

Racial Conflict
in the 1985 NES Pilot Study

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Many observers have noted major liberalizing changes in whites' racial attitudes since World War II. These changes are perhaps most obvious in the reduction of old-fashioned racial prejudice -- relatively few people still support segregated public accommodations, schools, jobs, housing, and so on. But, despite this liberalizing change, the political arena continues to present the white public with candidates and policies that bear directly on race. Increasing numbers of black candidates run in jurisdictions with large numbers of white voters, white candidates must stake out positions on issues intimately related to race (such as affirmative action, busing, or welfare), and these racial issues themselves are on the public agenda, so that the white public is called upon to take stands on them. It can no longer be said that whites' responses to these racially-tinged political stimuli are simply a function of their old-fashioned racial prejudice. A new set of determinants of whites' political responses to racial issues must be assessed.

A number of previous studies have contrasted two very general sets of factors as determinants of whites' responses to racial issues: 1) self-interest, or personal racial threat -- the extent to which the political issue or candidate is perceived as threatening the white person's own material well-being -- and 2) symbolic attitudes -- longstanding attitudes toward various symbols of political and social life -- such as racial intolerance, political conservatism, individualistic values, and the like. In general these studies have found little impact of self-interest or personal racial threat, and much stronger effects of symbolic attitudes (see Kinder, 1986; and Sears, 1986, for recent reviews).

Others have suggested that a third set of factors may be even more important -- whites' sense of shared group interests that they perceive to be threatened by blacks' advances (e.g., Bobo, 1983; Rothbart, 1976). Whites may perceive that busing threatens the value of the education given to white children in general, that affirmative action threatens access of whites in general to the best schools and jobs, that government spending on blacks (e.g. on welfare) threatens higher taxes for whites in general, and that election of black candidates threatens to make government give preferential treatment to blacks in general. This group interest approach suggests that whites perceive themselves as having shared interests with other whites, and that

those shared interests are threatened by pro-black government policies or candidates.

We felt that these three approaches -- perceived racial threat, symbolic attitudes, and group interest -- were all potentially important components in the overall measurement of racial group conflict. The 1985 NES Pilot Study contained measures of all three of these approaches (as well as several other approaches, covered in the Kinder and Sanders memo) in exploring the racial attitudes of white Americans. In this memorandum we focus particularly on the properties of new measures of group interest, and evaluate whether they increase our ability to explain phenomena such as whites' racial policy preferences, whites' evaluations of black political candidates, and whites' evaluations of the President and presidential performance.

In developing and evaluating these measures we were primarily concerned with four theoretical issues about the political implications of racial group conflict. As indicated in an earlier memo (Sears & Huddy, 1986), the group interest approach raises questions about 1) the distinction between group interest and group conflict, 2) the extent of and nature of any involvement of the self in group conflict, 3) the role of racial affect in group conflict, and 4) the possibility that group conflict is heightened by intergroup contact. These questions correspond to the major sections of this report.

Sample

In this memorandum we report data from white (Caucasian, Asian-American, Hispanic-American, and Native-American) respondents only. We combined responses from the cross-section (n=350) and the elderly oversample (n=46). Among respondents 60 years of age and over (the age range of the oversample) there were no significant differences between the two samples on any of the demographics, racial conflict measures, or dependent variables (except that respondents in the oversample were more likely to feel a sense of social identity as a white person, that is to think of themselves as "white," than respondents in the cross-section). Furthermore, there were no differences between the cross-section as a whole, and the combined sample in the marginals, means, and standard deviations of any of the racial items. Thus, the unweighted sample (n=396) was used in reporting marginal frequencies, while the weighted sample (n=612) was used for computing correlations, and running regressions and factor analyses.

Group Interest versus Group Conflict

A potentially important distinction in research on the political effects of groups is between group interest and group conflict. Group conflict involves the perception of

interdependence between blacks and whites in political outcomes. Hence for the group conflict model to hold, whites must feel that a particular policy would advantage blacks to the disadvantage of whites; e.g., whites must perceive that preferential treatment in jobs for blacks will result in a significant loss of job opportunities for whites. A simple group interest model would not make this zero-sum assumption. Rather, one group would be affected and the other one not; e.g., affirmative action could help blacks without hurting whites.

Four items were included in the pilot study to measure the extent to which whites perceive interdependence of outcomes between blacks and whites. This series of items -- perceptions of intergroup conflict in the areas of jobs, school admissions, affirmative action, and opportunities for advancement -- appears in Table 1.

Two of the items asked respondents for assessments of the likelihood that an equally or less qualified minority person might receive preferential treatment in hiring or promotion (v8335) or school admissions (v8334) compared to a white person. For each item, about one-half of the respondents thought that these events were "somewhat likely to happen these days" (54% for hiring and promotions, and 48% for school admissions); the remaining respondents were nearly equally split between "very likely" and "not likely." A third item (v8338/v8339) asked whether affirmative action for minorities had hurt whites -- 59% agreed that it had, and 37% disagreed. A final item (v8336/v8337) asked respondents to compare the opportunities for advancement available to blacks with those available to whites. This item was more skewed -- only 24% thought that blacks had more opportunity than whites; the majority thought that whites had much more (19%), somewhat more (38%) or slightly more (14%) opportunity than blacks.

The four items were moderately correlated with one another, as shown in Table 2. The largest correlations were between the "jobs and promotions," "school admissions," and "affirmative action" items. The "opportunities" item was less correlated with the other three, most likely because it was more skewed and (perhaps) measured a different construct -- the perceptions of discrimination against blacks in society. The four items formed a moderately reliable scale ($\alpha = .69$). However there was a negligible drop in reliability (to $\alpha = .68$) when the "opportunities" item was omitted. Thus a "perceived intergroup conflict" scale was formed from the first three items, recoded on a 0 to 1 scale and averaged. It had a mean of .53 and median of .58, on a scale running from 0 to 1, indicating that the sample was quite divided with respect to perceptions of conflict of interest between whites and minorities over jobs and school admissions.

Involvement of the Self

A second important question concerns the role of self-interest in group interest. Group interest might rest partly in perceptions of interdependence of the self with the ingroup; one's own fate is tied to that of one's group. Or it might rest partly in perceived interdependence with the outgroup; e.g., with perceptions that blacks threaten the white individual's own personal interests. On the other hand, a white who is affluent and stably employed might feel that affirmative action helps blacks and hurts whites in general, but has no chance of hurting her herself, indicating a perception of group interest with no self-interest component.

The measurement of outgroup interdependence

One set of items included in the pilot study was designed to measure whites' sense of interdependence between the self and blacks -- outgroup interdependence -- in the areas of jobs, school admissions and opportunities for advancement. These appear in Table 3. They directly paralleled the intergroup conflict items (see Table 1) on "jobs and promotions," "school admissions," and "opportunities for advancement," differing only in that they referred to the self rather than whites as a group. Respondents were asked to assess the likelihood that they or anyone in their family might miss out in hiring or promotion (v8540) or in school admissions (v8539) to a less or equally qualified minority, and to compare blacks' opportunities to advance in society with their own opportunities to advance (v8409/v8410).

