But this is actually an exception to that. This is documented from the 2004 planning committee. It's part of the list of questions that were presented in a memo to the user committee, that said, "Step up and defend these, or they're at risk of being dropped, and in fact, the evidence that came in led us to drop the question in 2004.*

*Unidentified Speaker: All right. So, let me just make a strong recommendation that that question come back. And I would make two arguments here. One of them is that that born again or evangelical question is a shortcut that is almost certainly likely to be used on the exit polls. And so if you want to have comparability between what you're collecting and the way the evangelicals are being defined in the exit polls, you're going to need that question.*

*It's also the standard shortcut that's being used probably by most, if not all, of the polling organizations represented here — so if you want to have comparability with our surveys, or at least with most of our surveys, you need it.*

*But I would also very strongly defend it on substantive grounds. We are, the Pew forum is in the process of looking in very great detail at the comparability of born again question in terms of what it yields and an affiliation-based measure of evangelicalism asking great detail about even about your denominational and church affiliation, and sorting respondents into categories as being members of evangelical affiliated churches or mainline churches within the Protestant segment, and there's an extremely high correlation between what you get with the two measures.*

*The affiliation-based measure is unwieldy, although not necessarily for the National Election Study. In fact, that's the way that evangelicalism used to be defined in the National Election Study, because you actually do get into leads with the affiliation. But I would strongly suggest that that question come back. I respect Ken Wald, but his voice is not the only one in the community.*

*[Portion inaudible]*

*Unidentified Speaker: So, there are aspects of the exit poll that are problematic in terms of [inaudible] the differential in response, and certainly, simply in terms of voting patterns. In fact, increasingly Americans don't vote on Election Day, but in other ways on other days. I think that makes it particularly valuable to try to find ways in which to validate or invalidate the exit poll. And I think that this survey is a terrific opportunity to do that—the extent to which as many questions as possible that are on the exit poll could also be on the ANES, as a validation measure, I think, would be really important to do that—particularly this year. The exit poll is under a lot of stress and under a lot of pressure. [inaudible] It would be a bigger opportunity to test [inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** And it might be worth using old exit polls to do that analysis where the questions are comparable already.

*Unidentified Speaker: Let me take that one step further. I don't know how far in advance you'd have to prepare your post-survey, but I think we've run into the last couple of years with the exit poll that it sometimes raises as many questions as it answers. The exit poll can raise a lot of questions. I made one up. But, people say corruption is their number one issue, but maybe we don't know what exactly you mean by corruption. And we can argue and debate this and go back in the field ourselves, but it might be very nice if you had the ability to then go and explore some of the issues that were raised like I've just mentioned. [inaudible] Yeah that's a perfect real example other than the one I just made up, so [inaudible] Maybe you could talk about how fast you can turn on a dime and maybe even consult with us again on post- [inaudible].*

*Unidentified Speaker: And just to add onto that, if you can do it in a more timely way so that we don't have to wait two years [inaudible]—no, I'm not joking. I mean, if you want to be valuable to our community, it has to be timely. I mean, I can't go to our reporter and say, "Two years ago we had our election, but now we're getting all of this valuable data or results or whatever." So, I think that if you can turn it around quicker, it would really help us. And I just wanted to ask on the religion question, do you break out Muslim?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, in the long battery, we have a very long—I don't know—100 religious categories and it's definitely in there.

*Unidentified Speaker: Cause, I mean, a couple of years ago we started breaking out the Muslim religion as a separate variable.*

**Frank Newport:** To what avail? You're getting five per survey, right?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** You get five of them, in a survey?

**Frank Newport:** What good does it do you to break out Muslim? *[Portion garbled]* It takes a lot of aggregation.

*Unidentified Speaker: Well, just like exit polling. That's the only way that you can get Jews is in exit polling or gays is only in exit polling, so, I mean, maybe that could be [inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Right, and it is important to remember that the exit poll sample is much bigger than—ours are a couple of thousand people, and so unless we significantly increased our sample size, we're not going to have a lot of Jews either.

**Arthur Lupia:** As a point of information, we're really working hard to try to get the studies out more quickly. The pilot study that we ran in 2006, I think we had the prerelease out, it was days right?—*(January.)* It was January, but it was from our final interview to the day that we first—was that like two weeks? *(Two to three weeks, yes.)* And then in 2004, on the big face-to-face, that was a small number of months. *(Maybe three weeks more, but that's a considerable—)* Yes, and so anyway, that's the timescale.

**David Howell:** *[Inaudible]* We do actually, and this might be a good chance to promote our email list. If people are willing to be on this list, all you have to do is send me an email—you've all received my email

address, and I'll add you on it. Every time we have a data release, it goes out to that list, which is comprised of maybe 1,600 people— *[inaudible]*

*Unidentified Speaker: It's not clear, when do you put out your first election release of data?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** It's all after the election, so far.

*Unidentified Speaker: How far after the election?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, Dave you can—

**David Howell:** Typically January or February.

*Unidentified Speaker: Well, see that's really difficult for us. [Unintelligible]*

*Unidentified Speaker: Well, for what it's worth, I see theirs as a different role than ours. I think our purpose is to provide ongoing immediate measurements of public attitudes. I think we can use them for validation, for further investigation to study what we're doing, particularly at the exit poll to see if working and if there are alternatives. But I don't think that we can look to them to what we do in terms of [unintelligible].*

*Unidentified Speaker: No, but it would be interesting to see if we had some of that data in the post-election environment where we're trying to figure out what happened and why it happened, and we had some sense of what these surveys showed. I think that would be pretty useful —*

*Unidentified Speaker: It would be nice, but—*

*Unidentified Speaker: Put it down for "nice."*

*[Group Laughter]*

**Harold Clarke:** It's my impression that the press and the media generate — it's a hard sell, we've found in Britain to say, "We've got these great findings from our study three years ago. Would you like to do a story on this?" And the answer typically is a non-response. Your email doesn't get answered.

**John Curtice:** But Harold, that's the issue. You see, now, this is where the model that you are funded to provide a resource to the academic community—and you don't seem to think for anybody else—is a disadvantage. Because, I guess what these guys really want from you — they don't necessarily want this fantastic data set that they can then waste hours analyzing; what they want to know is your top-of-mind interpretation of why was it that Bush got reelected or whatever.

That's what you need to be getting out in January or February, is a very quick "skip across the data" that says, "Hey, look, actually what the exit polls said about the importance of moral values was wrong, because actually if I run my regression analysis and I therefore look at it and I correlate issue attitudes against vote behavior, I don't find moral views at the top, I find something else, right?" But that's what you've got to get out into the public domain very, very quickly.

Then there's an issue that you've got to sort out with the community, which is whether or not it's okay for you guys to spread your cream in order to get this study to have this much higher public profile as opposed to the issue of academic equity — so that everybody can get publications in peer review journals two years later at more or less the same speed. *[inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Exactly, so it would be useful, I think, for us to hear from you, because historically when the ANES first started at Michigan they did exactly what you said. Very quickly, the PIs every survey put out a paper fast saying, "This is our analysis of the data, and this is how we interpret what happened in that election." And that stopped the minute this equity thing came —

**John Curtice:** I need to give you a fairly small domestic example. We just did a study of the Scottish parliament election last May, okay? Now we, like you, took hours to get the bloody data, all right, *[inaudible]* but all the way through from May through to August, okay? But then at the end of October, we were in conference, we skimmed the data; found a news media story that was *[inaudible]* particularly interesting where we could get another profile on that. Now, frankly, it's just taking the cream off of something that's there, but that way you ensure that you're getting something out to the wider community.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** So if we did a story like that in January, is that too late to be interesting?

*Unidentified Speaker:* Yes, in the middle of December.

*Unidentified Speaker:* It would have to be December. It would have to be in fact the later part of November, set up those end-of-the-year stories, what does it all mean. Those stories basically have to be finished two weeks, perhaps a week before the end of the year, and have that data out, even as you've described it or as Gary described it. *[inaudible]* In every election there are two or three issues. Focus on answering the questions raised immediately afterwards, and then you have this complementary function to, but have it out in early December — in as early in December as you can.

**John Curtice:** I mean, that implies, presumably it's true *[inaudible]* that probably also implies being prepared to do something in public on the basis of interviews completed by the end of November, right? *[inaudible]* We know it's not going to make a difference to the lead story —

**Jim Norman:** I think we're setting ourselves up for failure. We all as media types sit around and say, "We want you to put something out right away on one or two or three main points. Those are points that we've asked questions about and we've been writing about." In turn they give it to us, and we say we've already done this. I think that we need to be pretty careful about what we would like to see that's going to be additional that shows us things that we hadn't already done, which is what the NES does so well. I think if you just turned out a top line that gives us things that are things we've already explored, it may wind up on Page 11.

