Morality and Politics: Conduct and Control

A Report on New Items in the 1987 National Election Pilot Study

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This report discusses several sets of new items from the 1987 American National Election Pilot Study: a set of five questions asking respondents to provide an evaluation of homosexuality, divorce, abortion, premarital sex, and having children without being married – the "moral evaluation" questions; a set of three questions following upon the homosexuality, divorce and abortion moral evaluation questions, which roughly ask respondents whether they would characterize their moral view as reflecting a "basic truth," – the "objectivism" questions; a set of four Likert questions designed to form a scale measuring support for the value of moral autonomy; a set of two Likert questions assessing the role that government should play on the issue of homosexuality.

The primary aims of this report are to:

A) explore the potential of these new items in aiding our understanding of the "New Right" in American politics, particularly inasmuch as these items may compete with the "moral traditionalism" items developed in the 1985 pilot study and carried in the 1986 post-election study.

B) elucidate the potential of these items in understanding public views on governmental regulation of personal conduct.

In an earlier report to the NES Board of Overseers, I laid out a set of arguments concluding that while the moral traditionalism scale has been shown to be analytically potent (Conover and Feldman, 1986), it was conceptually problematic. That discussion is reproduced in Appendix F. To briefly summarize here, I suggest that traditionalism, as an "ism," cannot be seen as a single underlying attitude that generates the observed constraint among responses to these items; the items reflect at least two conceptually distinct underlying positions: support for traditional family values, and tolerance of moral diversity. I conclude that the moral traditionalism items capture complaints about contemporary society that are found in the rhetoric of the "New Right," but that the moral traditionalism concept and measurement leaves us with no firm conceptual ground to discuss either the relationships we find or the processes generating those relationships.

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In suggesting new measures for the 1987 pilot study, my goal was to represent the conservative values of the "New Right" with respect to modes of conduct that threaten the traditional family, while keeping these measures conceptually distinct from views on the social and legal regulation of private conduct. Some groups in contemporary society — particularly Christian Fundamentalists — may decry elements of contemporary morality <u>and</u> evidence less tolerance of individual moral diversity. But a strong theme in my earlier reports, as here, is the conceptual division between these positions.

In order to understand the political import of the moral conservatism of the "New Right," we need measures which capture that conservatism, allowing us to investigate what part it plays in defining political cleavages and guiding political choices. But we also need measures which allow us to understand the policy agenda of the "New Right" in advocating legal restrictions on questions of personal conduct, of claiming for that moral conservatism the right to extend the arm of legal enforcement.

The organization of this report is outlined below:

1. Moral evaluation items: background, frequencies, analysis of stability.

2. Objectivity responses: background, frequencies, effects on stability of moral evaluations.

3. Moral Autonomy items: background, frequencies, scaling properties, bivariate associations.

4. Homosexuality policy items: background, scaling properties.

5. Using the moral evaluation, objectivity, and moral autonomy items to help understand policy positions on abortion and homosexuality: multivariate analyses.

6. Scaling the moral evaluation items — the "moral conservatism" scale: background, scaling properties.

7. Moral conservatism vs. moral traditionalism:

   a) Moral traditionalism — distinct sub-scales?
   b) Predicting moral conservatism and moral traditionalism.
   c) Bivariate associations.
   d) Subgroup analysis: Conservative Democrats.
   e) Multivariate analyses: Gary Hart; Women's Movement and Feminists; Moral Majority, Christian Fundamentalists, and Pat Robertson; Reagan, Bush, and vote choices.

To help you wade through these analyses, I will highlight some of the conclusions they generate:

1. As an indicator of their reliability, the moral evaluation items show strong cross-time stability.

2. The objectivity characterization is a strong predictor of moral evaluation response stability; and among those who view a practice as immoral, a strong predictor of one's willingness to "legislate" that view.

3. The moral autonomy items have poor scaling properties, but when scaled, show potent effects in many analyses.

4. The moral evaluation items have very good scaling properties, but the resulting scale, the "moral conservatism" scale, has poor discriminatory power when compared to the moral traditionalism scale.

5. The moral conservatism and moral traditionalism scales, correlated at .67, show many similar relationships with demographic, validation variables and general political orientations and evaluations.

6. Major exceptions to #5 occur, however. The moral conservatism scale shows stronger linkages to measures of religiosity and level of political information.

7. When focusing on conservative Democrats as the general political group most evidencing "New Right" conservatism, the moral conservatism index surpasses the moral traditionalism index in reflecting their "brand" of conservatism.

8. The moral conservatism scale provides us with readily interpretable results when analyzing evaluations of Gary Hart obtained both before and after he withdrew from the Presidential race. However, the moral traditionalism scale yields unexpected and puzzling results.

9. The moral traditionalism scale far exceeds the moral conservatism scale in estimated effects on evaluations of the women's movement and feminists. The moral traditionalism index is capturing sentiment about change in the roles assumed by women, not captured in the same way by the moral conservatism scale.

10. Evaluations of Reagan, Bush, and state and district vote choices were dominated by partisanship in 1986. Bivariate association between the moral conservatism and traditionalism indexes and these variables disappear when we turn to multivariate analyses.

(1) Moral Evaluation Items

Respondents in the pilot study were asked, in wave 1, to evaluate premarital sex, having children without being married, homosexuality, divorce and abortion by selecting one of two responses: "(the practice) is immoral," or "there is nothing necessarily immoral about (the

practice)."[1] Three of these questions, those regarding homosexuality, divorce and abortion were repeated in wave 2 of the pilot study. In each case, "depends" responses were recorded if volunteered.

Table 1 presents the marginals on these questions across both waves of the pilot study. Approximately 95% of the sample selected one or another binary option when evaluating each practice except in the case of abortion. In this evaluation, and in both waves of the pilot study, the percentages drop to approximately 90%. The response options, designed to reduce the likelihood of "depends" responses, "failed" in this instance. I interpret this result as suggesting that respondents who conditionally condemn abortion as immoral (eg., "after the first trimester") are still unwilling to select the "not necessarily immoral" option.[2]

Evaluations of homosexuality and divorce show the most extreme distributions. In wave 1, "immoral" responses outnumber "not necessarily immoral" evaluations of homosexuality by about 3 to 1. For divorce, the ratio is about 4 to 1 in the opposite direction, with only 17.5% of the sample claiming divorce to be immoral. Wave 2 response distributions are similar, though showing slightly less skew.

As indicated above, three moral evaluation items — evaluations of homosexuality, divorce and abortion were included in both waves of the pilot study (administered roughly one month apart). In addition, six moral traditionalism items were asked both in the 1986 study and the first wave of the pilot study (administered roughly 5–6 months apart). Table 2 reports the observed continuity correlations and percent of respondents giving the same response across both time points for these items. When calculating the percent agreement scores for the moral evaluation items, a "depends" response at both time points was considered stable. When calculating the percent agreement scores for the moral traditionalism items, each item was first recoded into agree (strongly or not strongly), neither

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[1]Considerations underlying the selection of these response options, including results of a split-half test of alternative wordings on a student sample, were presented in an earlier report to the Board of Overseers (Stoker, 1987).

[2] Recording and reviewing the "depends" comments would enlighten us here.

agree nor disagree, or disagree (strongly or not strongly). A match across time using these categories was considered stable. For the moral traditionalism items, I also calculated a "% non-contradictory" score, found in Table 2. If a respondent altered the direction of his or her response, either from agree to disagree across waves or visa versa, it was coded as a "contradictory" pattern.

As would be expected based on evidence in prior research (Markus and Converse, 1979) and the short time span between pilot interviews, the moral evaluation items show high levels of response stability. Continuity correlations range from .68 to .73, and % agreement figures from 79.8% to 85% across these items.

Simple comparisons between the moral traditionalism and moral evaluation stability indicators cannot be made, in part because of the different time points upon which these measures are based, but also because we would expect the continuity figures for the moral traditionalism items to be inflated due to the operation of acquiescence set in both waves. However, looking at the % agreement figures, one contrast is obvious: the three moral evaluation items show similar continuity levels while there is greater variation in continuity levels among the moral traditionalism items. Among the moral traditionalism items, the "moral tolerance" subset shows somewhat less cross-temporal stability than the "family values" subset, with the only marked drop occurring for item 6 – "Society should be more accepting of people whose appearance or values are very different from most."[3] (This item also has a very poor 'fit' with the other scale items. The average inter-correlation among all six moral traditionalism items is .32, but with this item excluded the average inter-correlation is .38.)[4]

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[3] The labeling of items as "family values" or as "moral tolerance" partly refers merely descriptively to their content, but partly reflects my contention that the Likert items worded in opposite directions are reflecting distinctive concerns. See Appendix B for the precise wording of the moral traditionalism items.

[4] In viewing these measures as providing item reliability information, "true change" between waves should not be discounted, but no simple explanation for these continuity patterns is apparent to me. However, see the related discussion, below.

The picture changes somewhat when we turn to the % non-contradictory figures. As an alternative indicator of item stability, this measure shows less differentiation among the moral traditionalism items. The differences apparent in the percent agreement measure are attenuated by the alternative handling of movement between a "neither agree nor disagree" response and a directional response (and visa versa) captured by the % non-contradictory measure.

Since I expect the features of Likert items in general, and these in particular, to be of continued interest in the Board's future deliberations, I have pursued these issues a bit further here (see Table 3). Table 3 begins by reporting the marginals for the moral traditionalism items in each wave (for the same set of respondents, n=333). One result is immediately apparent: the percentage of respondents neither agreeing nor disagreeing is substantially larger for each wave 1 question. Responses at time 2 tend generally to be more extreme. Furthermore, the percentage of respondents selecting the middle option shows a small but steady increase associated with question order. At the individual level (see bottom of Table 3), we see that the rate of exit from the middle category is roughly the same across items: 85–90% of wave 1 middle responses become directional at time two, exhibiting a slight tendency toward an agree response at that time. Additionally the percentage of new entrants into the middle category, while tiny, is roughly constant across items.

These responses have not been analyzed with any more rigor than found in Table 3, but these results are suggestive nonetheless. Changes in the percent of middle category (and extreme) responses might suggest that the first interview provided a stimulus that led respondents to more definitive positions by wave 2 (5–6 months later). Alternatively, they could be explained by reference to the potentially greater salience of moral concerns by the time the Pilot Study went into the field (the PTL and Gary Hart "scandals"). Still yet, they may be linked to differences between personal and telephone interviewing methods. Each of these interpretations could certainly be pursued further than this analysis takes them.

The other broad, but weak, pattern − that the percentage of respondents selecting the middle response is related to question order − suggest that respondents may have been susceptible to consistency pressures when first faced with this battery of questions.

The patterns documented in Table 3 directly affect the magnitude of the continuity coefficients and % agreement figures. This effect is partially reflected in the contrasts seen between the % agreement and %non-contradictory figures from table 2. Yet the interpretations I have provided do not necessarily link response instability to problematic features of the moral traditionalism items themselves. For example, depending on which interpretation is correct, we may conclude that the especially low continuity correlation for item six should not overly concern us (e.g., if question order effects on selection of middle category are operative). These comments suggest a need for caution when interpreting the moral traditionalism continuity correlations and agreement figures as indicating item reliability, but even with that caution heeded, several conclusions can be firmly drawn. First, even the % non-contradictory figures suggest lower reliability levels for the "moral tolerance" items relative to the "family values" subset. Secondly, when instability in the strength assessment is additionally considered, stability levels become much less impressive. Strict % agreement figures drop to 52.5%, 46.2%, 62.1%, 41.4%, 54.6%, and 39.3% (more reflective of the pattern and level of the continuity coefficients).

In sum, these stability analyses indicate that the moral evaluation measures exhibit high cross-temporal reliability. The moral traditionalism items show fairly, but unevenly, high continuity characteristics. However, weaker requirements for "stability" present a more positive picture of the stability of responses to the traditionalism questions. At the level of agree, neither agree nor disagree, and disagree, the stability levels are much higher than if the strength assessment is included and all five Likert categories evaluated. Given that the more ephemeral strength assessment is an element of these items when scaled, however, instability in the 5 category responses remains an issue of concern.

(2) <u>Objectivism</u>

One intriguing feature of moral evaluations is their potential to be buttressed by claims

of undeniability and truth. Contrast the following statements:

"I like Ronald Reagan."
"Abortion is immoral."

Both are, strictly speaking, <u>personal</u> statements of evaluation. But the latter lacks the

personal referent, "I," imbuing it with an element of impersonality and undeniability. As

written, it shares the formal structure of a factual statement like "oranges are orange."

However, it could have been written so as to remove this distinctiveness:

"I feel that abortion is immoral."

It is this potential for moral evaluations to be, for some, expressions of purely personal

judgments, and for others, statements expressing a supra-individual truth value, that I have

attempted to capture with the "objectivism" questions. These questions ask respondents to

characterize their own moral evaluation (immediately after providing it) by selecting one of

two options: "I have my own view, but I'm not sure if its the one true answer," or "I feel there

is a basic truth to the position I have taken."

We might expect this characteristic to be important to an examination of the linkages

between morality and politics in several ways. Of primary importance is the effect it may

have on positions regarding the imposition of one's standards as regulated forms of conduct.

McClosky and Brill argue:

> Those who know the "truth" on a particular issue, and in addition, enjoy the right to
> expound it, may find it difficult to understand why they have an obligation to permit
> someone with a contrary (and hence obviously false) view to enjoy an equal
> opportunity for freedom of expression (McClosky and Brill, 1983, p. 16).

Characterizing extremist groups of the left and the right as those who feel they "<u>possess</u> the

truth" they continue:

> They are champions of their own orthodoxy. They have little patience with diversity,
> and seek instead, uniformity in opinion and lifestyle (McClosky and Brill, 1983, p. 17).

While it is difficult to find in McClosky and Brill's work any clear empirical test of these claims, they are nevertheless compelling in light of common political observations, and will be put to a test with these data (section 5, below).

