THE COLLAPSE OF A PARTY SYSTEM?

THE 1993 CANADIAN GENERAL ELECTION

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The 1993 election was an event without precedent in Canadian history. The Conservative party, the country's most successful political combination in 40 years, was effectively erased from the political map. The Liberal majority which replaced it is not constituted according to the traditional formula: the Quebec core is missing. The national NDP is now a wraith. The main parties in opposition now are the Bloc québécois and the Reform party. One - perhaps both - is dedicated to breaking up the country as presently constituted. Neither presents itself as a government in waiting.

How did we reach this pass and was it inevitable? We argue that not every feature was inevitable, that, although the Conservatives were unlikely to win, they had a reasonable prospect of remaining the official opposition. From the beginning, however, they walked a knife edge of their own making. The fate of the Conservatives, the Bloc, and Reform seemed intimately linked to each other and to the historical logic of the Canadian system. But the Conservatives were also victims of a widespread 1990s problem: mounting public-sector deficit and debt. The Bloc may be the Canadian manifestation of a global, post-Cold War trend toward the breakdown of old nation-states. The decline of the NDP mixes peculiarly Canadian factors with social democratic parties' near-global millenial weakness. Reform echoes the European right. For all this, it is still reasonable to ask if there is less in 1993 than meets the eye: Was Reform really a vehicle for protest that somehow cut through all preexisting parties, or was it just a hollowing out of the Tory core? Did the NDP collapse into the rest of the system, including into Reform, or did it mainly represent a reshuffling of the centre-left? What if the Bloc's sovereignist project fails?

Apart from its historical importance, the 1993 election is fertile ground for examining recent theories of multiparty competition with entry. We argue that the 1993 event, like the 1988 one, controverts emphasis on median-voter results on ways that the theoretical literature has not, to our knowledge anticipated. But if in 1988 the decisive event was the successful preemption of a nonconvergent position by a threatened central player, the Liberal party, 1993 saw the other traditional central player, the Conservatives, fail to preempt such a position. In that failure, we believe, lies the secret to their collapse. Our characterization of the 1993 outcome has affinities with Greenberg's and Shepsle's (1987) notion of "2-equilibrium". But differences remain between our empirical account and their theoretical one.

This paper begins by accounting for individual-level components of aggregate 1988-93 shifts. It then moves to narrative of the 1993 campaign, emphasizing dynamical interactions among Conservatives, Liberals, and Reform and the threat to brokerage politics. After brief consideration of two elements in place at the beginning of the 1993 campaign, the Bloc surge and the NDP collapse, we ponder the implications of it all and speculate on the future of party system and country. We also draw out some theoretical implications of the event.

1988-93 Turnover

Where the 1988 election seemed to signal a Conservative era, an alignment that joined forces new in 1984 to older patterns, some dating back 150 years,[1] the 1993 election shattered much of the old system. The Liberal party returned a clear seat majority (177 of 295), but on a remarkably small popular vote, 41%. In contrast with almost every earlier election, the winning party's pivotal gains occurred mainly outside Quebec. Historically, Quebec has almost always put the winning party half way to a House majority and only thrice has a Canada-wide majority not also been a majority in Quebec; *never* had the Liberals constructed such a coalition. The Conservative vote share dropped to 16% and this share brought them only 2 seats out of 295; under House rules the former government is no longer even an official party. The NDP dropped from 20% to 7% and to only 9 seats in House; they too lack official party status. Instead, the opposition benches are controlled by the Bloc québécois and Reform, with 54 and 52 seats (14% and 19% of the popular vote) respectively.

It might not have turned out this way. On the eve of the campaign, the Conservatives were at least competitive, as the column margin of Table 1.B and Figure 1 reveal.[2] Our tracking and that in published polls placed the Conservatives and Liberals roughly level at mid-September, each at 35% of active intentions. It is true that Conservatives had gotten back into the race by climbing out of an apparently deep hole. Various polls in 1991 and 1992 put the Conservative share around the 16% it eventually became. But their recovery in 1993 was hardly unprecedented as, since 1974, *all* majority-government parties lost ground down to mid-parliament only to recover in the quarters preceding the next election.[3]

Still, the Conservatives were a party in trouble. Even level pegging the Liberals at 35-35, the Conservatives were unlikely to form the government, not even as a minority. On the traditional seat-vote formula, the 35-35 split would give the Conservative party 45-50% of House seats, with Liberals and New Democrats fighting over the balance (Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête, 1992, Figure 1-1). But the formula reflected a geographically efficient Conservative vote distribution. In 1993, however, the efficiently distributed vote was the Liberal one and Conservatives risked finishing second across much of the landscape. Moreover, as we argue below, Conservative strength was in part strategically induced, as only they seemed positioned to stop the Liberals. Substantive reasons for voting Conservative were weak, vulnerable to an accident.

In the flow of vote intentions, how did the Conservatives get to this point and where did they go from here? Tables 1 and 2 have the pertinent data, 1988-93 turnover cast three ways: from the 1988 vote to the 1993 campaign's opening weeks: from the opening weeks to election day; and from 1988 to 1993 vote. By "opening weeks" we mean 10 interviewing days, 10-19 September inclusive; our choice of these days reflects the timing, elaborated below, of campaign shifts in vote intention.[4] 1984-88 turnover appears as well, to serve a point, also developed later, about turnover's stochastic character. In each panel of Table 1, the earlier period defines the rows and the later period the columns. In each cell the roman figure in the top left is the row percentage; if you think of each table as a transition matrix, row percentages correspond to t_1 -t_2 transition rates. Row percentages correspond to conditional probabilities, of later choices given earlier ones. The italicized bottom-right figure is the diagonal (or total) percentage, cases in the cell as a percentage of all cases in the table. The diagonal percentage facilitates calculation of net change components. Arithmetically, each diagonal percentage is the product of the row percentage (top left, same cell) times the row marginal.

For the three 1988-93 intervals, Table 2 and presents components for *net change in the Conservative lead* over the Liberals, calculated from turnover data in Table 1.[5] The basic logic of the net change measure goes back to 1950s Nuffield studies. Other measures are certainly possible, but this one is especially appealing as it focuses on the two traditional frontrunning parties, the only ones ever to form governments. One disadvantge is that it tends to exaggerate the importance of direct shifts between those frontrunners, as such shifts must be double-counted. Calculation follows the logic outlined in Butler and Stokes (1974, Chapter 12), although our analysis differs from theirs in detail: we refrain from "Mostellerizing" tables, adjusting margins to conform to known population values and adjusting cell numbers to conform to the adjusted margins whilst preserving the internal association between row- and column-defining variables; we entirely neglect demographically induced entry and exit; and we merge circulation of tiny parties' support with differential turnout.

Setting the Table

The shift from 1988 to September 1993 reflected Conservative weakness, not Liberal strength. In Table 1.B's accounting, the Conservative lead was cut 10 points, net, from a 1988 lead of 6 points to a September 1993 lag of 4 points. The table makes the shift combine a 6-point Conservative drop with a 4-point Liberal surge. In fact, all of the nonartifactual change was in the Conservative share. The appearance of Liberal growth was created by shifts in the "other/none" percentage: from 30% for 1988 to 18% for 1993. Among respondents with active preferences, the Liberal share was 37% at each time where the Conservatives dropped 14 points, from 46% to 32%.

At this point, according to Table 2, Reform and the Bloc each contributed about one-third the total Conservative drop. Of 1988 Conservative voters, one in eight moved to the Bloc and one in eight moved to Reform; no Bloc or Reform voters, obviously, moved the other way. Former Conservatives made up half the Reform vote; the rest

Table 1
Turnover, 1998-93 and 1984-88

A. 1988 Vote

1984 Vote	Con	Lib	NDP	Ref	Other None	
Con	65 *28*	14 *6*	8 *4*	3 *1*	10 *4*	*44*
Lib	20 *4*	58 *12*	9 *2*	1 *0*	13 *3*	*20*
NDP	14 *2*	16 *2*	63 *7*	0 *0*	8 *1*	*12*
Other/ None	32 *8*	21 *5*	15 *4*	1 *0*	31 *9*	*25*
	42	*25*	*17*	*2*	*16*	(2652)

B. Sept Intention

1988 Vote	Con	Lib	NDP	Ref	Bloc	Other None	
Con	52 *17*	11 *4*	1 *0*	13 *4*	13 *4*	10 *3*	*32*
Lib	13 *3*	63 *16*	3 *1*	5 *1*	2 *1*	14 *4*	*26*
NDP	11 *1*	18 *2*	33 *4*	13 *1*	0 *0*	25 *3*	*11*
Ref	0 *0*	0 *0*	0 *0*	86 *1*	0 *0*	14 *0*	*1*
Other/ None	17 *5*	29 *8*	4 *1*	4 *1*	17 *5*	29 *8*	*30*
	26	*30*	*6*	*9*	*11*	*18*	(685)

C. 1993 Vote

Sept Intention	Con	Lib	NDP	Ref	Bloc	Other None	
Con	43 *11*	27 *7*	1 *0*	15 *4*	4 *1*	11 *3*	*25*
Lib	2 *1*	76 *23*	1 *0*	6 *2*	1 *0*	14 *4*	*30*
NDP	0 *0*	17 *1*	44 *3*	10 *1*	4 *0*	25 *2*	*7*
Ref	0 *0*	17 *2*	1 *0*	73 *7*	0 *0*	9 *1*	*9*
Bloc	0 *0*	1 *0*	0 *0*	0 *0*	83 *10*	13 *2*	*12*
Other/ None	14 *2*	23 *4*	3 *1*	17 *3*	7 *1*	32 *7*	*18*
	14	*36*	*4*	*16*	*13*	*18*	(607)

D. 1993 Vote

1988 Vote	Con	Lib	NDP	Ref	Bloc	Other None	
Con	24 *8*	25 *9*	2 *1*	26 *9*	15 *5*	9 *3*	*35*
Lib	6 *1*	70 *17*	1 *0*	10 *2*	5 *1*	9 *2*	*24*
NDP	4 *1*	29 *4*	30 *4*	13 *2*	7 *1*	19 *3*	*14*
Ref	0 *0*	4 *0*	0 *0*	89 *1*	0 *0*	8 *0*	*1*
Other/ None	7 *2*	28 *7*	4 *1*	11 *3*	17 *5*	33 *9*	*27*
	12	*37*	*6*	*17*	*12*	*17*	(3129)

came from other parties or from nonvoting. For the Bloc, the former-Tory contribution was proportionally a bit smaller.

The rest of the Conservative drop came from exchange with the "other/none" category. This was not because former Tories dropped out; indeed, Figure 1.B indicates that the Conservatives realised a small net gain from direct exchanges with abstention. Rather it reflects success in these exchanges by Liberals and the Bloc. Much of this is an artifact of the "turnout" shift discussed two paragraphs above and is of little real interest. For the Bloc, though, there is a substantive story: just under 20% of their intending supporters voted in 1988 for the Parti Rhinocéros, a dadaist group with candidates everywhere in the country but with a special Quebec appeal for sovereignists.