*Unidentified Speaker:* But Jim, they will have the vantage point of knowing what we've said. And they have all of this material, *[inaudible]* you said that, but we can say this, so it can't be just a resuscitation of the top line. It should be what value-added can you deliver based upon what you have that we don't. *[inaudible]*

**John Curtice:** I think inevitably, the success of the exercise will depend on whether they find something that has needs value. Ideally, it's going to be something that's a bit different from what's — *[inaudible]*

*Unidentified Speaker:* Well, just for example, you can measure the cell on the population, so can we but it's troublesome and expensive. You should measure the cell of the population in your in-person interviews and tell us what you saw there. But you also have the advantage of those monthly or six or seven surveys to draw from, and you can be writing that in October and have that good to go. It's something that we don't have, that at least something that has a reasonable chance of being covered, if it's newsworthy. And then there's a couple things that *[inaudible]*.

**Frank Newport:** But does that run afoul of the funding fathers, so to speak? In other words, the quicker that you put something out that could be negative to one part or the other — does that make it more sensitive to the funders? I mean, if you wait two years and it's all academic, you don't run afoul.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well we're only waiting five months. But would the funding fathers like to speak about that at all?

*Unidentified Speaker:* Well, I would be worried about anything pre-election, because I think we're setting ourselves up, you know. ANES has been a subject Capitol Hill before, and I don't like when they talk about my programs on Capitol Hill. It's not a nice thing, because they're usually not doing it in a complimentary fashion. Now, the thing about getting something out quick post-election — that's not as bothersome.

*You know, ANES is really the only study that we fund that has set up its own moratorium of saying, "We're not going to do anything with this data until it's released to everybody." I think we'd have to be careful about it with the community, so that people are well aware of what's going on and they don't think that you and Skip are going to sit there with the data and hold on to it for months on end. And after you've taken everything out that can be gotten, then you toss it. But I don't think — that's not what we're talking about. We're not even probably talking about it in an academic [unintelligible]. I don't think that's going to be a problem, I just worry about pre-election.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** All right. So, we should keep that conversation going, I think, and see whether we can do this —

**Frank Newport:** On a different issue, how well is the survey — back to your original question — set up to handle a Michael Bloomberg jumping in the race? Are the questions appropriately set so that the stage is set, if he makes the decision to jump in? Are there third party questions on there, and/or whatever else scholars would deem of interest to have both pre and post?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yeah, well, we dealt with it with Ross Perot in and out. Because it's all computerized, you know, if we were in the era of paper questionnaires and you printed them and then you had to reprint them, it would be a disaster to have to stick something in, but with computerized — even with an interviewing force across the country — you can have them download via the Internet the new questionnaire —

**Frank Newport:** I'm talking about the big study here, the long three.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Right, and so the interviewers, even if they're around the country ready to start interviewing tomorrow, if we wanted to change a question or had to change a question —

**Frank Newport:** I know that, but when is the long pre going to be in the field?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** The long pre is going to start in September.

**Frank Newport:** Okay, well, then we'll know by then — but then it would be obvious, I guess, what the question said.

**Arthur Lupia:** David, our typical production schedules, when do we send the last version of like the pre-election poll to the firm?

**David Howell:** Well, I mean, we always have a little window with our survey research firms where if an issue of salience comes up really close to the field period that we can add in a few questions like that then. I think that what Jon was alluding to is that you can patch things even in the field. You just don't get to ask those questions of the sample that's already interviewed. *[inaudible]* So while adding things at the last minute exponentially increases risk, the other questions, the programming errors and things like that, can be done clear up to Election Day.

**Frank Newport:** The other point, and quickly in answer to the big question is the idea about religious affiliation is a good one. One question is "What do we find in our daily work that we cannot put in surveys that we would like to?" And one thing, like Scott mentioned, is we would like to be able to do an in-depth denominational inventory, but you can't with so many different denominations today. So, we have to do crude religious, you know, other Christian/Protestant. So that's an example of where you could really contribute to what we can't do. So I guess the question is what else is it in our daily life do we say, "Geez, I wish that we had more time that we could put in that we're typically not able to do?"

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Exactly, that's what we're on right now.

*Unidentified Speaker:* I think of it less in terms of specific questions, but the broader types of questions you can answer. Like the things you showed in terms of correlations and all of that. Because you have a long survey, you can ask a zillion *[inaudible]* you can troll through lots of things and maybe give us the ultimate

answer to the character issues, you know? [inaudible] All the years I've studied political science and I still can't answer that question. I don't know. Maybe I'm missing something.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yeah. No, that's not resolved yet.

*Unidentified Speaker:* So I mean, try to resolve that. Maybe it's a little bit of everything for different people, but those [inaudible] questions also. So, to me, it seems unfortunate to hear your efforts to reporting something out in December of election year that's really going to be treading the same ground we are. We hacked into what happened with the election and what the exit poll said, and trying to build some clarity around it. I'd rather you stand back from that; let us do that. That's what we compete in the marketplace and we need the resources to do, but answer these big questions we just can't get at. So, I would hate to see a shift in focus to rush things out. I don't see any value for you to be in the newspaper. I think the value is to research and be in academic literature and [inaudible] be a resource for the next four years, but yes, those big questions. And to me a big question is issues versus character.

*Unidentified Speaker:* Would you want to see that timeline change?

*Unidentified Speaker:* Not necessarily.

**John Curtice:** It's partly a question of maintaining the profile of the study so that you broaden the constituency. [Background noise] who wants it to happen. For example, I mean, we had the situation in the U.K. 20 years ago, more than 20 years ago now, where within the academic community there was an attempt to kill it off. It was in part overcome by mobilizing the views of the nonacademic community, putting pressure on the funding bodies and saying, "Actually, we think this is useful." Having a broad constituency of people who have an interest in the National Election Study, not just within academia, can actually shield it from you academic enemies.

**British Election Studies:** I also think that you can have your cake and eat it. You can have your cake, your long-term reflection, with the face-to-face probability sample. And you can also with your internet panel [Portion unintelligible] With the component that you've got you can get that out there. There is no reason why you couldn't get a lot of this stuff. You can front load these on those early waves. You can get all of these religious questions down on those early waves. You don't need to put that in your post-election sample similarly [Portion unintelligible]. And you can release that Internet version very, very quickly along with your headline [inaudible].

*Unidentified Speaker:* My answer to Frank's question of what can you do that we can't do that we wish we could do, speaking for myself, it would be nice to have more open-ended questions. I mean, what we struggle with is within a 20-minute phone interview, which is our maximum, there are just a handful of open-ended questions that we can get. You've got one hour. This is done by ACAPI? **(Yes.)** You have a really great situation where you can ask people to speak in their own words about some of these questions. I just made a quick run-through; I didn't see many open-ended questions.

*They may be here, but the more you can do to tell us how people talk about these issues in their own words and the extent to which the way that they frame things — that would be a tremendous contribution to add on to the kinds of things that we do.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** And a very cool thing about this, for the first time, all of the interviews are going to be audiotaped automatically by the laptop so the interviewers don't even have to transcribe. We'll have a perfect transcription from the recording. I'll tell you the open-ended questions that are always in there. Is there anything that you like about the Democratic candidate that would make you want to vote for him or her? Is there anything that you dislike about the Democratic candidate that would make you want to vote against him or her? The same thing for the other candidates and the same thing for the parties, and then we've got the open-ended most important problem question, and that's it. What else would you —

*Unidentified Speaker:* Well, we've had a lot of success with questions that say, "What's the first thing that comes to mind? What one word would you use to describe this, that or the other thing?" It's very hard to try

to see how that could sit in this framework, but something that gets to people's gut reactions in their own words to candidates — to things about the campaign would be a service.

**Gary Langer:** Yes, it's the emotional responses that you've told us are important. "What worries you? What do you fear most about the country's direction and where the country might be? What are your hopes?" The hopes, the dreams, the fears, the worries — they're the things that are hard for us to spend on, and also, analytically it's difficult [inaudible]. I'd love to see you guys doing the things that we can't. [inaudible]

Also, I'd just like to say that there's a lot of academic testing. Pew does some of it, most of us don't. To take the time to do some split samples, to try to nail down the things that Jon, you and I always debate. Midpoints, you and I have discussed this, you like midpoints, I don't like midpoints. Take some basic question [inaudible]. Ask half of them midpoint and half without, let's half that analysis out and test/retest. Do that, we're not going to spend time on. If you want to go back and add selection bias, you can do that. There are all kinds of things that you could do that we could use and are happy to have it. [Technical difficulties]

**Susan Pinkus:** Can I just piggyback to what Gary said? I'm kind of interested in when you're testing a candidate whether you should put in their title — like whether you say, "New York Senator, Hillary Clinton," or should it be, "Hillary Rodham Clinton," or should it just be, "What's your impression of Hillary Clinton?" So if you could do a split sample like that with a title and without a title —

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, and let me tell you what Skip was just reminding me that I should say. Can I just ask, how many of you have heard of TESS, which is Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences? That's almost a quarter. So, Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences is funded by NSF. It's a regular survey platform that offers sort of continuous data collection opportunities, and they do experiments just like this for free.