A belief in the "truth" of one's moral judgment should also contribute to response stability over time. One's personal viewpoint may subject to many influences promoting change, but claiming an element of truth for one's response implies inflexibility and the absence of ambiguity. Instead of being subject to personal redefinition, these responses rest on something external to the individual.[5]

In the pilot study, the objectivism questions follow three of the five moral evaluation items (homosexuality, divorce, and abortion) asked in wave 1. Table 4 presents marginals on these items, and Table 5 presents the cross-tabulation of moral evaluation and objectivity judgment for each practice.[6] The marginals are strikingly similar across each of these items, with approximately 60% of the respondents willing to claim for their viewpoint a basic truth. This aggregate similarity, however, hides a good deal of individual diversity; the average inter-correlation among these items is only .27. 13.6% of respondents with valid data on all three objectivism questions characterize no view as objective; 23.6% claim objectivity for one moral evaluation, 28.2% for two evaluations, and 34.7% claim an objective basis for all three evaluations. As I would expect, a larger percentage of those who view the Bible literally give 3 objective responses (40.5%) than those with a non-literal view of the Bible (29.5%).

The cross-tabulations show similar distributions of objectivist/non-objectivist responses within moral evaluation categories for the practices of divorce and homosexuality, although not so for abortion. For the evaluation of abortion, these distributions are significantly

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[5]What that "something" is I would expect to fall into three general categories: religious authority, "social authority," or the "authority of nature." To fully explicate these potential sources of moral authority would be tantamount to providing an account of the genesis of moral evaluations, which is inappropriate in this report even if I were capable of doing so.

[6]If a respondent gave a "depends" coded response to the moral evaluation question, they were asked the follow-up objectivity question. These responses are not included in Tables 4 and 5.

different (p<.01). Those claiming abortion to be immoral are more willing to assert that that evaluation reflects a basic truth than are those claiming abortion to be 'not necessarily immoral.' This simple result is consistent with a recognition of the intensity of 'pro-life' factions in presenting their viewpoint. But their opponents do not show a matched willingness to claim a 'basic truth' for the contrary moral position. As would be suggested by the 'pro-choice' slogan, and in part by this result, for them, the intensity of this issue does not stem merely from the consideration of whether abortion is fundamentally immoral.

Based on the strong expectations outlined above, I investigated the effect of a characterization of one's moral view as objective upon the stability of the moral evaluations across waves of the pilot study. Table 6 provides a first examination of this issue, reporting continuity measures for the moral evaluation items while controlling for objectivity.[7] Controls for level of political information and education are presented for comparison. The objectivity characterization consistently shows a positive relationship with response stability. For each practice, the continuity correlations for objectivists exceeds that of non-objectivists by approximately .16. The percentage of objectivist respondents claiming the same moral evaluation across waves exceeds that of non-objectivists by approximately 14%, 11% and 12% for the homosexuality, divorce and abortion questions, respectively. Each difference is statistically significant at p<.01.

In comparison, respondents characterized as having high levels of political information show higher levels of response stability than those in the lowest information group, but the differences are smaller than those produced by the objectivity characterization. Further, the relationship between response stability and level of political information is erratic, showing monotonic increases for divorce (and then, weakly). Education level shows a small but non-monotonic relationship with stability only for the evaluation of divorce.

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[7] In these stability analyses, I coded depends and don't know responses to the objectivity questions as non-objectivist.

Table 7 extends this probe of response stability through multivariate analysis. A logit model was estimated using objectivity, political information, education, religious involvement, view on the bible, Evangelical and Catholic denominations, and age as predictors of response stability.[8] This table reports the predicted probability of a stable response for illustrative sets of respondents characterized on the basis of significant predictors, and the prediction equation (log odds form) for each response stability item.

First note that across all three estimations, an objectivity characterization is expected to produce a more stable response, as in the bivariate analysis. Secondly, level of political information has a positive association with response stability for the evaluations and homosexuality and abortion, although not for that of divorce. These results are interesting, for the personal moral evaluations of these practices are not obviously political. We would expect level of political information to affect the stability of articulated policy positions inasmuch as they are dependent on the existence of a degree (often high degree) of political information, and inasmuch as political information level reflects politicization or degree of engagement with politics more generally. But an explanation for its predictive power here is less apparent.

One viable explanation is that less politicized respondents provide less reliable responses due to a lack of attentiveness and interest during the explicitly political interview. Alternatively, low political interest may reflect a narrow social horizon more generally, such that respondents with low levels of political information have not given much thought to issues that don't enter their personal sphere. Yet another alternative point of view would assert that contemporary moral evaluations of practices such as these are political evaluations, based at least in part on an understanding of the political conflicts surrounding those practices in society today. In this view, degree of engagement with politics, represented by the political information measure, predicts stability of those moral evaluations which are informed by an understanding of the politics of the specific social practice.

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[8]The precise descriptions of these specifications are reported in Appendix C.

The latter two explanations find some support in the results presented in table 7. It is the most politicized issues that show a relationship between response stability and political information: homosexuality and abortion. Further, compared to homosexuality and abortion, considerations of divorce are more likely to enter the personal lives of people of both narrow _and_ broad social horizons – either through personal experience or through contact with people close at hand.

Table 7 also shows that, under this model, older respondents are more likely to provide unstable responses across waves when evaluating divorce and abortion, though not when evaluating homosexuality. And, those who interpret the Bible literally tend to be more stable relative to non-literalists when evaluating homosexuality but _less_ stable when evaluating divorce.[9] Tentatively, I would suggest that these results may be linked to the duration of the practices on a "social agenda" due to conflict over their normative status, and to the division of opinion within American society regarding these practices.

Roughly speaking, the issues of divorce and abortion have a longer history of debate within our society than does homosexuality, and have undergone transformations in normative and legal status over that time. Homosexuality, which might be characterized as a newer issue on an _articulated_ social agenda, however, is still decidedly condemned as immoral by the great majority of respondents in this study, but has been the focus of a more recent effort by homosexual groups to gain acceptance. Based on their assessment of public opinion on homosexuality, McClosky and Brill conclude: "From all appearances, we are witnessing substantial changes in the way homosexuality is legally and popularly perceived..." (McClosky and Brill, 1983, p. 203). These observations may suggest that youth socialized into society where conflict over the normative status of homosexuality was relatively absent are more susceptible to the contemporary voices of conflict over this issue as they grapple with their own evaluation. Older Americans, on the other hand, have a longer history, albeit not

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[9]Although not reaching standard statistical significance levels in the homosexuality estimation.

salient, of moral condemnation of this practice. With respect to the practices of divorce and abortion, older respondents have lived through the social conflict on these issues and may feel continued personal conflict between earlier and 'modern' positions they have held.

Finally, Bible literalists are decidedly more likely to view the practices of divorce and homosexuality as immoral than are non-literalists (the percentages for literalists vs. non-literalists are: homosexuality: wave 1: 88.3 vs 60.8, wave 2: 87.0 vs 52.5; divorce: wave 1: 25.8 vs. 7.2, wave 2: 31.9 vs. 12.7). However, in the case of homosexuality literalists stand with the strong majority of public opinion, whereas with respect to divorce, a literal interpretation of the Bible as condemning divorce stands in contradiction to the expressed view of the American majority. Thus, one might argue that cross pressures from biblical authority and "social authority" leads to greater instability for the literalist group when evaluating divorce.

These multivariate stability analyses must be regarded with caution in that the sample size is small, the dependent measures have little variability, and further capacity for evaluating these issues is therefore very limited. But the analyses clearly suggest the power of the objectivity characterization for predicting response stability. In addition, this analysis suggests that response instability may be subject to partial efforts at explanation by linking observed measures (such as age, view on the Bible, used here) to processes suggesting ambivalence in views tapped by the dependent measure. In this sense, this analysis pursues a theme found most recently in the Zaller and Feldman pilot endeavor: that there may be "good reasons" for instability in the survey response.

(3)   Moral Autonomy

Paralleling efforts to understand the influence of the "New Right" in mass American politics is a substantial body of scholarly literature tracing the development of conservative ideas in the rhetoric and propositions of political elites over recent decades (for example, Casey (1984), Fowler (1978), Coser and Howe (1974), Levitas (1986), Nash (1976) Steinfels

(1979)). These, broadly, are attempts to describe Neo-conservatism, the "New Right," Neo-liberalism, and Libertarianism as intellectual phenomena, and to contrast them with classic Liberalism, and Liberalism and Conservatism of the New Deal/post New Deal era. Of particular interest to me when developing items for the pilot study was the characterization of Libertarianism developed in this literature. While any simple description of "the" Libertarian viewpoint will be incomplete, one main element is clear: the importance of individual autonomy. The term autonomy is derived from the Greek "aut" : self, and "nomos" : rule, and stands in contrast to the term, heteronomy: subject to someone else, external impositions and controls. In these conceptual terms, Libertarianism has been described as:

> "the principled adherence to individual liberty, e.g., the right of every individual to live by the judgments he or she makes and to be free from the imposition of others concerning his conduct affecting his life..." (Machan, 1984, p. 36)

> "against the subordination of the free autonomous individual to higher movements or systems." (East, 1984, p. 84)

> "the fundamental ideal (is): high moral value placed upon individual freedom of choice." (Kurtz, 1984, p. 135)

In the realm of morality, the Libertarian position can be seen as standing in opposition to the position of Christian fundamentalists on matters of social control. Liberty, expressed as authoritative individual choice on matters of conduct, becomes viewed as licence by the fundamentalists. Explorations of the degree of support for moral autonomy could be useful, therefore, not only for pursuing the themes salient to the fundamentalist "New Right," but also their opponents in this matter, the Libertarians.[10] As suggested by the phenomenon of the "New Right," one would expect that individuals taking traditional moral viewpoints would tend to be those least supportive of moral autonomy. However, regardless of one's moral evaluation, support for the value of moral autonomy would be expected to lead to policy stances which oppose the imposition of strict measures of social control.

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[10]Maddox and Lilie (1984) have argued for the importance of considering libertarian themes in investigating ideology and ideological cleavages in the U. S. Using NES data, they characterize respondents as Libertarian, Populist, Liberal and Conservative based primarily on issue positions taken. The measurement of support for moral autonomy pursued in the

Four Likert items were included in the pilot study for the purpose of creating a scale indicating support for a narrow version of the broad ideal of individual autonomy: moral autonomy. Through references to "questions of right and wrong" and "moral issues" in these questions, I have attempted to impose a restricted context, such that these questions tap support for the authority of the individual in moral matters. The exact question wordings can be found in Table 8a. Specifically, agreement with the first pair and disagreement with the second pair of items indicate the respondent's support for the ideal of moral autonomy. The opposite pattern of responses is indicative of support for the position of moral heteronomy: viewing morality as legislated by some supra-individual authority, whether God, nature or through the demands of social organization. This pattern is not necessarily indicative of a homogeneous position on where moral authority does indeed lie, thus is best viewed as expressive of a lack of support for the value of moral autonomy.

Table 8a gives the question wording and marginals of the items, and (simple additive) scale reliability information. A cursory glance at this table indicates that:

1) the marginals on these items are extremely skewed.

2) while the existence of the skew across all four items would be expected to strongly attenuate the intercorrelations, the intercorrelations are nevertheless extremely low.[11]

3) the item-total correlations are marginal – at best.

The scale constructed using these items is very skewed, ranging from 0 (most supportive) to .875 (least supportive) out of a possible maximum of 1.0, with a mean of .26 and standard deviation of .18. Yet, Table 8b suggests that regardless of these poor measurement properties, the scale performs as would be expected, exhibiting moderately strong relationships with a set of religious and moral variables. The strongest relationships are

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pilot study allows us to investigate the relationship between support for this libertarian ideal, and policy positions taken.

[11] Because the correlation coefficient (product moment) is so affected by the shape of the marginal distributions, especially if some items have opposite skew, as here, I have calculated an alternative descriptive indicator of the relationships among these variables, presented in Appendix E. These suggest only a slightly less gloomy picture.

found for the questions tapping support for restrictive means of legal control over conduct (abortion and homosexuality) and evaluations of Christian Fundamentalists – findings which are consistent with the expectations generated on the basis of the conceptual development of these items. Moral autonomy additionally shows a significant relationship with a scale reflecting nationalistic sentiment. This relationship suggests that one's perspective on moral autonomy transcends domestic applications, and may help define positions on U.S. intervention abroad. Below, we will see that these items, when scaled, still perform well in several multivariate analyses, suggesting the potency of the dimension even given poor measurement. Nevertheless, the poor scaling properties of these items is an issue which will not be neglected when I consider, below, the potential use of these items in further NES studies.

(4) New Homosexuality Policy Items

The pilot study included two questions addressing issues of the legal control over homosexuality. The wordings of these Likert-form questions are given below:

> There should be laws that protect homosexuals from any discrimination on the basis of sexual preference.

> There should be laws that prohibit homosexuality altogether.

These questions, previously untested in any survey, were designed to represent positions on the legal control of homosexuality, with the expectation that they would not be combined into a unidimensional 'continuous' scale. While agreement to both questions does not represent any realistic position in my view, disagreement with both captures the libertarian sentiment that 'there should be no laws at all' on this issue. And if these items are scaled using standard additive techniques, respondents with such views would be placed in the middle of a scale otherwise intended to represent a dimension of support for government intervention, ranging from complete prohibition to complete protection. Yet, these respondents wouldn't belong on this scale at all. I considered these issues when developing these questions, and expected to treat the responses as producing categorical identification of liberal, conservative, and

libertarian response types for use in analysis. It is now clear to me, however, that those who disagree to both these questions <u>may</u> fall into the previously defined libertarian camp, but equally well could be claiming a moderate degree of legal regulation over the practice of homosexuality. The earlier intent — to identify those who distinctly disavow government involvement while capturing the sentiment of those willing to extend the arm of the law to this issue — fails with these questions. In analyses to come, I have chosen to go ahead and treat these items as combining to form a unidimensional scale (they inter-correlate at $r = .46$) with the knowledge that I may be misrepresenting some hidden libertarians.

(5)   <u>Sources of Policy Positions on Abortion and Homosexuality</u>

Having introduced the new moral evaluation, objectivity, autonomy and homosexuality policy questions, I now turn to an analysis which incorporates these and other measures. I will report on a set of multiple regressions seeking to explore the determinants of policy positions on abortion and homosexuality. These analyses can be seen as serving validation purposes since I have laid out strong theoretical expectations of how one's moral evaluation, objectivity characterization and view of autonomy will affect positions on the governmental regulation of personal conduct. However, the broader purpose of an analysis such as this is to understand the sources of intolerance toward those exhibiting controversial modes of personal conduct — where intolerance in this case is reflected in support for governmental control over these modes of conduct.

