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TO: NES Planning Committee and Board

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RE: NES Pilot Study of Values REVISED

A debate has raged over the last two decades as to whether public opinion has any systematic basis or not. The search for consistency within public opinion was given impetus by Converse's (1964) original finding that the American electorate was largely unaware of political ideology and certainly did not organize their political positions along traditional ideological grounds. This conclusion was challenged by Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1979). They claimed that the American electorate was capable of thinking ideologically given an ideologically polarised electoral campaign or set of policy issues. Kinder and Sears (1983), however, point out that there are some flaws in Nie et al's measurement of ideology which raise serious questions about the validity of their conclusions.

The political ideology debate has moved increasingly away from an interest in linking ideology to policy preferences, and has instead become enmeshed within ideographic explorations of ideology on an individual (Lane, 1962; 1969; 1973) or ideological subgroups basis (Conover & Feldman, 1981). This approach attempts to deal with the idiosyncratic nature of ideological beliefs but adds considerable complexity to understanding the basis of public policy preferences at an aggregate level.

In the never ending search for public consistency, and amidst dissatisfaction with ideology as an explanatory concept, values have arisen as a

contender for the central organizing principle around which policy preferences are formulated. Individualism (Lukes, 1973; Feldman, 1983), egalitarianism (Rokeach, 1969; 1973) and post materialism (Inglehart, 1977; 1979) have emerged as the three values thought to play a major role within American politics and political beliefs. Values hold considerable appeal in this quest for consistent explanatory constructs relevant to both the public and their observers, because they are thought of as relatively stable, and less subject to temporal fluctuations than either attitudes or beliefs. The predictive utility of values is, as yet, not firmly established. Feldman (1983) has found a relationship between economic individualism and opposition to government provision of social programs but causal directions are unclear, as is the relevance of individualism to other policy areas. Rokeach (1969; 1973) has documented the prevalence of egalitarianism as a relevant value in a variety of issue domains including desegregation, support for social welfare, and attitudes toward the poor. Yet the case for values remains inconclusive for a number of reasons.

Firstly there is frequently a lack of consensus about what individualism or egalitarianism really mean. Individualism has a variety of connotations ranging from laissez-faire capitalism, libertarianism, opposition to big government, through to a belief in the efficacy of hard work. Egalitarianism, likewise, has been presented in many guises including both equal opportunity, equality of treatment, and governmental redress of societal inequities. One solution to this definitional dilemma has been to present values at a very general level of abstraction (e.g., equality) and hope that meaning is extracted in a consistent way.

This raises a second problem related to the context in which values are presented. Values such as individualism and equality are held almost unanimously at an abstract level but within a given issue domain are often brought into conflict (e.g., welfare state policies). In fact Lipset (1963) has characterized much of American political history as a direct battle between these two values. This poses the question as to how consistently abstract values are organized within themselves and are brought to bear on issue domains. Before abandoning values as a volatile construct, at least in their application to policy preferences, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at a number of interesting instances in which values have been measured at less abstract levels. Feldman (1983) found individualism to have a different meaning when applied to blacks than when measured at a general level, and Marsh (1975) argues that personal and political values are very different phenomena. This lack of uniformity in values across issue domains could be construed as yet another reflection of the public's inconsistency in dealing with policy issues.

There are, however, a number of competing explanations which argue for the exploration of value structures at levels other than the very abstract. An application of schema theory to the study of values would suggest a hierarchical value structure, with differing levels of value abstraction. A general belief in equality would be the most abstract level within an equality schema, lower levels of abstraction would incorporate beliefs in personal or political equality and at more specific levels this would become a belief in equality for various minority groups.

The most specific level in such a schema would be policy preferences.

The relationship between any given level of the value schema and specific policy positions would depend on the basic level at which processing occurs. This basic level is in turn seen to vary with the person's expertise, knowledge, and interest levels in the issue under investigation. One obvious prediction from this formulation is that the more involved in an issue an individual is, the more likely they will be to apply a very specific version of equality to their opinions about public policy.

A symbolic theory of politics also argues for investigation of values at levels other than the most abstract. Symbolic politics suggests that within each issue domain area there are symbols that have greater or lesser affective potency and while values themselves are symbols with an associated affect their application within a given domain depends on other relevant symbols.

It is proposed that values may in fact help organize policy preference decisions but not necessarily in the straightforward way suggested by current values research. This memo outlines a method for measuring individualism and equality at the general socio-political level and the more specific levels of race and gender. The interrelationship between values at these two levels of abstraction and their predictive utility to policy preferences is also explored.



I. Scale Construction: Values.

Equality Values Scales

General socio-political equality. Six items were chosen to measure equality and these items represented different aspects of egalitarianism. There was one equality of treatment item (v2169 at the general socio-political value level), two items measuring endorsement for equality of opportunity (v2175, v2256) and three items related to non-elitism (v2172, v2178, v2250).

The general socio-political equality values were measured during both waves of pilot testing; however, detailed analysis will be presented only for the equality values collected at time one. There is a highly significant correlation between the two general equality scales ($r = .65$) and this suggests value stability across Wave I and Wave II test periods.

An additive general equality scale was constructed by reversing the direction of original items so that an endorsement of equality was high and, non-endorsement low, and then adding across each of the six five-point items. The final scale had a potential range of 6 to 30 and it is apparent from Table 1 that equality of opportunity and treatment were strongly supported, non-elitism was not, and the final scale mean represented an item average of just above 3 on the 5-point scale. Thus, overall, respondents endorsed equality although the item mean would be increased as would the internal consistency of this scale by the deletion of the non-elitism items (v2172, v2178, v2250). This shorter three-item scale (v2169, v2175, and v2256) has a standardized alpha of 0.55 and is conceptually simpler than the 6-item scale presented in all subsequent analyses.

(Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here)

Table 1

Item means, item standard deviations, item to total scale correlations
and summary scale statistics for equality value scales
at the general, gender, and racial levels

Equality items	MEAN			STD. DEV.			ITEM TO TOTAL CORRELATION		
	General	Gender	Race	General	Gender	Race	General	Gender	Race
Equality of treatment ^b									
-v2169	3.97 ^a			1.42			0.40		
-v3192		3.70			1.44			0.46	
-v3200			3.77			1.52			0.48
Equality of opportunity ^b									
-v2175	4.35			1.15			0.32		
-v3196		4.30			1.18			0.36	
-v3204			4.30			1.12			0.42
Give equal chance ^b									
-v2256	3.13			1.63			0.32		
-v3220		2.95			1.54			0.42	
-v3226			3.14			1.58			0.50
People not too different for equality									
-v2172	4.02			1.41			0.11		
-v3194		4.15			1.24			0.46	
-v3202			4.37			1.18			0.31
Everybody cut out for important positions									
-v2178	1.87			1.28			0.12		
-v3198		3.81			1.50			0.54	
-v3206			4.52			0.91			0.15
Everybody good at running things									
-v2250	1.42			0.86			0.08		
-v3216		4.30			1.18			0.44	
-v3222			4.29			1.07			0.50
Summary Value Scale Statistics	18:77	22.76	24.38	4.09	5.41	1.07	Cronbach's Alpha		
							0.44	0.71	0.64

a. All items are based on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) agrrrment scale.

b. These items reversed to construct scale.

Table 2

Item means, standard deviations item to total scale correlations and summary scale statistics for individualism value scales at the general, gender, and racial levels

Individualism items	MEAN			STD. DEV.			ITEM TO TOTAL CORRELATION		
	General	Gender	Race	General	Gender	Race	General	Gender	Race
Hard work leads to success ^b									
-v2170	4.14 ^a			1.40			0.56		
-v3221		4.02			1.29			0.51	
-v3227			3.80			1.38			0.60
Hard work guar- antees success									
-v2173	3.83			1.55			0.47		
-v3219		3.32			1.61			0.50	
-v3225			3.51			1.54			0.49
Hard work gets you what you want ^b									
v2254	2.97			1.59			0.44		
v3195		2.95			1.55			0.61	
-v3203			2.77			1.54			0.54
Blame self ^b not system									
-v2176	3.19			1.56			0.33		
-v3217		2.77			1.57			0.44	
-v3223			2.91			1.50			0.63
Ambition leads to success									
-v2251	2.02			1.34			0.19		
-v3197		2.56			1.46			0.55	
-v3205			2.72			1.56			0.60
Try hard, get goals									
-v2257	1.90			1.16			0.40		
-v3193		2.34			1.51			0.49	
-v3201			2.65			1.63			0.45
Summary Value Scale Statistics	18.03	17.99	18.37	5.27	6.15	6.44	Cronbach's Alpha 0.66 0.77 0.80		

a. All items are based on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale.

b. These items reversed to construct scale.

Gender equality. The six basic equality items were reworded with the minimum wording arrangement, for the gender and racial contexts. The gender equality scale exhibited greater internal consistency than the general value scale (see Table 1) and had a higher overall scale mean. The reason for this was the endorsement of gender non-elitism. It appears that elitism was supported at an abstract level, but not when the issue was sexist elitism. The sample as a whole agreed with gender equality, and the scale mean fell between 3 and 4 on a five-point agreement scale.

Racial equality. The racial equality scale was also reasonably internally consistent, although the non-elitism items again lowered the reliability of the scale, but in this instance it was because these items were so overwhelmingly supported (particularly v3202 and v3206). The elitism items may have suffered from strong social desirability biases and may have translated less well into a racial context than a gender one. The overall racial equality scale mean is high (just above a four rating on a five-point scale) but is obviously elevated by the elitism items.

Individualism Value Scales

General socio-political individualism. Individualism value scales were constructed from six items that measured an endorsement of hard work as the road to economic success (v2170, v2173, v2254, v2176, v2251, v2257). Free enterprise items were also included in the 1983 Pilot Study but were omitted from the current values analysis because of the difficulty in translating these items in a gender or racial context.

The internal consistency of the general individualism value scale is reasonably high and the poorest item is one which contains a reference to ambition rather than hard work (v2251). The scale mean indicates that, on average, respondents endorse hard work as a general value. Items relating to the efficacy of ambition and trying hard, are not supported, whereas hard work items are. It may be fruitful to consider dropping items other than those referring to hard work from future scales.

Gender individualism. The gender individualism value scale has greater internal consistency than the scale at the general level with all items contributing roughly equally to the final scale. Again, the ambition and trying hard items are less strongly supported than the hard work items but the overall scale mean represents support for the value of hard work.

Racial individualism. The racial individualism scale has high internal consistency; all six items appear to contribute equally to the scale and the value of hard work appears to be supported as equally for blacks as for women or people generally.

Conclusions and Suggestions

The preceding section demonstrates the feasibility of measuring individualism and equality within differing contexts or levels of abstraction with not inconsiderable consistency. Equality can be most reliably measured, within all contexts, by restricting its meaning to political equality of opportunity and equality of treatment. Endorsement of elitism is more contextually bound and should be explored as a distinct political value.

Support for the efficacy of hard work appears to be consistently endorsed within both the general and specific contexts, and a scale could probably be reliably constructed from less than six indicators of this value.

II. Dependent Variable Policy Preference Scales Construction

Women's Issues

Government involvement. Four items contributed to this scale, one of which was a 4-point affirmative action item (v3171), and the other three were 10-point items for government involvement in women's issues, affirmative action, and equal pay (v3185, v3187, and v3189). (See Table 3.) All items were from the 1983 Pilot, Wave II. and contributed to an internally consistent scale. The government involvement scale was constructed by reversing items when necessary so that the high end of each scale was equaled with endorsement of a government role, standardizing items and then summing across them.

Collective action. A scale that measured approval of collective political action by women was also constructed from two items in the second wave of the 1983 Pilot (v3170, v3173). The correlation between the two items was significant but not extremely high (see Table 3) and the final scale was formed by adding together the two standardized variables.

Opposition to government social spending. This scale is constructed from six variables, one of which was itself an additive scale measuring preferences in 1982 for spending on health, education, and other social services (v311, v315, v319, v320, v321, v322, v323, v324) (see Table 3). The additional items

were support for guaranteed jobs and government services in 1982 and the rest were measured in the 1983 Pilot study and were support for government improvement of the living standard, government creating jobs for the unemployed, and government minimization of the income gap. Items were scaled so that endorsement of government involvement was low, standardized and additively combined. The final scale had high internal consistency and was used as a dependent measure in subsequent analyses.