If you all had questions like this, let's just imagine we could have a situation where you call me and say, "We want to know, should it be Senator Clinton, or Hillary Rodham Clinton or Hillary Clinton?" that we could fire a proposal off to TESS, and it could be reviewed very quickly. The whole thing is very fast, and you get data back, and it's free and it's paid for by the National Science Foundation.

So, anytime you have things like this you're interested in, you know, either me or Skip or any other academic — you can partner with them, or do it yourself if you want. You don't have to be an academic, or do you? Maybe you do — ?

**ANES:** Someone on the proposal has to have an academic affiliation.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, so find an academic to partner with and then, you know? [inaudible]

**ANES:** The website is [experimentcentral.org](http://experimentcentral.org).

**Jon A. Krosnick:** [experimentcentral.org](http://experimentcentral.org)

**Evans Witt:** One thing that I would like to see, make sure that the ANES proposal includes and is flexible on is basically the technology. Making sure we not only know their internet [inaudible] we know what kind of internet access they have. Cause if you have broadband Internet access at home, you're on a different version. And you have different political views, and you have different access to information. Do you have a cell phone? Do you make most of your phone calls on a cell phone? How many people in your household have cell phones? Do you text message? Do you IM? Lots of really sort of trivial kinds of questions, in a sense, but in political terms a) it makes a difference today, and it's going to make a much bigger difference as we go forward.

I really think that that [inaudible] has been sort of missing in the past, and, you know, the exit poll has been able to get "are you an Internet user [inaudible]?" as a question on occasion, but you all can do it and really

give us a better picture of what the information flows to these folks are, in terms of politics, how immersed are they in that. I mean, talk about, "Did you talk to somebody that convinced you of a candidate? Well, did you see an email? Were you on an email list?" You get blast emails every day from politicians. It could make a big difference. I'd really like to make sure that part of the communications world at the individual level is well represented and well included in the data.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** So, there are a bunch of academics that share that view; that we need to expand instrumentation in that regard a lot. And so let me just ask you the question that they've run into that's been a challenge for them, just to see if you have a feel for how you'd like it to be. One of the concerns that emerged originally was you could ask people how much do you watch TV, and that would pick up something about exposure to political information from television.

Researchers quickly realized that that doesn't work, because there's too much TV that's not about politics. So, then you have to ask how much do you watch news on television. Then they found out that, "No, that's not good, because there's a lot of nonpolitical news." So then you have to ask about political news, and then they found out that that's not good. Then you have to have campaign news.

And then what everybody now has realized is that just asking how much were you exposed to campaign news doesn't tell you what campaign news they were exposed to; and so therefore, now the idea is to bridge our survey data with media market content analysis to say what was on the news in Baltimore for these people to have seen on television. So, this is just by way of saying, if we asked a question like "do you IM" is that going to give you what you want? Is it enough for you? If it is, that's great —

*Unidentified Speaker: It's a starting point, because, I mean, what I would argue you need to do is to create an analysis of political activists and political communicators within the general public and those groups are different. When we measure them, it's through technology. They don't watch the local news, you know? They're on the Internet. [Portion unintelligible] I mean, frankly, I wouldn't spend another question on watching news on television — at all.*

*I think that you've got one, it's a trend, keep your one question. But if you're going to add questions, add about the Internet; add about cell phones; add about different modes of communication; add about social networks. I mean, all of us — well, some of us are old farts. You say, "social networking" to us, and we go, "Well, we don't do that." That's for 25 year olds. That's how they communicate, and that's how campaigns have figured out how to communicate to those groups —*

*Unidentified Speaker: So you could ask if they use them, and then ask if they use them for political participation.*

*Unidentified Speaker: Exactly. Pew internet project does that, and it's fun. It's just like the TV news questions. You sort of say, "What have I got in total?" But particularly with younger people that multiple sources of information of communication — no one question is going to work. You've got to [inaudible] across the technologies.*

*Unidentified Speaker: I think you have a great opportunity. You may be exercising it but maybe not. At the risk that you are not, I'm going to ask it. One of the problems that we have on the telephone is getting email addresses. Now, you're sitting there with a computer and you're going to ask people if they go on the Internet. Are you asking people to type in their email addresses?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** We've never done that, right?

*Unidentified Speaker: Well, you should, because there's the basis for going back to them with an email questionnaire. You could do some tracking, you could do some really interesting stuff, if you can communicate with them by email.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** And that's what the British Election Study did, right?

**British Election Studies:** That is indeed what we did, as part of this big experiment that David was describing, because we're interested in trying to see what happens when you do have the probability basis. Of course, that's the main study, so indeed we asked people about giving us information about their Internet address and so on. We want to do that again—

*Unidentified Speaker: It would be really interesting to see what percentage would give you their email address, because it's not a high percentage right now with the third party research.*

**Frank Newport:** The other thing, before I forget, it would be to have a screen in front of them and say, "Take me through the five sites that you go to regularly today," which I think would be invaluable — along the lines of what Evans was saying. If they have a screen in front of them, even if they don't have their favorites list, they're more likely to be able to recreate where they go typically in a day for news and information than otherwise. Maybe you already have that intent to do that collection, but I think that would be very good.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** No, that's a great idea. Yes, and just a quick footnote on something. I'm sure you're right that people would be reluctant to provide email addresses, but we pay these respondents. And so if we told them, "If you give us your email address, we will email you to make sure that you got the check," that might give them an added incentive.

*Unidentified Speaker: Another thing you can obviously do that we can't is ad test, I'm sure you can show people an ad on the computer. And, I mean, you know, you've seen our coverage. Things are framed in terms of ads. [Portion inaudible] show full candidates' ads. There's always speculation about what happened and what effect that ad had and it is speculation. In your monthly surveys, even if, and in deference to the NSF not being able to say, well maybe "vote for Clinton" or "not vote for Clinton," but even if you can do emotional responses to it and have some tangible data there, I'm sure my people would love to have that in a very timely fashion.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** So we should tell you that you can buy time on this panel, it turns out. What we call the "off wave," so as Skip described it, we sort of have 7-ish waves of these 19-ish waves that we're going to use ourselves. But all the other waves are available for you to buy time on if you want, at a pretty low price.

**Arthur Lupia:** With the caveat that it can't be political content? *[inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes.

**Arthur Lupia:** Right, you can't put political content on the off waves.

*Unidentified Speaker: You cannot?*

**Arthur Lupia:** No.

*Unidentified Speaker: So that means we couldn't give you an ad and say, "Show this or test this?"*

**Arthur Lupia:** Not on an off wave. I mean, the decision is whether we would put something like that on a political wave.

*Unidentified Speaker: So you could put it on? Could put it on? [Group Laughter]*

*Unidentified Speaker: When do you guys make the final decision? Who makes the final decision on the questionnaire? And if after this meeting we think of something, where do we go?*

**Arthur Lupia:** On the 2008, we're not even at the end of our production schedule for the questionnaire, so that is wide open, except for the core. On the panel study, *[inaudible] two and a half months? [Interjection inaudible]* Right, so we just mailed in the February '08 questionnaire last night. In terms of the process, it's the opening Online Commons. Everybody can see all the proposals and comment on them.

Then there's a board of overseers meetings. It's a team of, what, 18 scholars from a number of different disciplines, and there's a review there. And then, you know, we take that and we communicate with people, at the end of the day we try and get that into an instrument. So at the end of the day we're accountable to the foundation — Jon and I, so we make the final decisions.

But we're trying to make the whole procedure transparent so that people can see, you know, what we're thinking. And when we communicate with individuals, it's both us trying to say, "Well, here's what we think the needs of the study are," but also trying to draw them out and say, you know, "now that you have these means, are there ways that we can help you and you can help us?" *[Interjection inaudible]* That's correct.

Oh, yeah. No, I mean, for the pilot study, for example, we had over 1,100 questions proposed. Now, we can run about 120. You know, on the panel study we have more real estate. We have about 30-minute equivalents seven times, and so that's about 210 minutes. We have about 1,100 questions there, but a number of them would be repeated.

What I should say, too, when I talk about 1,100 questions, that's the absolute number. A lot of them are on the same topic. So, what we can do is if we get four or five proposals on the same topic, we'll talk with a group of scholars and try and get them to go back and forth with us about the best way of measuring these things. Or sometimes we'll get a proposal from outside. *[Interjection inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** No, you have to do it.

**Arthur Lupia:** Nothing prevents it. On the online comments, you know, you guys want to write proposals — you're in. There's no status; there's no exit. It's all about ideas.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Tell us what you want.

*Unidentified Speaker: How many are in the panel?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** It starts at about 2,000, and then it will shrink over time.

*Unidentified Speaker: The response rate for the in-person sample?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, we're predicting above 70 this year. RTI is doing the fieldwork, and they have a track record of hitting 80 on face-to-face surveys.