Table 9 presents estimates of a set of regression models predicting policy positions on abortion and homosexuality. The abortion policy question used is the standard NES item, with response options ranging from a view of abortion as a matter of personal choice, to support for legal prohibition of abortion. The homosexuality policy item is the new scale previously discussed. Responses to these policy questions are modeled using a set of religious variables (religious involvement, view on the Bible, Evangelical and Catholic denominations), race, gender, egalitarianism, party identification and liberal/conservative orientation. In

addition, the moral evaluation of the specific practice (abortion, homosexuality) was specified as a predictor, but separately for those characterized as objectivist and non-objectivist on that evaluation. Finally, moral autonomy was also specified as a predictor in these equations, but separately for males and females, reflecting the consideration that "choice" themes underlying the abortion issue may affect men and women uniquely. This particular specification was carried over to the homosexuality regression primarily for ease of comparison.

In an effort at partial replication, two separate abortion equations were estimated. The first uses abortion policy responses obtained in the 1986 study and abortion moral evaluation responses from wave 1 of the pilot study. The second uses abortion moral evaluation and policy responses from wave 2 of the pilot study. In all other respects, the equations are the same.

Turning first to the abortion results, we see that, after controlling for religious, demographic, and general political orientations, a view of abortion as immoral unsurprisingly has a large and highly significant estimated effect on the policy position taken. Among non-objectivists, the coefficient is of a magnitude exceeding one-fourth of the scale range. Among objectivists, that effect is surpassed, significantly, by about half as much again. When we turn to the homosexuality policy regression, very similar results (almost startlingly similar in detail) are found for the evaluation of homosexuality as immoral, both among objectivists and non-objectivists.

Thus, on the issues of abortion and homosexuality, those rejecting the objectivist claim of authority for their view of abortion of immoral are expected to extend their personal moral evaluation of the practice as immoral into a willingness to advocate legal measures of control. But a starkly more prohibitive position will be taken if that moral evaluation is characterized as reflecting a "basic truth."

Focusing again on the abortion equations, we see that, across both specifications, moral autonomy is related to policy position for women only. Controlling for all other variables, and among those least supportive of moral autonomy, women are predicted to be significantly

more "conservative" on this issue than are men. Using the results from the first abortion policy specification, if we "set" moral autonomy to its sample maximum (.875, which is the score of those least supportive of moral autonomy), these predicted differences are nearly .20 (precisely .195) on the 0 to 1 scale of the dependent variable. However, when we consider those most supportive of moral autonomy, the relative position of women and men reverses, with women more "liberal" than men by nearly .20 on the abortion policy scale (precisely .19). Looking at the second abortion specification, the observed coefficients show differences in magnitudes, but the relative positioning of women and men just discussed is almost identical (with figures of .26 and .20, respectively). These results very neatly capture the potency of issues of personal choice that directly underlie this issue for women. While men could respond symbolically to these same considerations of choice, these results suggest that they do not.

In the homosexuality policy specifications, by contrast, no effects of moral autonomy occur. This failure is conceptually unexpected, but perhaps not surprising given the difficulties with the homosexuality scale in "placing" libertarian sentiment, and further, given the poor measurement features of the moral autonomy scale. Gender differences are in evidence again, with men supporting more restrictive policies than women once controlling for other factors.[12]

These analyses illustrate very potent effects of moral condemnation, particularly if buttressed by an objectivist characterization, on the advocacy of restrictive measures of legal control over the practice which is condemned. Not surprising, but also not trivial. For these tendencies do have countervailing forces — as illustrated in the effects of moral autonomy on women's position on abortion, or in the effects of level of political information evidenced in

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[12] These estimations show other significant predictors, but one especially needs to be singled out for the purposes of this report, and that is the large estimated effects of political information in these analyses. In each estimated model, those with low levels of political information are more supportive of restrictive policy positions that those with high levels of political information. This is particularly true for the homosexuality policy specification. These relationships, while of substantive interest and importance, are noted here because of the relevance of this information to certain contrasts between the moral traditionalism and moral conservatism indexes, below.

Table 9. Surveying other results in Table 9 that I have not discussed further underscores a more general point: moral evaluations may tell an important part of the story underlying the policy positions taken, but it is only a partial element of that story. Furthermore, the potency of the moral evaluation and objectivity measures in these analyses provide a focal point for the study of changes in tolerance of abortion and homosexuality. We are led to consider how moral evaluation and objectivity characterizations, and thus the tolerance they condition, are themselves subject to change. These are large questions, and beyond my capacity to evaluate here, but are surely not irrelevant to developing a broader understanding of the linkages between morality and politics.

(6)   Scaling the Moral Evaluation Responses

When we look at the set of moral evaluations included in the pilot study, they appear to be quite diverse. However, moral evaluations of these practices may share a common grounding in concerns for the threat they pose to an ideal of the traditional family. Treating support for an ideal of the traditional family as a single conceptual entity provides one route to viewing the evaluations of these practices as united by a single underlying concern.

A second approach focuses not on how these practices threaten features of an ideal traditional family, but instead on what these practices imply about the features of individuals or actors, compared to those epitomized by the ideal individual in the traditional family. For example, this ideal individual, or more weakly, a virtuous individual, is as one who honors the commitments and duties in the traditional marriage and family context.[13] An individual who engages in the practices evaluated in the pilot study could be seen as straying, in various degrees, from that ideal model.

If we were interested in pursuing these postulated sources of moral evaluations directly, each approach outlined would suggest different strategies. The former would explore

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[13]Edgar (1986) provides an interesting account of the "New Right" which links their apparently inconsistent positions in the realm of morality (authoritarian) and economics (supportive of individual autonomy) through a 'personal virtue' commentary of this kind.

perceptions of the forms and extent of harm produced by these practices, to the structure of and relations in the traditional family unit. The latter would attempt to explore the characteristics that are valued in individuals as they assume a particular role within the traditional family. This approach would investigate and draw linkages between personal expressions of value, in defining the virtuous person, and political expressions such as the rise of a distinctive brand of moral – yet political – conservatism that characterizes the "New Right."

These are very rough sketches, but they provide plausible reasons for viewing these moral evaluations as tapping common concerns which might be represented as a single concept. However, if these items are utilized in later studies, a continued theoretical and empirical probing of the elements underlying the moral appraisals (as I have already suggested above) should not be forgone. Linking these items to concerns related to the traditional family provides only a preliminary sketch of the possible roots of these evaluations.

Tables 10a and 10b look empirically at whether these binary items (excluding depends and don't know responses) can be represented as reflecting a single factor. Table 10a presents the associations among these items, using the tetrachoric correlation as the measure of association.[14] The items show evenly high inter-correlations, in the .6 to .7 range, with the exception of that between evaluations of "premarital sex" and "having children without being married" which correlate more highly, at .90. The logical dependency of these practices would lead us to expect this particularly high association. Table 10b presents a confirmatory factor analysis of these items modeled as representing a single dimension.[15] This analysis shows an evenly high set of factor loadings – all in the .80 range, with a high goodness of fit. This

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[14]Appendix D presents a justification for the use of this measure, as well as details on the technique used to establish the dimensionality of these items presented in Table 10b.

[15]In this analysis, I allowed for a non-zero error covariance between the "premarital sex" and "having kids without being married" items. As discussed in Appendix D, this specification recognizes that unique factors affecting these evaluations would be expected to be, in part, shared due to the logical dependency between the practices.

analysis provides an important, but preliminary, indication of the potential of scaling these moral evaluation items to represent the moral conservatism of the "New Right."

Creating an additive index based only the binary responses to the moral evaluation questions results in a 0 to 6 scale, with only 356 cases represented. To avoid this severe sample reduction, I considered several alternative scaling procedures for these items which are discussed in Appendix D. I settled on a simple additive index, first rescaling the "depends" and "don't know" responses to the midpoint between the "immoral" and "not necessarily immoral" responses.

(7)   Contrasting the Moral Conservatism and Moral Traditionalism Indexes

The moral conservatism scale shows substantial "censorship", particularly in contrast to the moral traditionalism scale. 49 or 10.9% of the scaled respondents (n=448) inhabit the lowest value of the scale, and 53 or 11.8% inhabit the largest value. The exact distributions of the moral conservatism and moral traditionalism scales are presented below (0 to 100 scale, with slight rounding on the moral traditionalism codes).[16]

Moral Conservatism:

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
49	3	58	14	59	8	61	28	89	26	53
10.9%	.7%	12.9%	3.1%	13.2%	1.8%	13.6%	6.3%	19.9%	5.8%	11.8%

[16]Six moral traditionalism items were included in the pilot study although the index was developed using eight items, and the 1986 NES study carried all eight items. In this report, I use the six pilot study items to form the moral traditionalism scale. See Appendix B for the wording on these items. The average intercorrelation among these items is .38.

Moral Traditionalism:

0	4	8	13	17	21	25	29	33	38	42	46	50
3	6	5	3	13	12	16	19	25	25	14	26	31
.7%	1.3%	1.1%	.7%	2.9%	2.7%	3.6%	4.2%	5.6%	5.6%	3.1%	5.8%	6.9%

54	58	63	67	71	75	79	83	88	92	96	100
36	18	35	32	18	24	19	26	19	5	10	9
8.0%	4.0%	7.8%	7.1%	4.0%	5.3%	4.2%	5.8%	4.2%	1.1%	2.2%	2.0%

The moral conservatism scale has a very even distribution, though over only eleven scale values.[17] The moral traditionalism scale has a fairly even distribution as well, with the exception of a drop off in the tails. The finer discriminatory capability of the moral traditionalism scale is a very desirable feature not shared by the moral conservatism scale. In its "pure" form (excluding depends/DK and only considering those who select one of the binary response options on each component item), the moral conservatism scale has only six scale values. Improving its power to discriminate among respondents requires that we either A) add more component items, or B) move away from the binary response format. I will return to the consideration of these issues in the concluding section of this report.

Moral Traditionalism: Distinct Subscales?

In my earlier report to the Board (Stoker, 1987) I investigated the possibility of dual dimensionality in the moral traditionalism items by presenting numerous analyses of the moral traditionalism index broken down into subscales: the "family values" subscale and the "moral tolerance" subscale. (See Appendix F for a conceptual discussion of these dimensionality concerns.) The items within these subscales are worded "in the same direction," although worded in opposite directions across subscales. When analyzing these

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[17]The 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 values exist due to the scaling of depends/don't know responses as halfway between the immoral and not necessarily immoral options for each item prior to creating the scale. See appendix A for details.

subscales using a homogenous, highly educated student sample, I did not need to be overly concerned about distortions introduced into the analysis due to acquiescence bias. However, using a small national sample, the potential distortions introduced are much more problematic. As a result, in this report I limit empirical considerations of the distinctiveness of these subscales to an analysis presented in Table 11.

Table 11 relates: a) the intercorrelations between each subscale and the moral autonomy and moral conservatism index, using responses to the moral traditionalism items obtained both in the 1986 post-election study and in wave 1 of the pilot study; and as an alternative measure, b) the average correlation of the subscale items with the moral autonomy and moral conservatism indexes. In these analyses, acquiescence biases should not distinctively alter the correlations for either subscale.

I have suggested that issues of tolerance for moral diversity can be conceptually distinguished from condemnation of the forms that diversity takes. If the moral traditionalism subscales are empirically distinguishable in this respect, that distinctiveness should be reflected in these analyses. In particular, we would expect higher associations between moral autonomy and the "moral tolerance" subscale relative to that between moral autonomy and the "family values" subscale. Further, we would expect higher associations between moral conservatism and the "family values" subscale than that between moral conservatism and the "moral tolerance" subscale. We do see these patterns in Table 11, more strongly when considering the 1986 responses to the moral traditionalism items. Moral autonomy shows considerably stronger relationships with the "moral tolerance" subscale than with the family values subscale, while moral conservatism shows stronger relationships with the "family values" subscale than with the "moral tolerance" subscale. These results lend empirical support to the conceptual arguments claiming distinctiveness across these subscales.

Predicting Moral Traditionalism and Moral Conservatism

Table 12 presents a pair of regressions modeling responses in the moral conservatism and moral traditionalism indexes as a function of demographic and religious variables. The

primary purpose of this analysis is to contrast the "sources" of moral traditionalism and moral

conservatism as identified by this analysis.

Contrasts are evident in Table 12, with two major differences identified:[18]

1) Moral conservatism shows a much stronger relationship with degree of religious
   involvement then does moral traditionalism.

2) Political information shows a strong relationship with moral conservatism in contrast
   to no observed relationship with moral traditionalism, given other controls.

Clearly, the moral views reflected by the moral conservatism index have strong religious

convictions at their base; religious convictions are influential in responses to the moral

traditionalism items as well, but not to as large an extent.

The political information result is more dramatic, in that no effects are found in the

moral traditionalism estimation in contrast to the large effects found in the moral

conservatism estimation. Numerous other analyses discussed in this report indicate the

importance of political information to an understanding of moral conservatism. It was found

to exert independent effects after controlling for moral conservatism in the abortion and

homosexuality policy regressions, and similar results will be seen in analyses to come. I would

not attribute the "effects" of political information on moral conservatism to level of political

information per se. Rather, I expect it should be given an interpretation which links level of

political information to the openness of one's social horizons, and to various psychological

factors. Without developing this interpretation further, we can nevertheless conclude that

these same factors do not structure the views represented by the moral traditionalism index.

Bivariate Associations

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[18]In addition, the measures of fit diverge between these two estimations. Both the r^2 and the standard error of the regression are higher in the moral conservatism estimation. Comparison of the r^2 across these specifications is problematic due to the different variances of the indexes. (When these indexes are scaled on a 0 to 1 interval, the standard deviations are .32 and .23 for moral conservatism and moral traditionalism, respectively.) The higher standard error for the moral conservatism regression suggests larger prediction errors, on average, than those generated in the moral traditionalism estimation.