Racial issues. Four items were used to construct an additive scale for racial policy preferences. The aid to minorities item was from the 1982 study, while endorsement of a governmental role in improving the position of blacks, promoting school integration and affirmative action were from Wave II of the 1982 Pilot (see Table 3). The scale had high internal consistency and was used as a dependent measure of racial policy preferences in later analyses.

(Insert Tables 3 and 4 here)

Table 3

Reliability analyses: Component items of
each policy issue scale

	Item to total correlation	Scale Statistics
Women's Issues		
Government Involvement	--	$\alpha = .77^a$
Government set aside jobs (v3171)	.37	
Government improve women's position (v3185)	.74	
Government promote affirmative action (v3187)	.75	
Government ensure equal pay (v3189)	.53	
Collective Action	--	$r = .32^b$
Women join together (v3170)	--	
Women should protest (v3173)	--	
Opposition to government social spending	--	$\alpha = .81$
Specific program spending (v311, v315, v319, v320, v321, v322, v323, v324)	.63	
Government improve living standard (v3181)	.70	
Government create jobs (v3182)	.65	
Government reduce income gap (v3184)	.53	
Guaranteed jobs (v425)	.50	
Government services (v443)	.44	
Racial Issues	--	$\alpha = .80$
Government improve blacks' position (v3183)	.76	
School integration (v3186)	.68	
Promote affirmative action (v3190)	.74	
Aid to minorities (v415)	.36	

a. Cronbach's alpha

b. Simple item correlation

Table 4

Summary regression analyses: Demographic and political predictors
for values at the general, gender, and racial levels

	Equality			Individualism		
	General	Gender	Race	General	Gender	Race
Age (v535)	.10	.16	.06	-.03	-.02	-.31*
Education (v542)	-.09	.08	.19	.03	-.09	-.16
Party identification (v291) (Republican)	-.03	-.02	.01	-.06	.05	-.12
Ideology (v393) (Conservative)	-.02	-.06	-.14	-.01	.14	-.30*
Sex (v762) (Female)	.06	.15	.19	-.01	-.14	-.28*
Race (v2355) (Black)	.00	-.25*	.11	-.00	-.09	-.04
Income (v2354)	.03	.01	.06	-.06	.01	-.07
R ²	0%	2.0%	0%	0%	0%	11.0%

Note: Entries are betas. Each column is a separate regression equation.

*p < .05

10

III. Demographic and political determinants of values and policy preferences

Values

Demographic variables and political predispositions were regressed onto equality and individualism value scales at the gender and race levels (Table 4). Neither demographic variables nor political predispositions (Party Identification or liberalism-conservatism) were able to account for any of the variance in the value scales. This suggests that both equality and individualism, regardless of the context in which they are measured, are independent of the liberal-conservative ideology dimension.

Policy preferences

Opposition to government social spending was the policy preference most strongly accounted for by demographic and political predisposition predictors. Party identification and ideology were primarily responsible for this (Table 5). Political ideology also contributed significantly to explaining the variance in endorsement for government involvement in women's issues, support for collective political action by women and government intervention in race issues. People endorsing a conservative political ideology were opposed to welfare state spending, a government role in women's and race issues, and also opposed to collective political action by women. Blacks supported collective action by women and government intervention in race issues significantly more than did whites. The only major sex difference was a stronger endorsement of government involvement in women's issues by women.

Table 5

Summary regression analyses: Demographic predictors
for each policy issue

	Women's Issues		Racial Issues	Opposition to Government Social Spending
	Government Involvement	Collective Action		
Age (v535)	.15**	.07	.17**	.12*
Education (v542)	-.18**	-.04	.06	.04
Party identification (v291) (Republican)	-.04	-.02	-.00	.34**
Ideology (v393) (Conservative)	-.33**	-.27**	-.33**	.38**
Sex (v762) (Female)	.16**	-.02	.06	-.09
Race (v2355) (Black)	.11	.16**	.25**	-.11*
Income (v2354)	-.06	.04	-.19**	.03
R ²	22.4%	7.9%	25.2%	34.5%

Note: Entries are betas. Each column is a separate regression equation.

*p < .05

**p < .01

IV. Predicting to Policy Preferences

The usefulness of introducing values into the NES schedules will depend in large part upon their power in helping us predict to and explain policy preferences. Thus a first consideration is the extent to which both general and domain-specific (or "specific", below) values make a significant contribution to explaining policy preferences, and especially a contribution not accounted for by existing measurement. A second more theoretical question concerns the understanding of consistency in public opinion, or constraint, or schematic thinking, depending upon one's orientation. A third question concerns the extent to which evaluation or affective preferences regarding the groups in question (women and blacks), as opposed to the cognitive complexities introduced either by general or domain-specific values, account for whatever impact these values have. And finally we will address the contribution made by these values measures to a series of traditional problems in the political behavior literature.

Simple explanatory power.

How much explanatory power do these values measures add to understanding policy preferences? We have summarized an extensive series of analyses in the accompanying table (Table 5a). It shows the R^2 for several component sets of variables as they are successively added into basic regression equations. The general methodology used in these analyses is elaborated at the end of this section (see "Method"), and the detailed tables upon which this one is based are shown immediately following that (Tables 6-12). Commentary upon all those specific analyses accompany those tables; all that is presented here is some overall observations about their general drift.

(Insert Table 5a about here)

What do these analyses show? First of all, the general values (in this case, a combination of the 6-item equality scale and the 6-item hard work scale) increase variance accounted-for by a significant degree for men in virtually every case, and for women in some cases. This can be seen by comparing row B with row A for each of the four dependent variables. This means that general values explain variance that basic demographics and the two conventional political predispositions (party id and liberal-conservatism) do not.

The two domain-specific sets of values -- gender and race equality and individualism also explain variance not explained by demographics and conventional predispositions. This can be seen by comparing row C with row A in each case, for gender values, and rows D and A, for race values.