*Unidentified Speaker: So, I mean, how good do you think that it could be at helping determine how biased a telephone sample at getting voters versus — ?*

*Unidentified Speaker: I have a suggestion on that, if I might. I think it would be really helpful if you could—and I don't see it here—code the data for the ease of difficulty for which contact was made, and the cooperation was obtained. And then you could set variables that would in effect mimic a range of response rates.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** We have that, actually, and analyses like that have been done of our data. Pretend that you run out of money after a 30 percent response rate. It's kind of like Andy's studies, but not separate designs. It's reanalyzing the subsets, because we know how many callbacks. We know if they refused and were converted, and so it turns out that it supports Andy's stuff. You can shrink the response rate considerably and the sample size shrinks, and the power you have shrinks, but the results don't change.

*Unidentified Speaker: What variables do you use to make that analysis? Is it the number of callbacks?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, you could do it in a bunch of different ways, right? The first thing you could do is just by date. So, you can say let's pretend we ran out of money after two weeks instead of two months. Then secondly, you can say, "More callbacks versus less callbacks." Then you could do it, "Did they refuse or not, and then you converted them in?" And you get the same result no matter what you do.

Let me say that those data are available to you. You could think of it in your language as you could submit a foyer request. It's not really a foyer request; it's that we have lots of confidential data, including getting back to Andy's comment. We have the full transcripts of their answers to open-ended questions that do not get released to the general public, but you can get them if you sign an agreement to keep them super confidential. That's the same thing for all of this other stuff.

You can get like geographic locations and other stuff that you could conceivably use to identify the respondents, but you sign a thing where you say — I mean, you can write and analyze stuff, but you just won't reveal the identities of the respondents.

*Unidentified Speaker: I have one suggestion related to this. You know, one of the things that we struggle with in telephone surveys is predicting turnout. I thought your little capsule of some previous work on that was quite interesting, and I'll think about how we might be able to make use of that. But, you know, we a few years ago did an experiment in a mayoral race in Philadelphia, in which we asked a number of different questions, the old Gallup series which is basically what we're using, but a lot of variations on that.*

*And then we validated the vote — sort of, but pretty well, and not great — and then we tried to figure out, is there some magic combination of questions that could really predict who really does turn out as opposed to what you're telling me. I'm wondering if you are planning to validate the vote, if you have the capability of doing that. So that in your fall pre-election panel you might include some interesting measures, and then you could have a fight between, you know, enhanced models that you were describing and the kinds of things that we have to rely on in the telephone surveys. Maybe we could learn something useful about predicting who really shows up.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Right, absolutely. So, two answers to that and then we're going to go break for lunch, cause this could continue, but we have other things we want to grill you on. So, the first answer is absolutely, we're validating the vote. We're working with Michael McDonald at George Mason University, who I think is kind of the leader in the country on this stuff. He's writing a proposal now to go to the National Science Foundation to get the funding to do it. We've contributed money from ANES's budget already to do that California analysis that I described for you, as a kind of feasibility test to say, "How well can we take official voter records now and match them up to our survey respondents?" Cause you have to go through an algorithm of matching.

And, it went very well. We are very confident about the match process, and so we will invest what it takes. Now, as you know, you have to get it state by state, and the state records vary a lot in how sophisticated they are. We didn't pick California to start with by random lottery, because California is way better than a lot of other places, and so we'll see how it goes.

We're committed to validation, but an important thing to bear in mind is that NES did validate for a number of years in the '80s and stopped, because they concluded that there were enough errors in the validated side of things, and there was enough match-up between the two that we weren't gaining a lot. Nonetheless, we want to have it ourselves.

Let me just take this opportunity to toss this out, so that we can talk about it over lunch. It's your Philadelphia study that I thought was an interesting illustration of this point. So we ask a pre-election question in September, and we say, "If the election were held today, who would you vote for?"

And the purpose is to gauge if the election were held today, who would you vote for? Well, I think what you want to do, if that's the logic, is you want to figure out who would vote today if the election were held today. You don't want to figure out who would vote two months later in November, to then find out how they would vote in an election today, and so the idea of thinking that in September you can know whether they're going to vote or not in November —likely voters are a stable group.

I mean, we now know, thanks to the reanalysis of the Gallup data that the bumps after the conventions are partly illusory based upon that screen. And we thought we were getting a stable group, but no, the group is

actually changing. I think that's actually the reality of it; not the problem. So the idea then being, if you want to validate likely voter screens, maybe one way to think about it is not trying to figure out who's going to vote on Election Day, but use, for example, candidate evaluations today in that turnout model to figure out who would vote today. And that's a different matter, and so we'll leave it at that. On that note— *[inaudible]*

**David Howell:** No, you've said it all. Actually, there's a preliminary report on our website, though, about the California exercise. It just goes to show that it's more feasible these days technology-wise and administratively than it was in the '80s. But as Jon said, this is something that we're working with Michael McDonald on to make real in 2008.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** So, on that note, can we break for lunch? And come back at five after. We'll start at five after. Thank you so much, this is fabulous so far.

*[Lunch Break]*

**Arthur Lupia:** — And going through the middle of 2009. So, the idea is, we're going to be in the field for 19 months, and the question is what would you want us to measure over that time? Unlike the time series study, there is no core on face-to-face. There is no requirement to be consistent to prior ANES polls, and so we're really trying to think about how you leverage this instrument in ways to get all of the essential measures but to get new things, too. So, that's the basic design.

Again, as we've talked about before, I've done some questions in the interim. This is an Internet-based panel study, but the panel itself is being recruited by RDD, and then the initial contact is through the phone — the normal methods — and then the people are being asked to sign up on the panel. We have 19 waves scheduled, first one in January. Again, one of the ideas is we want to track people from the beginning of the year and stay with them through the end, but we also want to see what happens to them the months after the election, how their feelings about the new president might be affected by transitions they went through at times in 2008. Is there anything else we want to say about this? So, that's the basic idea. You have 19 months with the same people. What do you want to ask them?

**Susan Pinkus:** I guess I'm a little worried that you're using the same people for 19 months. Is there some sort of like panel effect? Will you have a control group that will just be regular RDD to see if there is any difference in attitudes or behavior?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** So, two parts to that. Definitely, there would be the potential that if we had 19 months' worth of political questions that people would quickly realize this is a political panel survey and select out based on lack of interest in politics. And so the reason that there's sort of this firm restriction on only 7 of the 19 waves being in politics is to make it seem like the topics are all over the place on the survey and minimize that at least.

But the fact is still, before the election, we will have interviewed people four times out of a period of 11 months when we will have asked them about politics. Clearly, there is the potential for those questions to influence what they do, just like in our main survey where we interview them right before the election and then after the election. There's almost certainly some influence there. So we can't get around it, probably. We won't have a post-election only sample that will be interviewed for comparison, but maybe you will. I mean, we could try to put some questions on ours that are on your post-election surveys and compare that way, but other than that, there isn't a control group that will just be recruited afterwards in our budget.

*Unidentified Speaker: That's a good idea, if you're looking for some coordination where we could help each other. Maybe the polling organizations could divide up who asks the control questions that month or something, or that might be something to look at.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, or we could take your questions and put them on ours. That's the way to look at it too.

**Andy Kohut:** One of the things that we found in using that survey is that some questions because of mode effects, some questions track and some questions do not. We could not, as Scott could tell you more about this, we could not use, for example, our news interest index questions — how closely do you follow this, that and the other thing, on that survey, even experimenting with different ways of presenting it to Internet respondents.

So, one piece of advice would be to think about the kinds of things that you want to track that you want to be parallel to your personal interview surveys, and limit your questions, or at least knowingly go in there with some sense of what's going to line up on the basis of they're not mode-sensitive on these Internet surveys with your personal interview surveys.

I don't know how much room you have for the flexibility in testing in the beginning. But you could take some of your standard measures that don't move much from year to year and see the extent to which they play differently on the Internet. Now, that's not a substantive suggestion, but it's one that I would recommend within the potential ethological issues. They're not sampling so much as they are a way people react to questions on the Internet versus on the phone.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Do you have a sense, from your experience, of how to anticipate what questions are going to be mode-sensitive and which ones aren't or is it— ?

**Andy Kohut:** No, it's a puzzle. Some of them work and some of them don't. I mean, it's like the experience that we went through when we converted from personal interview to telephone. The only way that we could figure it out was to do service simultaneously in saying, "This doesn't make any sense, and so it's obviously not working the same way." There were some questions that, I mean, you could figure out why. Scott, do you want to say a little bit about this and what we learned trying to do this?

**Scott Keeter:** The example that Andy is talking about is our standard news interest questions which we've been asking for 20 years, how closely you're following this particular sport or that particular sport. We put a module of those on Knowledge Networks, at the same time that we were doing the telephone surveying and we got very different results. We said, "Oh, it's because we were putting them all up there in front of them. You know, five of these items all on one screen for somebody, and so they're seeing all of the items and they're able to calibrate.

So then we went back and did it again, asking them serially the way that you would get them on the telephone, and we still didn't get them to track. So, we just came away with the conclusion that it doesn't work, but we still don't exactly know why. I should send you the data, Jon, you could ransack them [inaudible]

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yeah, and that's actually important. Cause in the stuff we've done, I'm like startled at how closely they track. And this would be an importance instance, which I haven't seen yet, where they don't. Yes, we'd love to look at that.