Table 13 presents pairwise correlations between the moral conservatism and moral traditionalism scales and a set of validation variables. Across these variables, the correlations are reassuringly high, with a slight to moderate edge given to the moral conservatism index.[19] An exception is evaluation of the women's movement, which shows a slightly stronger relationship with moral traditionalism.[20]

In addition, table 13 presents similar pairwise correlations between these indexes and a set of general political orientations and evaluations. Notably, moral conservatism and moral traditionalism show virtually no relationship with partisanship. And overall, the correlations in Table 13 are very similar across the two indexes – and nearly uniformly low in each case. However, a major exception to this generalization is found for relationships between the moral conservatism and moral traditionalism indexes and measures of ideological orientation. These correlations are larger, ranging from approximately .25 to .40 across evaluations of liberals and conservatives, and ideological self-identification. These magnitudes suggest the importance of moral concerns in understanding contemporary ideological differentiation – at least at the symbolic level reflected by these measures of ideology.[21] Yet, differences between these observed relationships with party and ideology further suggest that the effects of these moral concerns are found within rather than across party lines.

Table 14 further investigates these issues by reporting a similar correlation analysis conducted separately for self-identified Democrats and Republicans.[22] The first row of this table presents a somewhat startling result: moral conservatism shows a positive relationship

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[19]The difference in correlations is striking only with respect to the abortion policy questions. If I drop the abortion evaluation item from the moral conservatism index and recreate the scale using only four items (thus having a less reliable scale) the edge for moral conservatism remains. The correlations with each abortion question using this scale are .42 and .45, respectively.

[20]This edge is sharpened when we turn to multivariate analysis. Stay tuned.

[21]Whether this differentiation extends to an articulated understanding of differences between liberalism and conservatism is a further question of interest, but is not assessed here.

[22]Including leaning partisans.

with partisan strength for <u>both</u> Democrats and Republicans. Among each partisan group, the strongest partisan adherents are the most morally conservative. This result holds up when looking at the moral traditionalism index as well, although weakly with respect to Democrats. Thus, the nearly nonzero linear relationship between party identification and moral conservatism masks a slight curvilinear relationship between these orientations when considering partisans alone.[23]

At the same time, however, we again see a strong relationship between moral conservatism and conservative self-identification among both partisan groups. Focusing on the Democrats, this is particularly true: for this group, the correlation between moral conservatism and ideological self identification is .49, in contrast to a correlation of .23 for Republicans. However, the correlations between the moral indexes and ideological self identification among Republicans are constrained by the fact that there is very little ideological variation among Republicans. Only 27 out of 160 Republicans giving ideological information consider themselves liberal (16.9%); 128 or 80% consider themselves to be conservative. In contrast, Democrats show a large inner split in ideological orientation in the pilot study. Out of 210 self-identified and leaning Democrats who gave ideological information, 105 (50%) call themselves liberals and 104 (49.5%) call themselves conservatives. The results in Table 14 suggest that a primary element underlying this split is diversity in moral views; but further, that the tendency for the morally conservative to identify themselves as generally conservative is paralleled by a tendency to consider themselves stronger Democratic partisans.[24]

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[23]When looking at average moral conservatism levels among the 'standard' seven partisan groups, a "W" pattern emerges. Moral conservatism levels show the acknowledged increase with partisan strength, but in addition, those calling themselves independent are more morally conservative than are leaning partisans. I will not attempt to go into any explanation of these patterns here.

[24] The relationship between moral conservatism and liberal/conservative identification hold up using L/C measures available from the 1986 post-election study. This allays fears that respondents are responding to the pilot study L/C questions (asked shortly after the moral traditionalism items) in a morally imbued context.

Clearly, moral conservatism cross cuts partisan lines, but is not irrelevant to partisan politics. Those most dissimilar in partisan orientation (strong Democrats and strong Republicans) are most similar in orientation when the focus is on moral conservatism; yet even if moral conservatism unites conservative Democrats with Republican counterparts, strong partisan distinctiveness serves to divide them.

At the bivariate level we do find that moral conservatism is related to evaluations of Bush, Reagan and Reagan's performance in office among Democrats as well as Republicans (Table 14). Weaker relationships are found using the moral traditionalism index. Relationships between the moral indexes and evaluations of Gary Hart and Jesse Jackson, however, exist only for Republicans, which is consistent with a view of partisanship as dominant in evaluations of these candidates.

Subgroup Analysis: Conservative Democrats

As the previous analysis should suggest, interest in and uncertainty about the behavior of the large group of conservative Democrats in the 1988 elections provides a strong argument in favor of including some measure of conservative moral views in the 1988 study. And, in characterizing this important group, the moral traditionalism and moral conservatism indexes differ markedly.

Using the moral traditionalism index, conservative Democrats and conservative Republicans are indistinguishable when average scores are compared. They average .61 and .60 on the (0 to 1) scale in contrast to an average of .44 for liberal Democrats. Using the moral conservatism measure, however, conservative Democrats are characterized as most extreme with a mean of .69, compared to .59 for conservative Republicans and .39 for liberal Democrats.[25]

Evidence in Table 15a suggests that the distinctiveness identified by the moral conservatism index is not artifactual. Across a variety of moral and religious measures, a

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[25]This difference between conservative democrats and conservative republicans on the moral conservatism scale is significant at p=.01.

similar pattern emerges. While response biases could be still accounting for the distinctiveness of this group on some measures (e.g., through a "positivity" bias on the feeling thermometer measures), it is not a likely explanation for the consistency of the pattern across all of the measures. Further, when each of the eleven items in Table 14 is correlated with the moral conservatism index, the average correlation is .28; for the moral traditionalism index the average is only .16.[26] Overall, the evidence suggests that the moral conservatism scale is more valid in its characterization of conservative Democrats. It also suggests, again, the potency of a moral dimension for understanding the conservatism of this group.

Nevertheless, Table 15b again indicates the strength of partisanship in accounting for the general political orientations and choices of conservative Democrats. Across a variety of measures reported in this table, they resemble liberal Democrats much more than they resemble conservative Republicans. Exceptions, however, are evident. Expectedly, they resemble conservative Republicans in their evaluations of liberals and conservatives. Further, and more importantly, they show greater Republican voting tendencies than liberal Democrats in Senate and gubernatorial races, although not House races (expectedly more partisan oriented). These results indicate the potential of members of this large group to cast a Republican vote when campaigns carry themes and convey information appealing to their conservative – and very morally conservative – orientations.

Continuing the Comparison: Multivariate Models

Gary Hart

By May 1987, Gary Hart, most likely the strongest contender for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination, had withdrawn from the race following numerous reports of his relationship with a woman who was not his wife. This event has sharply changed the

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[26]For each pair of correlations (MC scale – item), (MT scale – item), the n's were constrained to be equal. The only pairwise correlations which were larger for the moral traditionalism index than for the moral conservatism index involved the prayer in public schools item (.13 vs. .08), and the dummy variable representing evangelists (.32 vs. .31).

Democratic contest for the presidential nomination, leaving an open field of contenders
without a leading front-runner.

The 1986 and 1987 National Election Study data allow us to take a look at the public
response to these events. The 1986 post election study (November – December, 1986) and
wave 1 of the 1987 pilot study (June, 1987) each carried an item asking respondents to
evaluate Hart on a "feeling thermometer," where in the interim, the Hart disclosures and
withdrawal from presidential contention occurred. We have, in effect, a quasi-experimental
design allowing us to gauge public reactions to these events.

From the first to second point of evaluation, average ratings of Hart dropped 11 points
on the feeling thermometer, from 58.1 to 47.0 on average (n=339 responses at both time
points). 84 respondents who excused themselves from rating Hart in 1986 were willing to in
June of 1987, resembling the rest of the sample in their average rating of Hart (46.6). Table
16a presents the results of a multiple regression analysis predicting wave 2 evaluations of Hart
using partisanship, ideological identification, egalitarianism, moral autonomy, sex, race,
religious measures, and a variable indicating whether one grew up in the South, as predictors.
In addition, moral conservatism, political information, and the interaction between these
factors were used as predictors. The information and (moral conservatism*political
information) interaction predictors are included to capture the dependency of wave 2
reactions to Hart on knowledge of the disclosures about Hart's behavior that the preceded his
withdrawal from presidential race. The same model applied to wave 1 evaluations of Hart is
presented for comparison.

In evaluating the results found in table 16a, the most striking finding is the absence of
any effect of moral conservatism and political information in wave 1 in contrast to the strong
effects they have, individually and interacting, in wave 2.[27] By June of 1987, among those at
the lowest level of political information, evaluations of Hart show a strong negative

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[27]While the interaction term fails to reach standard significance levels, that may be explained
by the high degree of multicollinearity necessarily created by incorporating a multiplicative
term such as this.

relationship with moral conservatism. Those most morally conservative are estimated as rating Hart 23 points lower than those least morally conservative. Among the moderately informed (setting political information to its midpoint of .5) this differentiation drops to 14 points. And among those most informed, differences in moral conservatism yield very small estimated differences in evaluations of Hart – the most morally conservative rating him just 5 points lower than the least morally conservative. Evaluating these results from the alternative angle, we find that among those most morally liberal, respondents characterized by high levels of information rated Hart an average of 23 points lower than low information respondents. But among the most morally conservative, this distinctiveness across political information groups shrinks to only a 5 point rating difference.

These main and interaction effects between moral conservatism and political information can be summarized by generating predicted ratings of Hart for respondents distinguished only on the basis of these characteristics, as I have done below:[28]

	Morally liberal	Morally moderate	Morally conservative
Low political information	63.0	51.6	40.2
Moderate Political information	51.7	44.6	37.5
High Political Information	40.5	37.6	34.7

Considering only the characteristics of moral conservatism and political information level, we see, not unexpectedly in the context of these evaluations, that uninformed, morally liberal respondents are most favorable toward Hart, and highly informed morally conservative respondents are least favorable. But as indicated in the discussion above, the morally conservative are, as a group, almost indistinguishable in their evaluation of Hart regardless of

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[28]   Of course, the absolute magnitude of the predicted values in this table will vary depending upon the profile of other modeled characteristics used to generate each value. In this table, that profile was generated by using a value of .5 for all the "continuously scaled" variables (moderate ideologically, independent, etc.) and the categorical choices: male, white, ·not Evangelical Protestant or Catholic, and not raised in the South. These choices are basically arbitrary. My purpose here is not to characterize some "typical" respondent but to illustrate the estimated effects of moral conservatism and political information in a straightforward manner.

political information level. And those most politically informed are similarly homogeneous regardless of degree of moral conservatism. These results suggest that general level of political information may not reflect <u>specific</u> levels of information about the reported activities of Gary Hart for those most morally conservative. Those not generally attentive to and informed about politics within this group may nevertheless have selectively assimilated the reports about Hart that were clearly relevant to their moral conservatism.

Additionally, those characterized as having a high level of general political information, who thus would be expected to be well-informed about the reported activities of Hart, show uniformly negative evaluations. This uniformity among the most politically informed is especially interesting. The publicized behavior of Hart presented a strong suspicion of marital infidelity, which we could expect to be condemned as immoral by respondents at all levels of moral conservatism.[29] The predicted ratings of Hart among the most informed suggest that this condemnation has a <u>categorical</u> effect on evaluations of Hart. Being <u>more</u> morally conservative, and thus finding many other practices objectionable that moral liberals may not, does not lead one to a harsher evaluation of Hart.

These conclusions, must, however, be presented cautiously. This model performs quite poorly in accounting for wave 2 evaluations of Hart, with an r^2 of .17 and a standard error of 22.7. In addition, if these analyses are replicated using the moral traditionalism index, we would reach <u>different</u> conclusions.

Table 16b presents the results of this replication. A comparison with table 16a shows that large differences occur only for the moral indexes, political information, and the interaction coefficients. For wave 2, the results are roughly similar to those found using the moral conservatism index, but the interaction term is highly insignificant and the main effects terms show much lower significance levels. The wave 1 results, however, show large differences. They suggest a large <u>positive</u> effect of moral traditionalism on evaluations of Hart

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[29]These expectations are based on an earlier pretest of the moral evaluation items. The student sample in that pretest overwhelmingly viewed adultery as immoral (Stoker, 1987).

among the least informed (18 rating points difference between least and most morally

traditional), linking increases in moral traditionalism with more favorable evaluations of Hart.

A slight negative effect among the most informed (-9 point comparable difference) is

predicted. Using the same profile of characteristics presented earlier, we can represent the

wave 1 interaction results tabularly:

	Morally liberal	Morally moderate	Morally conservative
Low political information	46.5	54.5	63.5
Moderate Political information	53.0	55.4	57.8
High Political Information	59.5	55.3	51.0

I find it difficult to account for these wave 1 results substantively. They may merely reflect

tiny sample peculiarities in the estimation of effects for highly multicollinear variables.

However, when contrasted with the strong and readily interpretable results obtained using the

moral conservatism index, these results are disturbing.

Moral Majority and Christian Fundamentalists

Table 17 reports a set of regressions predicting evaluations of the Moral Majority and

Christian fundamentalists. As we would expect, moral traditionalism and moral conservatism

have significant effects on evaluations of the Moral Majority. The coefficient and t-ratio for

moral traditionalism is slightly larger than for moral conservatism (as is the beta coefficient,

.18 vs. 15). Across each estimation, the coefficient on moral autonomy is reasonably large

(approximately 12 on the 100 point scale), but fails to reach significance.[30]

Turning to the Christian fundamentalists estimation, we see strong confirmation of the

validity of the moral autonomy scale. Those least supportive of moral autonomy are expected

to rate Christian fundamentalists 18 points higher than those most supportive of moral

autonomy.[31] In contrast, no effects of moral traditionalism or moral conservatism are found

[30] These effects pale when compared to the effects found for political information. This may partly reflect positivity bias given the ambiguity of the "moral majority" symbol.

[31] Again using the maximum scale value of .875 in this calculation.

in these estimations — although the coefficient on moral conservatism approaches standard significance levels. It is not degree of moral conservatism, but considerations regarding the public imposition of that moral conservatism, that appear to structure evaluations of this group.