As with the intergroup conflict items, there was substantial variation in response on the "jobs and promotions" and "school admissions" items, while the "opportunities" item was highly skewed. Nearly half the sample (46%) thought that it was 'very' or 'somewhat' likely that they or someone in their family might miss out on a job or promotion; a slightly lesser, but still substantial number (33%) felt that way in regards to school admissions. Meanwhile, only 16% felt that blacks had much, somewhat, or slightly more opportunity than they did.

The "jobs and promotions" and "school admissions" items were correlated with each other at a moderate level (see Table 4), but both items were only slightly correlated with the "opportunities" item. A scale of outgroup interdependence composed of all three items was not very reliable ($\alpha = .50$), but reliability improved to a moderate level ($\alpha = .60$), when the "opportunities" item was dropped from the scale. When the remaining two items were recoded on a scale of 0 to 1, and averaged, the resulting scale had a mean of .39.

The measurement of ingroup interdependence

A single item was included in the pilot study to measure individual whites' sense of interdependence with other whites. The item (reported in Table 5) asked whether respondents thought their own opportunities would be affected if opportunities were to improve for white people in general. Only 22% felt their own opportunities would get better, with only 3% feeling they would get much better. The majority (76%) felt that their opportunities would be unaffected by what happened to whites in general.

Categorization and identification.

Whether or not group interest has a self-interest component, there are other possible links between the self and the ingroup. One is group identification. The NES studies have long depended on the "closeness" items to measure group identification. As mentioned in an earlier memo (Sears & Huddy, 1986), however, the closeness rating is theoretically ambiguous, as it may measure shared interests with the group, affect toward the group, or shared identity. To help make these theoretical distinctions, the pilot study also included an additional item developed from social identity theory, on self-categorization as a white person. According to social identity theory, cognitive categorization of oneself as a group member may lead to tendencies to favor other members of the group, or "ingroup bias." A goal of the pilot was to assess whether this bias affects racial policy preferences for a "dominant" ingroup (such as whites, as compared with blacks). In particular, we were interested in any interactive effects of identity -- that is, whether other group variables were more connected to racial policy preferences among those respondents who categorized themselves as "white," or identified with other white people.

A single item was included as part of the Sears-Huddy social identity series to measure how often whites thought of themselves as "white." Different social identity series were given to respondents 60 years of age and over (v7320 to v7326), and to women, of all ages (v7326 to v7321). The same "white social identity" item appeared in each series (v7324 for older men, and v7331 for all women). Men under the age of 60 were not asked the item.

The item appears in Table 6. There were significant differences in responses to the item between women under 60 (who received only the identity series for women), women 60 and over (who received both the series for women and the series for older people) and men 60 and over (who received only the series for older people). These differences could have been due to the different contexts in which the white identity item appeared for the three different groups.

Nevertheless, a large proportion of the sample (63%) thought of themselves as "white" most of the time. This was high, compared to identity as "elderly" (5%) or "older" (17%), but low, compared with identity as "a woman" (90%).

Given that the closeness items had appeared in wave II of the 1984 pre-post election study, we were able to compare several different types of relationship between the self and the ingroup, and the impact of these relationships on racial conflict between the ingroup and the outgroup. Also included in Table 6 are marginals for several of the "closeness" items. Closeness to "whites" was about at the same level as closeness to "women," "the elderly," "young people," and "poor people."

Group Affect

Symbolic politics theory suggests that individuals respond to social groups as they would to any other type of political symbol, based on the affect they feel towards those groups. Distinguishing group conflict from symbolic politics raises three questions.

Affect is paramount. First, do perceptions of intergroup conflict really reflect symbolic group affect rather than ingroup or outgroup interdependence? If this is so, positive affect toward whites and negative affect toward blacks should account for racial policy positions better than perceived intergroup conflict, or ingroup or outgroup interdependence.

Bipolarity. Second, are whites' affective responses bipolar; i.e., do they focus on both ingroup and outgroup, or only on the outgroup, blacks? For example, in the symbolic politics model, whites may be antagonized by blacks, but their affects toward their fellow whites may be irrelevant. There is much research in social psychology today on distinctions between ingroup and outgroup -- how they are perceived, and how they are treated -- so this question of bipolarity is potentially quite consequential.

Differentiation. Third, do whites make use of a single affective dimension to evaluate blacks, or do they in fact have more differentiated feelings toward the outgroup? Again, research in social psychology (Brewer, Dull, and Lui, 1981) suggests that ingroup members may develop schemas corresponding to meaningful subcategories of the outgroup, no longer making use of the global category label. It is unclear whether whites' political responses are based on their subcategorizing of blacks, as opposed to the global category of blacks as a whole.

Based on these three questions, two items measuring ingroup affect -- whites, and white politicians -- and seven items measuring outgroup affect -- blacks, black politicians, black young people, working class blacks, black activists, civil rights

leaders, and black militants -- were included in the pilot study. The items were ratings on the "feeling thermometer," and appeared in a series which included ratings of candidates and several other social groups. These items appear in Table 7.

Respondents were more positive toward whites ($x = 72.8$), than toward blacks ($x = 62.4$). There appeared to be some differentiation among both sets of thermometers (ingroup and outgroup), in that respondents were more positive toward whites than toward white politicians, and more positive toward blacks, black politicians, black young people, and working class blacks, than toward black activists, civil rights leaders, and black militants.

A series of exploratory principal components factor analyses with oblique rotation also suggested some differentiation among subcategories. When only the outgroup affect items were included in the analysis, two moderately correlated ($r = .39$) factors emerged: 1) a large first factor (52% of the variance) concerning such "mainstream" groups as blacks, black politicians, black young people, and working class blacks, and 2) a smaller second factor (18% of the variance) concerning "activist" groups such as black activists, civil rights leaders, and black militants. When the ingroup thermometers are included in the analysis, they load with the mainstream black subgroups on the larger first factor.

The factor analyses suggest that the most pure measures of group affect -- the "whites" and "blacks" thermometers -- may not completely capture the role of group affect in racial conflict. Therefore, we constructed a scale measuring affect towards "mainstream blacks" (blacks, black politicians, working class blacks, and black young people), which was quite reliable ($\alpha = .88$), and a scale measuring affect towards "black activism" (black activists, civil rights leaders, and black militants), which was less reliable than the first, but still of acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .69$).