Strikingly absent is an effect from direct Conservative-Liberal exchanges. According to Table 2, their net contribution was miniscule and, according to Table 1.B, gross flow between the two parties was not large. Also weak at this point is any apparent contribution from the NDP. Had the NDP collapsed into the Liberals, this would have registered as a component of change in the Conservative lead. Instead, 1988 New Democrats distributed themselves rather liberally at this point and were only modestly more likely to shift to the Liberals than to Reform. Their modal destination, however, was the "other/none" category. This is the mirror image of the Bloc story in the preceding paragraph: 1988 New Democrats seem to drop out at nearly twice the rate of other partisans; the difference is entirely the product of attraction to the National Party, a recently formed left-liberal nationalist movement.

Table 2
Components of Net Change

	Interval		
	88 Vote - 10-19 Sept 93	10-19 Sept - 93 Vote	88 Vote - 93 Vote
Component			
Straight conversion	-0.6	-12.0	-14.2
Circulation of New Democrats	-0.5	-1.2	-3.7
Circulation of Reformers	-2.8	-3.4	-6.4
Circulation of *Blocistes*	-3.4	-0.8	-4.0
Differential "Turnout"	-3.2	-0.6	-6.7
Net Change in Conservative Lead	-10.5	-18.0	-34.9

Rolling the Dice

Over the campaign, Conservative weakness was stripped bare. Table 2 indicates a further net change almost twice as large as that registered before the campaign began.[6] In the sample, the 18-point total change reflected an 11 point Conservative drop and and a 6-point Liberal surge. This time, the Liberals truly did gain, as the "other/none" proportion remained constant.

Among parties with Conservative affinities, the Bloc was no longer a dynamic factor; its contribution to the Tory drop had already been made. Reform, in contrast, took another 3-4 points off the Conservative position. Reform gathered support from other sources, to be sure, but none of these flows mattered much to the net change: Reform exchanges with Liberals were almost exactly offsetting and further gains from the NDP were miniscule.

The biggest story, though, was straight conversion, Conservative to Liberal, which contributed about two-thirds of the total net campaign shift. As Table 1 shows, this reflected a marked reorientation of Conservative defection:

losses to the Liberal party proportionately doubled and now the Conservative-to-Liberal flow was nearly twice as large as the Conservative to Reform flow. Still missing was any apparent impact from the NDP's collapse.

Cashing in the Chips

In the survey data, the total 1988-93 net change was about 35 points, a 23-point Conservative drop and a 13-point Liberal surge. Factored into this is a shift in the "other/none" marginal percentage. For the most part, the total shift was a simple compound of pre- and intra-campaign shifts. The Bloc's contribution is confirmed as mainly a pre-campaign one. Reform's contribution was split roughly in halves and cumulatively was half again as large as the Bloc's. Biggest of all was the contribution from Conservative exchanges with the Liberals, and virtually all this contribution came during the campaign itself. Cumulatively, roughly as many Conservatives went Liberal as Reform. Each of these flows represented nearly one voter in ten and neither was offset by complementary flows. One voter in twenty was a Conservative shifting to the Bloc. Differential turnout seems important but this, once again, was mainly artifactual.

Now, though, the NDP's decline appears as an important factor in Liberal growth. And the NDP drop was about as important cumulatively as the Bloc's surge, in the sense that the NDP contributed, net, about as many voters to the Liberals as the Bloc took from the Conservatives. Why did this appear only in the final accounting? The answer lies mainly in the National party, hidden in the "other/none" category. New Democrats were remarkably susceptible to its appeal, and almost no one else was. Only as it became clear that the Nationals, a party with no sectional base, were bucking the logic of the electoral system did New Democrats parked with them move to the Liberals. Not all moved, as the large NDP percentage still remaining in Table 1.D's "other/none" column reveals.

Were New Democrats also powerfully attracted to Reform? The two parties share a western base and many New Democrats were unhappy with the constitutional preoccupations of the preceding decade. At first glance, Table 1.D might be construed as indicating an NDP-Reform nexus: a higher percentage (13) of 1988 New Democrats than of 1988 Liberals (10) shifted to Reform. But this would be a misreading, for the NDP-Liberal difference is not absolutely great and, more importantly, the direction of the difference is artifactual: a higher percentage of New Democrats than of Liberals defected; of NDP defectors (70% of the 1988 base), 19% (13/70) went to Reform; the corresponding percentage for Liberal defectors was 33% (10/30).

Could the novelty be that *any* New Democrats shift to a party of the right? In fact, transitions between the system's left and right extremes have been quite routine and 1984-88 turnover, in Table 1.A, serves as an example. Of 1984 NDP voters 14% voted Conservative in 1988, a rate that rivalled NDP defection to the Liberals. Table 1.A portrays party conflict organized along more than one dimension and implies that on at least one dimension the NDP and Conservatives were not polarized against each other.[7] What was truly novel about 1993 was *not* that movement to and from the NDP traversed more than one dimension but that, whatever the dimension, movement was uni*directional*, that the NDP recruited no defectors of its own. Where of 1984 Conservatives, 8% shifted to the NDP, a rate that rivalled 1984-88 Liberal-to-NDP defection,[8] in 1993, virtually no one shifted to the NDP. What must be explained, then, is not why Reform had some peculiar appeal for New Democrats - but why the NDP lost so many supporters all round.

Of course, the appeal of Reform itself must be explained and the obvious complementary question is why that appeal was so peculiarly great for Conservatives. But if we can explain why one 1988 Tory in four went to Reform, how can we account for the other one in four who went to the Liberals? These questions, which are about the electorate outside Quebec, occupy the next several sections of the paper. Later, we return to the NDP's collapse and the Bloc's rise.

The Course of Vote Intentions

Figure 1 lays out the evolution of vote intentions outside Quebec.[9] With four parties in the game, no single party need complement any other one and temporal asymmetry between parties was common in 1993. Where abrupt

discontinuities were visited on the Conservatives and Liberals, Reform shifts seemed gradual. The NDP, of course experienced neither gain nor loss.

The Conservative party suffered two permanent reversals, one in the vicinity of 20-22 September and one around 13-15 October. Each drop spanned about 10 percentage points and both had the same shape: a swift initial drop with a modest further bottoming out. The first drop took the Conservatives from the mid-30s to the mid-20s. The second moved them down to the mid-teens. The record suggests two other drops, neither of which did permanent damage: the first came near the start; the second followed 6 October.

Liberal gains were a pale reflection of Conservative losses. Of the first 10-point Conservative drop the Liberals secured half; this took them from the high 30s - slightly ahead of or level with the Conservatives - to the mid-40s. The Liberals then stalled and may even have slid back to around 40 percent. They then benefitted from the last permanent Conservative drop, as their share outside Quebec moved back up to the mid-to high-40s.

Reform gained even more at the Conservatives' expense than the Liberals did. Where the Liberals moved up between 5 and 10 points, the Reform gain was closer to 15 points, certainly over 10. The smoothed tracking suggests that the first Reform move started just after the first Liberal one. Reform was stuck in the mid-teens to about 21 September,[10] then began a gradual gain which was arguably unbroken until the campaign's last week. Reform cleared 20% about 1 October and reached the mid-20s by 6-8 October. The Reform surge continued - indeed it may have accelerated after 10 October - to a peak in the low 30s around 16 October. Had the election been held this day, Reform would certainly have formed the official Opposition. But Reform then fell back to the mid-20s, even as the Liberal party's final surge continued.[11]

The key to unlocking the three-party pattern always seems to be the Conservative share: something happens to knock the Conservative share down; the leavings distribute themselves across the two other parties, but not necessarily to both and not necessarily immediately. Of the four Conservative drops only two had an enduring effect and the second was much less consequential than the first.

Figure 1
Party Shares of Vote Intentions - Rest of Canada



5-day moving average

For the second drop, around 13-14 October,[12] an obvious explanation refers to a Conservative advertisement attacking Jean Chretien, which provoked an extraordinary backlash. The advertisement was placed on the 14th and was not seen as an advertisement in its own right by all that many viewers. Most saw it as part of a news item, bracketed by adverse comment even from Conservatives - indeed from the Prime Minister herself - and counterposed to a dignified response by Jean Chretien.[13]

For all that, the critical moment in the campaign, we argue, took place three weeks earlier: the shift of 20-22 September. This drop may not have been enough by itself to deny the Conservatives control of the opposition, perhaps not even enough to guarantee the Liberals a majority, but was a *cardinal* event, in that other events hinged on it. The other misfortunes might not have befallen the Conservatives had the first misfortune not struck.

Untuning the String

But what was the event itself? The timing suggests that the collapse came out of controversy over a "secret plan to cut social programmes", which culminated in Kim Campbell's remark that 47 days was too short a period to debate social policy. The remark itself is commonly blamed for the débacle[14] but this is difficult to square with the time path of Conservative collapse. Ms Campbell made the remark on the 23rd, by which time the drop was largely accomplished.[15] But the general controversy that the remark encapsulated does seem to be the key to the campaign. It had simmered for a few days before the remark and its structure echoed the Mulroney style. At issue were the social programmes that the former Prime Minister had described as a sacred trust and yet had sought to alter. The "threat" to the programmes was secret and thus partook of the 'hidden agenda" so often attributed to Brian Mulroney. The Conservatives' denial of a secret plan simply was not credible and may only have reminded voters of a theme that the Liberals emphasized in 1988: "say one thing, mean another" (Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête, 1992, pp. 129-31). At the same time, the denial may have undermined Ms Campbell's credibility as a deficit cutter, a point to which we return.

The first step in substantiating this argument is taken in Figure 2, which tracks ratings of the four leaders relevant to choice outside Quebec. All four seemed to lose ground in the first week or so, for reasons we find entirely obscure; especially notable were Manning's and McLaughlin's declines.[16] Whatever was at work, three of the four leaders recovered. The exception was Kim Campbell. Indeed her ratings did not drop on quite the same track as the others. If anything, she gained over the campaign's first ten days; by the time her own drop started the worst had already been visited on the others. At this point she was the most highly rated leader, but in absolute terms her edge over Jean Chretien does not seem huge. And in a matter of days, she went from being a narrow first choice to a narrow second one and, eventually, she even fell below Preston Manning.

That Campbell's ratings dropped proves nothing by itself. They dropped over the entire campaign, after all, and much of their path suggests that the drop was not itself a motive force in the Conservative party's decay, but was as much symptom as cause. The late-September drop seems qualitatively different from the subsequent slide. Only this first drop was notably abrupt (although the drop around 5-6 October was also fairly sudden) and by itself spanned about two-thirds of the overall slide. Equally important, this drop *preceded* the critical shift in the Conservative party's share. None of the rest of the movement in her ratings seems quite so obvious a candidate to explain her party's fate.