**John Curtice:** I mean, the argument that's often used is it's those things which are more sensitive, people may be more reluctant to declare [inaudible]. So for example, some of your questions on attitudes towards blacks and Hispanics would be of this color. But, I was wondering, Jon, [inaudible] this discussion, when you recruit people on RDD, are you going to ask them some questions by RDD at that stage, which you will then repeat on the Internet relatively soon thereafter? Cause, obviously, that gives you the chance of looking at duplicating mode effects within individuals, which is arguably more powerful than looking at mode effects between two independent [inaudible]

**Jon A. Krosnick:** No, we are going to ask them questions on the RDD, but it hadn't occurred to us to repeat the questions. We're feeling so pressed for space right now that just for this luxury of that —

**John Curtice:** Yes, but there will probably be somewhere you do want to do the tracking anyway? In which case, you've got potentially a methodological experiment [Portion inaudible]

**Frank Newport:** Back to your question, what Evans was saying, to me the thing that would be of most value from this long panel would be specific, highly detailed use of media. And I'm sure that you have questions in there, but maybe even more than you have now. Cause that's what the panel can really tell us. It has in the past, some panels, but I think more so this year than in others. Exactly what is the pattern by which voters begin to tune into the campaigns, and where do they begin to get information as it rides up through September and on to the election?

*Unidentified Speaker: And sort of adding onto that, and maybe this is inappropriate for your framework, but I would be interested to know how people learn or unlearn things over the course of the campaign initially through this primary period — however long it lasts. People clearly are picking up some information. Do they lose that over the course of the campaign, or as the campaign goes underground, does it pop up again, if at all? And is there any residual loss? Do people, essentially, because of the length of this campaign, [inaudible] did people lose information, get were interested initially, and then just get bored and never quite return?*

**Frank Newport:** That's excellent, because one of the big outcomes of this year will be a reevaluation on the part of everybody about the early primary, the late conventions where we have six months of an interregnum. And if you have data, if the NES has data which would enable us to say something like what like Rich was saying, you know, "During this time period people totally tune out [inaudible]," or whatever happens, I think could be invaluable for those who are proposing that we have a national primary in May next cycle or whatever is going to be proposed after this year. This is a unique opportunity. [inaudible]

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Right, because we had not been thinking about questions that asked about how attentive have you been to politics lately. We have been asking more general questions, so we'd have to work on rephrasing it to capture this.

*Unidentified Speaker: You'd also want to measure people, you know, can they identify candidate positions early on [inaudible] in the process.*

*Unidentified Speaker: They forget who the candidates are. By July, "Who's running again?"*

**John Curtice** I mean, you could look to this stuff about uninformed preferences. I mean, one obvious hypothesis given the nature of the campaign is that you'll find that people have relatively informed preferences in January and February. For them to repeat some of these questions in July, maybe they'll become less informed. So even without just asking this stuff about, you know, how much you've followed, just taking some of the theories about what are going to be the consequences of the campaign, and then seeing whether we end up with a dip during the interregnum. [Portion unintelligible]

*Unidentified Speaker: Does your panel design work against that? Because you will have asked people specifically whatever, you know, and if these are samples you'll catch that more clearly than you would on your panel. [inaudible]*

**John Curtice:** Well, the answer to that is that you're simply making it more difficult for yourself to find what it is that you're looking for. [inaudible] So, if you still find it, it's probably more likely to be true.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, but you're right. It would be valuable, we could do separate samples and look at whether overall rates go down. But it's particularly interesting to see who's less attentive, [inaudible].

*Unidentified Speaker: I was wondering just sort of on a different topic, what plans you have for the nonpolitical waves in distracting them? I mean, you've really offered them as kind of distracters, but clearly, this is valuable real estate. And so my suggestion would be that you probe opinions and attitudes and knowledge in other kinds of domains that are not political with an eye towards figuring out and establishing the general theory of knowledge. You know, how much is political knowledge really correlated with scientific knowledge, religious knowledge, about religion or other topics? I mean, those are all kind of interesting separate areas that you could try to speak to, but now that you have it, essentially the equivalent of an*

*extremely long and exhaustive interview with the same person — you know, you might be able to come up with something quite interesting.*

**Arthur Lupia:** *[inaudible]* Let me just say something about the off waves, because there's a contractual underpinning to how and why we're doing these things. One of the things that we're worried about is attrition and response rates, and so with all of the vendors we work with we've written contracts such that certain performance standards, you know, there's a number of things that are necessary, and then other performance standards affect the nature of compensation. They're not heavily scaled, but they're there.

And so, with Knowledge Networks there is a real premium on them being able to perform, you know, to get people and keep them. The idea, the main function of the off waves in terms of the bigger design is to keep people interested in being in this study, and so that's the primary functionality.

Contractually, we're really only paying them for seven waves, and they're giving us the other twelve for free. Now, the reason they do this for free is they're going to take content that they already have and have evaluated and have run a debriefing, and so they have some sense about whether respondents in their normal panel — which these won't be — whether they've enjoyed answering these questions. So, those are going to be the main drivers.

So, the contractual nature is they can bring us sets of questions that have these attributes, and we can accept them or put the ixnay on them. And, the one thing we've said *ex ante* is because of what we're trying to do, we just don't want political content on those off waves. So, that's our range of motion. So, if they give us questions about sort of nonpolitical knowledge, that would be great —

**Jon A. Krosnick:** I think that we can ask for it. *(Yes, that's right.)* We can say, "Please look through your archives and see if you can find this."

**Arthur Lupia:** Yes, and so that's a good idea. So, that's the nature of our mutability.

*Unidentified Speaker: You're not fishing to fill up those things with your own content [inaudible]— ?*

**Arthur Lupia:** No, they're going to be sent to us. Again, this is something that people can influence. There is the ability to buy, you know, there are other people who might want on this. You know, we have a veto over any possible content that comes in on an off wave, but we're open to a lot of things.

*Unidentified Speaker: So is this Knowledge Network?*

**Arthur Lupia:** No.

*Unidentified Speaker: Well, do you know how long the panelists you're assigned have been panelists?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** They're brand new. They're recruited for us. We're supervising the recruitment right now. Matt is like monitoring interviews, writing scripts —

*Unidentified Speaker: And all they will get is your survey ?*

**Arthur Lupia:** That's right, this isn't the Knowledge Networks panel. Knowledge Networks is administering it, but this is a separate panel. They'll only be answering our questions, or the ones that we approve. And they'll only be doing one survey a month, the normal Knowledge Networks panelist does like four a month. Is that right?

*Unidentified Speaker: Are they still WebTV? Or are they mixed?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** If you have a computer already, you use that. If you don't, you get WebTV.

*Unidentified Speaker: All right, and has the rural non-coverage been addressed?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Rural non-coverage is still the same issue that it always was, so there's five percent of households that don't have it. By the way, just for those who care, we have this other grant from NSF — I have a grant from NSF — to build an Internet panel with face-to-face recruitment that is going to happen over the next year, and so we will be doing some parallel collection. So the idea is, you've probably heard this idea already, so we're going to a random sample of households around the country, offer them a free laptop computer, free high-speed Internet, which we pay for to connect and pay for every month, and we pay them per survey. And we ask them to do 30 minutes of data collection per month for a year, and then they can keep the laptop. *[inaudible]*

**Frank Newport:** When can I sign up? *[Group Laughter]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** No, you cannot because you're not in the random sample! You might be in the random sample, but so far you're not — *(Arthur Lupia: It's unlikely.)* The idea is that this has already been tested out a little bit, and there was almost a 70 percent sign-up rate when they were not being offered a free laptop computer, but when they were recruited face-to-face. So there is reason to think that with the free laptop and so on, it will do better, but we'll see. Then we'll be able to do some parallel data collection on that for all of this other stuff, and so that's an opportunity to compare this RDD-recruited panel to a face-to-face recruited panel.