Women's Movement

Table 18 presents the results of a pair of regressions predicting evaluations of the women's movement. Two findings stand out in Table 18. First, there are dramatic differences between the results obtained for the moral traditionalism and moral conservatism indexes. The estimated effect of moral traditionalism across its scale range is three times as large as the comparable estimate using the moral conservatism index, with a t-ratio that nearly parallels that relative magnitude. These differences suggest that the moral traditionalism index is indeed capturing sentiment reflecting support for women remaining in 'traditional roles,' a sentiment that is not comparably reflected in the moral conservatism index. When applying this model to predict the evaluation of feminists, a comparable but less distinctive result is obtained. In that estimation, the coefficient and t-value for moral traditionalism are −21.7 and 3.38; for moral conservatism the values are −10.8 and 2.08 (entire set of results not shown).

The other finding to note in table 18 is the effect of moral autonomy on evaluations of the women's movement. After controlling for other factors, and among those most supportive of moral autonomy, men and women are not distinguishable in their evaluations of the women's movement (there are no "main effects" of gender). But among males, a decrease in support for the value of moral autonomy is associated with a significant drop in evaluation of the women's movement, while women are not 'moved' to a less supportive position. Among those least supportive of moral autonomy this produces a 15 point predicted gender difference in evaluations of the women's movement. Thus, after controlling for other factors, these results suggest that it is only males most supportive of moral autonomy who will resemble women in support for the women's movement.

Reagan, Bush, and 1986 Vote Choices

Table 19 presents a subset of the results of multiple regression analyses predicting

evaluations of Reagan and Bush, and approval of Reagan's performance in office.

Additionally, it reports a subset of results from Logit estimations of House, Senate and

Gubernatorial vote choice.[32] The only striking thing about these results is the lack of

positive findings for the moral traditionalism and moral conservatism indexes.

Being generous, we might notice that moral conservatism almost has a significant effect

in the Senate vote estimation, and moral traditionalism shows reasonably large, but

insignificant effects in the Senate and Gubernatorial vote estimations. Since the sample size

in these vote estimations is small, these results should be noted. Yet the main conclusion

must remain that moral conservatism/traditionalism do not help us understand public

response to Reagan and Bush, nor 1986 vote choices.[33] Not unsurprisingly, partisanship is

dominant in these estimations.

But as we look ahead to the 1988 primary and general elections, the role of moral

conservatism in the campaigns, while in doubt, may be larger. On the one hand, Pat

Robertson, an evangelical minister, has announced his candidacy for the Republican

presidential nomination and has exhibited organizational strength in early primary activity in

Iowa and Michigan. Yet there is no evidence of a broad base of support for Robertson (a

recent Gallup poll reports Robertson as preferred by 8% of the identified Republicans

interviewed, lagging far behind Bush as the preferred Republican candidate. Reported in the

New York Times, 9/16/87). The impact of his candidacy on the Republican primary

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[32] To be precise, House vote choice or preference (if did not vote) is the dependent variable
presented in Table 19.

[33] One caveat is owed to the moral conservatism and moral traditionalism indexes. These
vote choice analyses completely neglect contextual information at the state or district level
which might suggest greater or less salience of moral issues and thus heighten the importance
of moral conservatism/traditionalism in vote choice. With the small sample size of the pilot,
subscale analyses may not be terribly informative. But influences of this type could be
operative and are not modeled.

campaign could nevertheless be significant, particularly if his organization maintains or builds its mobilization capacity.[34]

Further, an analysis of conservative Democrats shows that those with high levels of political information are at least as morally conservative as those with low levels of political information − if not more so.[35] Thus, even though this group exhibits decidedly "Democratic" evaluations of Reagan and voting behavior in 1986 (although less so for Senate and gubernatorial choices than for House choices), we may find this group responding favorably to the Robertson campaign, or more generally, prepared to defect from the Democratic camp if the ultimate configuration of presidential contenders provides a Republican which better reflects their conservative complexion. With Robertson in the race, even if not the eventual Republican nominee, moral issues will be expected to reach the campaign agenda and could be expected to raise the salience of this dimension throughout the course of the 1988 elections.

(8) Concluding Comments and Recommendations

Moral Evaluation Items

There is no question, in light of these analyses and arguments, but that the NES should include some measure of conservative moral views in the 1988 election study. But what measures? Although the moral traditionalism items have only been included in NES studies since 1985, considerations of continuity − important to longitudinal analyses − rests the

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[34] The pilot study indicates that those most morally conservative (and thus most likely to support Robertson) showed lower levels of political participation than those not characterized as such (although participation levels were low, altogether, in the 1986 campaigns). The average number of non-voting political activities for this group (out of six activities assessed in the pilot study) was .283 compared to .771 for the least morally conservative group. Some of this inactive tendency may be countered by the existence of an announced evangelical candidate with a strong campaign organization.

[35]This result is observed using either the moral traditionalism or moral conservatism index. Among liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans, this pattern is reversed. Higher political information levels correspond to lower levels of moral conservatism within these groups. As such, differences among these three groups in moral conservatism are most prominent when looking at those evidencing high levels of political information.

burden of proof with the moral conservatism index. At the same time, if a change is to be made, now is better than later for that same reason.

Conceptual arguments and evidence reviewed weigh heavily against the moral traditionalism index. It is clearly tapping potent concerns about contemporary society, but not in a clear way that will help us advance our theories and understanding of the linkages between morality and politics. But the evidence in this report suggests the moral conservative items to be highly reliable and valid indicators of the moral conservatism of the "New Right" in American politics. As such, I urge the NES to use the moral evaluation questions in the 1988 study.

Along with this recommendation I have several further comments. First, the moral traditionalism index is clearly tapping things that the moral conservatism index is not. This is particularly evidenced in the Women's Movement analysis. But I see this as motivating us to continue to define and measure critical elements of public opinion rather than as an argument in favor of keeping the moral traditionalism items as a scale.

Secondly, the moral conservatism scale has relatively low discriminatory power, which could be improved by adding more items.[36] Considering the items found in the original pretested scale but not included in the pilot study, I would recommend that evaluations of adultery be added. This would aid our powers of discrimination at the liberal end of the scale, but not at the conservative end, however.

Moral Autonomy

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[36] Theoretically, an alternative remedy is not to increase the number of questions, but to increase the number of response options per question. This would suggest fundamentally new questions — dropping the categorical language of morality in favor of some set of continuously scaled response options. Moral judgments certainly can utilize a continuous evaluative scale. One's claim that two practices are immoral, for example, does not necessarily imply that they are morally undifferentiated. One may be "worse," "more condemnable," "more harmful to society," .... Seeking to represent these potential underlying sentiments in a survey question is a future project, however. It is made very complicated by the fact that many possible evaluative scales may underlie the categorical response. It is also made problematic in that if we operationalize a continuous scale of evaluation, we forgo the categorical information we obtain in the NES items. Considered singly, categorical moral evaluations may well have effects that are lost if we represent individuals on a continuous scale without knowledge of how those responses map into a categorical judgment for each respondent.

The moral autonomy scale has provided strong results in many analyses despite its poor scaling properties. These analyses suggest that moral autonomy may prove critical to an understanding of gender politics, and that it is clearly important to an understanding of the "New Right" in American politics. This concept deserves a chance at better measurement. Ideally, these items would be carried in 1988, along with "new and improved" items. I would be willing to suggest new items and might be able to field a small (student) pretest of additional items if that suggestion is forthcoming from the Board.

Homosexuality Policy Items

In order to further our understanding of the "New Right," it would be useful to represent that policy agenda in the 1988 study with more than the standard abortion item. But we can do better than the homosexuality policy items used in the pilot study, which I have critiqued in the body of this report. The "better" questions I envision should share the virtues of the abortion question in reflecting realistic legal/policy options that are being considered in our society. The "endpoints" of that scale could be those represented in the Likert scale items, but developing the middle options would be difficult at this time. However, we could proceed efficiently by presenting the polar options to respondents while not discouraging "depends" responses, then recording and coding the "depends" responses obtained.

Objectivism, and Miscellaneous

The objectivism questions are an odd lot. They are unusual and powerful, and probably, given my early stages of theorizing about the characteristic of objectivity, under-explored in these analyses. Nevertheless, based on the power they have exhibited, these are my recommendations: Carry the objectivist characterizations that are paired with the abortion and homosexuality moral evaluations (if both abortion and homosexuality policy questions are used in 1988). In addition (and on a "miscellaneous" note), ask respondents to place the leading presidential candidates and Pat Robertson on the abortion and homosexuality policy questions. This entire configuration of responses will allow us to

precisely investigate the relationships between moral evaluations, objectivity characterizations, moral autonomy, policy positions and candidate evaluations. It would also allow us to investigate numerous questions relating to information about candidates in this moral policy domain.

Table 1

Marginals on Moral Evaluation Questions

"X"	"X" is immoral.	There is nothing necessarily immoral about "X."	Depends/ Don't Know	Total
Wave 1				
v2220 Premarital Sex	226 49.8%	211 46.5%	5 / 17 3.7%	454
v2221 Having children without being married	283 62.3%	157 34.6%	8 / 14 3.1%	454
v2222 Homosexuality	342 75.0%	93 20.4%	5 / 16 4.6%	456
v2224 Divorce	80 17.5%	353 77.4%	14 / 9 5.0%	456
v2226 Abortion	264 58.0%	143 31.4%	37 / 11 10.5%	455
Wave 2				
v5226 Homosexuality	342 68.0%	98 27.5%	3 / 12 4.5%	356
v5227 Divorce	78 22.9%	262 73.2%	17 / 1 5.0%	358
v5228 Abortion	184 51.5%	136 38.1%	31 / 6 10.4%	357

Table 2[1]

Response Stability
Moral Evaluation and Moral Traditionalism Items

Moral Evaluation Items	r	% Agreement
Homosexuality	.71	84.4
Divorce	.68	85.0
Abortion	.73	79.8

Moral Tradtionalism Items	r	% Agreement	% Non-contradictory
v1006-v2192 (new lifestyles)	.60	76.9	88.0
* v1007-v2193 (change views)	.53	67.9	77.5
v1009-v2194 (too much sexual freedom)	.58	77.5	90.7
* v1011-v2195 (be more tolerant)	.46	64.6	80.5
v1012-v2196 (increasing moral decay)	.67	70.6	87.4
* v1013-v2197 (society more accepting)	.33	59.5	78.7

*Indicates a "moral tolerance" item. See Appendix B for exact question wordings.

[1]The n for these analyses is 333. In calculating the percent agreement scores for the moral evaluation items, a "depends" response across both waves was counted as stable. The moral traditionalism items were recoded into agree, neither agree nor disagree, and disagree responses prior to calculating the agreement figures. A "contradictory" pattern is defined as a change from agree to disagree, or visa versa, across waves. The percent of cases not exhibiting such patterns is reported as "% non-contradictory," above.

Table 3[1]
Marginals on Moral Traditionalism Items
(percentages only)

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree Somewhat	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly
Wave 1-New Lifestyles(v1006)	35.7	41.1	9.0	9.3	4.8
Wave 2-New Lifestyles(v2192)	45.6	28.8	3.9	13.2	8.4
Wave 1-Change Views(v1007)	8.7	34.5	9.6	21.9	25.2
Wave 2-Change Views(v2193)	18.3	35.4	2.4	12.3	31.5
Wave 1-Sexual Freedom(v1009)	54.1	22.2	12.3	8.1	3.1
Wave 2-Sexual Freedom(v2194)	55.0	23.1	4.5	10.5	6.9
Wave 1-Be More Tolerant(v1011)	18.9	39.9	12.6	19.8	8.7
Wave 2-Be More Tolerant(v2195)	26.7	39.6	5.7	15.0	12.9
Wave 1-Moral Decay(v1012)	36.0	23.7	14.4	15.6	10.2
Wave 2-Moral Decay(v2196)	37.8	19.5	5.4	18.9	19.3
Wave 1-Society Accepting(v1013)	16.8	42.9	17.7	16.2	6.3
Wave 2-Society Accepting(v2197)	28.2	43.8	6.9	15.3	5.7

Middle Category Movement Patterns

	% Stayed in Middle	% Moved to Agree	% Moved to Disagree	(n)
New Lifestyles	10.0	50.0	40.0	(59)
Change Views	12.5	40.6	46.9	(48)
Too Much Sexual Freedom	14.6	53.7	31.7	(42)
Be More Tolerant	9.5	59.5	31.0	(41)
Increasing Moral Decay	10.4	41.7	47.9	(32)
Society More Accepting	15.3	61.0	23.7	(30)

% of Sample:	v1006 v2192	v1007 v2193	v1009 v2194	v1011 v2195	v1012 v2196	v1013 v2197
moving into "3" at time two	4.2	3.9	4.5	2.7	1.2	3.0
moving out of "3" at time two	15.0	12.9	11.4	10.5	8.4	8.1

[1]For exact question wordings, see Appendix B.

Table 4

Marginals on Specific Objectivism Questions

| "X" | On the issue of whether "X" is immoral: | | | Total |
	I have my own view, but I'm not sure it's the one true answer.	I feel there is a basic truth to the position I have taken.	Depends/ Don't Know	
Homosexuality	156 36.1%	260 60.2%	0 / 16 3.7%	432
Divorce	142 33.1%	274 63.9%	5 / 8 3.0%	429
Abortion	157 39.0%	242 60.0%	2 / 2 1.0%	403

Table 5

Cross-tabulation of Moral Evaluation and Objectivity Questions

Homosexuality

	Own View	Basic Truth	(n)
Not Neccesarily Immoral	46.2	53.8	(93)
Immoral	38.1	61.9	(339)

Chi-Square=2.04 p=.15

Divorce

	Own View	Basic Truth	(n)
Not Neccesarily Immoral	35.7	64.3	(350)
Immoral	38.0	62.0	(79)

Chi-Square=.14 p=.71

Abortion

	Own View	Basic Truth	(n)
Not Neccesarily Immoral	52.8	47.2	(142)
Immoral	33.0	67.0	(261)

Chi-Square=15.0 p<.01

Table 6[1]

Moral Evaluation Continuity Measures
With Bivariate Controls on Political Information, Education and Objectivity

Control	(n)	Homosexuality % Agreement	Divorce % Agreement	Abortion % Agreement
Objectivity				
Own View	*	77.2	79.4	73.5
Basic Truth	#	91.6	90.1	85.5
Political Information				
1 (Low)	(52)	80.8	82.7	76.9
2	(65)	87.7	83.1	83.1
3	(69)	85.5	85.5	76.4
4	(55)	78.2	85.5	76.4
5 (High)	(77)	93.5	90.9	85.7
Education				
< H. S. Degree	(48)	87.5	81.3	77.1
H. S. Degree	(117)	82.9	86.3	81.2
Some College	(76)	88.2	82.9	78.9
Coll. Degree or +	(77)	87.0	90.9	83.1

* The n's are 127,126, and 132, respectively.