For no other leader is the dynamic pattern so striking. Jean Chretien clearly gained ground but at no point did his ratings appear to drive the Liberal share. His ratings turned up about the time (post-20 September) the Liberal share first surged, but they continued to go up gradually after the vote surge stalled. There is no obvious connection to the late Liberal gain. Preston Manning also seems to have gained, although for him interpretation depends on his "true" early values. Certainly his ratings ended up well ahead of their position on 18 September. But if we believe the ratings at the very beginning, his gains were modest indeed. And for Manning too there is little to authorize a claim that reevaluation of his person was critical to the surge in his party's share. Indeed it is striking that even at the end he was hardly more popular - if more popular at all - than Kim Campbell.

Figure 2
Leader Ratings by Day - Rest of Canada



5-day moving average

One reading of the late September events was that the Conservatives were still in the game only on a kind of sufferance. If they had a serious chance to stay in power, they would owe it to rejuvenated leadership. Certainly, Kim Campbell entered September with a greater stock of personal credibility than any other leader. The credibility was recently acquired, however, and more readily susceptible to displacement than was Jean Chretien's more meagre, but long-established, stock. Once Campbell's personal appeal unravelled - once she ceased to distract voters from the Mulroney record and, instead, began to *remind* them of it - her party's strategic vulnerability was unmasked.

Strategic Vulnerability

The Conservative government seemed exposed on three fronts. It presided over a feeble economy. It was more preoccupied with accommodating French Canada - sometimes Quebec, sometimes official language minorities - than its natural constituency outside Quebec wished. Along the same lines, it may have conceded more to "New Canadians" and to avatars of a new morality than that same constituency desired. And then there was the public-accounts deficit and the national debt. Notwithstanding its orientation to the business community, the Conservative government had allowed both to grow. This was a problem, but it also presented an opportunity, the one club Conservatives might still use to beat Liberals.

The Economy

That the recession of the early 1990s told against the Conservative government seemed a commonplace in pre-election commentary. Certainly, the government plumbed the depths of popularity roughly as the economy reached its own depths. The difficulty with this account is that the scholarly record on elections, popularity, and the macroeconomy in Canada is thin and chequered, although the last two years may mark a turning. The most comprehensive analysis of *popularity* - that is, of short-term variation in governments' poll standings - found no economy-polity relation (Monroe and Erickson, 1986). But this account ends in 1979 and no systematic updating

has been ventured yet. More recently, two persuasive cases have been made that economics matters in the Canadian setting, by Nadeau and Blais (1993) and by Clarke and Kornberg (1992). Blais and Nadeau stake a general claim, covering almost all postwar elections; certainly 1993 fits their model's conditions. Fitting the Nadeau-Blais findings to survey data is next to impossible, however. Theirs is a quintessentially aggregate claim: that the the unemployment rate's medium-term average departure from a longer-term baseline affects the incumbent party's vote at the next election.[17] No analogue exists in survey data; indeed, the gap between their analysis and what is possible here illustrates the problem of disaggregation identified by Kramer (1983). Clarke and Kornberg (1992) thus may be more immediately relevant. They attributed most of the 1988-90 drop in Conservative popularity to economic factors, specifically to judgements on personal financial condition and on the national economy[18] and expectations for the next twelve months, all expressed as scales derived from confirmatory factor analyses. Our analysis is roughly comparable, but simpler.

That the economy had worsened relative to 1988 was certainly not lost on our respondents, according to Table 3. Where in 1988 those who thought their personal situation had improved outnumbered those who thought it had worsened, the opposite was true in 1993 and the contrast is even sharper for judgements on the national economy. Table 4 translates these shifts into a 1988-93 vote comparison by compressing the options in Table 3 to a 0-1 range and relating them to the Conservative vote, a 0-1 dummy.[19] The exact coefficients in the table should be treated with a grain of salt, as they are almost certainly overestimates, as the only way to effect a 1988-93 comparison was through a radically underspecified estimation. The 1988 estimation reveals an apparently robust relation between economic judgements and vote, with most of the connection carried by judgements on the national economy. With the 1988 estimation as the baseline, what would the 1988-93 economic shifts in Table 3 imply for Conservative vote share in 1993? Both judgements worsened and so both should translate into a smaller predicted Conservative share. Most of the shift would be attributable to national judgements, as the latter both shifted more and had a larger coefficient. Increased personal adversity alone would cost the Conservatives just under 3 points but the worsened national judgement would cost them nearly 12 points. The total drop would be predicted as slightly over 14 points. As the Conservatives' actual drop outside Quebec was some 25 points, it is tempting to suggest that roughly half was attributable to the economy. Especially compelling is the suggestion that the Tories' weakness at the campaign's start in 1993 relative to 1988 was economic in origin, even if the rest of their collapse had other causes.

Table 3
Perceptions of Economic Performance, Last 12 Months

	Personal		National	
	1988	1993	1988	1993
Much Worse	6	14	2	24
Somewhat Worse	17	37	12	38
No Change	38	26	51	30
Somewhat Better	30	19	30	8
Much Better	9	5	5	0
N	*2002*	*2144*	*2002*	*2148*

The story is hard to sustain, however. First, the 1988 coefficients carry much that is not specifically economic. Judgements on the national economy carry projective content: voters who support the Conservatives for other reasons rate favourably the economy that, by implication, the Tories have been managing. Similarly, winners in the personal finance game may be Conservative for reasons other than retrospective reward on that party in power. These processes inflate coefficients and so inflate the importance of shifts in factors directly represented in the equation. Second, the story would be more convincing - even if we reserve judgement on the coefficients as point estimates - if the estimated polity-economy relation were the same in 1993 as in 1988. It was not, however.

The rightmost column of Table 4 indicates that both personal and national coefficients shrank. They did not absolutely disappear: clearly, neither stems just from random association. But both were cut radically, and the intercept shifted upward by way of compensation. Now, it is tempting to dismiss the comparison on the grounds that by election day everything had changed. The coefficients may have shrunk just because the Tory collapse was so complete; even voters who themselves had done well or who saw the economy as doing well were *forced* - perhaps for strategic reasons - to abandon the Conservatives. The old equilibrium vanished and with it, the parameters of the old polity-economy relation. But we should still see the old parameters in an early-campaign estimation. At that point, the Conservatives were still one of the system's central players and so were still available to be rewarded or, more commonly, punished. But this expectation is not supported by the relevant estimation, in the middle column. Strikingly, the September coefficients are essentially indistinguishable from the election-day ones. Especially close are the personal-finances coefficients. The September coefficient is unstable, but this is probably just sampling error. The September national coefficient seems larger than the election-day one, but again the early coefficient is unstable and is less than a standard error larger than the late coefficient. Most striking is movement in the intercept: the intercept dropped about 10 points, September to October; and the September 1993 intercept was *15* points higher than the 1988 one. It is hard to argue, then, that at any point the 1988 relation endured to 1993. It is also hard, concomitantly, to pin much of the 1993 result outside Quebec on the economy. It is hard, that is, to do so with the survey data. Aggregate analysis may shed more light on this.

Table 4
The Economy and Conservative Support, 1988-93

	Vote 1988	Intention 10-19 Sept 1993	Vote 1993
Personal	0.20	0.09	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)
National	0.46	0.22	0.15
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.03)
Intercept	0.02	0.17	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)
R^2 - adjusted	0.05	0.01	0.02
N	*2002*	*395*	*2144*

Standard errors in parentheses; estimation by OLS.

Them and Us

The combination that Brian Mulroney created and Kim Campbell inherited was deeply incoherent: "francophones and francophobes" as Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête (1992, p. 73) put it. Outside Quebec, Conservative voters were typically resistant to accommodating Quebec or French Canada and visibly uneasy about the cultural reconstruction of the country at large. These sentiments had been cultivated over many decades and sat uneasily with Conservative leaders' aspirations for power. Brian Mulroney finally delivered real power, by invading the Liberals' traditional turf in Quebec. And many of his Quebec supporters were far more nationalist than any federal Liberal from that province. If this incoherence was the price of power, it continued to lurk in the background as a threat to the Conservatives' own aspirations. One way to contain the threat was to emphasize an issue on which both French and English Conservatives agreed and which distinguished them from other parties' supporters.

Figure 3 carries forward the logic of a key demonstration (Figure 3-2) in Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête (1992). The horizontal axis indicates party and voter positions on the question of whether more or less should be done for

"French Canada" or "Quebec".[20] Voters' positions are self-attributions averaged, as required, across the whole sample or across 1988 party preference groups;[21] party locations are as perceived by voters in the year in question. On French-English relations, broadly defined, the major parties and their respective bases were far apart. Only for the NDP was the gap small and for no party was the gap larger than for the Conservatives. The gap may have shrunk modestly for 1988 Conservative and NDP voters. Both voter blocs seem to have moved slightly toward the pro-French pole while their respective parties moved in the other direction. These perceptions strike us as roughly in accord with reality. The Conservatives had just rejected a very attractive leadership candidate from Quebec. For the NDP, both candidates on the 1989 leadership convention's final ballot repudiated the party's 1988 binational strategy. For Liberals the gap essentially did not change: both 1988 Liberal voters and the party as perceived appeared to shift slightly in the anti-French/Quebec direction. Such a shift characterized the non-Quebec electorate as a whole.

The missing half of the picture is the Quebec electorate. Quebeckers' own positions on this axis are well off to the right, to the pro-French Canada/Quebec end of the continuum and parties' perceived locations reflect the compromises necessary to build a pan-Canadian electoral coalition. So long as all parties play the national game, as all did in 1988, voters simply have to live with the policy gap. The smallness of the gap between the 1993 NDP and its own 1988 supporters may indicate not so much that that party was available to lead an anglophone charge as that it had become abjectly weak and had given up on Quebec. In any case, there was another pretender in the field: Reform. Respondents were very clear in seeing Reform as the only party committed to doing seriously less for French Canada than any of the others; even the NDP was much closer to the two old parties than to Reform.

The clarity and uniqueness of Reform's position was a great potential advantage: a voter who cared deeply about this issue and who wanted less done than now had a real alternative in Reform. But this strength was also a weakness. For all that Reform was distinct on a dimension on which most voters were far from the traditional parties, Reform itself was not close to the typical voter. Most voters wanted less done for French Canada, but not much less. The typical 1988 Liberal was still much closer to the 1993 version of that party than to Reform; the same was even more true for old New Democrats. *Only for the typical 1988 Conservative was the distance to the 1993 version of his or her own party greater than to Reform.* The temptation for many Conservatives must have been extreme and the mere fact that Reform was even visible in early September suggests than many former Conservatives had already yielded to it. But many clearly resisted and part of the reason, again, may have been tactical: traditionally, being a big party has meant having some appeal in French Canada; lacking such appeal, Reform was not a credible vehicle for the very francophobia that made it so attractive, and so that sentiment remained, circularly, bottled up. But if the Conservative party should, for whatever reasons, lose its own credibility, then tactical considerations could go out the window - or even turn on their head - and make voting Reform an entirely reasonable option.