*Unidentified Speaker: My suggestion for a substantive area here has to do with tracking how different media audiences change the perceptions of the candidates, the issues, and the campaign more generally over the course of the campaign. Obviously, news audiences are more partisan than they once were, and they're choosing up where they get their news based on party affiliation to a far greater degree than 10 or 15 years ago.*

*And it would be interesting to see the extent to which you start out with where Fox viewers are now, where CNN viewers are now, where readers of elite newspapers are in respect to these measures. Look at how they change over time, and be prepared to make some observations about what the media did or did not do over the course of the campaign. You would be in a great position to study media effects, you know, in what is increasingly a politicized media environment — particularly on cable. I don't know how large your Internet sample is, but you'd want to have enough people who start out as regular, and at least occasional, MSNBC users and Fox and so on, *[inaudible]* know this as well as I do.*

*I think that's a tremendous opportunity, because you know, we see these relationships between media use and attitudes, but we have to judge from whence these people came. So you have a baseline where they start out, and we'll have a basis for looking at where they go over the course of the campaign.*

*We have a tool that may help you in judging this. That is we are, now our Project for Excellence in Journalism now has continuous content analysis of national and international news. And we're looking regularly at the differences between the way various media are covering a campaign. We are going to look at the similarities, the convergences, or the lack thereof, on a gross basis — on an aggregate data basis — you can look at it, obviously, on an individual basis and say much more than we can about the nature of change and its relationship to what the media does or does not do. So, I would really urge you to put a lot of emphasis on tracking by media audiences.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** So we should see how you're segmenting soon, so our questions can properly —

*Unidentified Speaker: You should go on our website and look at what the Project for Excellence in Journalism is doing, and look at the ways in which we've been measuring these audiences. There's no one way to do it, obviously, but I think that our content analysis offers you *[inaudible]* a lot of opportunities.*

*The first analysis that we did with the Kennedy School, January through June, I believe it was, of content coverage showed really substantial differences in tone about candidates and focus of various user positions covered. So there's potentially some terrific stuff as we go forward into '08 in this material, and you can do more with it ultimately than we can with our cross-sectional surveys.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Is starting panel size of 2,000 enough to break down, given your knowledge of—?

*Unidentified Speaker: Well, I don't know. What are we getting on CNN? We're getting about 20 percent on CNN, with a good measure of about 20 to 22 percent on Fox, CNN maybe MSNBC is going to be relatively light, because its going in the other direction. But you can do what you do with the 20 percent, and you also have the ability to aggregate the audiences of the "The Times" and "Wall Street Journal," elite media and other kinds of things. [inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, so we've got to ask more detailed questions than we have been, I think, is what it comes down to. Okay, thank you.

*Unidentified Speaker: One thing that strikes me is that in general terms using this kind of panel, you're able to fit some much more interesting models and explanatory [background noise]. One of the first slides you showed was this kind of pretty little list of predictors of voting intention. Of course, there you're never quite sure with cross-sectional data whether you've controlled for everything possible. [Portion unintelligible] Now, my general suggestion is to try and test some of those explanations in terms of time variance [inaudible]. In other words, if political knowledge changes, does that lead to changes in candidate evaluation? So used fixed effects, random effects and so you're basically using the panel as a method for controlling out all of the unobserved or observed, and inter-individual time in variance stuff so you can get rid of all of the [inaudible] economists, and just use this as a method of testing all these existing theories. [inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, I think that's probably the most important reason why NSF was enthusiastic about funding the panel, was for that purpose. And so, that rationalization analysis that I put up was a panel, like a design like you are describing. And so the question is, "Will the field of scholars rise to this challenge and do the analysis the way that you said, or are they just going to do the same-old, same-old?"

*Unidentified Speaker: Well, you can try taking a demonstration of it first, [unintelligible].*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Right, that's the future, we hope.

*Unidentified Speaker: A couple of different suggestions, not related to each other in the least bit, but from our panel survey like this, you've mentioned the importance of fear and being afraid. It seemed to me it would be interesting to do that, not only on the sort of terrorist attacks, but also fear of crime and being a victim of crime in their own neighborhood, and perhaps a different kind of fear — the fear of losing their job. [inaudible] economy's going in the right direction.*

*I think that going back to technology, I think it would be very interesting using an online panel to see people's patterns of using their cell phones and whether or not there are people who use a cell phone for a couple of months, and then for a couple of months don't have a cell phone. We don't have a clue on that, and so it would be interesting.*

*The other area which is totally unrelated to the first is whether or not a panel like this, if you could talk about individuals dealing with health problems, both on their own health problems and the health problems of their family members and friends. That's a very episodic kind of thing. The cross-sectional surveys get at it in sort of a strange way. A panel survey could get at some very interesting things.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, that's the kind of question that I think we can pretty easily get on the off waves and maybe repeatedly is, "How are you feeling today? How's it going? Any medical problems? Seen a doctor lately?"

*Unidentified Speaker: Or even with a medical problem for yourself or a family member. [inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Right, and when you say that it stimulates ideas like asking, “Is anybody in your family serving in Iraq? Have they come back?” Ways in which national healthcare connects to individuals, ways in which the War in Iraq connects to individuals and that sort of thing.

*Unidentified Speaker:* You could ask whether or not they have health insurance, because the definition of not having health insurance has to do with the dimension of time.

*[Background noise]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** —Yes, they do. As soon as we sign them up, the first survey that they do is what’s called a “Profile Questionnaire,” which is a slew of demographics. What did you have in mind?

*Unidentified Speaker:* *[Background noise]* No, I was just thinking, I mean, I have a lot of skepticism about the panel — I don’t know how much to rely on what changes you find in their preferences. *[Background noise]* *[Portion unintelligible]* But, at the very least, if you had 500 demographic questions on these people when they took their first survey *[inaudible]*, that alone could be really valuable to obtain that data.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, the good news is that this year is an unusual year for panel stuff, because not only are we doing this panel, but Annenberg is now doing a panel where they basically bought the whole Knowledge Networks — 20,000 or whatever it is — and they are now prohibiting all other political content on those questionnaires. And they’re collecting data over the same period we are, basically, and Associated Press is also doing a long-term Internet panel. And so, there are a bunch of these panels that are all going to be going at the same time, then there is also our face-to-face panel, our recruited panel. So at least we could sort of see if the effects are all the same across the different panel designs or not, and if they’re different—

*Unidentified Speaker:* *[inaudible]* mention of a control survey, just struck me as important, because at least if you’re *[inaudible]* compared to an RDD ballot, of course you’re going to have that in all national surveys *[inaudible]*, but maybe some other things like interest in the election, just something to get a sense of how valid these responses, how representative they are, how much they’ve been altered by the process.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, both how much they’ve been altered, and how much there is selective dropout of people of certain kinds, yeah.

*Unidentified Speaker:* Do you have controls, a design in place for evaluating that as it goes along through comparisons with — ?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** With Wave 1, and so we watch who drops out. And we can see if they differ from who stays in using all the early collected data.

*Unidentified Speaker:* But in terms of their changes in attitudes — ?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, that we can’t do, other than to compare to your data.

*Unidentified Speaker:* Right, so that kind of idea of a control, I guess, I would think a lot about that.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** NSF I’m sure is listening as you said that.

*Unidentified Speaker:* If you said this and I missed it, forgive me, but would you consider oversampling hard-to-reach populations? I mean, I speak not just to particular demographic groups, although that’s always reportable and would be of interest I think to us, but also segments of the electorate that often get coined every year whether we like it or not—soccer moms, et cetera, et cetera—that may or may not be difficult to find and sample, that kind of thing. I mean, is there a possibility of that design? *[inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, we are oversampling Hispanics. We have a special grant from NSF to do that on the face-to-face study. There is under review a proposal that may or may not be funded to oversample

African-Americans on the face-to-face study, and it's still possible to get funding to oversample other subgroups. I'm not sure how easy it would be to fund a soccer moms oversample, but you could try. So there is funding available to anybody; I mean, there's an opportunity available to anybody with funding to oversample however they want. And this is a new thing.

NES used to say, "We're not interested, you know? It doesn't matter if you have money, we don't want it." And now we're saying, "Yes, we're happy to partner with whoever has funding to influence the sample composition." I mean, the recruitment is probably two-thirds over, I guess, for the panel study at this point, so it's a little late to start recruiting special populations there, but it could be done. *[inaudible]*

*Unidentified Speaker: The panel is English only?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Good question. Yes, at the moment the questionnaires are only going to be administered in English. Actually, I would love to hear if people wouldn't mind commenting on this, I had my first Spanish-English experience recently where a survey was translated to Spanish and administered. There was, you know, a tiny number of people in the fairly large RDD who wanted the Spanish interview, and they didn't change the results at all. Is that typically what you all see? I mean, I don't know who does Spanish translations, but — ?

*Unidentified Speaker: It's probably not going to affect overall numbers, but if you want to look at Hispanic subgroups —[unintelligible].*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** You get a bigger "n."

**Harold Clarke:** Jon, and in Canada we, of course, have the question always of doing the interviews in French or English. We just simply offer respondents the option at the beginning. Canadians are used to it, because of the official bilingual law of seeing that option at the beginning so that works really well. *[inaudible]* It doesn't matter where they live in the country and it doesn't matter who they are, they've got that option and away they go. That works well.

**Arthur Lupia:** On the time series we'll be Spanish language interviewing, but not on the panel.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** We will do that.

*Unidentified Speaker: I was just going to say it depends. If you're just looking for voters, I mean, you can do a lot of things to bring people into your sample but then to have to turn around and chase them back out. [inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Exactly. Marjorie, you were going to say something earlier?

**Marjorie Connelly:** Oh, I just wanted to agree that I think we would be interested in people who *[inaudible]* about health insurance, asking questions about health insurance and also with military families. I like the idea of getting more demographic types of questions, would be interesting.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Would the value to you, just simply to see percentages of people in buckets or to do something with it?