Relationships among the Group Measures

The correlations among the several group variables are presented in Table 8, and an exploratory principal components factor analysis (with oblique rotation) of their constituent items is presented in Table 9. These analyses suggest that: 1) Consistent with symbolic politics theory, affect towards the groups is of major importance in whites' racial attitudes, since the two "affect" factors (I and III) account for a total of 33% of the variance in the analysis, compared with 32% contributed by the remaining four factors. 2) Consistent with realistic group conflict theory, perceptions of conflict between the races is linked to interdependence (conflict) between the self and blacks, and together, they are also of central importance in whites' racial attitudes, since both load on the second factor. The analysis also suggests that 3) an outgroup focus may be more

central than an ingroup focus in exploring whites' attitudes about blacks -- since the largest three factors all involve perceptions and feelings about the outgroup (affect toward the outgroup, and perceptions that the self and whites are interdependent with blacks), while the smallest three factors involve perceptions and feelings about the ingroup (identity, closeness, and interdependence). Finally, consistent with the earlier reliability analyses, the analysis shows 4) that the "opportunities" items should not be included in the perceived conflict or outgroup interdependence scales, as it is unclear that these items measured what they intended.

Perceptions of intergroup conflict and outgroup interdependence are, in fact, strongly related. However, it is as yet unclear whether they are measures of the same construct. The items composing each scale are more closely related to one another than to items in the other scale. When the two "opportunities" items are omitted from consideration, the average correlation among the remaining three perceived conflict items is .42, the correlation among the remaining two outgroup interdependence items is .43, while the average correlation between the two sets of items is .29. Furthermore, as shown in Table 8, affect towards blacks is more strongly linked to the intergroup conflict scale than to outgroup interdependence. This suggests that, while the two measures may overlap to some extent, perceptions of intergroup conflict may have a symbolic component absent from outgroup interdependence.

Demographic antecedents

Since these several group variables will be used subsequently in regressions predicting to political variables, it is useful to know if they are closely related to any demographics, and might therefore produce spurious relationships. However, these relationships are in general not very strong, as shown in Table 10.

Relationships with Political Variables

In this section we explore the political ramifications of these new group measures. The analyses attempt to answer the questions raised earlier: 1) To what extent are whites' political responses to racial issues a product of perceived intergroup conflict, or 2) some relationship of the self to the ingroup or to the outgroup? 3) Do the effects of these group variables simply reflect whites' group affects? 4) Are whites' political preferences based equally on affects toward both ingroup and outgroup, or only toward the outgroup (blacks)? 5) Is the most politically potent symbolic affect toward the outgroup toward blacks as a whole or to subcategories of blacks? 6) Finally, what role does intergroup contact play in determining the effects of these group variables on political responses?

Government racial policy

The first series of analyses examines the role of the new group items in determining whites' racial policy preferences. Eleven items composed the racial policy scale; the scale had a reliability of $\alpha = .82$. The eleven items are listed in Appendix A; they were recoded on a scale of 0 to 1 and then averaged. The scale was constructed so that opposition to government policies designed to aid blacks was coded high.

Column 1 in Table 11 presents the correlations of the predictors with the policy scale. Perceived group conflict, outgroup interdependence, and outgroup affect were all significantly related to policy preferences, in the expected directions. Whites who felt that the advances of blacks hurt whites as a group (perceived group conflict), or hurt them personally (outgroup interdependence), and who also disliked blacks were opposed to government policies designed to help blacks. This provides evidence for all theories. However, the several ingroup variables were not significantly related to policy preferences.

In the remaining columns of Table 11, the policy measure is regressed on the predictors. The demographics related to either the independent variables or the dependent measure (age, education, occupation, and residence in the South) were included in each equation as controls, though the results are not shown.

Group conflict. The set of "realistic group conflict" items were entered first, in order to disentangle the relationship between perceived group conflict and outgroup interdependence. Group conflict appears to be related to policy preferences largely through perceptions of conflict at the group level, rather than through felt interdependence between the self and either the ingroup or the outgroup, as shown in column 2 of Table 11. The items tapping interdependence between the self and the relevant groups do not have significant effects when considered simultaneously with perceptions of intergroup conflict. So respondents who feel that the races are involved in a zero-sum game, where blacks gain at the expense of whites, are significantly more likely to oppose government policies designed to help blacks. But there is no involvement of the self in this perceived group conflict.

Symbolic group affect. Our next question is whether or not these perceptions of intergroup conflict have their impact on policy stands through the operation of symbolic group affect. This would be the prediction of a simple symbolic politics theory: the connection between perceived group conflict and policy stands is simply a function of group affect, and would disappear when affect towards the groups is taken into account. This possibility is explored in columns 3 and 4 of Table 11, which differ only in that racial affect is measured in somewhat

different ways. The two regressions show that the affect variables have substantial effects in their own right. But their inclusion only slightly diminishes the impact of perceived group conflict -- the beta drops from .39 (column 2) to .33 and .27 (columns 3 and 4). That is, perceived conflict continues to have a considerable effect no matter whether racial affect is measured with simple black and white thermometers (column 3), or subcategories of blacks differentiated (column 4). So racial affect does not account for the large effects of perceived group conflict. Thus, there is something to group conflict above and beyond symbolic group affect.

It should be noted that the beta for outgroup interdependence reaches significance when affect is entered in the equation, although it is still quite small (the ingroup interdependence term also reaches significance, but it is in an unexpected direction: perceiving shared interests with other whites leads to support for pro-black policies).

Nevertheless, racial affect does play an important role in its own right in determining racial policy preferences. Entering ingroup and outgroup affect into the equation using either the pure measures ("whites" and "blacks" thermometers), or the more differentiated measures ("whites" thermometer, with the "mainstream blacks" and "black activism" scales) results in significant increases in the R-square (6% in column 3, and 10% in column 4), over and above the effects of the realistic group conflict scales.

Ingroup vs. outgroup. Regarding the question of bipolarity of whites' responses, measures of affect toward the outgroup are uniformly more strongly related to racial policy preferences than are measures of affect toward the ingroup. Outgroup antagonism thus appears to be more politically powerful than ingroup positivity, even though positive affect toward the ingroup is significantly associated throughout with opposition to pro-black government policy.

In fact, the measures involving some sort of mention of the outgroup (outgroup affect, perceived conflict between outgroup and ingroup, or outgroup interdependence) are more strongly associated with whites' racial policy preferences than are the measures involving perceptions or feelings about the ingroup. Ingroup interdependence was related to policy in an unexpected direction, while ingroup social identity, and the traditional closeness (to whites) measure were not correlated with policy, and made no difference when entered into the regressions (in results not reported in the table). Thus, in racial conflict between blacks and whites, it appears that perceptions and feelings about the outgroup are paramount.

Subcategorization. A further question is whether a model taking into account more differentiated evaluations of the outgroup works better than one based on simple affects towards the group as a whole. Comparisons of columns 3 with 4 of Table 11, and columns 5 with 6, suggest that the more differentiated measures may have more predictive power. Replacing the blacks thermometer with the differentiated outgroup measures increases the R-square by 4% and 7%, respectively.