In 1988, an emphasis on Canada-US relations helped all parties, but especially the Conservatives, cut through Canada's binational divisions. This 1988 logic must have been tempting in 1993. This was not to be, for reasons which bear more investigation than this paper can give but which seem quite ironic. On Canada-US relations, divisions among parties and voters all shrank relative to 1988. Most notable were the diminished enthusiasm of 1988 Conservative voters for further integration with the US and the anti-US shift in the perceived location of their own party. Liberal and NDP voters hardly shifted at all but the Liberal party was seen - correctly - to be notably less anti-US than before. All things considered, then, Canada-US relations offered less mileage in 1993 than in 1988. Yet a major trade initiative *was* on the table: NAFTA. The Conservatives had pushed this measure despite apparently clear public opinion indications to the contrary - indications consistent with movements in Figure 3 - and in the face of pointed opposition from prominent supporters of the 1988 Canada-US initiative. The NDP did stake out clear opposition to the agreement and this is reflected in the fact that they absolutely controlled the anti-US pole of Figure 3, in contrast with 1988 when they had to share the pole with the Liberals. But the clarity of this position helped the NDP not at all. This might have been because of the party's overall lack of credibility, but it might also suggest that the issue truly did not have legs. Voters may have accepted that undoing NAFTA, which had already acquired the force of law, would be harder than repudiating the 1988 FTA, which had yet to clear Parliament. Voters may also have reckoned that NAFTA represented a much smaller shift relative to the FTA than the FTA did relative to its status quo ante. Be all this as it may, Canada-US relations seemed less available in

1993 than in 1988 as a lever for old-party divisions and as a way of distracting voters from French-English relations.

Figure 3
The US-French Canada Space - Rest of Canada



Also important, potentially, was Reform's perceived location on continentalism. As a party of free-market principles and with a decidedly American political style, Reform might be expected to share the Conservative party's enthusiasm for the continental integration. Instead, whatever the reality for Preston Manning or his organization, Reform was perceptually almost indistinguishable from the Liberals - perhaps even slightly more anti-US - and certainly far from the Conservative party. Reform was not a plausible vehicle for either anti- or pro-US sentiment. But in an election in which such sentiment seemed not strategically critical, Reform's opaqueness, like that of the Liberal party, may have been an advantage.

The Deficit

On this issue the Conservative party was awkwardly situated: although it contrasted itself with the Liberals as a party of fiscal probity, its own record was not very good. Making this contrast might have been strategically necessary, to stave off defections on the Liberal flank. But insisting on the contrast invited defection on the Reform flank. For all that, deficit-fighting may have been only thing to save the Conservatives.

Table 5 opens the case by presenting response to a question about credibility in deficit fighting, controlling voters' choice over the deficit-unemployment tradeoff.[22] An incidental point in the table is that in 1993 the "null" expectation was for the deficit to increase and that the less one liked a party the less credible it seemed on the deficit. This is indicated by the fact that the more one opposed deficit reduction the less credible were the two arguably anti-deficit parties. Among anti-unemployment voters the Liberals rivalled - indeed outranked - the Conservatives. Among those who could accept higher unemployment to fight the deficit, however, the Conservative party was clearly more credible than the Liberals and it was for this group that deficit credibility mattered. Even in this group, though, only 30% saw a Conservative victory actually leading to smaller deficits; as many saw it as leading to larger deficits (percentages not reported in the table). Only from a Reform victory did a majority of deficit-cutters predict smaller deficits.

Table 5
Parties' Credibility on the Deficit by Own Position on Deficit-Unemployment Tradeoff

	Own Position	
	Reduce Unemployment	Reduce Deficit
Conservative	19 *(1112)*	30 *(802)*
Liberal	23 *(1111)*	16 *(803)*
NDP	13 *(1035)*	9 *(778)*
Reform	37 *(927)*	53 *(724)*

Entries are percentages claiming that the party's victory would make the deficit "somewhat smaller" or "much smaller."

But the Conservatives need not have given ground to Reform, according to Figure 5. At the start of the campaign, the Conservatives were just as credible as Reform. Neither party was as positively regarded as the Liberals were negatively judged, but the gap between each and the Liberals seemed wide nonetheless. In the critical late-September period, however, the Conservatives dissipated their position. Within days they found themselves closer judgementally to the Liberals than to Reform, entirely because of reevaluation of their own position. Then things got even worse, for Reform *gained* credibility. Our sense is that the credibility was earned, as Preston Manning proved much less yielding on programmes than Campbell allowed herself to be. But it is conceivable that voters would never have become aware of the the depths of Manning's anti-deficit commitment had Campbell not first revealed how shallow her own commitment was.

The Conservatives thus had ground staked out at the beginning, but its area was dangerously small. On the deficit they were clearly more credible than the Liberals among those who cared most about the deficit. For these voters, so long as the deficit was the issue and the choice was solely between Conservatives and Liberals, the Conservatives should have prevailed. Now, deficit cutters were outnumbered on this particular framing of the issue but other frames were in play, ones more favourable to deficit cutting. And it was absolutely essential to keep the Conservatives as the only alternative to the Liberals. For the Conservatives were simply *not* all that credible by an absolute standard, even if they were just as credible as Reform. Why would a generally conservative-minded person not go straight to Reform? For one thing, such a voter might greatly prefer Kim Campbell as head of government. And such a voter might take history seriously and assume, circularly, that only the Conservatives could stop the Liberals. We already know (Figure 2) that Campbell rapidly ceased to help her party. Once that happened, both the strategic consideration and the deficit credibility evaporated.

Figure 4
Credibility on the Deficit
Rest of Canada, Anti-Deficit Voters Only



The Issue Space: General Considerations

Neither Figure 3 nor Figure 4 exhausts the potential 1993 issue space. The figures *assert* that continnental integration, French-English relations, and the deficit are possible dimensions of choice. Were these organizing considerations for the electorate at large? What other dimesions might underlie choice? To find out, we pooled virtually all telephone-wave items which invited respondents to locate themselves on an issue and subjected the items to a factor analysis in the non-Quebec sample. We began with 46 items and produced a six-factor solution. One of the factors, *willingness to accept the Goods and Services Tax* (GST), was of little further interest: few respondents were willing to accept the tax, and the factor arguably represented diehard capital-C Conservatism, where GST support was more effect than cause.[23] Some items loading on other factors did not really add information to the exercise.[24] One item is of further interest and will be considered in the vote estimations below. Seventeen items loaded on the five remaining factors:

- *The Place of French Canada/Quebec* (**cpse1a**): Should more or less be done to promote the French language or Quebec in Canada?
- *Canada-US Ties* (**cpse2a**): Should Canada have closer or more distant relations with the United States?
- *Free Trade Agreement* (**cpsf1**): Does the respondent support or oppose the 1988 agreement?
- *NAFTA* (**cpsf3**): Does the respondent support or oppose the 1993 agreement?
- *Deficit vs Programmes* (**cpsf5a/b**): Which is more important, reducing the deficit or maintaining programmes?
- *Pensions and Old Age Security* (**cpsf7c**): Is the respondent willing to make cuts to pensions and OAS?
- *Health Care* (**cpsf7d**): Is the respondent willing to make cuts to health care?
- *Unemployment Insurance* (**cpsf7e**): Is the respondent willing to make cuts to unemployment insurance?
- *Deficits vs. Unemployment* (**pes4a/b**): Which is more important, reducing the deficit or reducing unemployment?
- *The Place of Racial Minorities* (**cpsi3a**): Should more or less be done to promote for racial minorities in Canada?
- *Immigration* (**cpsj5**): Should Canada admit more immigrants or fewer immigrants than at present?

- *Abortion* (**cpsj6a/b/c**): Should abortion be a woman's personal choice, permitted only after need is established, or never be permitted?
- *Women in the Home* (**cpsj7a**): Would society be better off if women stayed at home?
- *Homosexual Marriage* (**cpsj7b**): Should homosexuals be allowed to get legally married?
- *Marriage Before Children* (**cpsj7e**): Should couples marry before they have children?
- *Job Creation and Deficit Reduction* (**pese8**): Is reducing the deficit necessary for job creation?
- *Programme Maintenance and Deficit Reduction* (**pese9**): Is reducing the deficit necessary to maintain programmes?

The fruits of a factor analysis confined to these 17 items appear as Table 6. In this analysis, as in the preliminary one, factors were rotated by the oblimin method, which permits an oblique solution; there seemed to be no reason to impose orthogonality on the solution; indeed angles between factors are of intrinsic interest. The stripped-down analysis exactly reproduced the initial five factors:

- The first and most powerful factor we call *continentalism*, as it groups three items about Canada's ties to its North American neighbours. This factor echoes an issue divide discussed a few paragraphs before but captures orientations to NAFTA as well as to Canada-US relations.

- The second factor, *moral traditionalism*, taps a fairly broad gauged but intuitively coherent value divide, encompassing marriage and children, the place of women in society, abortion, and homosexual marriage.

- The third factor is driven by concerns about the *deficit* and the kind of policy trade-offs a vigorous deficit reduction policy entails.

- The fourth factor, *out-group attitudes*, reflects concerns about what Canadians outside Quebec might regard as outgroups of one sort or another.[25] This factor picks up French-English relations, as discussed above, but, significantly, also includes attitudes to immigration and about how much should be done for racial minorities.

- The fifth dimension is a package of attitudes about the size and scope of the *welfare state*, including questions about cuts to health care, pensions and Old Age Security, and unemployment insurance, as well as a more general question about the relative importance of cutting the deficit and maintaining existing programmes.

In the five-factor solution, three general points must be made about what does and does not go together.

The first point is about two things which go together notwithstanding attempts to drive a wedge between them. Philosophically and in terms of much practical policy, French Canada and "New Canadians" often seem at odds. Occasionally the Conservative party of the 1980s seemed to try to split French Canada from other minorities. An attack on the Charter could be seen as part of such a strategy, where French Canada in this case means only francophones in Quebec. Much of the tension within the NDP over its 1988 binational strategy revealed bad conscience over the Charter, some of which was driven by concern for New Canadians. But in the structure of mass sentiment outside Quebec, francophones and new Canadians are essentially alike: both are *out*groups relative to the traditionally dominant culture of English Canada; what moves a respondent to support one group moves that respondent to support the other group, and *vice versa*. In fact, this is a standard finding in research on group-related attitudes (Allport, 1954)

The second point is about two things that do not go together notwithstanding attempts to join them. Opinion on the welfare state is largely independent of opinion on the deficit. This is so even though we encouraged such a link ourselves: in the questionnaire, all welfare-state items were worded in the context of the deficit: would you cut programmes or would you live with the deficit? If you had to cut, where would you do it? Notwithstanding this rhetorical linkage, programmatic items have a coherence of their own quite separate from general anxiety over the deficit as such. We should not exaggerate, to be sure, as the welfare-state and deficit factors are not orthogonal to each other. But their overlap is modest, much less impressive than the link between welfare state dispositions and continentalism (compare correlations among factors in Table 6-B). This reminds us that the deficit is rich

rhetorical turf: pitting the deficit against jobs evokes one set of coalitions (organized by one factor), while pitting it against existing programmes evokes another set of coalitions (organized by another factor). It also alerts us to the possibility that the two components of what is commonly presented as a single issue might have different effects on