**Marjorie Connelly:** Well, to have them and to then be able to look at their views on different questions. I think with healthcare finding out if they have any health issues would be interesting, but I think it's also mainly health insurance. On our last survey, we found that healthcare is rivaling—among Democrats—the war. And from other surveys we've found it's not so much healthcare on the availability of the healthcare, it's really the cost of it. It's the insurance, and that's sort of becoming more of the economic issues. So, I think people who have health insurance issues, who either don't have it or are underinsured, would be something that we would be interested in.

*Unidentified Speaker: [Comment inaudible] military families, could you ask it as a [inaudible] two-part or something like, "Have they been deployed to Afghanistan and/or Iraq," and also ask if veterans, if you're a vet, have you been [inaudible], have you come back from Iraq or Afghanistan. Especially [inaudible].*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Does anybody have a feel for how big are those groups going to be?

*Unidentified Speaker: It's about, I was looking at my [inaudible], about 10 or 12 percent.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Of respondents in an RDD who have ever had a family member participate?

*Unidentified Speaker: [inaudible] Well no, this was during the 1991, this was going back to like 2004, I think, 2005, it was 10 to 12 percent [inaudible]*

*[Portion garbled]*

*Unidentified Speaker: You get enough to pull out in a survey, a normal survey. You get enough to pull out and look at.*

*Unidentified Speaker: Yeah you can look at it, but you can't break them out in any way.*

*Unidentified Speaker: No, so you get over a hundred, two hundred, in a normal thousand survey. So if you had a big one, you'd get enough to look at.*

*[Portion garbled]*

*Unidentified Speaker: We do, because we called people back and found out if it was extended family.*

*[Portion garbled]*

*Unidentified Speaker: We started asking if it's a parent, sibling, a spouse, or a child, grandchildren. And we're showing [inaudible] 12, 13 percent [inaudible], I thought it was more like 13 to 16 percent, but [inaudible]*

*Unidentified Speaker: But there's another group on top of that who ask first, "Do you have a family member, yes or no?" and then "Who?" So that's open-ended, and we get a lot of cousins, nephews, but we're not counting that as immediate family, [inaudible] doubled, more than doubled compared to [inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** That sounds like good to have, right? If you can ask that follow-up then you can analyze it however you want. You can either include the cousins or not include the cousins. We can definitely do that on the Internet easily on a single screen by saying, "Indicate whether any of these following people have been serving." And, you know—

*Unidentified Speaker: [Comment inaudible]*

**Arthur Lupia:** We've been talking a lot about leveraging the dynamic aspects of the panel as it regards the months before the election and up to the election. But one of the unique things about the study is that we're going to stay in the field for another eight or nine months after the election. Does that provide any special opportunities from your point of view? We're still going to have the same people.

*Unidentified Speaker: [Comment unintelligible]*

*Unidentified Speaker: I think there would be an interest building back towards the next election cycle to see specifically how the candidate's ex-voters, particularly if that candidate wins — are feeling heading into the next cycle. Right now, for example, if you look at 2004 Bush voters, where are they? Always an interesting story. You can make something out of that, if you can track them going in, there would be a lag— By the*

*time you come out of the field, it might actually work perfectly. If you're eight months out from the election, and then by the time you analyze and everything else, we're a year away from mid-term. [inaudible]*

*Unidentified Speaker: It seems that you have kind of a unique opportunity using the election as kind of a wedge to see how attitudes change immediately before and immediately after, and look at bandwagon effects, obviously. You can see if the candidate viewed as a huge threat becomes less threatening when he or she is the loser.*

*I'm wondering if there are any clever things that you can do about assessing, first of all, the breadth and depth of the mandate that the winner would allegedly have, and how that changes immediately. I don't know if the eight months would give you enough time to really see much evaluation, but it seems that a mandate is always an issue. [Portion inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** So is the mandate, does it come down to why did people vote for this person? What preferences drove this voter or is it something else?

*Unidentified Speaker: Well, I mean, others can speak more thoughtfully about this, but kind of a couple of issues. One, there is an issue or a small basketful of issues that may, you know, be tagged as issues that decided the election. But, I'm always interested in thinking about how deeply felt — if that merely was, you know, a mishmash election, these rose higher than the rest, or people genuinely expect action and are either disappointed or pleased when [unintelligible].*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, that's I think really important. It's actually embarrassing, the National Election Studies has never really asked questions about how hard do you think that this president would work on the following issues, or "if George Bush is elected, how hard do you think the government will work on these issues, and how hard would you like the government to work on those issues?" And then come back later and say, "How hard do you think the government is working on those issues?" and see the—

*Unidentified Speaker: Also, you have that period when you have the cabinet being formed, that pieces of information are feeding into — at least then [inaudible] evaluation of what this new administration will really look like. It would seem in that period you have a chance to say something thoughtful about how people think the new president is doing even before he or she is doing much.*

**Frank Newport:** Do you have a measure of who do you think will win on the panel?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Normally, we would ask that, yes.

**Frank Newport:** As of looking ahead, who do you think will win?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Right.

*Unidentified Speaker: Or "as of today."*

**Frank Newport:** As an adjunct to that, you're asking what we might put on there. I think that it might be of interest to ask, and I don't know how you would phrase it, "exposure to polls." "Have you seen, or have any polls that you've seen recently about the race? And based on what you've seen or read or heard about the polls, who are the polls—maybe use the word 'polls'— showing as ahead at this point?"

**John Cuttice:** And you also need to ask them whether they believe them or not.

**Frank Newport:** Yes, well, you could also ask that as well. *[inaudible]* Rich mentioned the bandwagon effect, which we're often asked about that. This might allow some clever academic or other analyst in the future to say, "All right, we should track where does the frequency of exposure to polls change in the sample." I think that's something that's worth considering.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, that's a great idea. I mean, perceived closeness of the race was a predictor of turnout in that very first table I showed you. So if polls tell you it's a close race, then that might induce you to vote more.

**Frank Newport:** Well, the augmentation we're talking about here is to add the word "polls" in the survey? *[inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Right, and to actually say, "What do you think the polls show, if you've seen them?" To see if they can remember.

**Frank Newport:** I would be interested, it's self-serving, but very interested to know how accurately Americans track. We once asked, remember Lydia, "Right now, what is president X's job approval rating?" And we were surprised at how accurate it was. *[inaudible]* The public fairly aggregates the mean collective wisdom, but the mean estimation of the president's job approval rating, if I remember correctly, I remember that it was remarkably accurate to what it really was.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** How long ago did you do that?

**Frank Newport:** *Was that Bush?*

*Unidentified Speaker: It was Clinton, it was about 55 percent, so—*

*Unidentified Speaker: And Frank you can watch Power of Ten on CBS.*

**Harold Clarke:** Coming back to this, give us a point, though, of what you get from the rundown after the election. I think this is a really good opportunity for election studies to actually answer questions about the role of elections in democratic society in terms of how they influence public opinion. There are a variety of hypotheses out there in the public literature out there. I think you've got a really good opportunity to look at the stickiness of some of these things, like winners' and losers' effects. preferences for policy versus representation and various things like this.

So I really think that these interviews on the other side of the panel — on the other side of the election — are potentially really valuable to give a sort of larger picture on what this election means in this broader context. We're often criticized for ignoring it, because we do all of this individualized.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, I'll take this opportunity to tell people about a paper of yours, which is one of my favorite papers. Looking at the impact of election outcomes, and so the hypothesis that Harold tested was whether voting for the winner in an election leads you to feel more efficacious about politics afterwards. Our efficacy question says, "How well can you understand politics, and how much does government represent people like you?" And so the idea was that if you go and vote and the person that you vote for wins, that makes you feel terrific — like government reflects people like you.

And so he produced a result that looks like that, but much more interestingly, he showed you get the same effect among people who did not vote, that it's people who didn't vote, but who see their preferred candidate win say, "Yes, government reflects me. I can stay home and influence government!" This was a very nice use of longitudinal pre-post data along the lines that Nick was talking about earlier to document how this event and this outcome has impact. And if you didn't do both analyses, you would think that it was the act of voting, but you have to ask the right questions to know it's not that, actually.

**John Curtice:** How many of your waves are going to be post-election?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, in the panel study we'll have at least two political ones.

**John Curtice:** So the intriguing challenge you face is *[unintelligible]* the first post-election, right? How the post did? It would be interesting *[inaudible]* get after the second post-election wave, which is so much after and particularly, what are you expecting to get out of the second post-election wave without there being a

prospect, at least at the moment, of looking at these people going into 2012. *[inaudible]* So for example, is it true that people become disenchanted with a new president quite quickly, does that feed all the way through to the next election round? So, it's interesting. It's that second wave *[inaudible]*. Again, I mean, I can think of going back to informed preferences. Presumably, we might be able to get *[unintelligible]* demobilization of the election, all right? So, you should find the relationships between vote choice and various other things like policy motives *[inaudible]*, should weaken. Again, that's not really the panel design, you could do that with a cross section. So I'm intrigued as to what it is you think you want to get out of that second post-election wave.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, so we are not going to be in a position to do what these guys can do with their YouGov sample, where they're going to be linking between one election and the next one. And of course, NES panels, as Skip showed you, there are like 1972, '74, '76 panels where you could do that in the long-term.