Do the general and specific values each contribute something uniquely, or is their contribution the same? The unique contribution of specific values can be assessed by comparing rows B and E; and of general values, by comparing row E against either

VARIANCE ACCOUNTED FOR (R^2) IN SIMPLE REGRESSION EQUATIONS
 USING SEVERAL PACKAGES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TO
 PREDICT TO POLICY PREFERENCES

	Subs ample	Men		Women	
		A	B	A	B
GOVERNMENT AID TO WOMEN					
Demos/Party id/Libcon (A)		.20	.16	.10	.15
A plus General values (B)		.41	.30	.10	.17
A plus Gender-specific values (C)		.26	--	.29	--
A plus Race-specific values (D)		--	.45	--	.22
A plus General plus Specific values (E)		.39	.46	.27	.21
COLLECTIVE ACTION					
(A)		.16	.03	.02	.23
(B)		.19	.10	0	.24
(C)		.25	--	.34	--
(D)		--	.17	--	.36
(E)		.25	.23	.34	.35
RACIAL ISSUES					
(A)		.06	.42	.20	.34
(B)		.32	.57	.26	.41
(C)		.14	--	.28	--
(D)		--	.68	--	.54
(E)		.31	.71	.29	.56
GOVERNMENT SPENDING					
(A)		.19	.14	.21	.12
(B)		.24	.24	.20	.21
(C)		.18	---	.23	---
(D)		---	.28	---	.16
(E)		.23	.28	.20	.24

NOTE: The entries are the adjusted R^2 for the predictors indicated. Columns 1 and 3 are based on sample A, columns 2 and 4 on sample B. In these analyses, a less-than-perfectly reliable government spending scale was used, so those R^2 's can be increased with little effort.

row D or row C. A crude index of the contribution is its average value across these several disparate comparisons. The general values add either 1% (median) or 3% (mean) to R^2 relative to what is contributed by specific values. The specific values add either 4% (median) or 8.4% (mean) compared to what is contributed by general values. All this is truly crude and conceals some much more interesting patterning. But it gives us an approximate basis for concluding that the specific values clearly add something unique, and the general values do as well, though not as much.

Schematic thinking.

In a number of respects, these data can inform us about the locus and extent of schematic thinking in the electorate. Some examples may illustrate. The racial issue is more schematized than the gender issue. This can be seen in two different ways. First of all, racial issues can be explained more readily than can positions on gender issues. This can be seen in the third panel of Table 5a. It is particularly because of the powerful explanatory role of racial values. Second, specific racial values have more explanatory power than do specific gender values. This can be seen within any given issue by comparing the difference between rows D and A (the impact of specific racial values) with the difference between rows C and A (the impact of specific gender values). For racial issues, this difference overwhelmingly favors racial values (+45 and +27 vs. +8 and +8). For the two gender issues, it is pretty much a wash. For government spending, racial values are more important once again (+14 and +4 vs. -1 and +2).

Another way to tackle this problem is to consider the extent to which domain-specific values explain or mediate the effects of general ideology upon policy preferences. Operationally, this can be indexed by the extent to which insertion of domain-specific values in the equation diminishes the ideology term. Inspection of Tables 4, 6, and 12 will reveal, for example, that inclusion of racial values on gender issues reduces the ideology term, but inclusion of gender values does not. This means that ideology's effects upon gender issues are being mediated by some underlying schema of equality which people understand in terms of racial equality but not gender equality.

Men think more schematically than women do on gender issues. Men tend to use general values to understand gender policies, whereas women do not; they use specific gender values instead. This would imply that for women, the "basic" level of processing is more specific, less abstract than it is for men. This is a point made by Klein (1984) on the basis of much poorer data, but in some ways is tested much more precisely here. How can it be seen in the data? In several ways.

For one thing, the contribution made by general values to gender policy preferences is considerably greater for men than for women,

whereas for women a stronger predictor is specific gender values. Take government aid to women as an issue. General values make much more difference for men than for women (compare rows A and B: 21% and 14% for men, against 0% and 2% for women). On the other hand, look at the impact of gender values: much stronger for women (compare rows A and C: 19%) than for men (6%). To illustrate even further the fact that men treat gender issues as part of a broader equality schema, men use specific racial values to help them sort out gender issues, whereas women do not; to them, gender issues demand gender values. The impact of racial values on preferences about government aid for women is 29% for men, and 7% for women (compare rows A and D).

However, when we look at racial issues it turns out that women and men look similar. So we learn that women's more concrete response to gender issues is not due to some generalized lack of abstraction, but is issue-specific. In the third panel of Table 5a, row B shows that both men and women make free use of general values in understanding racial issues, perhaps because (as suggested above) the racial issue is more generally schematized in the population. Moreover, men and women both make free additional use of specific racial values to arrive at racial policy (compare rows A and D, or rows E and B for sample B).

Sophistication helps to convert general values into policy. We suspected that more schematic thinking (as defined by the use of general values to arrive at policy preferences) would be likely among those with more political information in general. A further question might be the extent to which domain-specific information would encourage more schematic thinking within a particular domain, but we did not try to tackle that here. Our approach was to run the basic regressions shown in Table 5a separately for respondents high and low in general political information (as indexed by questions on party control of Congress).

We will not present the specific data. However, the crucial tests involve estimating the increment in R^2 produced by general values (i.e., row B minus row A in Table 5a) or the increment in R^2 produced on one issue by specific values concerned with the other issue (e.g., specific race values as predictors of gender policy preferences). In either case, the respondent presumably is having to engage in some rather abstract thinking. In both these cases, we find that the increment in R^2 is considerably greater for the highly informed (+14% and +10%, respectively) than it is for the less informed (+4% and +2%, respectively) on the issue of government aid to women.

However, sophistication is not required or even helpful in translating gender values into gender policy; presumably the connection is obvious even to the uninformed. Here the increment is +14% for the highly informed, and a similar though slightly smaller +9% for the less informed. And finally even high sophistication cannot make general values relevant to the cognitively distant government-spending issue; they add but 5% and 1% to the R^2 for the high and low information groups, respectively.

These are but three illustrations of the kinds of analyses that can help us understand better the role of schematic thinking underlying public response to policy issues such as those affecting women, blacks, and government spending in general. They are not exhaustive of course but are meant to illustrate three different domains of analysis: issue differences, group differences, and the driving power of information (which of course could be extended into consideration of the effects of education, higher levels of cognitive organization, informational increases over time, and so on).