Table 6
The Structure of Opinion on Policy Questions

A. Factor Pattern

	Continent-alism	Moral Traditonal-ism	Deficit	Out Groups	Welfare State	Communality
Canada-US FTA	**0.82**	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.71
NAFTA	**0.77**	-0.01	0.06	0.17	0.08	0.65
Canada-US Ties	**0.70**	-0.01	-0.04	-0.14	-0.14	0.49
Marriage before children	0.07	**-0.77**	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.60
Abortion	-0.03	**-0.69**	0.08	0.26	-0.05	0.50
Women Stay Home	-0.11	**-0.67**	-0.01	-0.0	-0.04	0.50
Homosexual Marriage	-0.08	**0.62**	0.05	0.25	-0.04	0.50
Jobs req Low Deficit	-0.06	0.01	**0.85**	0.04	-0.05	0.70
Progs req Low Deficit	0.06	-0.05	**0.78**	-0.03	-0.03	0.64
Deficit v Unemployment	-0.09	-0.02	**-0.58**	0.00	-0.26	0.50
Racial Minorities	0.01	0.06	0.03	**0.72**	-0.14	0.56
French Canada/Quebec	-0.09	0.02	0.10	**0.64**	-0.08	0.44
Immigration	0. 13	0.01	-0.20	**0.62**	0.24	0.48
Cuts to Health Care	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	0.05	**0.77**	0.58
Cuts to Pensions/OAS	-0.05	-0.06	0.00	0.03	**0.64**	0.41
Cuts to UI	0.00	0.09	0.07	-0.05	**0.60**	0.39
Deficit v Programmes	-0.14	0.02	-0.19	0.21	**-0.45**	0.39
Eigenvalue	2.86	2.15	1.44	1.34	1.23	
% of Variance	16.8	12.6	8.5	7.9	7.3	

B. Factor Correlations

Moral Traditonalism	0.03			
Deficit	0.15	-0.06		
Out Groups	-0.06	0.14	-0.06	
Welfare State	0.25	-0.03	0.19	-0.06

different parties. The slippage is not a peculiar to this issue or this period: it is an example of a regularly observed gap between principle and policy: voters commonly will the end but not the means, sometimes because the means are uncomfortable (Jackman, 1978), sometimes because certain means to an end are precluded by other ends (Sniderman, et al., 1991, Chapter 4).

The third point is also about a failed linkage: *moral* traditionalism is utterly disconnected from ethnic sentiment. It is often tempting to think in terms of general cultural conservatism, and to see Reform, in particular, as a rejection of all that is new in Canada, both of novel consensual modes of living and of non-European (but not necessarily consensual) cultural forms. The factor analysis makes clear that these are quite separate considerations. It is still

possible that Reform reflects a rejection of both things, but it is also possible that the party's appeal was more specialized. We should also be alert to the complexities of the Liberal party's appeal.

Of the items left over by the factor analysis, one warrants further consideration: are politicians peculiarly corrupt? One way in which Reform might represent something wholly new is as a vehicle for truly antipolitical sentiment. If we observe that Reform has mainly stepped into an out-group or deficit gap vacated by the Conservative party, we might concede that the system has *re*aligned but not that it had *de*aligned in any meaningful sense. Indeed we should be tempted to say that such a realignment represented only a shuffling of places within an ideological family, much as Bartolini and Mair (1990) claim most recent shifts in European party systems have been. But a respondent who claims that politicians as a class are morally inferior to those who elect them is deeply alienated. To be sure, a respondent can still claim this for substantive policy reasons; the language of moral corruption may be just careless speech.[26] But if this question exerts leverage even when substantive issue positions are controlled, we have at least *prima facie* evidence that Reform is cutting through old coalitions, possibly signalling a demand for a change in the style of politics.

Issue Coalitions on Election Day

In what follows, we start with election day. This allows us to nail down the considerations that proved ultimately critical. Then, as we work back through the campaign, we can economize in our treatment of the evolution of attitudinal coalitions.[27] Table 7 gives the election day snapshot.

The first thing that leaps out is the centrality of Reform to the cleavage structure: Reform was differentiated by more considerations than either the Conservatives or the Liberals. In part this reflected Conservative weakness. But some voters could still find reasons to vote Conservative and almost all these reasons distinguished that party more from Reform than from the Liberals.

In the end, the most important single factor in Reform support was attitudes to out-groups. At its core the party's claim to represent a new politics is hollow: in a sense, Reform is the Diefenbaker Conservative party, that is, the party that John Diefenbaker's closest acolytes might have idealized had they not been forced to tolerate some of the coalitional baggage he inherited. Diefenbaker's ethnic appeal was quite subtle: as the bearer of a German surname he had personally experienced prejudice and so spoke with considerable moral authority when he insisted on an ethnically neutral definition of Canada; but that insistence could also serve as a cover for ethnically exclusive appeals, even if Mr Diefenbaker himself did not intend them. Certainly, the out-group items in this index are difficult to square with a posture of true neutrality on matters ethnic. Reform, then, was partly a gesture of impatience with the Conservative party's coalitional dalliances.

Strikingly, two other considerations that might have been expected to distinguish Reform did so only weakly or not at all. Reform voters tended toward moral tradtionalism, but the effect was weak: many who supported the party had fairly secular attitudes on gender, family, and sexuality. Similarly, Reformers were not peculiarly continentalist, as orientation to the US and Mexico made only a small - although statistically significant - difference to the likelihood of supporting the party. This is consistent, of course, with Reform's centrist Canada-US location in Figure 3.

Reform did stand out on fiscal questions, but not so much on the deficit as such as on welfare-state programmes. To be sure, the deficit was a factor as well, but its marginal leverage was only half as great as that from attitudes to programmes. This admits two readings, both of which may be true, indeed mutually supporting. One is that Reformers did not care about the deficit so much as about cutting government back. The other is that Reformers, more than Conservatives, really meant it when they declared their intent to tackle the deficit; they closed the principle-policy gap.

Table 7
Attitudinal Forces on Election Day
(N=1893)

	Conservatives	Reform	Liberals	NDP
Out-Group Attitudes	0.00	0.44***	-0.35***	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Moral Traditionalism	-0.07*	-0.11**	0.08	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Continentalism	0.21***	0.06	-0.14***	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Deficit	0.14***	0.12***	-0.25***	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Welfare State	-0.03	-0.37***	0.25***	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Politicians Not Corrupt	0. 08***	-0.10***	0.04	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Intercept	-0.00	0.16**	0.62***	0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)
R^2-adjusted	0.07	0.13	0.09	0.05

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Finally, Reform did tap a purely antipolitical impulse. Voters who rejected the proposition that politicans are no more fallen than the rest of us were nearly 10 points more likely than all others to support the party.[28] There is, then, a suggestion that Reform cuts through old political lines. But the impact of alienation - at least measured this way - is small. Far more striking is how distinct Reform voters were on Canada's ancient questions.

By election day, out-group attitudes were simply irrelevant to Conservative support. Also irrelevant for the Tories were attitudes to welfare programmes. As mentioned, the few remaining Conservatives were less morally traditionalist than most other voters. What did matter to the Conservative vote were worry about the deficit as such, tolerance for politicians, and continentalism. In the end, the deficit itself was still as powerful a factor for Conservative as for Reform voting; the two parties shared the anti-deficit pole, notwithstanding Reform's greater credibility on the issue (Table 5). Missing from the Tory equation was antipathy to programmes. Attitude to politicans as a class distinguished Conservatives at the end, but the pattern of coefficients suggests that this consideration fed an intramural dispute on the right: the Conservatives were polarized against Reform on this. Attitude to politicians was simply irrelevant to Liberal and NDP support.

Where Conservatives were not polarized against Reform, Liberals generally picked up the slack. The biggest single story was out-group attitudes: the Liberals picked up three-fourths of the polarization against Reform; the rest accrued to the NDP. On the deficit the Liberals were pitted jointly against the Conservatives and Reform; the coefficients for the latter two sum almost exactly to the Liberal coefficient. On welfare-state programmes, the polarization was heavily Reform vs Liberals, with the NDP also implicated. The Liberals did pick up some anti-continentalism, more in fact than the NDP.

On moral traditionalism, Liberals and Reform defined one pole. Indeed, traditonalism helped the Liberals more than it did Reform, although neither party was sharply differentiated by the factor. On this question, the two parties led by men with traditional marriages faced off against the two parties led by divorced women.

Evolution of the Cleavage Structure

In their specific form, many of the election-day cleavages must have been novel: Reform was just not realistically available in any actual election before 1993 to control a pole on any question. But how novel were the cleavages in fact? Did Reform open up new ones, or did it instead mainly usurp the Conservatives' place in old ones? Table 8 addresses the question by looking at the evolution of cleavages by day over the campaign. The estimation is identical to that in Table 7 except in one particular. For the three biggest cleavages in Table 7 - over out-group attitudes, the deficit, and the welfare state - the impact is split into main and interaction effects. The interaction is between issue and day, where the day counter starts at zero on 10 September (our first interview date) and grows by one unit per day thereafter. With the interaction term in the estimation, the main-effect coefficient indicates the cleavage width on the first day of interviewing. The interaction coefficient indicates the daily increment or decrement in the cleavage width. If the main-effect coefficient is positive, then a positive interaction coefficient indicates a widening of the cleavage and a negative coefficient, a narrowing. If the main-effect coefficient is negative, then a positive interaction indicates a narrowing of the cleavage and a negative interaction, a widening. For economy of presentation, only the three main-interaction combinations appear in Table 8.

The pattern of displacement could hardly be more clear. On each dimension, the Conservative cleavage shrinks and the Reform one grows: for the Conservatives, main and interaction coefficients always have opposite signs; for Reform, they always have the same sign. Of the six interactions, five cannot possibly be the product of random association. The sixth - welfare-state attitudes in the Reform estimation - is unlikely to be as well.

Most dramatic was the shift in party orientation of out-group attitudes. Notwithstanding all the coalition politics by Brian Mulroney and notwithstanding Kim Campbell's clear intention to continue in the same vein, the Conservative party still started out attracting the lion's share of the anti-outgroup vote. But the difference between out-group extremes in the likelihood of voting Tory shrank, on average, about one percentage point each day.[29] At the same time, the Reform cleavage grew about seven-tenths of a point each day. If we take the numbers literally, the Reform and Conservative cleavage widths roughly equalled each other about 16 days out (14th day of interviewing) and at the end the Reform cleavage width should have been about 0.44 and the Conservative one, effectively zero (indeed, it ought to have reversed direction). Even though these are numbers derived from a campaign-period modelling exercise, they are very close to the actual election-day widths in Table 7. The totality of the shift is stunning: at the outset, the Conservatives still controlled the ethnic play; at the end, decades of Conservative group politics were washed away and attitudes to outgroups made no difference whatsoever to that party's vote. In the 1970s and 1980s Conservative leaders sought to purge their party of its narrow ethnic appeal; in 1993 they finally got their wish.

The story for the other two cleavages is similar, but less dramatic. The Conservatives initially captured all the benefit of deficit politics but dissipated most of it. Even so, they still had some appeal at the end for deficit fighters; again this is consistent with the election-day evidence. On the anti-welfare dimension, Reform clearly rivalled the Conservatives from the beginning and ended up asserting outright dominance.