Overall, the first series of analyses suggest three conclusions. First, group conflict has a strong effect on whites' racial policy preferences. The view of the social world as a place where blacks and whites compete for limited opportunities for employment and advancement plays a potent role in determining whites' preferences for government involvement in helping blacks realize these opportunities. Second, this group conflict motive is not based entirely in fears about the impact of policies on the self, as the "classic," self-interest-based, version of realistic group conflict theory might predict. Neither is it based entirely in affect towards the two competing groups, as the most pure version of symbolic politics might predict. Third, symbolic group affect does not seem to operate in a simple bipolar manner, where ingroup solidarity and antagonism toward the outgroup lead to opposition to outgroup interests. Instead, outgroup affect appears to play the larger role (although more differentiated measures of ingroup affect, had they been available, might well change the picture). Finally, perceptions of group conflict and group affect are both important elements in whites' racial attitudes. They overlap to some extent, but each contribute large, unique variance to explaining policy preferences. Perceptions of group conflict add 11% to the explained variance, over and above differentiated affect (subtract column 6 from column 4), while differentiated affect adds 9% over and above group conflict (subtract column 2 from column 4).

It is possible that the groups measures really overlap with other important explanations for whites' opposition to pro-black racial policies (see Kinder and Sanders' August, 1985 memo to the Board for a discussion of these explanations). In Table 12, we have controlled for partisanship and ideology (column 2); values with respect to equality and individualism, and opposition to government spending in general (column 3); and standard measures of symbolic racism (column 4), all potentially important explanations for whites' policy preferences (see Appendix A for construction of these scales). Partisanship, equality values, opposition to government spending, and symbolic racism are all strongly related to policy preferences. Nevertheless, the group conflict and group affect measures are not subsumed by the addition of these controls. The betas for the measures drop, but remain significant throughout. Thus the group conflict perspective appears to add significantly to other explanations for whites' racial policy preferences.

Race vs. radicalism. Differentiating subcategories of blacks added significantly to the explanation of policy preferences beyond simply considering the global "blacks" thermometer. The "black activism" affect scale proved to be the most powerful of these subcategories. Yet one might wonder whether this captures white Americans' objections to activism or radicalism on the part of any social group, as opposed to their objections specifically about black activism. In fact, the results of the factor analysis of group thermometers (see Table 7) suggests this possibility, since mainstream whites loaded on the same factor as mainstream blacks, leaving black activists on a separate factor.

To check on this hypothesis, we included in our regression a measure of affect towards "white" activism -- "feminism" -- using a scale combining thermometer ratings of "feminists" and "the women's movement" (see Table 7 for the means on these items). These two items had loaded on the "activism" factor in the earlier factor analyses. The question is whether these items on the women's movement and those on black activism measure affect toward activism in general, or if they reflect affect toward the type of activism practiced by each group separately. If the former, one would expect them to be related in the same manner to preferences on racial and women's policies. If they reflect affects toward group-specific activism instead, they should be differentially related to the racial and women's policy scales. For this analysis, we created four group affect scales, each with two thermometer items. Hence, we dropped "black militants" from the "black activism" scale (leaving "black activists" and "civil rights leaders"), and we used parallel measures of affect towards more "mainstream" whites and blacks -- "whites" and "white politicians;" and "blacks" and "black politicians," respectively -- and combined "feminists" and "the women's movement."

The raw correlations suggest that activism per se, rather than race or gender, is the key factor, since, both activist scales are correlated at similar levels with both policy measures (columns 1 and 3 of Table 13). But when all the group conflict and group affect measures are entered simultaneously in a regression (columns 2 and 4), the principal effects are issue specific -- black activism influences racial policy preferences, and feminism influences women's policy preferences, but not vice versa. Interestingly, perceptions of group conflict also have an effect on women's spending, but again, the beta is much smaller than the beta for racial policy.

Candidate support

Opposition to "black activism" is also the strongest predictor of negative evaluations of Jesse Jackson; affect towards "mainstream" blacks is not significant. In fact, in contrast to racial policy, responses to Jesse Jackson are

strongly, and almost completely determined by negative outgroup affect (Table 14, column 1). Finally, evaluations of Ronald Reagan (Table 14, column 2) are related to black activism, but the variance contributed by all the group measures is quite low (5%).

Interactive effects

In this final section of the report we explore two interactive models: the possibility that effects of perceived interdependence between the self and the outgroup, as well as the perceptions of conflict between the ingroup and the outgroup, are heightened among those individuals who 1) come into more direct contact with the outgroup, or 2) have categorized themselves as ingroup members, and therefore identify themselves as "white."

Contact with the outgroup. Realistic group conflict theory would predict that contact with the outgroup in situations where the outgroup might be in objective competition with the ingroup (such as for promotions at the workplace) would heighten perceptions of conflict, and increase the connection between conflict and opposition to policies designed to help the outgroup. The pilot study contained an item on whites' perceptions of the proportion of black people at their place of work, in order to test this idea. This item appears in Table 15. The item (v8534/v8535) was asked of all respondents who had ever worked, and who did not work (or had not worked) alone. Since the item was to be used as a measure (albeit subjective) of direct contact, it was only used for respondents who were currently working, or had recently worked (those temporarily laid off or unemployed). Although few whites worked in settings that were substantially integrated (only 6% worked in settings which were about half black, and another 14% in settings that were one-half to one-quarter black), a large number (32%) worked in settings where there were at least some blacks.

In Table 16, we repeated our earlier main regressions (see Table 11, column 4) separately for those respondents who had at least some contact with blacks at work, and those who had no contact or worked alone. Perceived conflict was in fact, more strongly related to racial policy among those who had contact with blacks than among those who did not ($r = .50$, $b = .27$; compared with $r = .29$; $b = .12$). On the other hand, group affect was slightly more strongly related among respondents who had no contact with blacks, although affect towards black activism was significant in regressions among those who did have contact. (Contact with blacks was related to residence in the South -- $r = .23$; the regressions include controls for this variable) This suggests that group conflict may in fact be "realistic," based in actual experiences with the outgroup, and suggests that it is important to measure such contextual items. For those respondents who do not have contact, group affect plays a somewhat stronger role.

Social identity. Social identity theory predicts heightened ingroup bias among members of the ingroup who categorize themselves as "white." In Table 17 we repeated the main racial policy regressions separately for respondents who thought about themselves as "white" most of the time (63%) and for respondents who thought about themselves as white "some of the time," "occasionally," or "never." Since social identity was related to age and gender in the sample (perhaps due to the different contexts in which the items appeared for men 60 and over, women 60 and over, and women 59 and under); we controlled for these variables in these regressions.