But we're going to do like what Andy was talking about earlier, and what Harold was talking about, sort of the buyer's remorse sort of thing and looking at the idea that here's why this person got elected. And we know what the preferences of voters were pre-election, and if we look six months into this administration and we say, "Okay, do you think you're getting what you expected from this president and how does that affect your approval of this president?" So we know, for example, in fact, Susan was saying earlier that, "Is this generally true that after an election when you do an RDD survey and you ask people whom did you vote for, the percentage claiming to have voted for the winner is higher than the actual?" That's very general.

Where does that come from? Is that because the people who didn't vote for the winner are so disappointed and dispirited and depressed, they're not even getting out of bed and they won't answer the phone, or is it the case that people are saying, "I must have voted; I always vote for winners? I must have voted for the winner."

They can't actually even remember. So we can explore that kind of thing, and we can look at whether that number grows over time. Like six months later if we say, "By the way, whom did you vote for in November?" that we will know who they said they voted for in November, and so we can compare. There is some potential for those kinds of things too, but it's along the lines, actually, my favorite book on this is Andre Blais's book — I think it's with other people too. And I can't remember what the name of it is, but it's like within the last two years.

**Arthur Lupia:** About losing, right? The one about losing, losers — ?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, what happens if your candidate loses, and what's the result of that for you in terms of your engagement in politics and your view of the system, all of that sort of thing. So that was our model that we were thinking of.

*Unidentified Speaker:* Are you going to validate the vote *[unintelligible]*?

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yeah.

*Unidentified Speaker:* But then you can know who they voted for?

*Unidentified Speaker:* Not necessarily.

**Jon A. Krosnick:** How could we know who they voted for?

*Unidentified Speaker:* Just in terms of their disenchantment, one of the things that would be interesting to look at is their attention to media. The people that lost stop watching television *[inaudible]*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, it's too upsetting to see this president being celebrated left and right. Yeah. That's a great idea.

*Unidentified Speaker: Would you also ask some questions of the nonvoter, the ones who say that they don't vote? (Absolutely.) To try and find out why, and what motivated them not to vote or get into it? Because I know we've had a couple of nonvoter polls or series of questions, and it just seemed so like conventional wisdom. "I'm too busy; I didn't have time; I couldn't get a babysitter, et cetera." But I wonder if it's deeper than that, and sort of delve into the nonvoter psyche and why they didn't come in to vote.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, and I'll give you the humorous answer. The right answer is, "I don't own my house, and I haven't lived in this city long enough." That was a joke from the regression, but the more serious answer is that there is like 50 years of research in psychology suggesting that if you ask people why did you do something or why did you not do it, you're going to get made up answers that aren't really reflecting the process. And that's, of course, doubly complicated when you have a social desirability complication to the reporting process. I believe we will have minimal social desirability problems on the computer, because there won't be somebody to frown when you answer. I think that on the academic side there would be a lot of skepticism about an open-ended "why didn't you vote" thinking that that's really going to give you the answer.

*Unidentified Speaker: No, but I'm just saying if you could get at it somehow, that would be, I think, a great asset for us.*

**Arthur Lupia:** Why don't we make this the last question of, and then we'll have a break.

*Unidentified Speaker: [inaudible] Someone asked us recently about why young people don't vote. There is the typical hypothesis that they're disenchanted and they've zoned out of politics, and they're not interested.*

*So, I looked at the answers to our seven likely voter questions, which cover range of dimensions of voting about age, and in terms of answering "how interested are you in the election; how definite or certain are you to vote on the 10-point scale; how certain are you to vote on a verbal scale; how much thought have you given to the election" —really very little difference by age. The youngest category is not that much different from the remaining categories.*

*The main difference is on "have you voted before?" It's getting over that inertia of doing something you've never done before. And, so, I wonder if using the panel, you could ask people, like put test questions in everyone's. "Do you plan to buy a ticket to an event? Do you plan to do something?" Then ask them the next month whether or not they did it. Some way to use the panel methodology to follow up with people on behaviors, and just kind of measure inertia — have you done this before, have you bought a ticket to a concert before, yes or no, do you plan to do it, and then the next one, did you do it. The people who have done it before know much more than the people who had never done it before.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** All right. It turns out that this is a great idea, and people have done this already. So, let me tell you — I mean, not in this context exactly. But they don't talk about it as inertia, but they talk about it as habit partly. And it turns out that Don Green at Yale did these wonderful experiments where what he did was to— I'll oversimplify it for you — take a random sample of households; send somebody to the door of half of them selected randomly. Knock on the door, say, "Hi, we really hope you'll vote."

And then the other half, they don't go, and then they look up on official records did people from this household vote or not. And it turns out that the knocking on the door increases turnout in that election. And then he looked at the next election, and he didn't go to any of the houses the next time, but the question is did the treatment group vote more at the next election, and they did!

Your habit idea is absolutely right, but your other idea is interesting too. Because, it turns out that there's this big literature and some of you know about this, where the hypothesis that started in the '70s was if I ask you in a survey how likely are you to buy a car in the next year, asking you that question increases the likelihood — it increases the people who actually buy a car.

And I found this personally preposterous, and I mean, one question in one survey causes you to spend \$30,000 sooner than you would have or whatever? *[Group Laughter]* So, I just couldn't believe it. The

author of the first paper, I emailed them and said, “Could you send me the data so I could actually look at them?” [They said,] “Oh, I’m really sorry, they’re proprietary. They’re owned by a company who gave us the data under conditions of not sharing them.” [I said,] “Oh, well, why don’t we ask the company if they’d be willing to share them?” [They said,] “Well, the company has gone out of business.” [I said,] “Oh, if the company is out of business, why do they care about sharing the data?” [They said,] “Well, I still wouldn’t feel comfortable, you know?” Okay, fine.

So then the example you may know about is that about a year and a half ago there was a paper that got attention on AAPORnet that was written by a marketing professor who did an experiment where he asked college students in the next 60 days how likely are you to use illegal drugs. Half of them got that question, half of them did not. He went back to them after the 60 days and asked them, “How many times did you use illegal drugs during the last 60 days?” and claimed that drug use increased as a result of this question in this survey — which I again found preposterous, and I asked for the data and I got the data, and reanalyzed the data and found mistakes in the data analysis, and we’ve now published a correction that shows there is no effect of this.

The reason that this is interesting is that apparently news media picked up his story, when the thing was pre-publication. And, so people from Congress were like trying to find out about the results to possibly shut surveys down, which is why it got on AAPORnet —

*Unidentified Speaker: So the obvious thing that they did wrong — [unintelligible]?*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Well, two things — one was obvious and one not. The obvious thing was don’t use Excel to do statistics, because they didn’t realize how Excel computes p-values, and so it gives you automatically one tailed p’s, and they thought they were two tails, and so they started dividing them by two. But more importantly, just think about college students and illegal drug use. The distribution of illegal drug use is very skewed; most of them don’t use drugs, and there are a few whackos who do. Sorry, I didn’t mean to be pejorative there. There are a couple of people in the sample who said that they used illegal drugs every single day out of the last 60, and unless you use negative binomial or one of a variety of different statistics and you just do a regular t-test, you will get the wrong answer because the assumptions are violated. This paper sort of documents how you should really analyze these data, but I don’t know if anybody will ever see the paper. But I just thought that you might like to know. All right, so I think Skip wants us to move on.

**Arthur Lupia:** So we have a five minute break scheduled, we might want to take it, and then we continue.

*Unidentified Speaker: Can I make one suggestion, [inaudible]. why don’t you ask these people, or some of them at least, to send you things online that are important to them relative to their choices, and get a collection from respondents of things that they see as important? I don’t know what you would get out of it, but you have an incredible opportunity with an online sample to have somewhat of a continuing dialogue [inaudible] when you go back to them. You know something about their attitudes relative to what they said to you. I don’t know what it would show, but you could do it on a small basis to see to what extent, how burdened they would be by it, but I would be interested in finding out what people would send me. If I asked them to send important stuff about the campaign as they encountered it.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** Yes, so it’s kind of like the experience sampling methodology that psychologists have been using where you fire an email to people at a random time, and you say, “In the last 24 hours what interesting websites did you look at involving politics?” So you build a collection —

**Frank Newport:** But it also sounds similar to the — what’s the stuff where you cut out stuff? You create a mosaic or a collage, yes. People have used that as a psychological technique. In marketing research you put together your own collage, and it’s very revealing and so it’s kind of online. You’re saying, “Send us your collage of things.”

*Unidentified Speaker: Downside is you’re gonna get some lunatics who are going to overwhelm you.*

**Jon A. Krosnick:** We can deal with that. All right, so we’ll take our break.

**Arthur Lupia:** So, *[inaudible]*, maybe come back at quarter after. And then for what it's worth, we're going to the lightning round where conversations are a bit shorter for a while, and pick up the pace of the day. So, quarter after please.