The modelling exercise is very crude. It imposes a linear shift on cleavage widths when Figure 1 leads us to expect discontinuities. At the same time, the exercise is rather abstract. Figure 5 tries to remedy both defects by representing evolution of the out-groups cleavage another way, by daily tracking. The gain in dynamic subtletly comes at the price of lack of control over other issues in play. The representation of width cannot be the same here as in Tables 6 and 7. There, coefficients indicated the difference between extremes. Few voters actually inhabited either extreme; for graphical purposes it makes more sense to compare top and bottom terciles. Readers should resist the temptation to relate Figure 5 too directly to Table 7.

Table 7
Attitudinal Evolution: Out-Groups, the Deficit, and the Welfare State
(N=1972)

	Conservative	Reform
Out-Group Attitudes		
Main	0.41***	0.18*
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Interaction	-0.0108***	0.0068**
	(0.0028)	(0.0026)
Deficit		
Main	0.25***	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Interaction	-0.0040*	0.0047*
	(0.0021)	(0.0021)
Welfare State		
Main	-0.20***	-0.21**
	(0.07)	(-0.07)
Interaction	0.0070**	-0.0033
	(0.0022)	(0.0021)

Figure 5 confirms the broad outline of Table 7, that Reform displaced the Conservative party on this cleavage. But the picture indicates subtleties in the displacement that are worth dwelling on. Note first that the surge in Reform's cleavage was more sudden than the decline in the Conservative cleavage. This seems opposed to the overall vote-share pattern - sudden Conservative drops, gradual Reform gains - in Figure 1. If the difference means anything, it must indicate that, although the Conservative drop was triggered by a fiscal controversy, the bulk of the early defectors were preoccupied by ethnicity. In any case, from 28 September or thereabouts, shifts in the Reform cleavage width follow shifts in the overall Reform share: gradually up, peaking about a week before election day, and falling back in the last week.

The Conservative pattern is altogether more complicated. Most importantly, it includes two reversals of cleavage direction. Defection by anti-out-group voters was so complete that by the third-last week in the campaign the only Conservatives left were those who positively *favoured* out-groups. At this point, for the first time in living memory, Liberals and Conservatives occupied the same turf. Now why would such voters stay with the Conservatives? By this time most were unlikely to prefer Kim Campbell to anyone, although some must still have done so. These are likely to be fiscal Conservatives, unwilling to join Reform for sentimental reasons, unwilling to join the Liberals for fiscal ones. The last week brought a final shakedown, however. At this point, the Liberals surged (Figure 1) and the Conservatives emitted their death rattle. For voters who felt strongly about out-groups, staying with the Tories was becoming pure self-indulgence, especially as the biographies of certain Reform candidates became public knowledge. In the end, Tories who favoured ethnic accommodation - especially, we suspect, accommodating French Canada - went over in serious numbers to the Liberals; indeed they may have contributed the bulk of the late Liberal surge. This late defection on the pro-out-group flank restored the original Conservative cleavage, in a sense.[30] Of course, this takes us back to the vote flows of Tables 1 and 2: the Liberals' transformation over the campaign included a great infusion of former Conservatives; much of this infusion must have come at the very end.

Figure 5

Displacement of the Out-Groups Cleavage

Cleavage Direction and Width



7-day moving average; entry is party share difference highest and lowest tercile

Finally, did Reform merely displace the Conservatives, or did Reform, so to speak, *raise* the ethnic stakes? To answer this question, 1993 must be compared not just with the early campaign but also with election day, 1988. For the 1988-93 comparison, we need equivalent measures. The measure to hand is the "French Canada/Quebec" placement item that defined the horizontal axis in Figure 3. By going back to the measure we also bring the argument about strategic vulnerability full circle. Figure 6 presents the case. For 1988, the figure gives the relationship between opinion on French Canada and the likelihood of voting Conservative. For 1993 it gives two relationships, one for the first 10 days of fieldwork and one for election day; in each case the likelihood is for Conservative and Reform combined. The Reform component of the combined Reform-Conservative share also appears, below the combined-share line, as a dotted line.

Consider Figure 6's elements in chronological sequence, starting with election day 1988. As should be familiar by now, there was a rough but marked negative relationship between sympathy for French Canada and the Conservative share. Crudely, those who wanted to do less for French Canada were about half again as likely to vote Conservative as those who wanted to do more. As the system moved into mid-September 1993, the total relationship clearly sharpened: where the 1988 ratio between extremes was roughly 1.5:1, the September ratio was roughly 2:1. At this point, Reform was not supplying much of the relationship: the line is non-monotonic and generally *less* negative than (by implication) the Conservative one. Indeed, among the few who were willing to do "much more" for French Canada as many were prepared to vote Reform as Conservative. The Reform proportion was certainly larger at the other end, but so by an even larger margin was the Conservative share.

Now look at the 1993 election-day lines. The combined share is the bold line, the slash across the middle. The combined-share relationship is now absolutely monotonic and the ratio of the extremes, 2.5:1 or 3:1. Compared with 1988, attitude to French Canada was clearly a more important factor in the outcome; a modest relationship became a stark one. Some of the relationship was still contributed by the Conservative coalition: this is not

absolutely consistent with the evidence in Table 7, but then Figure 6, unlike the table, embodies no controls. The

Figure 6
Conservatives, Reform, and French Canada



real story, in any case, is Reform: a voter at the anti-French extreme was four times as likely to vote Reform as a voter at the other end. *None* of the growth in the Reform share came from francophiles. *All* of the combined-share growth toward the other end came from Reform. Reform thus did two things at once. First, it increased the the system's overall polarization on this dimension. In doing so, it attracted francophobes across the board, not just from the old Conservative bloc. But the Conservative bloc was, in fact, where francophobes were disproportionately to be found. The second thing Reform did, then, was hollow out the Conservative base.

The Decline of the NDP

So far we have simply taken NDP weakness as given. Accounting for it is difficult with the 1993 CES survey data, as the critical shifts predated the campaign. Only for Reform and the Conservatives were we privileged to see the realignment - if that is what it was - unfold before our eyes. We can, however, canvass potential explanations for the NDP shift.[31]

Three issue-based explanations spring immediately to mind:

- the *deficit* may have made the NDP's programmatic commitments simply implausible, no matter how intrinsically attractive the programmes might seem. New Democrats with relatively weak programmatic commitments might have defected under deficit pressure.

- *continentalism* and globalization more generally may have done the NDP in. Even voters who regret the fact of globalization may see the NDP is standing in the way of the inevitable.

- for whatever reasons, *unions* might have lost political legitimacy and this shift may have implicated the party most intimately linked to the union movement.

One difficulty is that readings of these issues can easily be constructed to favour the NDP. On the deficit, the NDP would be forced to accept the inevitability of cutting but might still be trusted to minimize damage to the social service state; New Democrats, at least, actually believe in the programmes they are forced to cut. On continentalism, Figure 3 indicated that opinion outside Quebec had shifted against further continental integration. Opinion on both the Canada-US agreement and on NAFTA was sharply negative (figures not reported in a table). While this may not have helped the NDP, neither should it have harmed them. Unions were not popular in 1993 but the mean 1993 rating on our union-power item was scarcely different from the 1988 one (figures not reported in a table). In any case, Table 8, which stratifies 1988-93 NDP shifts by each consideration, indicates that anti-NDP swing was greatest among voters least concerned about the deficit, most opposed to further continental integration, and least troubled by union power. The flight, in short was from the NDP core, not from the periphery.

Table 8
Issue Bases of NDP Defection

Issue	Low	Medium	High
Concern for Deficit*	-15.8	-15.6	-6.1
Continentalism*	-16.5	15.7	-5.1
Opposition to Unions**	-16.8	-9.1	-6.7

Entry is net shift against the 1988-93 NDP, non-voters excluded from calculation.
* Categories are terciles on factor scale.
** Low = "same or more"; medium = "somewhat less"; high = "much less" on union power item (**cpsi1a**).

Another possibility is that the economic recession deterred voters from dallying with a party of the left. In most polities, this would be an absurd proposition; as a rule, where economic adversity produces a party-oriented - as opposed to incumbent-oriented (Kiewiet, 1983) - response, the beneficiary is a left-wing party; parties of the right gain from inflationary episodes (Lewis-Beck, 1988). In Canada, however, supporting the NDP seems to be a luxury: indulged in good times, avoided in bad (Erickson, 1988). This may be part of the explanation for 1993, but a proper test lies outside the 1993 CES data set. Estimations of the economy-vote link for the NDP exactly like those for the Conservatives in Table 4 were, if anything, even more inconclusive.

Perhaps the leader was the problem. Her ratings were the weakest of the four non-Bloc leaders (Figure 2, above), weaker even than Campbell's at the end. The contrast with the high ratings enjoyed by her predecessor, Ed Broadbent, is especially striking (Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête, 1992, Chapter 6). But Broadbent's own ratings were anomalously high by NDP standards (LeDuc and Price, 1990) and, in any case, mattered much less at the end of the 1988 campaign, when the NDP was clearly going to receive only 20% of the vote, than at the beginning, when the NDP seemed to have a serious chance of becoming the official opposition. The implication is that for the NDP, unlike the historically dominant parties, leadership is of limited relevance; only if thre party is already in the big-party game for other reasons does leadership become important. And if McLaughlin was indeed weak, her party nonetheless soared in published polls over 1990-91, as a reflection of it credibility in three provinces comprising over 50% of the population. If she did not apparently inhibit the rise, should we assign her primary blame for the fall?

Perhaps the blame properly lies with the party's success in those three provinces. All three NDP governments immediately faced austerity pressures. By caving in to the pressures they may have alienated their bases, proved that the were no better at defending the public sector than the next party in left-right line, the Liberals. In BC the source of conflict was less over public sector cuts than over environmental management, but in all three provinces (least in Saskatchewan) there was a palpable sense of betrayal. The 1988-93 swing against the NDP was greatest in the three provinces with NDP governments: 21.4 in BC, 17.6 in Saskatchewan, and 14.1 in Ontario, as against a national average swing of 13.5.

This evidence hardly disposes of the question, however, and we must at least mention two competing considerations. First, the presence of an NDP provincial government is confounded with the NDP's historic standing in the province. These three provinces are traditionally numbers 2, 1, and 4 in NDP federal share (Manitoba is number 3). Sometimes, when a force works against a party, its impact is proportionate to the *ex ante* share, as if an historically produced regression artifact is being rectified. If we focus only on the presence-absence of an NDP government we may overstimate the impact of office itself. But if we control for the historic share, we may dismiss the possibility that some of the swing elsewhere is attributable to the negative example of those governments. It seems entirely reasonable to point to NDP provincial governments as part of the cause of the national NDP's plight. But we are in no position yet to apportion the blame, nor even do we have a properly specificed measurement model.[32]

Fianlly, it maybe that much of the explanation lies outside the NDP entirely. Perhaps voters on the centre-left so wished to punish the Conservative party that they felt compelled to rally to the Liberals. They may have been helped in this by the Liberals' choice of Jean Chretien, Pierre Trudeau's spiritual heir, as leader. But if circumstances and Jean Chretien promoted a consolidation of the non-Quebec centre-left, they may have undermined a century and a half of political logic inside Quebec.