The role of affect.

A third general question concerns the role of affect or evaluation in producing these value effects. A simple model would be that responses to policy questions about blacks or women depend largely on how the respondent evaluates those groups. Hence the domain-specific values, which simply ask the respondent how he/she feels about the group in several different ways, merely pick up that evaluation, so their impact on issue preferences just reflects their affectively loaded quality, and says little about equality or individualism in general. If that were the case, there would be little justification for bothering with the values, since they would just be indirect ways of getting at that affect toward these groups.

Certainly we find much consistency within each issue domain, as shown in factor analyses we have done or in the reliability data presented earlier. (Table 4). Moreover, reliabilities tend to be higher for the race and gender value scales than for the general value scales, which would indicate a stronger level of consistency introduced by placing these groups' names explicitly in the value items. This can be seen in Tables 1 and 2 above. Third, the domain-specific values tend to have more impact on policy preferences than do the general values, again suggesting that the link of group name (with the transfer^{of} affect thus provided) breeds a common, consistent response (this can be seen in Tables 5a-14; it is true for both sexes with respect to the racial issue, and for women for the gender issue, though not true for men for the gender issue). Indeed the highest univariate correlations of all are between the two specific racial-values scales and the racial-issue scale (.66 and .52); next highest (of all the issue-value correlations) are the four specific-gender-value X gender-issue correlations, which average .37. So for all these reasons we would have the suspicion that the link between specific values and policy preferences is provided by common evaluations of the group in question, rather than some more cognitive process. It would be a pure form of a symbolic politics, in which the engine motivating consistency was affect toward the group-symbols.

The most straightforward way to determine if group-evaluations are mediating these effects of specific values is to index them (group-evaluations) with the feeling thermometers. We did this for the racial issue by using the difference between evaluations of blacks and of whites, and for the gender issue two ways -- difference between evaluations of women and men ("gender thermometer") and the sum of evaluations of feminists and women's liberation ("feminist thermometer").

However, we find that these thermometers have little impact in the kinds of analyses presented above. Let us suggest a few ways in which this is true:

(1) Once demographics, standard political predispositions, and general values have been entered into the equation, adding one or another of these three thermometer measures scarcely improves prediction of policy preferences at all -- even though they should provide a large increment, if they explain the great effect of domain-specific values. The increments provided by the race thermometer are +3% for the racial issue dependent variable (from 36% to 39% in terms of R^2), and exactly 0% on each of the other three scales. The two gender thermometers add a little more: either 1% or 0% for the "gender thermometer", but 9% for feminism on collective action (13% for women, 6% for men), and 5% for feminism on racial issues, and 2% (from 30% to 32%) on government aid for women.

Even these latter findings, which seem impressive, do not come close to matching the increment in R^2 produced by the domain-specific values. For example, gender values add 16% to R^2 for collective action, as opposed to the 9% for the feminist thermometer, and 8% for government aid to women (as opposed to the 2% for the thermometer).

(2) The thermometers do not do an impressive job of predicting to the domain-specific values, either. One could have a model suggesting that domain-specific values (e.g., gender equality) would be a simply function of general values (e.g. general equality) and domain-specific affect (e.g., gender and feminist thermometers). We tested this by looking at the R^2 produced in specific values by the relevant general values, thermometers, then both together. We took the unique contribution of either predictor to be the difference between the other's univariate contribution and the joint contribution of both; e.g., for men, the two thermometers produced 7% in R^2 on gender equality; general equality produced 34%; and both together produced 36%. We then took the contribution of general values to be 29% and of the thermometers to be 2%. A series of such analyses led to the conclusion that the contribution of general values to specific values was large (mean 16%, median 12%), while the contribution of the thermometers was small (mean and median 4%).

(3) Not surprisingly then, the thermometers add little to prediction of policy preferences when all the other terms are included. Nor do they serve to explain the contribution of specific values. Consider what happens in predicting to racial issues when demographics, symbolic

predispositions, general values, and specific racial values are included. The R^2 is 64%. Add the black thermometer. The R^2 goes to 65%, the beta for this new term is .10 ($p < .08$), and the beta for racial equality drops from .42 to .40 -- a negligible decline. Repeat the same reasoning for government aid to women, and the two gender-relevant thermometers: the R^2 rises from .32 to .34, the new betas are .14 and .05 (n.s.), and the gender equality beta declines from .29 to .27.

(4) Finally, the thermometer impact does not interact with sophistication. One might think that it would be greater among the less sophisticated, who would be less taken with the abstract-reasoning required by application of abstract values. The less sophisticated might in contrast rather prefer the elemental application of simple group-related affects (I don't know much about equality, but I know who I like). However, on none of our four basic dependent variables did we find impressive increments in R^2 resulting from the addition of race or gender thermometers to general and/or specific values, in either high or low sophistication groups. For racial issues, the increment was 4% for the race thermometer among the least sophisticated, the largest effect (from 51% to 55%). But in the other seven cases, the change ranged from -1% to +1%.

Why do the thermometers have so little of their expected effect? One can think of several possible reasons: perhaps we indexed them poorly, and certainly we can dole further with them (e.g., take feminism-evaluation as a difference from the average thermometer score for the person). The thermometers may themselves just be too obvious and hence reactive to be useful. Or possibly, as many social psychologists now argue, a cognitive component -- and a schematized one at that -- may be necessary for the affect to have the impact we expect of it. That would imply that our specific values, rather than the content-free thermometers, would be the better measures.

In making recommendations, our data analysis do suggest some answers to some practical questions, as follows:

The general equality scale is heterogeneous as it was used in these analyses. If reduced to the homogeneous three-item scale in on equality of opportunity, what happens to its value as a predictor? It actually improves somewhat but not enormously. The R^2 (for general values, demographics, and 2 standard political predispositions) goes up from 30% to 33% and from 10% to 13% for the two gender-relevant dependent variables, and from 25% to 25% for government spending. The betas for the general equality term go up from .31, .17, and .23 to .37, .28, and .26. So the change actually helps a little, but the rest of our data do not change much.