The n's are 191,192, and 186, respectively.

[1]The difference in proportions across objectivity categories are statistically significant (p < .01) for each moral evaluation item.

Table 7
Predicted Probability of Providing a Stable Response
A. Homosexuality
n=313

	Non-objective	Objective
Low Political Information		
Not Evangelical or Catholic	.66	.86
Evangelical	.86	.95
High Political Information		
Not Evangelical or Catholic	.86	.95
Evangelical	.95	.98

Additional elements of profile: age 44, at least some college education, low to moderate religious involvement, not Bible literalist.

B. Divorce
n=317

	Non-objective	Objective
Bible Literalists		
60 years old	.46	.63
25 years old	.75	.86
Bible Non-literalists		
60 years old	.81	.90
25 years old	.94	.97

Additional elements of profile: at least some college education, low to moderately religious, not evangelical Protestant or Catholic, moderate level of political information.

C. Abortion
n=315

	Non-objective	Objective
Low Political Information		
60 years old	.59	.76
25 years old	.74	.87
High Political Information		
60 years old	.79	.89
25 years old	.88	.94

Additional elements of profile: at least some college education, low to moderate religious involvement, not evangelican Protestant or Catholic, not a literal interpretation of the Bible.

Table 7 (continued)

Predicting Response Stability
Logit Estimates

Predictor	Homosexuality b (t)	Divorce b (t)	Abortion b (t)
Constant	1.19 (1.95)	4.10 (6.07)	2.05 (3.70)
Objectivism	1.16 (3.30)	.73 (2.09)	.80 (2.70)
Age	− .012 (−1.19)	− .036 (−3.62)	− .020 (−2.26)
Some College or more	.06 (−.15)	− .49 (−1.29)	− .25 (−.73)
Low Political Information	− .69 (−1.52)	− .14 (−.31)	− .27 (−.65)
High Political Information	1.17 (2.07)	−1.00 (−.20)	.69 (1.62)
High Religious Involvment	− .04 (−.10)	.27 (.72)	.01 (.02)
Bible Literalist	.56 (1.37)	−1.65 (−3.92)	−.20 (−.59)
Evangelical Protestant	1.12 (2.16)	.18 (.45)	.18 (.47)
Catholic	.47 (1.10)	.23 (.45)	.41 (−1.12)
"pseudo r^2"[1]	.08	.11	.06

[1] This is a measure suggested by Aldrich and Nelson (1984) for reflecting the predictive power of the model. They provide the label "pseudo r^2." The low values observed here are not surprising given the limited variance that the dependent measures exhibit.

Table 8a

Reliability Information on the Moral Autonomy Scale

Average Inter-item Correlation	Alpha
.13	.36

Moral Autonomy Items	Item-total correlation
1) We must respect people's own view of what is right and wrong, no matter what we think.	.51
2) People have to decide for themselves what is right and wrong.	.64
3) If we've decided something is morally wrong, it is wrong for everyone.	−.63
4) On most questions of right and wrong, it doesn't make sense to think of each person determining the answers for themself.	−.56

Marginals on Moral Autonomy Items

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree Somewhat	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	Total
1)	173 48.3%	145 40.5%	7 2.0%	24 6.7%	9 2.5%	358
2)	200 56.0%	104 29.1%	8 2.2%	21 5.9%	24 6.7%	357
3)	38 10.6%	45 12.6%	15 4.2%	131 36.7%	128 35.9%	357
4)	28 7.8%	67 18.8%	24 6.7%	108 30.3%	130 36.4%	357

Table 8b[1]

Bivariate Associations between Moral Autonomy and Validation Variables

		Moral Autonomy	(n)
	v2167 Moral Majority	.23	(331)
	v2170 Christian Fundamentalists	.31	(328)
*	v241 Robertson	.24	(195)
*	v251 Women's Movement	−.27	(342)
	v2165 Feminists	−.13	(334)
	v927 View on Bible	.25	(339)
	Religious Involvement	.26	(343)
*	v901 School Prayer	.08	(339)
*	v908 Abortion Policy	−.30	(347)
#	v5215 Abortion Policy	−.27	(344)
#	Homosexuality Policy	.31	(343)
	Nationalism	−.18	(347)

[1] * is used to denote a variable from the 1986 study, while # denotes a variable from the second wave of the 1987 Pilot Study. All other variables are from the first wave of the 1987 Pilot Study. All variables with variable numbers are documented in the 1987 Pilot study codebook. Those without variable numbers are documented in Appendix A of this report.

Table 9

Multiple Regression Analyses[1]
Abortion and Homosexuality Policy Positions

Independent Variables	v908 Abortion Policy		v5215 Abortion Policy		Homosexuality Policy	
	b	|t|	b	|t|	b	|t|
Constant	.24	(2.09)	.16	(1.53)	.26	(2.66)
Immoral Evaluation (non-objective)	.27	(5.52)	.30	(6.53)	.26	(5.41)
Immoral Evaluation (objective)	.43	(9.80)	.41	(10.08)	.37	(8.70)
Moral Autonomy (male)	−.08	(.51)	−.26	(1.61)	−.05	(.34)
Moral Autonomy (female)	.36	(2.78)	.26	(2.25)	.09	(.77)
Female	−.19	(2.99)	−.20	(1.80)	−.19	(3.13)
Religious Involvement	.13	(2.13)	.10	(1.80)	.14	(2.51)
Bible	−.10	(1.00)	.06	(.66)	.14	(1.42)
Evangelical Protestant	.12	(2.75)	.07	(1.75)	−.01	(.15)
Catholic	.07	(1.46)	.07	(1.86)	−.12	(2.83)
Egalitarianism	.01	(.15)	−.06	(.68)	−.04	(.48)
Black	.02	(.30)	−.03	(.62)	−.11	(1.96)
Political Information	−.12	(2.13)	−.09	(1.75)	−.22	(4.02)
Party Identification	−.05	(.84)	−.002	(.04)	.03	(.54)
Liberal/Conservative	.01	(.07)	.09	(1.46)	.09	(1.39)
Measures of Fit	R-sq=.46 SE=.27		R-sq=.50 SE=.24		R-sq=.49 SE=.25	

The estimated effect of an immoral evaluation for objectivists is significantly greater than that for non-objectivists, at p<.01, across all three models. In addition, there are significant gender differences in the effects of moral autonomy for in the abortion specifications, at p<.01 (v908 specification) and p<.05 (v5215 specification).

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[1] Dependent and independent variables have been scaled on the 0 to 1 interval. The abortion policy variables have been recoded for this analysis such that 1 = the most prohibitive response and 0=the least ('choice' response). The variables referred to as "immoral evaluation" are dummy coded versions of: v2226, wave 1 abortion moral evaluation, when predicting 1986 Abortion policy position(v908); v5228, wave 2 abortion moral evaluation, when predicting wave 2 abortion policy position(v5215); v5226, wave 2 homosexuality moral evaluation, when predicting homosexuality policy position. The n's for each regression are 262, 259 and 270, respectively. These low sample sizes in part reflect the fact that respondents are required to have responded in wave 2 to qualify for this analysis.

Table 10.a

Associations among Moral Evaluation Items[1]

	Premarital Sex	"Kids"	Homo-sexuality	Divorce
Premarital Sex				
"Kids"	.90			
Homosexuality	.72	.65		
Divorce	.62	.67	.68	
Abortion	.61	.62	.62	.68

Table 10.b

Dimensionality Assessment

Single Factor Solution	
Item	Loading
Premarital Sex	.80
"Kids"	.79
Homosexuality	.84
Divorce	.82
Abortion	.78

Adjusted Goodness of Fit = .996
Root Mean Square Residual = .023

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[1] Entries are tetrachoric r's. "Kids" is shorthand for "having children without being married."

Table 11[1]

Moral Traditionalism Subscale Analysis

| | Scale Intercorrelations | | | |
| | 1986 Responses | | Pilot Responses | |
	"Family Values" Subscale	"Moral Tolerance" Subscale	"Family Values" Subscale	"Moral Tolerance" Subscale
Moral Autonomy Scale	.34	.46	.37	.43
Moral Conservatism Scale	.65	.53	.68	.54

| | Average Correlation of Moral Traditionalism Items with the Moral Autonomy and Moral Conservatism Scale | | | |
| | 1986 Responses | | Pilot Responses | |
	"Family Values" Items	"Moral Tolerance" Items	"Family Values" Items	"Moral Tolerance" Items
Moral Autonomy Scale	.28	.35	.31	.33
Moral Conservatism Scale	.52	.40	.56	.41

[1] See Appendices A and B for descriptions of the items in each subscale.

Table 12[1]

Predicting Moral Traditionalism and Moral Conservatism

Independent Variables	Moral Conservatism		Moral Traditionalism	
	beta	|t|	beta	|t|
Evangelical Protestant	.028	(.55)	.046	(.85)
Catholic	−.016	(2.32)	−.179	(3.71)
Female	−.011	(.13)	.065	(.78)
Black	−.135	(2.99)	−.150	(3.13)
Political Information	−.105	(1.96)	−.009	(1.6)
Age	.153	(3.44)	.203	(4.30)
Education	−.058	(1.09)	.080	(1.39)
Religious involvement	.498	(7.26)	.329	(4.52)
Bible	.136	(2.69)	.154	(2.87)
Black*Relig. inv.	−.115	(1.24)	−.004	(.04)
Mid-Atlantic	.121	(1.70)	.000	(.00)
East North-Central	.107	(1.29)	.013	(.15)
West North-Central	.091	(1.30)	−.016	(.22)
Solid South	.173	(1.91)	−.011	(.11)
Border South	.100	(1.46)	.058	(.80)
Mountain	.079	(1.35)	−.009	(.15)
Pacific	.081	(1.26)	.015	(.22)
Country/Small Town	−.011	(.23)	.017	(.36)
Large City	−.079	(1.80)	−.064	(1.39)
Professional	−.090	(1.85)	−.129	(2.51)

[1] Standardized coefficients are presented in this table out of a consideration of the different variances for these scales.

Independent variables have been scaled on the 0 to 1 interval. Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, Black, and Female are dummy variables where the name reflects the category which was coded as 1. Region variables refer to the region where the respondent indicated growing up, and used the standard classification scheme identified in the NES codebook (v1434). I excluded respondents who grew up outside of the U.S. so the excluded region is northeast. Those growing up in the country or a small town, and those growing up in a large city (or its suburb) were coded as dummy variables using v1435 in the 1986 study. Professionals are those coded 1–13 on v1208 in the 1986 study. "Black" is coded 1 for Blacks and 0 for Whites, thus this analysis excludes other races. Black*religion is an interaction term between race and degree of religous involvement.

Table 13[1]

Correlation of Moral Traditionalism and Moral Conservatism Scales
with Moral, Religious, and General Political Evaluation/Orientation Variables

	Moral Traditionalism	Moral Conservatism	(n)
v2167 Moral Majority	.32	.38	(413)
v2170 Christian Fundamentalists	.29	.41	(403)
* v241 Robertson	.36	.42	(237)
* v251 Women's Movement	−.32	−.24	(433)
v2165 Feminists	−.26	−.25	(418)
v927 View on Bible	.33	.42	(425)
Religious Involvement	.46	.54	(434)
* v901 School Prayer	.20	.27	(426)
* v908 Abortion Policy	−.30	−.51	(437)
# v5215 Abortion Policy	−.38	−.55	(342)
# Homosexuality Policy	.45	.48	(340)
v2270 Party Identification	.10	.02	(437)
v2168 Democrats	−.07	.03	(432)
v2166 Republicans	.15	.13	(431)
Pilot Liberal/Conservative	.34	.37	(399)
Conservatives-Liberals	.40	.36	(402)
v2162 Liberals	−.32	−.30	(404)
v2164 Conservatives	.27	.23	(421)
* House vote/preference	−.01	.01	(325)
* v514 Senate vote	.12	.14	(151)
* v518 Governor vote	.15	.10	(182)
v2157 Reagan	.17	.15	(439)
v2152 Reagan Approval	.13	.13	(420)
v2282 Reagan Approval	.13	.16	(428)
v2159 Bush	.15	.16	(430)
v2161 Hart	−.18	−.14	(410)
* v244 Jackson	−.11	−.09	(409)

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[1] * is used to denote a variable from the 1986 study, while # denotes a variable from the second wave of the 1987 Pilot Study. All other variables are from the first wave of the 1987 Pilot Study. All variables with variable numbers are documented in the 1987 Pilot study codebook. Those without variable numbers are documented in Appendix A of this report. The Reagan approval measures have been reflected so that high scores indicate approval.

Table 14[1]

Moral Traditionalism and Moral Conservatism Scale Correlations, by Partisanship

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Moral Traditionalism	Moral Conservatism	(n)	Moral Traditionalism	Moral Conservatism	(n)
Partisan Strength	.10	.17	(212)	.20	.21	(171)
Liberal/Conservative ID	.36	.49	(205)	.24	.23	(157)
Reagan Evaluation	.15	.18	(212)	.10	.17	(171)
Reagan Approval (v2152)	.09	.14	(204)	.03	.12	(166)
Reagan Approval (v2282)	.11	.21	(208)	.01	.10	(167)
Bush Evaluation	.11	.21	(208)	.13	.10	(169)
Hart Evaluation	−.08	−.04	(195)	−.26	−.27	(166)
Jackson Evaluation	−.05	−.01	(201)	−.07	−.18	(158)

[1]The Reagan approval questions have been reflected so that high scores indicate approval.