Quebec: Raising the Stakes

The most truly novel feature of the 1993 result was the strength of the Bloc Québécois. In contrast to Reform, the Bloc has no serious precursor in Canadian electoral history: no party dedicated to breaking the country up has run candidates for the federal parliament, much less controlled most of a province's seats.[33] Merely by existing, the Bloc upsets the long-standing logic of Canadian politics whereby Quebec is the pivot for parliamentary majorities.

The first cut at understanding the Bloc - and the Quebec result - is to divide the province into three camps: non-francophones, francophone non-sovereignists, and francophone sovereignists. Non-francophones, defined by language first spoken and still understood, constitute 18% of the Quebec population over age 20, but since many are not Canadian citizens, only about 15% of the electorate. Among francophone Quebeckers, a small majority, 52%, support sovereignty, 45% are opposed, and 5% have not formed an opinion.[34] In the total electorate, as non-francophones overwhelmingly oppose sovereignty, the shares were 45% favourable, 51% opposed, and 5% with no opinion.

Table 9
Quebec: Building Blocks of the Electorate

		Francophones	
Vote	Non-Francophones	Non-Sovereignists*	Sovereignists
Conservative	11%	21%	3
Liberal	72	38	3
NDP	2	1	1
Bloc	13	38	90
N	*(132)*	*(270)*	*(299)*

* Includes "don't know"

According to Table 9, non-francophones voted 72% Liberal,[35] 13% Bloc, and 11% Conservative. The reason for non-francophones' aversion to the Bloc is ready to hand: an overwhelming majority strongly opposes sovereignty, and 63%

believe that their personal standard of living would get *much* worse if Quebec were to separate, compared to 20% among all francophones and 35% among francophone non-sovereignists. Their attraction to Liberals rather than to Conservatives is long-standing (54% identify themselves as Liberals, a slightly higher percentage than in 1988), although the factors that hurt the Conservatives elsewhere must also have played a role in Quebec.

Among francophone sovereignists, 90% (even more among those *very* favourable to sovereignty) voted Bloc. As with non-francophones, the reasoning is obvious: the Bloc is explicitly committed to sovereignty. Moreover, few sovereignists had a competing motive to support another party: for instance, sovereignists rated Bloc leader Lucien Bouchard 73, on a 0-100 scale, compared to 49 for Chrétien and 38 for Campbell. The arithmetic of the table suggests, then, that three Bloc voters in four supported sovereignty. Most such voters had supported sovereignty for years but had voted Conservative as a second choice or simply abstained (or voted Rhinocéros, the functional equivalent). Merely by presenting itself, the Bloc changed Quebec's electoral landscape.[36]

Had the Bloc relied solely on sovereignists, however, its Quebec share would have been about 38%. Instead it received 50%. One Bloc voter in four was a non-sovereignist and more than one francophone non-sovereignist in three voted Bloc, as many as voted Liberal.[37] What would account for such behaviour? Space does not permit a detailed account but we can venture a précis of work in progress.[38] Even within the federalist camp one can distinguish elements in what might be called proto-sovereignist disposition - young and presumably more caught up in the *zeitgeist*, more attached to Quebec than to Canada, and persuaded that Quebec gets less attention than other provinces - and these elements helped direct voters to the Bloc. The Bloc seemed to capture two lines of pure protest. One was over the GST: opponents were disproportionately likely to support the Bloc. This strikes us as more than just rationalization from prior commitments (in contrast to the case outside Quebec). Had the GST's impact in Quebec been driven only by simple partisanship, the apparent "beneficiary" of anti-GST feeling should have been the Liberals; but they were not, indeed Liberals seem to have been implicated along with Conservatives. Respondents reporting a worsened *personal* financial situation also tended to vote Bloc. Again, the fact that the Bloc received this vote - including from erstwhile Conservatives - makes us think that the relationship is real. If it merely exemplified partisan blaming, the Liberal estimation, not the Bloc's, should have mirrored the Conservative one. Finally, leadership was important. Even among federalists, Lucien Bouchard was popular and it is hard to take such popularity other than at face value. Equally credible is the low standing of Jean Chretien. He was widely regarded as setting his face against the wishes of Quebeckers. Especially galling was his widely reported role in 1981 constitutional negotiations. Missing in 1993 was any hint of a bandwagon.[39]

Conclusions and Speculation

Was 1993 a critical election? What happened to the politics of ethnic inclusion and the two-party-plus system that has characterized 20th-century Canadian electoral life? One significant feature of the old system is that major parties behaved as brokers; they appealed to a broad segment of the electorate, at least a large enough segment to secure a single-party parliamentary majority. We need not exaggerate the scale of such an electoral coalition: a vote share in the low 40s usually suffices to secure a comfortable seat majority (Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête, 1992, Figure 1-1). Getting that majority can even be assisted by divisive appeals; indeed, would-be brokers must start from a base. They must then, as a rule, transcend the base, but in doing so they place it at risk, exactly as the Conservatives discovered in 1993. This is a universal of party politics, on which the canonical source is Przeworski and Sprague (1986). But under the plurality formula, electorally efficient appeals divide voters against each other *within* constituencies and so cross constituency boundaries.[40] The Canadian wrinkle to this classic design, of course, is that parties hardly ever win an outright majority without securing a majority within Quebec. Major parties have been rewarded for bridging, rather than exploiting, the Quebec/rest-of-Canada cultural divide.

1993 seemed to break all these rules. The Liberals won the country handily, but without winning Quebec. This fact alone may reverberate in Quebeckers' calculations over the next few years: if the Liberals can repeat the feat, the long-standing calculus that made francophones a peculiarly well situated minority, one actually helped by the plurality formula, may become defunct. But then, can the Liberals sustain a non-Quebec coalition as inclusive as the 1993 one? 1993 did reverse another fact of long-standing: for years, the right outside Quebec has been consolidated and the left, divided. Even when the left was divided, the Liberals could still prosper if they controlled Quebec. Once the Conservatives detached Quebec, their joining it to a very strong non-Quebec base created a formidable combination. But now it is the left which is consolidated and the right which is divided,

between the Conservatives and Reform. The consolidation of the left is the flip side of the inanition of the NDP. How enduring the Liberal electoral coalition is depends, in part, on how much control the NDP has over its fate, a topic for another paper.

And the emergence of two other parties, each with a heavy regional foot, complicates matters. Each was small enough that its geographic concentration was close to optimal; neither faced the electoral penalities visited upon small parties with geographically thin bases of support; that fate was reserved for the Conservatives. In 1993, then, neither of the new parties had an incentive to broker the cultural divide. But neither can be satisfied with its current position. The Bloc has no desire to govern Canada. Reform does seem to want to govern, but to succeed must either change itself or change the country. In Canada as presently constituted Reform must grow beyond its western and ethnically narrow base. Figure 3 reminds us that Reform is hardly in the mainstream at present. Even if it stops short of invading Quebec, growth will mean compromising its current base, just as the Conservatives did after Diefenbaker. The alternative is to change the country, to acquiesce in its dismemberment, so that Reform's western base, joined to parts of Ontario, can generate majorities in a new, smaller House. The place of the Conservative party in all this remains to be settled. By election day 1993, however, the Conservatives still barred Reform's path to official opposition status. With a vote shares almost identical to each other's, Reform and the Conservatives conspired to fragment the Canadian right.

In the new configuration remained much that was old. A small part of Reform's appeal seems truly new, a token of impatience with politicians as a class. And in beating old tribal drums, Reform attracted voters from all old parties, not just from the Conservatives. But mostly they attracted old Conservatives, they hollowed out the Tory core. Sociologically, Reform is not so novel, it represents a shuffling of seats within an ideological family, a shift recognizable from European experience (Bartolini and Mair, 1990). Where Reform *is* truly novel is in its implications, for Canada's electoral system is, of course, not European, but rather embodies the high-stakes plurality formula.

But contrary to a widely held western view, Reform did not win the election. The party which did win remains, among other things, an ethnoreligious coalition on traditional lines. Even in relation to Quebec, there is much that is old-fashioned: a leader, Jean Chretien, and a respectable parliamentary presence (19 seats, second only to Ontario) from that province. At the same time outside Quebec, Liberal strength represent the coming of political age of Reform's sociological antitype, new Canadians, especially of non-European background. The Liberals may have done more than just pull in disgruntled New Democrats, they may now profit from a new electoral centre of gravity.

This naturally brings in question the future of the NDP. Although the party never broke through to full-fledged major-party status, it came close, we believe, in 1988. In certain key provinces it already was a major player: its base, organizational or ideological, was large enough that ethnic groups had to divide between the NDP and the locally dominant bourgeois party. It was not impossible to imagine an eventual breakthrough in which such a coalition congealed countrywide, a northern latitudes variant of the Australian Labor Party's old synthesis of social democracy and republicanism, more social democratic than republican. Now this seems unlikely and the very survival of the party will require reassertion of the old form in at least those provinces where it was viable. Of course, as we write, it is precisely in those provinces where the 1993 damage was most severe. And it may be that the demographic weight of New Canadians is now such that the old left must instead to come over permanently to the party which is best at ethnic mobilization, the Liberals.

It still seems true that the fate of the party system and of the country hang together. If the country holds, the party system may well reconstitute itself along traditional lines. Whether or not the country holds depends on two steps yet to be taken. As we write, a provincial election is under way in Quebec. Should the provincial Liberals win, the question of sovereignty will go on the back burner for some time. If, as seems likely, the Parti Québécois wins, then the temperature will rise and the stage will be set for a referendum on sovereignty in the spring of 1995. Polls at this point and the experience of 1980 indicate that the proposal will fail. Fail or pass, it is not clear that the Bloc Québécois will have any further role. It might be argued that Quebeckers should try and have it both ways: serious representation inside cabinet and a credible sovereignist threat outside. At the moment the Bloc's parliamentary

presence could be construed as a token of the strength of sovereignist sentiment; the party also has a role in a soon-to-be active debate. But failure of a sovereignist referendum question would undermine the Bloc's position on both counts. If sovereignty fails, then the logic of Quebec-centred coalition building seems likely to reassert itself. If Reform or a reborn Conservative party do not grasp this, then the 21st century, like the 20th, will belong to the Liberal party. If Reform does grasp the Quebec nettle, then Conservative tragedy may just repeat itself as Reform farce. But if the country cracks, so then may the party system, and we may see the outline of the future not on the government benches but on the opposition ones.