The results can only be viewed as suggestive. Both perceptions of intergroup conflict and outgroup affect appear to play stronger roles among respondents high in "white" identity than among those low in it. The raw correlations for perceived intergroup conflict, outgroup interdependence, and affect toward "mainstream" blacks, in particular are stronger among the former group. The unstandardized regression weights follow the same pattern (except not for perceived intergroup conflict). Unfortunately, the identity item was not asked of male respondents under 60 years of age, a group that might well be more likely to feel that blacks and whites are in conflict than would other respondents. Thus the story is somewhat suggestive, though not definitive, suggesting that self-categorization as a white sensitizes the individual to the several determinants of opposition to pro-black policies.

This new social identity measure is not the same as the older "closeness" measure. The two items are only modestly correlated ($r = .15$), they load on different factors (in the analysis reported in Table 9), and they have somewhat different demographic underpinnings (both are higher among younger respondents; but identity is higher among women, while closeness is related to higher levels of education). To check on their relative effects, we repeated the regressions of Table 17 separately among respondents who felt close to whites (38% of the sample) and among those who did not feel close (61%). Here the results are much more mixed, as shown in Table 18. The role of outgroup interdependence is again slightly higher among those respondents who feel close to other whites, but the correlations and regression weights for perceptions of intergroup conflict, and the correlations for group affect do not differ across the samples, and antagonism toward "mainstream blacks" is actually somewhat stronger among those who do not feel close to other whites.

Recommendations

Let us try to be brief but to the point.

(1) The traditional NES treatment of groups has focused attention on the respondent, attempting to determine which of the infinite variety of political groupings might be relevant for each respondent. This has characterized both open- and closed-ended measures. This approach has never had the empirical payoff it promises in theory. We therefore suggest a change of focus, to in-depth measurement of the impact of those few specific groups that are known (or at least thought) to have a major political impact. Along with the Sears and Huddy (1986) and Huddy and Sears (1986) reports, we therefore suggest that a more in-depth, and "group-specific" approach to exploring the role of groups in American politics may be more fruitful than an approach which attempts to assess whatever group-bases factors are important to all voters.

(2) This in-depth treatment is too expensive to carry out for more than a handful of groups. Moreover, the relevant variables differ considerably from one to another, in terms of the relevance of self-interest, group-interest (e.g., group financial situation), symbolic affects toward ingroup and outgroup, perceived group conflict, personal threats from the outgroup, etc. The NES instrumentation for each group would have to be individually tailored to what is known about that group's impact on the public.

(3) Racial conflict has been, is, and in all likelihood for the foreseeable future will be, a major source of group conflict in American politics, so NES should maintain a time series of those variables that are central to it.

(4) Our analyses suggest the following measures are important in this regard:

- (a) Perceived group conflict, which was the strongest variable. In some ways this is the modern-day analogue of the old perceived discrimination items.
- (b) Outgroup interdependence, like personal racial threat or self-interest measures in general, does not always live up to its potential. However, its role is important enough a priori, and its effects promising enough, that it should probably be retained.
- (c) Differentiated outgroup affect is an important contributor to explanations for whites' racial policy preferences, and plays an important role in whites' responses to a black candidate such as Jesse Jackson.

- (d) The measure of intergroup contact appears promising, in potentially uncovering different motivations underlying racial conflict among respondents who have differing amount of contact with blacks.
- (e) The new identity item has no main effects on racial policy preferences, but perhaps heightens ingroup bias by heightening the role of both perceptions of intergroup conflict and group affect. It may do a better job than the traditional closeness item in heightening these feelings and perceptions, although the comparisons between the items can only be viewed as suggestive. Nevertheless, the identity item, if included as part of the larger series for women and older people (see the Sears & Huddy, 1986 and Huddy & Sears, 1986 reports) would be a relatively minor addition (in terms of interviewing time) to future studies.

(5) Our analyses also suggest that these measures, and group measures in general, might be quite issue-specific, in that they predict to issues relevant to the particular group under study. In this connection, there is also the possibility that our group conflict measures, in referring to "minorities" instead of "blacks," might have caused people to think about a number of social groups when thinking about intergroup conflict. It would be interesting to have parallel measures of conflict with other groups. This is probably not feasible on a broad scale for the NES studies, and may run into the same problems as the closeness measures -- trying to capture too much. A better solution would be to focus more specifically on conflict with blacks, by referring to "blacks" in the perceived conflict and outgroup interdependence items, and perhaps extending them when the time is ripe to another specific minority group.

Table 1

Perceived intergroup conflict

What do you think the chances are these days that a white person won't get a job or promotion while an equally or less qualified minority employee gets one instead? (v8335)

(5) Very likely	23%
(3) Somewhat likely	54
(1) Not likely	22
(9) DK, NA	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL	101% (n=320)

What do you think the chances are these days that a white person won't get admitted to a school while an equally or less qualified minority person gets admitted instead? (v8334)

(5) Very likely	25%
(3) Somewhat likely	48
(1) Not likely	26
(9) DK, NA	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL	100% (n=320)

Think about the opportunities for advancement now available to black people and to white people. These days, do you think that whites would have more opportunity to advance than blacks, or would blacks have more opportunity to advance than whites? (v8336/v8337)

(6) Blacks have much more	6%
(5) Blacks have somewhat more	17
(4) Blacks have slightly more	1
(3) Whites have slightly more	14
(2) Whites have somewhat more	38
(1) Whites have much more	19
(9) DK, NA	5
	<hr/>
TOTAL	100% (n=320)

Affirmative action programs for minorities have reduced whites' chances for jobs, promotions, and admissions to schools and training programs. (v8338/v8339)

(5) Agree, strongly	23%
(4) Agree, not strongly	37
(2) Disagree, not strongly	23
(1) Disagree, strongly	13
(9) DK, NA	4
	<hr/>
TOTAL	100% (n=320)

Table 2

Perceived conflict scale construction

Correlations between perceived conflict items

	Jobs 1	Schools 2	Aff Act 3	Opps 4
1. Miss jobs and promotions	1.00			
2. Miss school admissions	.50	1.00		
3. Affirmative action hurts	.41	.34	1.00	
4. Blacks have more opportunity	.32	.26	.32	1.00

Perceived conflict scale reliabilities

Item	Scale 1		Scale 2*	
	item-total corr	alpha	item-total corr	alpha
1. Miss jobs and promotions	.56	.69	.55	.68
2. Miss school admissions	.49		.49	
3. Affirmative action hurts	.47		.44	
4. Blacks have more opportunity	.38		—	
Scale mean		.48		.53
Scale standard deviation		.24		.27
n		318		317

Note: Items were recoded on a scale of 0 to 1 for analyses.
Scales were constructed by averaging items.

* Scale 2 was used in the analyses that follow.