Are all six items needed in every case? Our substantive interests are served best by having all six items, because the considerably greater reliability at the domain-specific than at the general levels shows up with six but not with three items. However, we suspect that on psychometric grounds, three items would be possible.

Are equality and individualism equally valuable? We have not considered the free enterprise scale. But we have the following to say about equality and hard work:

(1) They are not highly correlated at the general level (-.17 and -.01 for men and women), but are considerably more highly correlated at the domain-specific level (.42 and .28 for gender, and .64 and .61 for race). Why these latter are so much higher is somewhat unclear; we have argued that the racial issue is better schematized in general; certainly the feeling thermometer does not account for the higher correlation with strong affect.

(2) Generally equality yields stronger results than individualism. In terms of univariate correlations with the dependent variables, both are generally significant but equality is generally higher. Hard work generally ranges around .20 or .30, which is not insignificant. However, when both are included in regressions, equality typically is significant and hard work is not (except on collective action where it is reduced).

(3) At the domain-specific level, equality generally adds significantly to the general values (in regressions), while individualism does not.

In short, one can make a good case that equality and individualism are distinct; that equality is the stronger of the two; that they relate in qualitatively different ways to our dependent variables (equality to government action for women and blacks; individualism to collective action); that domain-specific values have stronger effects than general values; that they have strong unique effects whereas general values have very weak unique effects; and that both levels of values have significant effects.

A variety of familiar questions can potentially be addressed using such measures. Here are some them.

How do reference group effects work? There is much work on self-interest in political behavior, which suggests that it is not a major factor, certainly not strong enough to explain group differences in political behavior. It is possible that group consciousness is a factor, and that will be explored elsewhere in this project. It is possible that simple group affects are the key. However, as the data analyses from the pilot study suggest, neither group consciousness nor simple group affects appear to be the major factor. So we need to look elsewhere, and possibly to some unique conjunction of values as applied to groups.

How does ideology have its political effects? For years it was thought that abstract ideology was not a factor, yet more recently the work of Robinson, Conover and Feldman, and Levitin and Miller suggests it is more potent than once thought. But it comes back in a different, more concrete form than it left. So it is possible that it works via some affect-laden symbols, and possibly via some fairly affect-laden conjunction of groups, values, and kindred symbols. Does being a "liberal" now connote being "pro-black" as some think?

What is the basis of mobilization of gender and/or race coalitions? Is it around some common sense of group interest? Is it around issues that are specific to the group; e.g., enhanced government activity on behalf of group members? Or is it via some values that relate to the group? If so, how much is brought under that particular cognitive tent? All group-related issues? Issues affecting other groups with similar problems? Government spending programs that have strong latent but little manifest connection to the group? And under what conditions will such connections be made?

VI. REGRESSIONS

Method

Regression equations were generated using pairwise deletion of missing values. In all equations, independent variables were entered in blocks. The first block consisted of Demographics plus the General Level Sociopolitical Values (Equality and Individualism). Next, Specific Level Values (Gender Equality and Individualism for Wave 2A and Racial Equality and Individualism for Wave 2B) were added. Finally, thermometer items were added (Feminist Thermometer for Wave 2A and Black Thermometer for Wave 2B). The Feminist Thermometer was constructed by averaging the values of the "Women's Liberation" thermometer item (V2199) and the "Feminists" thermometer item (V2186). The Black Thermometer was constructed by subtracting the value of the "White people" thermometer (V2190) from the value of the "Black people" thermometer (v2192).

The above stated blocks of independent variables were regressed against each of four dependent variables: Government Aid for Women (GOVTFEM); Collective Action by Women (COLLACT); Racial Issues (RACISSU); and Government Spending (GOVSPEN3). The construction of these d. v.'s has been detailed previously.

Regressions were run on each d.v. for the entire sample (Tables 6, 9, and 12) as well as for each sex separately (Tables 7, 8, 10, 11, 13 and 14).

VII. GOVERNMENT AID FOR WOMEN

Overall (Table 6)

The most consistently significant demographic predictors are Age and Conservatism. The older and more liberal respondents respond most favorably to the idea of government aid for women.

In the absence of Specific Level Values, the General Sociopolitical Value of Equality is seen to contribute a great deal to the equation. Individualism, on the other hand, adds very little to the equation. However, when Specific Level Values are added, the R^2 (for both Wave 2A and Wave 2B) jumps quite a bit at the expense, it would seem, of the General Level Values.

Neither of the Thermometer scales contributes much to the equation.

By Sex (Tables 7 and 8)

Demographics do not change substantially here, although Conservatism is only significant in one case for Females.

The most striking result involves General Level Equality vs. Specific Level Gender Equality. Here, the Gender Value is highly significant for Males, whereas the same is not true for Females. This would seem to lend support to the argument that Males are operating at a less differentiated level of processing for this d.v. than are Females.

Interestingly, the Specific Value of Racial Equality is also a fairly strong predictor for both Males and Females. It may be that, for some reason, support for racial equality is a more stringent test of one's support for equality (at least in this predominantly White sample).

Again, the Thermometers do not add much to the R^2 .

TABLE 6
REGRESSION - GOV. AID FOR WOMEN

		Demographics + General Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Specific Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Spec. Vals. + Therm.		
		Entire Sample	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B
DEMOGRAPHICS								
Age	V535	.21**	.19*	.21*	.16	.21*	.20*	.21*
Education	V542	-.18*	-.13	-.16	-.16*	-.25*	-.16	-.23*
Party ID	V291	-.03	-.01	-.05	-.04	-.05	-.05	-.05
Lib/Con	V393	-.28**	-.28**	-.27*	-.21*	-.13	-.21*	-.12
Sex	V762	.13*	.10	.20*	.07	.21*	.09	.23*
Race	V2355	.07	.07	.08	.05	.04	.05	.05
Income	V2354	-.02	-.06	-.06	-.11	-.03	-.12	-.04
GENERAL VALUES								
Equality		.31**	.32**	.27*	.18*	.12	.18*	.11
Individualism		.02	.00	.07	.05	.01	.06	.01
SPECIFIC VALUES								
GENDER								
Equality					.29**		.27	
Individualism					-.11		-.01	
RACE								
Equality						.39**		.41**
Individualism						-.02		-.01
THERMOMETERS								
Fem. Therm.							.05	
Black Therm.								-.10
ADJUSTED R²		.30	.24	.32	.32	.42	.34	.43