Table 15a[1]

Profiles of Partisan/Ideological Groups

	Moral* Conservatism Average	Moral* Traditionalism Average	Moral Majority Rating Average	Christian Fund. Rating Average
Liberal Democrats	.38	.44	35.5	43.5
Conservative Democrats	.69	.61	53.1	53.4
Conservative Republicans	.59	.60	46.1	49.5

	Robertson Rating Average	Prayer % Scheduled	Abortion Policy % not "choice"	Homosexuality Policy Average
Liberal Democrats	33.8	30.7	43.3	28.4
Conservative Democrats	51.4	50.0	68.0	58.8
Conservative Republicans	42.8	41.3	60.3	57.7

	Bible % Literal	Church Attend.* % almost weekly+	Evangelical Denom.* %	Religious Guidance* % great deal
Liberal Democrats	36.0	37.3	19.4	31.4
Conservative Democrats	65.7	42.7	36.5	37.1
Conservative Republicans	41.1	46.9	21.9	30.2

*See Appendix A for details on how these variables were constructed.

[1] The base n's are: Liberal Democrats 105; Conservative Democrats 104; Conservative Republicans 128. The n's in each table vary somewhat due to missing data on the descriptive variable.

Table 15b

	Reagan Rating Average	Reagan Approval[#] Average	Hart Rating Average	Bush Rating Average
Liberal Democrats	42.6	3.8	54.6	44.9
Conservative Democrats	51.2	3.3	49.4	50.8
Conservative Republicans	72.3	1.9	39.3	63.3

	Liberals Average	Democrats Average	Conservatives Average	Republicans Average
Liberal Democrats	61.7	69.8	47.9	44.7
Conservative Democrats	46.3	65.2	60.3	48.3
Conservative Republicans	41.0	49.4	65.2	70.6

	1986 House Vote/Pref.[*] % Democrat	1986 Senate Vote % Democrat	1986 Governor Vote % Democrat
Liberal Democrats	76.6	83.8	86.4
Conservative Democrats	78.3	71.8	66.7
Conservative Republicans	30.5	25.0	25.0

[*] See Appendix A for details on how this variable was constructed.

[#] Using v2282, not reflected. Here, high numbers indicate disapproval (the scale ranges from 1 to 5).

Table 16a

Multiple Regression Analyses[1]
Predicting Evaluations of Gary Hart using the Moral Conservatism Scale

Independent Variables	Wave 1 Evaluations		Wave 2 Evaluations	
	b	|t|	b	|t|
Moral Conservatism	1.1	(.12)	−22.8	(2.33)
Political Information	.4	(.06)	−22.5	(2.66)
Moral Cons*Political Info	−4.0	(.35)	17.0	(1.24)
Party Identification	−12.2	(3.13)	−7.4	(1.61)
Liberal/Conservative	−5.1	(.99)	−10.4	(1.73)
Egalitarianism	−11.9	(1.66)	−8.0	(.97)
Moral Autonomy	−7.1	(.91)	−4.5	(.50)
Religious Involvement	4.7	(1.02)	2.2	(.41)
View on Bible	−9.9	(1.46)	2.3	(.30)
Evangelical Protestant	6.9	(1.94)	−1.4	(.34)
Catholic	3.2	(.98)	2.3	(.62)
Female	.2	(.06)	−2.7	(.89)
Black	−4.6	(1.00)	10.1	(1.98)
South	−8.7	(2.55)	−.5	(.13)
Measures of Fit	R-sq=.14 SE=.18.2		R-sq=.17 SE=22.7	

[1] Independent variables have been scaled on the 0 to 1 interval. Evaluations of Hart are measured using the "feeling Thermometer," on a 0 to 100 scale. Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, Female and South are dummy variables where the Female and South are dummy variables where the name reflects the category which was coded as 1. South ("Border" or "Solid") refers to the region where the respondent indicated growing up. "Black" is coded 1 for Blacks and 0 for Whites, thus this analysis excludes other races. "Moral Cons*Political Info" is a simple multiplicative interaction term between these variables, as is "Moral Trad*Political Info" in Table 16b. The n's for these analyses are 234 (wave 1) and 271 (wave 2).

Table 16b

Multiple Regression Analyses
Predicting Evaluations of Gary Hart using the Moral Traditionalism Scale

Independent Variables	Wave 1 Evaluations		Wave 2 Evaluations	
	b	|t|	b	|t|
Moral Traditionalism	18.0	(1.60)	−22.6	(1.81)
Political Information	13.0	(1.38)	−16.6	(1.55)
Moral Tradit*Political Info	−26.5	(1.72)	8.7	(.48)
Party Identification	−12.2	(3.13)	−7.0	(1.53)
Liberal/Conservative	−4.9	(.96)	−11.7	(1.97)
Egalitarianism	−11.7	(1.62)	−7.1	(.85)
Moral Autonomy	−8.5	(1.09)	−3.6	(.40)
Religious Involvement	4.7	(1.06)	1.7	(.33)
View on Bible	−10.5	(1.54)	2.4	(.44)
Evangelical Protestant	7.0	(1.97)	−.9	(.23)
Catholic	3.8	(1.24)	1.9	(.51)
Female	.03	(.01)	−1.4	(.44)
Black	−4.3	(.93)	8.7	(1.69)
South	−8.7	(2.58)	−1.1	(.28)
Measures of Fit	R-sq=.16 SE=.18.1		R-sq=.17 SE=22.8	

Table 17

Multiple Regression Analyses[1]
Predicting Evaluations of the Moral Majority and Christian Fundamentalists

	Evaluation of Moral Majority				Evaluation of Christian Fundamentalists			
Independent Variables	Using Moral Traditionalism		Using Moral Conservatism		Using Moral Traditionalism		Using Moral Conservatism	
	b	|t|	b	|t|	b	|t|	b	|t|
Moral Index (MT or MC)	18.7	(2.72)	11.2	(2.06)	3.1	(.46)	7.4	(1.40)
Moral Autonomy	11.6	(1.42)	13.0	(1.57)	22.8	(2.85)	20.7	(2.60)
Political Information	−25.4	(5.86)	−23.6	(5.41)	−9.9	(2.37)	−9.2	(2.19)
Egalitarianism	−2.6	(.34)	−1.3	(.17)	1.6	(.21)	1.2	(.14)
View on Bible	17.0	(2.35)	17.7	(2.43)	22.1	(3.14)	20.9	(2.96)
Religious Involvement	1.7	(.38)	1.2	(.26)	7.2	(1.57)	5.6	(1.19)
Evangelical Protestant	5.3	(1.44)	5.7	(1.55)	8.0	(2.19)	8.0	(2.20)
Catholic	1.0	(.29)	−.1	(.01)	−1.8	(.51)	−1.5	(.45)
Female	−6.1	(2.13)	−4.8	(1.71)	.7	(.26)	−.5	(.19)
Black	6.0	(1.27)	4.7	(1.00)	18.8	(4.05)	18.4	(3.98)
South	−4.0	(1.10)	−4.0	(1.11)	−3.1	(.88)	−3.2	(.90)
Party Identification	.8	(.19)	1.2	(.28)	1.8	(.44)	2.1	(.49)
Liberal/Conservative	6.6	(1.21)	6.08	(1.09)	9.0	(1.69)	7.6	(1.40)
Measures of Fit	R-sq=.29 SE=20.9		R-sq=.28 SE=21.0		R-sq=.33 SE=20.5		R-sq=.34 SE=20.4	

[1] Independent variables have been scaled on the 0 to 1 interval. The dependent variables are v2157, evaluations of the Moral Majority, and v2170, evaluations of Christian Fundamentalists. Each of these is measured using the "feeling thermometer," on a 0 to 100 scale. Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, Female and South are dummy variables where the name reflects the category which was coded as 1. South ("Border" or "Solid") refers to the region where the respondent indicated growing up. "Black" is coded 1 for Blacks and 0 for Whites, thus this analysis excludes other races.

Table 18

Multiple Regression Analyses[1]
Predicting Evaluations of the Women's Movement using
the Moral Conservatism and Moral Traditionalism Scales

Independent Variables	Using Moral Traditionalism		Using Moral Conservatism	
	b	|t|	b	|t|
Moral Scale	−29.8	(4.91)	−9.1	(1.84)
Moral Autonomy (male)	−23.7	(2.1)	−27.4	(2.34)
Moral Autonomy (female)	−3.9	(.17)	−11.7	(1.10)
Egalitarianism	−37.4	(5.48)	−40.4	(5.73)
View on Bible	−18.2	(2.86)	−20.5	(3.08)
Religious Involvement	8.1	(1.96)	6.0	(1.35)
Evangelical Protestant	−6.6	(2.00)	−7.2	(2.12)
Catholic	−1.4	(.44)	.9	(.27)
Female	−2.1	(.48)	−3.2	(.71)
Black	.3	(.07)	1.4	(.32)
South	7.4	(2.31)	7.3	(2.21)
Party Identification	−7.3	(1.93)	−8.2	(2.10)
Liberal/Conservative	−.7	(.15)	−1.9	(.38)
Measures of Fit	R-sq=.36 SE=18.8		R-sq=.31 SE=19.5	

[1] Independent variables have been scaled on the 0 to 1 interval. The dependent variable is v251 (from the 1986 election study), evaluations of the women's movement, measured using the feeling thermometer. Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, Female and South are dummy variables where the name reflects the category which was coded as 1. South ("Border" or "Solid") refers to the region where the respondent indicated growing up. "Black" is coded 1 for Blacks and 0 for Whites, thus this analysis excludes other races. The n for this analysis is 282.

Table 19[1]
Evaluations of Reagan and Bush, and Vote Choices

Dependent Variable	Using Moral Traditionalism				Using Moral Conservatism			
	Moral Index	Party ID	Egalit.	r^2	Moral Index	Party ID	Egalit.	r^2
Independent Variables								
Reagan Evaluation (n=286)	6.8 (1.06)	37.4 (9.34)	12.4 (1.71)	.36	2.3 (.46)	37.6 (9.38)	13.1 (1.81)	.36
Reagan Approval (n=280)	−.35 (.81)	2.5 (9.34)	1.2 (2.44)	.38	.25 (.75)	2.5 (9.34)	1.1 (2.27)	.38
Bush Evaluation (n=283)	2.2 (.38)	20.1 (5.46)	4.8 (.73)	.18	.29 (.06)	20.2 (5.56)	5.1 (.78)	.18
Logit Estimations								
House Vote/Pref. (n=214)	−.50 (.58)	2.54 (4.78)	.85 (.90)	.22	.74 (1.07)	2.58 (4.83)	.70 (.74)	.22
Senate Vote (n=113)	1.17 (.71)	3.76 (4.25)	2.93 (1.64)	.36	1.88 (1.55)	3.93 (4.31)	3.25 1.78)	.37
Governor Vote (n=133)	1.09 (.82)	2.01 (3.00)	−.71 (.61)	.27	−.02 .02	2.03 3.04	−.50 .48	.26

Table entries are unstandardized coefficients, with absolute t-values in parenthesis below.

[1] Independent variables have been scaled on the 0 to 1 interval. The dependent variables are v2167 evaluations of Reagan, v2282 Reagan approval, v2159 Evaluations of Bush, House vote/preference documented in Appendix A, v514 Senate vote and v518 Gubernatorial vote. The evaluation measures use the feeling thermometer with scales from 0 to 100. The approval measure ranges from 1 to 5 and has been reflected so that high scores indicate approval. The vote variables are all scored so that 1 = Republican. Each of these analyses also included the following predictors: Liberal/conservative identification, political information, religious involvement, gender, race, Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, Moral Autonomy, and (grew up in) South. The r-square reported in the Logit results is the "pseudo r-square" discussed by Aldrich and Nelson (1984).

Description of Recoded Variables

Moral Conservatism
    Simple additive index using recoded versions of v2220, v2221, v2222, v2224, and v2226.
    Each component variable was recoded such that:
1=1 (immoral)
2=0 (not necessarily immoral)
3 or 8 = .5 (depends/don't know)
    Higher scores on the scale indicate greater moral conservatism.

Moral Traditionalim
    Simple additive index of v2192, v2194, v2196 (each reflected) v2193, v2195, and v2197
    from wave 1 of the pilot study (Likert items). I occasionally refer to the "family values"
    subscale (v2192, v2194, v2196) and the "moral tolerance" subscale (v2193,v2195,v2197).
    The wordings on these moral traditionalism items is given in Appendix B.

Evangelical Denomination
    Coded 1 if given denominational codes on v1422=130–149, or if coded 110 or 120 and
    respondent resides in the south ("solid" or "border," codes 140–159 on v1434). This
    coding scheme follows that set out in Wald, 1986.

House Vote/Preference
    Constructed using vote choice (v510) and vote preference (v527) if respondent did not
    vote, where 1=Republican vote/preference and 0=Democratic vote/preference.

Moral Autonomy
    A simple additive index using variables 5180 – 5183, (reflecting v5181 and v5183) such
    that higher scores reflect less support for moral autonomy (the conservative position).

Nationalism
    A simple additive index of variables 2172 – 2175. Note that these are four Likert items,
    all scored in the same direction.

Pilot Liberal/Conservative Identification
    Created using the "branching" liberal/conservative identification variables (v2215-
    v2217) in the pilot study, using the method followed by the NES staff in creating v1020
    in the 1986 study:

(1/1/0) = 1 (Strong Liberal)
(1/5/0) = 2
(3/0/1) or (4/0/1) or (5/0/1) or (8/0/1) = 3
(3/0/7) = 4
(3/0/2) or (4/0/2) or (5/0/2) or (8/0/2) = 5
(4/0/2) = 6
(5/0/2) = 7 (Strong Conservative)

Conservatives – Liberals
Simple subtraction of the feeling thermometer for Liberals (v2162) from the feeling
thermometer for Conservatives (v2164).

Homosexuality Policy
   Simple additive index of v5214 and v5326 (reflected) which are Likert items from wave 2
   of the pilot study.

Religious Involvement
   Simple additive index of recoded versions of v1028 (subjective religious guidance) and
   v1423 (church attendance).
 v1423 recoded (church attendance):

   If recorded as 800 (Atheists, Agnostics) or 998 (Don't Know, none, no preference) on the
   religious denomination question (v1422) then church attendance was coded as 0,
   otherwise the given values of church attendance held.