Table 3

Interdependence with the outgroup
(Perceived racial threat)

What do you think the chances are these days that you or anyone in your family won't get a job or promotion while an equally or less qualified minority employee receives one instead? (v8540)

(5) Very likely	10
(4) Somewhat likely	36
(2) Somewhat unlikely	26
(1) Very unlikely	28
(9) DK, NA	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL	101% (n=320)

What do you think the chances are these days that you or anyone in your family won't get admitted to a school while an equally or less qualified minority person is admitted instead? (v8541)

(5) Very likely	5
(4) Somewhat likely	28
(2) Somewhat unlikely	33
(1) Very unlikely	33
(9) DK, NA	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL	100% (n=320)

Think about your own opportunities for advancement in society compared to the opportunities available to most black people. These days, do you think you would have more opportunity to advance, or less opportunity to advance than most black people? (v8409/v8410)

(6) Blacks have much more	3
(5) Blacks have somewhat more	9
(4) Blacks have slightly more	3
(3) R has slightly more	15
(2) R has somewhat more	50
(1) R has much more	17
(9) DK, NA	4
	<hr/>
TOTAL	101% (n=320)

Table 4

Outgroup interdependence scale construction

Correlations between outgroup interdependence items

	Jobs 1	Schools 2	Opps 3
1. Miss jobs and promotions	1.00		
2. Miss school admissions	.43	1.00	
3. Blacks have more opportunity	.21	.12	1.00

Outgroup interdependence scale reliabilities

Item	Scale 1		Scale 2*	
	item-total corr	alpha	item-total corr	alpha
1. Miss jobs and promotions	.44	.50	.43	.60
2. Miss school admissions	.38		.43	
3. Blacks have more opportunity	.19		—	
Scale mean		.36		.39
Scale standard deviation		.23		.29
n		318		316

Note: Items were recoded on a scale of 0 to 1 for analyses
Scales were constructed by averaging items

* Scale 2 was used in the analyses that follow.

Table 5

Ingroup interdependence

If opportunities for white people in general were to improve over the next few years, do you think that your own opportunities would get better, get worse, or stay about the same? (v8411/v8412)

(5) Get much better	3	
(4) Get somewhat better	19	
(3) Stay the same	76	
(2) Get somewhat worse	2	
(1) Get much worse	0	
(9) DK, NA	1	
TOTAL	101	(n=320)

Table 6

Ingroup categorization and ingroup closeness

Categorization (social identity)

People think of themselves in different ways at different times. Take age for example. Sometimes a person might think of herself as old, sometimes as middle-aged, sometimes young, and sometimes she might not think about her age at all. I am going to run through a list of different ways in which people have told us they sometimes think about themselves and I'd like you to tell me for each, how often, if ever, you think of yourself in that way.

Do you think of yourself as (enter group label here) most of the time, some of the time, occasionally, or never?

Sample	White v7324/ v7331				Older v7326	Elderly v7320	Woman v7330	Feminist v7328
	(whites only)				(60 and over)		(women)	
	a	b	c	d				
(5) Most of time	63%	71%	65%	37%	17%	5%	90%	21%
(4) Some of time	9	10	3	14	25	22	6	19
(2) Occasionally	8	9	9	2	29	25	2	29
(1) Never	20	9	24	45	27	46	2	27
(9) DK, NA	1	1	0	2	2	2	0	4
TOTAL	101%	101%	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	269	142	76	51	127	127	218	218

- a. women; and men 60 and over
 b. women under 60
 c. women, 60 and over
 d. men, 60 and over

Closeness (reference group identification)

Here is a list of groups. Please read over the list and tell me the letter for those groups you feel particularly close to — people who are most like you in their ideas and interests and feelings about things. (n=396)

	Whites v5936	Blks v5925	Women v5933	Men v5928	Elderly v5924	Young v5931	Middle class v5938	Poor v5920	Femi- nists v5927
(1) Close	38%	6%	38%	20%	43%	40%	75%	32%	11%
(0) Not close	61	94	62	80	57	60	25	68	89
(9) DK, NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 7

Group affect measures

Factor analysis of group thermometers
(oblique rotation)

Item	Blacks		Blacks, Whites		Blacks, Whites, Feminism	
	Analysis 1		Analysis 2		Analysis 3	
	Factor I	Factor II	Factor I	Factor II	Factor I	Factor II
Whites	—	—	.84	-.18	.81	-.11
White politicians	—	—	.76	.01	.78	-.03
Blacks	.86	.02	.77	.11	.77	.10
Black politicians	.78	.14	.75	.19	.75	.18
Black young people	.90	.02	.85	.09	.85	.07
Working class blacks	.87	-.09	.82	-.04	.83	-.05
Black activists	.14	.83	.13	.83	.15	.73
Civil rights leaders	.13	.63	.03	.71	-.02	.75
Black militants	-.15	.84	-.07	.77	.01	.57
Feminists	—	—	—	—	.12	.70
The women's movement	—	—	—	—	-.13	.86
Eigen-value	3.61	1.27	4.46	1.41	4.94	1.81
Variance explained	.52	.18	.50	.16	.45	.16
Corr. between factors		.39		.36		.39

Affect scales

Scale	Mean	Std dev	Item to total r	Scale Mean	Scale s dev	Scale alpha
Mainstream whites				67.0	15.3	.73
Whites	72.5	19.1	.57			
White politicians	61.2	15.5	.57			
Mainstream blacks				62.8	14.6	.88
Blacks	62.2	17.5	.75			
Black politicians	60.4	16.5	.72			
Black young people	62.4	17.0	.82			
Working class blacks	66.4	16.8	.70			
Black activism				43.2	15.3	.69
Black activists	45.4	19.0	.67			
Civil rights leaders	52.3	16.3	.41			
Black militants	31.6	22.5	.45			
Feminism				54.4	18.2	.77
Feminists	52.1	20.1	.62			
The women's movement	57.0	20.2	.62			

Table 8

Correlations among group measures

	Confl 1	Outidp 2	Inidp 3	Whtid 4	Close 5	Whts 6	Blks 7	Main Blks 8
1. Conflict	1.0							
2. Outgroup idp	.44	1.0						
3. Ingroup idp	.08	.08	1.0					
4. White social id	.09	.14	.14	1.0				
5. Close to whites	.05	.06	.10	.15	1.0			
6. Whites therm	-.04	-.05	-.03	.09	.19	1.0		
7. Blacks therm	-.20	-.09	-.11	-.12	.01	.48	1.0	
8. Black mainstream	-.17	-.05	-.06	.01	.07	.61	.86	1.0
9. Black activism	-.20	.02	-.04	.04	.04	.20	.38	.45

Table 9

Factor analysis of group measures
(oblique rotation)

Item	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV	Factor V	Factor VI
<hr/>						
Group affect - whites						
Whites	.80					
White politicians	.73					
Group affect - mainstr. blks						
Blacks	.80					
Black politicians	.78					
Black young people	.87					
Working class blacks	.84					
Group affect - activist blks						
Black activists			.77			
Civil rights leaders			.47	-.41		
Black militants			.83			
Perceived group conflict						
Whites - miss jobs		.70				
Whites - miss admissions		.75				
Aff action hurts whites		.50			.33	-.36
Whits - less opps than blks				.60		
Outgroup interdependence						
Self - miss jobs		.63				
Self - miss admissions		.73				
Self - less opps than blks				.79	-.30	
Ingroup interdependence						.87
White social identity				.64	.35	
Closeness to whites					.82	
<hr/>						
Eigen-value	4.77	2.72	1.51	1.28	1.15	1.03
Variance explained	.25	.14	.08	.07	.06	.05
<hr/>						

Note: Factor loadings less than .30 are omitted from table.
Factors with eigen-values less than 1.0 are omitted from table.