TABLE 7
REGRESSION - GOVERNMENT AID FOR WOMEN
MALES

		Demographics + General Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Specific Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Spec. Vals. + Therm.		
		Entire Sample	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B
DEMOGRAPHICS								
Age	V535	.23**	.13	.30*	.12	.25*	.11	.23*
Education	V542	-.14	-.25*	-.03	-.26*	-.19	-.24	-.17
Party ID	V291	-.16	-.18	-.26	-.19	-.22	-.19	-.19
Lib/Con	V393	-.21*	-.22	-.23	-.20	-.13	-.21	-.09
Race	V2355	.05	.00	.04	.01	.00	.03	.05
Income	V2354	-.03	.01	-.09	-.00	-.06	-.00	-.08
GENERAL VALUES								
Equality		.49**	.52**	.48**	.48**	.24**	.47**	.18
Individualism		.06	.10	.16	.12	.12	.14	.07
SPECIFIC VALUES								
GENDER								
Equality					.04		.07	
Individualism					-.06		-.08	
RACE								
Equality						.40*		.46*
Individualism						-.12		-.17
THERMOMETERS								
Fem. Therm.							-.11	
Black Therm.								-.21
ADJUSTED R²		.39	.41	.30	.39	.46	.38	.48

TABLE 8
REGRESSION - GOVERNMENT AID FOR WOMEN
FEMALES

		Demographics + General Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Specific Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Spec. Vals. + Therm.		
		Entire Sample	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B
DEMOGRAPHICS								
Age	V535	.23*	.28*	.20	.23	.24*	.30*	.24*
Education	V542	-.15	-.02	-.27*	-.10	-.30*	-.11	-.28*
Party ID	V291	.09	.15	.09	.07	.08	-.01	.08
Lib/Con	V393	-.36**	-.41*	-.38*	-.31*	-.21	-.23	-.23
Race	V2355	.12	.14	.12	.05	.06	.01	.07
Income	V2354	-.03	-.05	-.06	-.16	-.02	-.16	-.03
GENERAL VALUES								
Equality		.17*	.14	.20	-.00	.12	-.03	.12
Individualism		-.00	-.05	.08	-.00	.01	-.06	.01
SPECIFIC VALUES								
GENDER								
Equality					.41**		.37*	
Individualism					-.15		-.09	
RACE								
Equality						.32*		.33*
Individualism						.03		.05
THERMOMETERS								
Fem. Therm.							.18	
Black Therm.								-.06
ADJUSTED R²		.17	.10	.17	.27	.21	.31	.20

VIII. COLLECTIVE ACTION BY WOMEN

Overall (Table 9)

The greatest contribution in this case can be seen for the Specific Level Values of Gender Equality (marginal for Individualism) and Racial Individualism. With the exception of Conservatism, neither the demographics nor the General Level Values contribute much to the R^2 .

Not surprisingly, support for Gender Equality is a strong predictor to support for collective action by women. What is surprising is the fact that belief in Racial Individualism also significantly predicts to collective action by women.

In this case, the Feminist Thermometer does add somewhat (but not much) to the equation.

By Sex (Tables 10 and 11)

Regarding the demographics, Conservatism is significant in many cases for both sexes. However, for the first time Race can be seen to be a significant contributor to the equation, but only for Females.

The General Level Values are not consistently significant predictors for either Males or Females. In addition, the inclusion of Gender Values does not do much for the Male equations (with two exceptions), whereas both Gender Equality and Individualism (especially Individualism) contribute significantly to the equations for Females.

In contrast to the sample as a whole, Racial Individualism plays a role only for Males. Females respond more to the idea of Racial Equality.

Also, it is apparent that the Feminist Thermometer is only significant for Females (again, not very much).

TABLE 9
REGRESSION - COLLECTIVE ACTION

		Demographics + General Vals.		Dem. + Gen Vals. + Specific Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Spec. Vals. + Therm.		
		Entire Sample	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B
DEMOGRAPHICS								
Age	V535	.11	.14	.10	.09	.05	.14	.05
Education	V542	-.04	.16	-.20	.12	-.27*	.10	-.27*
Party ID	V291	-.01	.07	-.04	.01	-.03	-.02	-.03
Lib/Con	V393	-.24**	-.29**	-.21	-.19	-.11	-.17	-.11
Sex	V762	-.04	-.00	-.04	-.05	-.04	-.03	-.04
Race	V2355	.14*	.15	.18	.14	.16	.11	.16
Income	V2354	.06	.01	.08	-.05	.11	-.05	.10
GENERAL VALUES								
Equality		.17*	.16	.17	-.03	.07	-.04	.07
Individualism		-.01	.04	-.00	.12	.00	.12	.00
SPECIFIC VALUES								
GENDER								
Equality					.38**		.34**	
Individualism					-.18*		-.17	
RACE								
Equality						.11		.12
Individualism						-.23*		-.28*
THERMOMETERS								
Fem. Therm.							.17*	
Black Therm.								-.03
ADJUSTED R²		.10	.08	.11	.24	.20	.27	.19

TABLE 10
REGRESSION - COLLECTIVE ACTION
MALES

		Demographics + General Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Specific Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Spec. Vals. + Therm.		
		Entire Sample	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B
DEMOGRAPHICS								
Age	V535	.03	.07	.18	.08	.13	.14	.14
Education	V542	-.08	.05	-.10	.14	-.07	.14	-.08
Party ID	V291	-.03	.05	-.01	.09	.05	.11	.04
Lib/Con	V393	-.27*	-.57*	.11	-.46*	.03	-.52*	.02
Race	V2355	.02	.18	.00	.17	-.08	.20	-.10
Income	V2354	-.05	-.14	-.19	-.11	-.22	-.15	-.22
GENERAL VALUES								
Equality		.26*	.15	.25	.03	.34	.20	.36
Individualism		.10	.25	-.23	.11	-.10	.33*	-.09
SPECIFIC VALUES								
GENDER								
Equality					.34*		.15	
Individualism					.20		-.14	
RACE								
Equality						-.32		-.34
Individualism						-.53*		-.51
THERMOMETERS								
Fem. Therm.							-.02	
Black Therm.								.07
ADJUSTED R²		.12	.19	.10	.23	.23	.22	.21