 V1028 recoded (subjective religious guidance):
   If coded 5 on v1027 (no, don't consider religion to be an important part of life) then
   given code 0, otherwise the given values of 1028 held.

Appendix B

Moral Traditionalism Items

v2192 The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.

v2193 The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.

v2194 There is too much sexual freedom and loose living today.

v2195 We should be more tolerant of people who choose live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.

v2196 Changes in lifestyles, such as divorce and men and women living together without being married are signs of increasing moral decay.

v2197 Society should be more accepting of people whose appearance or values are very different from most.

Appendix C

Description of Continuity Analysis Logit Specification (Table 7)

Dependent Measures:
    Coded 0 if not stable and 1 if stable, where a "depends" response across both waves of the Pilot study was considered stable.

Age:
    V2049 in the Pilot study (continuous form).

Bible literalist:
    A dummy variable coded 1 if v927 was 1 (the "literalist" response) and 0 if responses coded 2–4 were given.

"Some college education/+":
    A dummy variable using v1144, coded 1 if respondent had at least some college education, and 0 otherwise.

Objectivism:
    A dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent indicated an objectivist characterization of his or her moral view and 0 if the respondent gave a non-objective, don't know, or depends response to the objectivism question.

"Low political Information":
    Dummy variable based on v2035, coded 1 if in the lowest political information stratum and 0 otherwise.

"High political Information":
    Dummy variable based on v2035, coded 1 if in the highest political information stratum and 0 otherwise.

"High Religious Involvement":
    a dummy variable coded 1 if the constructed religious involvement variable, discussed in Appendix A, was greater than 6 (attends church every week and sees religion as very important in guiding life or attends church every week and sees religion as somewhat important in guiding life or attends church almost every week and sees religion as very important in guiding life).

Evangelical Protestant:
    Dummy variable coded 1 if Evangelical Protestant, 0 otherwise. See description of denominational coding provided in Appendix A.

Catholic:
    Dummy variable coded 1 if Catholic, 0 otherwise.

Appendix D

Measuring Inter-associations, Assessing Dimensionality, and Scaling of the Moral Evaluation Items

A standard justification for the use of tetrachoric correlation coefficients requires the assumption that the dichotomous responses we have measured reflect a binary coding of an underlying continuous dimension for each response (see, for example, Thorndike, 1978). In the survey context, the respondent has mapped a continuous underlying sentiment into one or another binary response option. In this particular instance, for example, we could conceive of the underlying continuous dimension as the degree of condemnation of the conduct, mapping into a judgment of whether the conduct should be categorized as immoral or not necessarily immoral.[1] The tetrachoric r represents the association between the implicit continuous variables.

The further claim, that these underlying continuous evaluations are linked to a concern for the threat the practices pose to cherished features of the traditional family, is evaluated by using the matrix of tetrachoric correlations in a confirmatory factor analysis procedure, and specifying a single dimension. The results presented in Table 10b were generated using the Lisrel program's unweighted least squares algorithm. One of the off-diagonal elements of the theta delta matrix – that representing the error covariance between evaluations of "premarital sex" and those of "having children without being married," was estimated. This specification reflects the recognition of a logical dependency between those practices, and the expectation that unique factors affecting their evaluations could be shared. The unweighted least squares procedure makes no distributional assumptions about the observed variables. (For a discussion of the use of tetrachoric correlations in Lisrel, and the unweighted least squares estimation algorithm, see Joreskog and Sorbom, 1986. For the latter, see also Long, 1987.)

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[1] In my view, this mapping procedure is not an artificial and alien procedure required by the presentation of these response options in the interview process. Rather, I would expect this mapping process to be familiar to respondents inasmuch as they generally impose such categories on their social world.

The analyses presented in Table 10a and 10b are based on the binary evaluations (immoral/not necessarily immoral), excluding responses of depends or don't know. The N for these analyses is 356. Assessing inter-associations and dimensionality of the moral evaluations in this way reflects a view of the depends and don't know responses as <u>conceptually</u> problematic given the response options: immoral and not necessarily immoral. However, it is clear that constructing a scale based only on complete cases in this sense involves a substantial loss of cases. To combat that problem, I evaluated several alternative scale versions. One version treated depends and don't know responses as missing, and created scale scores for respondents exhibiting one missing value across the set of moral evaluation items by averaging their four 'valid' responses. The valid n for this scale was 424. An alternative version coded the depends and don't know responses as a middle response between the binary options prior to creating an additive scale. The valid n for this scale was 441. These alternative scales correlate extremely highly, at .997.

If we subject each 3-value moral evaluation item (with depends/DK coded as middle response) to the association and dimensionality analyses presented in Tables 10a and 10b, (using polychoric correlations as measures of association) we get the results presented in Table D1, below. The results are very similar, with the abortion evaluation faring somewhat worse in this analysis. This item has the largest percentage of respondents failing to select a binary option. A scale created using the factor scores generated by this analysis correlates with the simple additive scale (using 3 point items) at .997 and with the four item scale at .994.

Given this statistical indeterminacy, I selected the simple additive version using the three category moral evaluation coding scheme for the analyses in this report. It maximized the sample size, and reflects a simple, straightforward scaling procedure that is representative of commonly used scale construction methods.

Table D.1[2]

Associations among Moral Evaluation Items using Revised Scale Versions
(Depends/Don't Know as Middle Response)

	Premarital Sex	"Kids"	Homo-sexuality	Divorce
Premarital Sex				
"Kids"	.86			
Homosexuality	.67	.63		
Divorce	.62	.62	.53	
Abortion	.51	.54	.56	.58

Table D.2

Dimensionality Assessment

Single Factor Solution	
Item	Loading
Premarital Sex	.81
"Kids"	.80
Homosexuality	.78
Divorce	.76
Abortion	.70

Adjusted Goodness of Fit = .993
Root Mean Square Residual = .028

[2] Entries are tetrachoric r's. "Kids" is shorthand for "having children without being married."

Appendix E

Percentage Giving "Correct" Responses Across Pairs of Moral Autonomy Items[3]

	v5180	v5181	v5182	v5183
v5180	*			
v5181	70.2 (75.1)	*		
v5182	82.5 (85.1)	66.5 (71.9)	*	
v5183	59.6 (68.2)	61.3 (69.9)	62.2 (69.9)	*

[3]These figures, "% correct," reflect the percentage of respondents who select an agree/ disagree (either strongly or not strongly) respnse that conforms to patterns intended, for pairs of variables. Figures in parentheses reflect the percentage who do <u>not</u> give a non-conforming response. (This, for example, would include a "neither agree nor disagree" response paired with either an agree or a disagree response − as "not non-conforming.")

Appendix F

Background: Critique of the Moral Traditionalism Index

The Moral Traditionalism scale that emerged from the 1985 pilot study attempted to

capture a "preference for traditional patterns of family and social organization that reflects a

reverence for the past and a resistance to change" (Conover and Feldman, 1986, p. 2). In

Conover and Feldman's conceptualization, this general preference is supplemented at

different historical points by specific issues expressing the general preference; contemporary

moral traditionalism reflects the political rhetoric of the "New Right," involving an

affirmation of traditional family values and norms of sexual propriety and an opposition to a

rise in "secular humanism: a human-centered rather than God-centered morality..." and

"expressive individualism that stresses each person's uniqueness and capacity to choose a way

of life..." (Conover and Feldman, 1986, p.4).

They argue against a strategy of measuring moral traditionalism by asking respondents

either to evaluate policy positions involving moral issues (e.g., "homosexuals should have no

special rights") or to assess practices underlying specific policy issues (e.g., "homosexuality is

wrong"). Conover and Feldman observe that

> both of these strategies are indirect in that they entail the inference of general beliefs
> from more specific ones. And, both suffer the same shortcoming: if one of the major
> reasons for measuring a general dimension of moral traditionalism is to explain specific
> issue preferences and attitudes towards social practices, using specific issue positions or
> attitudes towards activities to measure moral traditionalism would preclude such an
> examination. (Conover and Feldman, 1986, p. 5)

On the basis of the criteria they have developed for the Moral Traditionalism index,

Conover and Feldman find themselves in the difficult position of needing to strike a balance

between including elements from contemporary moral debate and political rhetoric that

symbolize Moral Traditionalism, making the "transcendent" index relevant and familiar to

respondents, and avoiding specificity in discussion of moral issues not only because of the way

they would tie the index to specific time periods but also because they would undermine the

explanatory utility of the scale. To serve as a useful index, the component items must differ

both in some substantive degree and in level of generality from the items or positions that the scale is used to predict or explain. I will argue that while Conover and Feldman are attentive to concerns of this nature in their theoretical discussion, the scale itself falls short of the theoretical standards they have outlined.

Moral Traditionalism — Reconsidering the Concept

Moral traditionalism, in their definition "a preference for traditional patterns of family and social organization that reflects a reverence for the past and a resistance to change," could be seen as a general belief underlying and preceding moral evaluation of conduct if this conceptualization held strictly. Moral philosophers provide at least two rough models that could characterize respondents following traditionalist thinking. Moral traditionalism could be seen as:

> —a characterization of a normative position which identifies and justifies right and wrong by referencing prevailing social standards. (The normative theory of Ethical Relativism discussed by philosophers is an articulation of this view. See, for example, the discussion by Shaw, 1980.)

or as

> —an interpretation of conventionalist thinking which arguably recognizes the intuitive nature of assessments of right and wrong; as an unexplicated 'second nature' born of social experience with prevailing moral standards and seeking no additional justification. (An "Intuitionist" characterization of morality.)

These sketches could be developed into arguments supporting a general predisposition toward traditionalism that becomes expressed in terms of specific attitudes, depending on the degree of contemporary conflict over traditionally prevailing moral standards. As developed thus far, they would imply opposition to the loosening of any traditional standards.

This stands in contradiction to the conceptualization developed by Conover and Feldman, in which the traditional positions of religious fundamentalists stem from specific Biblical prescriptions, not tradition itself. For religious fundamentalists, traditional moral positions do not reflect a general reverence for the past and resistance to change, but stem directly from the linkages between religious tenets and contemporary controversies over appropriate modes of conduct. One would arguably need to measure the degree of adherence

to these religious foundations in order the tap the higher order beliefs or predispositions which can serve to "explain specific issue positions or attitudes toward social practices" for this group (Conover and Feldman, 1986, p. 5, emphasis added).[4] Thus, it is possible to claim for Moral Traditionalism the status of a predisposition capable of explaining contemporary moral evaluations of changing social practices — as in the first two positions sketched above. But the concept of Moral Traditionalism does not capture the religious justifications underlying the traditional moral positions of the "New Right."

The Moral Traditionalism Index

What is being measured by the index of Moral Traditionalism? Of the four questions tapping the affirmation of traditional family values, two can be seen as summaries of the the evaluations of specific social practices:

V7102 There is too much sexual freedom and loose living today.

V7103 Changes in lifestyles, such as divorce and men and women living together without being married, are signs of increasing moral decay.

It is difficult to see how judgments such as these could be seen as prior to an evaluation of the rightness/wrongness of particular modes of conduct and thus support the conceptualization of moral traditionalism as general and capable of explaining attitudes toward particular practices.

The second pair of items can be interpreted, however, as tapping a general utilitarian justification for the condemnation of contemporary 'lifestyles:'

V8101 The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.

V8105 This country would be better off if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.

Both provide reference to social utility: "breakdown of our society," "country would be better off," which, within a utilitarian normative framework, may be viewed as justifying support for traditional standards of conduct. The view that modern forms of conduct or contemporary

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[4] A useful discussion of traditionalism as an 'ideology,' in contrast to views that are traditional, as established values or beliefs, can be found in Friedrich (1972).

diversity in particular modes of conduct are <u>harmful</u> will receive additional attention below.

Four additional items tap opposition to "modern positions" (Conover and Feldman, 1986, Appendix A). One item can be most closely linked to the "Secular Humanism"/ "Expressive Individualism" ideas identified above:

> V8102 The world is always changing and we should accommodate our view of moral behavior to those changes.

Agreement implies a recognition of moral principles as resting not upon fundamental, eternal truths, but deriving from human construction. This question is unique in the battery in that it begins to reveal formal rather than substantive properties of a respondent's morality. In the language of moral philosophy, this distinction is one of meta-ethics vs. normative ethics, where the former addresses questions of the basic structure and foundations of morality while the latter addresses prescriptions for action or judgment. In this view, the "should" in the question serves as a logical connector from the initial premise rather than as a normative prescription.

The other questions of this modern set refer to tolerance or acceptance of moral diversity:

> V7101 We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.

> V8103 There will always be some people who think and act differently and there is nothing wrong with that.

> V8104 Society should be more accepting of people whose appearance or values are very different from most.

Respondents' <u>general</u> level of moral tolerance (V8103) and satisfaction with societal levels of moral tolerance (V7101, V8104)[5] are not cleanly linked to the concept of moral traditionalism. While the first four questions refer to a specific content domain of moral considerations, this set of questions may be viewed as addressed at a higher level of generality.

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[5]The delineation between moral and non-moral concerns and standards is a very complex issue, but these questions do raise it. While V8103 might be given a moral "context" in this sequence of questions, it refers only to "people who think and act differently." Further, one might consider "appearance" (V8104) to be a matter of aesthetics and not morality.

The linkage to the other questions, however, can be drawn through reference to the rhetorical phrase: "The Permissive Society." Permissiveness, in this context, may be interpreted as the "claim that individuals not only have the responsibility for making their own moral decisions but the <u>right</u> to make them without any interference on the part of others" (Anderson, 1972, p. 39). Viewed in this way, these questions are linked to the ideas of "expressive individualism" discussed earlier. Further, they reference a broad view of morality. Not only is "a person's sense of morality ... a set of value judgments about what ought to be done and what ought not to be done" (Conover and Feldman, 1986, p. 1), but it is about <u>how</u> these end states are to be achieved; about the conflict between right and wrong, and rights.

The Moral Traditionalism scale might best be viewed as a summary of part of the received agenda of the "New Right." It captures contemporary moral concerns of the "New Right" and the fact that they are linked together and to politics, but it cannot take us far in understanding the processes producing these linkages.

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