Table 10

Antecedents of Group Variables

Antecedents	Group Variables				
	Intergroup Conflict 1	Outgroup Interdep. 2	Ingroup Interdep. 3	Ingroup Identity 4	Ingroup Closeness 5
<u>Demographics</u>					
Age	-.11	-.18*	-.01	-.25*	-.17*
Education	-.06+	-.10*	.03	-.04	.25*
Employed	.06	.08	-.02	.12	.04
Occupation	.00	.03+	-.08	.15	.05
Family income	.06	.00	-.11	.00	-.01
Male	.10	.11*	-.03	-.25*	-.08
Married	.13	.05	-.03	-.05	-.04
Had children < 18	.12	.11	.05	.09	.02
Lives in South	.03	.07	.05	.00	-.04
Contact with blacks	.11*	.20*	.06	-.05	.01
<u>Political Predispositions</u>					
Party identification	.02	.03	-.03	.00	-.01
Ideology	.07	.01	-.02	-.02	.03

Note: Entries are correlation coefficients.
 Partisanship: Republican is coded high.
 Ideology: Conservative is coded high.

* Indicates significant correlation coefficient, which remains significant as a regression coefficient in equations regressing each group variable on all antecedents simultaneously

+ Indicates non-significant correlation coefficient, which becomes a significant regression coefficient

Table 11

Predicting opposition to government racial policy

Variable	Regressions						
	r	1	2	3	4	5	6
<u>Realistic group conflict</u>							
Perceived intergroup conflict	.40***	.39***	.33***	.28***			
Interdependence with self							
Ingroup (whites)	-.04	-.10+	-.12*	-.10*			
Outgroup (blacks)	.23***	.10+	.12*	.13*			
<u>Group affect</u>							
Ingroup affect							
Whites (single item)	-.03		.12*	.16*	.16**	.20**	
Outgroup affect							
Blacks (single item)	-.28***		-.28***		-.36***		
Mainstream blacks (scale)	-.27***				-.20**		-.26***
Black activism (scale)	-.35***				-.25***		-.30***
<u>Other group variables</u>							
Ingroup social identity	.03						
Ingroup closeness	.08						
R-square		.20***	.26***	.30***	.11***	.18***	
Adjusted R-square		.19	.24	.28	.10	.17	

Note: Entries in column 1 are Pearson correlation coefficients.
 Entries in columns 2-6 are standardized regression weights.
 All equations include controls for age, education, occupation, and region (South).
 All variables are coded on a scale of 0-1, except age and education, coded in actual number of years.
 Minimum pairwise n=330 (weighted cross-section plus oversample).

+ p < .10
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001

Table 12

Predicting opposition to government racial policy
with controls

Variable	Regressions				
	r	1	2	3	4
<u>Realistic group conflict</u>					
Perceived intergroup conflict	.40***		.28***	.26***	.20***
Interdependence with self					
Ingroup (whites)	-.04		-.09*	-.04	-.08+
Outgroup (blacks)	.23***		.12*	.11*	.07
<u>Group affect</u>					
Ingroup affect					
Whites (single item)	-.03		.14*	.09+	.11*
Outgroup affect					
Mainstream blacks (scale)	-.27***		-.19**	-.16**	-.12*
Black activism (scale)	-.35***		-.20***	-.13**	-.18***
<u>Controls</u>					
Republican	.28***		.18***		
Conservative	.26***		.09+		
Equality	-.46***			-.25***	
Individualism	.17***			.06	
Oppose govt spending	.47***			.28***	
Symbolic racism scale	.53***				.40***
R-square			.36***	.49***	.43***
R-square added by all group variables over controls			.25***	.16***	.11***

Note: Entries in column 1 are Pearson correlation coefficients.
 Entries in columns 2-4 are standardized regression weights.
 All equations include controls for age, education,
 occupation, and region (South).
 All variables are coded on a scale of 0-1, except age and
 education, coded in actual number of years.

+ p < .10
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001

Table 13

Predicting racial and women's policy preferences
using black and white mainstream and activist group affect scales

Variable	Opposition to govt racial policy		Opposition to govt spending for women	
	r	beta	r	beta
<u>Realistic group conflict</u>				
Perceived intergroup conflict	.40***	.27***	.18***	.13*
Interdependence with self				
Ingroup (whites)	-.04	-.10*	-.05	-.09+
Outgroup (blacks)	.23***	.15**	.05	.06
<u>Group affect</u>				
Ingroup affect				
Mainstream whites (scale)	-.10	.12+	-.05	.03
Feminism (scale)	-.30***	-.13*	-.38***	-.38***
Outgroup affect				
Mainstream blacks (scale)	-.27***	-.13+	-.08+	.09
Black activism (scale)	-.37***	-.23***	-.25***	-.05
R-square		.32***		.20***
Adjusted R-square		.30		.17

Note: Entries in columns 1 and 3 are correlation coefficients.
 Entries in columns 2 and 4 are standardized regression weights.
 All equations include controls for age, education,
 occupation, and region (South).
 All variables are coded on a scale of 0-1, except age and
 education, coded in actual number of years.
 Minimum pairwise n=203 (weighted cross-section plus oversample)

+ p < .10
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001

Table 14

Predicting candidate evaluations from group variables

Variable	Negative evaluations of Jesse Jackson	Positive evaluations of Ronald Reagan
	beta	beta
<u>Realistic group conflict</u>		
Perceived intergroup conflict	.05	.02
Interdependence with self		
Ingroup (whites)	.02	-.11*
Outgroup (blacks)	-.03	.08
<u>Group affect</u>		
Ingroup affect		
Whites (single item)	.05	.04
Outgroup affect		
Mainstream blacks (scale)	.09	.11
Black activism (scale)	-.39***	-.21***
R-square	.20***	.08***
Adjusted R-square	.17	.05

Note: Entries in columns 1 and 2 are standardized regression weights.
 All equations include controls for age, education, occupation, and region (South).
 All variables are coded on a scale of 0-1, except age and education, coded in actual number of years.
 Minimum pairwise n=203 (weighted cross-section plus oversample)

+ p < .10
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001

Table 15

Intergroup contact

What proportion of the (other) people at your work are black — are most black, some, or are there no other blacks? (v8534) Is that less than a quarter black, somewhere between a quarter and a half black, or about one half black? (v8535) (asked of respondents who have ever done any work for pay, and have worked with other people)