TABLE 11
REGRESSION - COLLECTIVE ACTION

FEMALES

		Demographics + General Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Specific Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Spec. Vals. + Therm.		
		Entire Sample	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B
DEMOGRAPHICS								
Age	V535	.20*	.24	.08	.07	.11	.09	.11
Education	V542	.02	.25	-.21	.14	.05	-.26*	-.22
Party ID	V291	.00	.01	.04	-.08	-.26*	.02	.02
Lib/Con	V393	-.23*	-.12	-.52**	-.01	.18	-.29	-.32*
Race	V2355	.25*	.15	.39**	.08	.02	.32*	.35*
Income	V2354	.17	.11	.14	.00	.05	.20	.17
GENERAL VALUES								
Equality		.08	.09	.05	-.05	-.09	-.05	-.04
Individualism		-.06	.01	.18	.16	.10	.11	.13
SPECIFIC VALUES								
GENDER								
Equality					.37*		.35*	
Individualism					-.42**		-.39**	
RACE								
Equality						.34*		.36*
Individualism						-.14		-.09
THERMOMETERS								
Fem. Therm.							.46**	
Black Therm.								-.16
ADJUSTED R²		.11	.00	.24	.34	.48	.35	.36

IX. RACIAL ISSUES

Overall (Table 12)

Demographics play a more important role for this d.v. than for any looked at so far. Age, Race, and to a lesser degree, Income, are significant predictors.

As in the case of Government Aid for Women, General Level Equality is a very significant predictor until the addition of Specific Level Values. Here, the addition of Racial Equality boosts the R^2 (at the expense of General Level Equality), but Gender Equality does not. So, whereas Racial Equality was a significant predictor to Gender issues, the reverse is not true here for Racial issues.

The Thermometers do not make a significant contribution.

By Sex (Tables 13 and 14)

Subdividing by sex in this case does not change the overall picture very much. General Equality is a more significant predictor for Males than for Females. However, the same basic interaction occurs for both sexes when Racial Equality is added to the equation, although here the effect is more pronounced for Females.

Again, Thermometers do not significantly contribute to the equations.

TABLE 12
REGRESSION - SOCIAL ISSUES

		Demographics + General Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Specific Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Spec. Vals. + Therm.		
		Entire Sample	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B
DEMOGRAPHICS								
Age	V535	.24**	.18*	.26**	.19*	.25**	.22*	.24**
Education	V542	.07	.04	.16*	.04	.06	.02	.04
Party ID	V291	.01	.08	-.09	.07	-.09	.04	-.08
Lib/Con	V393	-.26**	-.13	-.30**	-.09	-.13	-.06	-.14
Sex	V762	.02	-.02	.08	-.03	.10	-.02	.09
Race	V2355	.20**	.14	.23*	.13	.18*	.11	.16*
Income	V2354	-.14	-.15	-.19*	-.18*	-.15*	-.17*	-.14*
GENERAL VALUES								
Equality		.36**	.40**	.34**	.31**	.16*	.30**	.17*
Individualism		-.03	-.11	.03	-.11	-.03	-.11	-.03
SPECIFIC VALUES								
GENDER								
Equality					.22*		.19*	
Individualism					.01		.02	
RACE								
Equality						.42**		.40**
Individualism						-.07		-.08
THERMOMETERS								
Fem. Therm.							.16	
Black Therm.								.10
ADJUSTED R²		.36	.24	.50	.27	.64	.29	.65

TABLE 13
REGRESSION ON RACIAL ISSUES
MALES

		Demographics + General Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Specific Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Spec. Vals. + Therm.		
		Entire Sample	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B
DEMOGRAPHICS								
Age	V535	.29*	.21	.24*	.22	.19*	.19	.19*
Education	V542	.22*	.10	.39*	.14	.26*	.12	.25*
Party ID	V291	-.08	-.13	-.14	-.10	-.10	-.11	-.11
Lib/Con	V393	-.14	.08	-.30*	.13	-.23*	.17	-.24*
Race	V2355	.18*	-.01	.24*	-.01	.19	-.06	.18
Income	V2354	-.17*	-.05	-.17	-.03	-.15	.00	-.14
GENERAL VALUES								
Equality		.47*	.58**	.48**	.53**	.29*	.55**	.30*
Individualism		-.01	-.12	.12	-.19	.11	-.26	.13
SPECIFIC VALUES								
GENDER								
Equality					.16		.13	
Individualism					.11		.16	
RACE								
Equality						.29*		.27*
Individualism						-.19		-.18
THERMOMETERS								
Fem. Therm.							.13	
Black Therm.								.06
ADJUSTED R ²		.41	.32	.57	.31	.71	.31	.70

TABLE 14
REGRESSION - RACIAL ISSUES
FEMALES

		Demographics + General Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Specific Vals.		Dem. + Gen. Vals. + Spec. Vals. + Therm.		
		Entire Sample	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B	Wave 2A	Wave 2B
DEMOGRAPHICS								
Age	V535	.21*	.12	.24*	.09	.29*	.16	.27*
Education	V542	-.05	-.02	-.04	-.06	-.09	-.06	-.13
Party ID	V291	.12	.37*	-.06	.33*	-.08	.27*	-.08
Lib/Con	V393	-.39*	-.38*	-.35*	-.32*	-.08	-.27	-.04
Race	V2355	.27*	.37*	.20	.32*	.10	.29*	.08
Income	V2354	-.13	-.13	-.18	-.19	-.11	-.19	-.08
GENERAL VALUES								
Equality		.27*	.25*	.30*	.17	.18*	.16	.17
Individualism		-.05	-.10	-.03	-.07	-.13	-.12	-.15
SPECIFIC VALUES								
GENDER								
Equality					.23		.19	
Individualism					-.08		-.02	
RACE								
Equality						.48**		.46**
Individualism						-.02		-.07
THERMOMETERS								
Fem. Therm.							.11	
Black Therm.								.15
ADJUSTED R²		.33	.26	.41	.29	.56	.31	.57