	Recent employment — Currently working, temp. laid off, or unemployed	Total sample
<u>V8534</u>		
(3) Most	2%	3%
(2) Some	51	47
(1) None	37	40
(0) Work (worked) alone	9	9
(8) DK, NA	0	1
(9) Inap: never worked	—	1
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	99% (n=222)	101% (n=320)
<u>V8535</u>		
(5) Most (3, above)	2	3
(4) Some — about 1/2	4	3
(3) Some — 1/4 to 1/2	14	13
(2) Some — less than 1/4	32	30
(1) None (1, above)	37	40
(0) Work (worked) alone	9	9
(8) DK, NA	0	1
(9) Inap: never worked	—	1
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	98% (n=222)	100% (n=320)

Table 16

Regressions predicting opposition to racial policy
among respondents who have or do not have contact with blacks at work

Variable	Have some contact		Have no contact	
	1	2	3	4
<u>Realistic group conflict</u>				
Perceived intergroup conflict	.50	.27*** (.06)	.29	.12+ (.06)
Interdependence with self				
Ingroup (whites)	.03	-.08 (.06)	-.13	-.06 (.06)
Outgroup (blacks)	.26	.06 (.06)	.24	.12* (.06)
<u>Group affect</u>				
Ingroup affect				
Whites (single item)	-.03	.09 (.09)	.02	.24* (.11)
Outgroup affect				
Mainstream blacks (scale)	-.19	-.19 (.14)	-.29	-.36* (.14)
Black activism (scale)	-.35	-.29** (.10)	-.37	-.34** (.12)
R-square		.33***		.36***
Adjusted R-square		.29		.31

Note: Entries in columns 1 and 3 are Pearson correlation coefficients.
Entries in columns 2 and 4 are unstandardized regression weights,
with standard errors in parentheses below.
All equations include controls for age, education,
occupation, and region (South).
All variables are coded on a scale of 0-1, except age and
education, coded in actual number of years.

Contact breakdowns (among unweighted sample)

Contact: n=118

No contact: n=103

+ p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001

Table 17

Regressions predicting opposition to racial policy
among respondents with varying levels of white social identity

Variable	Much of the time		Sometimes, Occasionally, Never	
	1	2	3	4
<u>Realistic group conflict</u>				
Perceived intergroup conflict	.45	.19*** (.05)	.31	.20* (.09)
Interdependence with self				
Ingroup (whites)	-.08	-.06 (.04)	-.18	-.13 (.09)
Outgroup (blacks)	.30	.08* (.04)	.08	.03 (.08)
<u>Group affect</u>				
Ingroup affect				
Whites (single item)	.03	.26*** (.07)	-.14	-.12 (.17)
Outgroup affect				
Mainstream blacks (scale)	-.32	-.31** (.11)	-.16	.00 (.22)
Black activism (scale)	-.34	-.31*** (.09)	-.28	-.23 (.15)
R-square		.35***		.18*
Adjusted R-square		.33		.10

Note: Entries in columns 1 and 3 are Pearson correlation coefficients.
Entries in columns 2 and 4 are unstandardized regression weights,
with standard errors in parentheses below.
All equations include controls for gender and age.
All variables are coded on a scale of 0-1.

Identity breakdowns (among unweighted sample)

Much of the time: n=252

Some, occasionally, never: n=134

- + p < .10
- * p < .05
- ** p < .01
- *** p < .001

Table 18

Regressions predicting opposition to racial policy
among respondents who are and are not close to whites

Variable	Close		Not close	
	1	2	3	4
<u>Realistic group conflict</u>				
Perceived intergroup conflict	.41	.20*** (.06)	.40	.20*** (.04)
Interdependence with self Ingroup (whites)	.04	-.04 (.05)	-.12	-.11* (.04)
Outgroup (blacks)	.29	.12* (.05)	.18	.05 (.04)
<u>Group affect</u>				
Ingroup affect Whites (single item)	-.02	.15 (.09)	-.06	.17* (.06)
Outgroup affect Mainstream blacks (scale)	-.28	-.19 (.12)	-.28	-.32** (.10)
Black activism (scale)	-.39	-.35*** (.09)	-.31	-.29*** (.08)
R-square		.33***		.29***
Adjusted R-square		.30		.26

Note: Entries in columns 1 and 3 are Pearson correlation coefficients.
Entries in columns 2 and 4 are unstandardized regression weights,
with standard errors in parentheses below.
All equations include controls for age, education,
occupation, and region (South).
All variables are coded on a scale of 0-1, except age and
education, coded in actual number of years.

Closeness breakdowns (among unweighted sample)

Close: n=152

Not close: n=243

- + p < .10
- * p < .05
- ** p < .01
- *** p < .001

Appendix A

Dependent measures

Opposition to racial policy

1. Oppose aid to blacks (v7311)
2. Oppose spending to improve the condition of blacks (v7231)
3. Oppose spending on welfare (v7239)
4. Oppose preferential hiring, promotions for blacks (v7420/v7422)
5. Oppose university admission quotas for blacks (v7424/v7426)
6. Oppose busing for racial integration (v5912 - 1984, wave II)
7. Equal opportunity for blacks and whites is important, but it's not the government's job to guarantee it (v7106)
8. Govt should do less to make sure b/w children attend same schools (v7412)
9. " " make sure blacks can buy any house (v7414)
10. " " make sure blacks have same job opps (v7416)
11. " " ensure equal rights regardless of race (v7418)

Oppose spending for women

1. Oppose spending to improve position of women (v7233)
2. Oppose spending on affirmative action for women (v7237)
3. Oppose spending on childcare for working women (v7240)

Oppose government role in racial policy (Jackman items)

Items 8, 9, 10, and 11 above

Dislike Jesse Jackson

1. Jesse Jackson thermometer -- reversed (v8114)

Positive toward Ronald Reagan

1. Ronald Reagan thermometer (v8111)
2. Reagan job approval (v8148)

Control variables

Symbolic racism scale

1. Most blacks can get along without welfare (v8222)
2. Blacks shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted (v8223)
3. Blacks have gotten less than they deserve -- reversed (v8224)
4. Govt officials pay less attn to request from black -- reversed (v8225)
5. Other minorities worked their way up -- blacks should do so without special favors (v8226)
6. Civil rights people have pushed too fast (v5911)

Equality scale: v8405,v8201,v8203,v8205,v8401,v8403,v8405

Individualism scale: v8202,v8204,v8206,v8402,v8404,v8406

Oppose government spending in general

1. Govt should provide less services (v5819)
2. Oppose govt guaranteed job and standard of living (v5893)
3. Oppose govt health insurance (v5849)
4. Spending on specific services, not including welfare or for blacks
v5741 to v5750 (1984; post election); v7229 to v7240 (pilot)