Finally, a few thoughts on the lessons of 1993 for theories of party competition. Embedded throughout this paper has been the presumption that a party's strategic task is to establish a credible *noncentrist* position. This contrasts with the bulk of the analytical literature, which emphasizes the attractive power of the median voter. Some analytic contributions do acknowledge the empirical ubiquity of noncentrist party locations, but none strike us as capturing the flavour of either the 1988 or the 1993 campaigns. In Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête (1992) we considered several analytical attempts to make sense of noncentrist results and found all wanting. Work we have consulted more recently is also similarly wanting. Kollman, et al. (1992) predict nonconvergent outcomes but employ a model which nonetheless presupposes convergence as the strategic ideal; parties are blocked from realising the ideal by limitations on their search capacity. The drift of our discussion, however, is that convergence is not even an ideal. Closer to the mark is Palfrey (1984), who imagines parties already in the game abandoning the centre to avoid being outflanked by a potential entrant. His model, however, requires the potential entry to be realised and, given that the initial players locate optimally, the entrant, *ex hypothesi*, (a) finishes third and (b) locates at the centre. This does not describe Canadian reality and itself makes one wonder why, after backward induction, the potential entrant bothers to come in (alternatively, why the system does not embody an infinite regress). Closer still is Greenberg and Shepsle (1987) who argue that staying in the game - getting into the game for the entrant - is the most important goal, a goal which can be frustrated by trying to maximize the vote. This is very close to our intuitive sense of the Canadian game. In Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête (1992) we speculated that the NDP ran a frontrunner's campaign in 1988, content just to brush the Liberals aside as the official opposition. The Liberals, for their part, took noncentrist risks to establish their credibility on trade policy. In 1992, the late-September "secret-plans" controversy was Kim Campbell's moment to establish her party's credibility on the deficit. Unlike John Turner in 1988, Campbell failed the test. Have we just proved the Greenberg-Shepsle case? We suspect not, for when we finally complete our analysis, we believe that we it will incorporate strategic elements that their model lacks. We also suspect that the intuition in Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête (1992), that voters' cognitive limitations figure in the noncentrist story, will bear fruit. But we share with Greenberg and Shepsle the sense that to stay in the game a party must shun the middle on at least one key dimension, it must give voters a *reason* to support it. By late September 1993 there was no longer a single reason to vote Conservative.

Appendix A: The 1992-3 Canadian Referendum and Election Study Design

The 1992-3 Canadian Referendum and Election Study resembles the 1988 study in its essentials. Enough random four-digit telephone suffixes were generated to produce, when wedded to known live exchanges, a target sample of 3600, overrepresenting Quebec and the smaller provinces. The total sample was then broken up into 45 replicates, one for each day of fieldwork. Release and clearance of replicates was then controlled to make the day of interview effectively a random event (starting from about the fourth day of fieldwork); this makes differences between days the product solely of sampling error and of intervening events, not of stage in sample clearance. In the event, we completed 3775 interviews in the Campaign Period Study (hereafter CPS), for a response rate of about 65 percent. Post-election reinterviews (PES) were completed with 3340 respondents, a reinterview rate of 88.5%. A further 2215 respondents completed a self-administered mailback questionnaire (MB), not referred to in this paper. CPS interviews averaged 38.7 minutes and PES interviews averaged 19.6 minutes.

The 1993 waves are linked to waves conducted in 1992, during and after the referendum on the Charlottetown Accord. More detail on the 1992 waves can be found in Johnston, et al (1993a,b). 1434 respondents completed both waves of the 1992 study and the 1993 CPS; of these, 1312 persisted to the PES and 877 to the MB. For respondents who soldiered through all five waves the file contains 715 variables, including ones of primarily methodological interest.

Appendix B: Item Wordings

cpsc1: Would you say that you are better of or worse off financially than you were a year ago?

cpsc1a/b: Is that much better/worse off or somewhat better/worse off?

cpsc6: Now I want to ask you about the economy in all of Canada. Would you say that over the past year Canada's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?

cps6a/b: Is that much better/worse or somewhat better/worse?

cpse1a: Now let's talk about [promoting the French language in Canada/Quebec] How much do you think should be done [to promote French/for Quebec]: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, much less, or haven't you thought much about it? *[random variation in item wording]*

cpse1b-e: How much does the federal [..party..] want to do [to promote French/for Quebec]: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less?

cpse2a: How about Canada's ties with the United States. Should Canada's ties with the United States be much closer, somewhat closer, about the same as now, more distant, much more distant or haven't you thought much about this?

cpse2b-e: Does the federal [..party..] want Canada to have much closer ties with the United States, somewhat closer, about the same as now, more distant, or much more distant

cpsf1: In 1988 Canada signed a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. All things considered, do you support the agreement or do you oppose it?

cpsf3: Canada and the United States have reached a new trade agreement which includes Mexico. All things considered, do you support this agreement or do you oppose it?

cpsf5a/b: On the deficit, which comes closest to your own view: (1) we must reduce the deficit even if it means cutting programmes, or (2) governments must maintain programmes even if that means continuing to run a deficit? *[random ordering of response alternatives]*

cpsf7: If you *had* to, would you cut spending in the following areas a lot, some or not at all:

.....f7c: Pensions and Old Age Security? (Should pensions be cut a lot, some, or not at all?)

.....f7d: Health care? (Should health care be cut a lot, some, or not at all?)

.....f7e: Unemployment Insurance? Should Unemployment Insurance be cut a lot, some, or not at all?

cpsf8a-d: Suppose the [..party..] win the election, what do you think will happen to the deficit? Would a [..party..] government make the deficit much bigger, somewhat bigger, somewhat smaller, or much smaller?

cpsi3a: How much do you think should be done for racial minorities: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, much less. or haven't you thought much about it?

cpsj5: Do you think Canada should admit more immigrants or fewer immigrants than at present?

cpsj6a/b/c: Now we would like to get your views on abortion. Of the following three positions, which is closest to your own opinion: (1) abortion should never be permitted; (2) should be permitted only after need has been established by a doctor; or (3) should be a matter of the woman's personal choice? *[random ordering of response alternatives]*

cpsj7: Could you tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements:

.....**j7a**: Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children.

.....**j7b**: Homosexual couples should be allowed to get legally married. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?

.....**j7e**: Only people who are legally married should be having children. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?

.....**j7h**: Politicians are *no more corrupt* than anybody else.

pese2b: What is your opinion on Quebec sovereignty, that is, Quebec is no longer a part of Canada?

pes4a/b: As a general rule, the government should: (1) reduce unemployment even if it means that the deficit stays high; or (2) reduce the deficit even if it means unemployment stays high? *[random ordering of response alternatives]*

(Could you tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements:)

pese8: The only way to create jobs is to eliminate the deficit.

pese9: To maintain our social programs, we must eliminate the deficit. Do you strongly agree somewhat agree somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

pese15b: We must crack down on crime, even if that means people lose their rights.

Notes

[1] For a more complete account of the 1988 election and its background, see Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête (1992).

[2] For more detail on 1993 fieldwork, especially on the time path of data collection, see Appendix A.

[3] The 1993 recovery, though, accompanied a leadership convention, which generated much favourable publicity for the party, just as conventions and primaries commonly do for US parties. The recovery most like the 1993 Conservative was the Liberal 1984 one: that recovery, also assisted by a leadership race, dissipated in the later campaign.

[4] The 19th, a Sunday, also marked the end of a fieldwork week.

[5] Calculations are from unrounded data.

[6] The accounting does balance over the various intervals in Tables 1 and 2 as each draws upon slightly different samples, depending on panel mortality.

[7] This point is hardly new. It was first made by Elkins (1974) and the substance of the dimensional structure was explored conjecturally by Johnston (1991) and empirically by Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête (1992), Chapters Two and Three.

[8] Indeed, if one looks at defectors only, a slightly larger share of Conservative than of Liberal defectors went to the NDP.

[9] To compensate for small daily sample sizes (62 per day on average outside Quebec), all trackings are smoothed by five-day moving averages, using the subroutine inside Harvard Graphics. Keep in mind that Quebec vote intentions are not factored into Figure 1 and so all four parties appear to do better than implied in Table 1.

[10] Until the 22nd in raw (that is, not smoothed by moving averages) tracking.

[11] Published polls did not report as a large a Reform surge as we pick up nor a last-week decline and so we feel diffident about interpreting the two phenomena. This is not to say, however, that our pattern contradicts published polls. In fact, none with fieldwork in the relevant period were published. The closest was the *Globe and Mail*-ComQuest poll published on 16 October, but fieldwork for this poll was completed before the Reform share peaked. The final Reid and Gallup polls entered the field after the share began its final descent.

[12] The apparent timing in Figure 1 may be an artifact of averaging; the raw tracking hints that the discontinuity is between the 15th and 16th.

[13] Kenneth Whyte, "The face that sank a thousand Tories," *Saturday Night* 109(February 1994), p.11; Edward Greenspon, Ross Howard, and Susan Delacourt, "Tories try to recover from goof," and David Roberts, "Angry calls flood PC offices," Toronto *Globe and Mail* 16 October 1993, p. A6.

[14] Edward Greenspon and Jeff Sallot, "How Campbell self-destructed," Toronto *Globe and Mail* 27 October 1993, p. A1,8.

[15] The smoothed tracking in Figure 1 has the shift start on the 20th and largely complete by the 22nd, the day before the remark. Raw tracking hints that the moving-average starts the decline a day early, but even so yields a string of Conservative shares below 30 percent starting from the 22nd. The first commercial polls to indicate a Conservative decline all completed their fieldwork before the 47-days remark. They all placed the Conservatives in the low 30s Canada-wide. Our sense is that their fieldwork periods exactly spanned the period of the drop and so averaged the Conservative share; if their samples could be split by day of interview, they might well reveal the pattern in Figure 1. See Geoffrey York and Susan Delacourt, "Liberals oustrip Tories in polls," Toronto *Globe and Mail* 27 September 1993, p. A1,5.

[16] We investigated if the shifts for Manning and McLaughlin reflected the obscurity of these two leaders relative to the other two; this seemed especially problematic for Preston Manning. But by alternative treatments of missing values the tracking remains roughly as in Figure 1. If the drop was some kind of autonomous early-campaign

effect, it did not manifest itself in 1988 (compare Figure 2 with Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête, 1992, Figure 6-3, p. 173)

[17] Their finding for unemployment also roughly holds for two less complicated treatments, but these may yield contradictory predictions for 1993.

[18] The personal-national distinction is commonly referred to as *egocentric* vs *sociotropic*, after Kinder and Kiewiet (1979). An extended treatment of the distinction can be found in Kiewiet (1983).

[19] We do not include a term for expectations, in contrast to Clarke and Kornberg (1993).

[20] The French Canada items are **cpse1a-e** and the Canada-US items are **cpse2a-e**. The French Canada items' 1988 version referred only to French Canada by that name and was deliberately ambiguous on whether that referred to Quebec or to all francophones. The focus on Quebec in the intervening years made us wonder if that province had not come to summarize all that mattered in the domain but a reluctance to adandon a measure so pivotal to the account in Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête (1992) led us to compromise by randomly assigning respondents to French Canada/Quebec treatments. For this paper's purposes the randomization does not seem to matter: mean ratings are about the same although the "Quebec" version evokes slightly less variance than the "French Canada" one.

[21] Averaging is by *1988* groups to bring out the vulnerabilities at the beginning of the 1993 campaign, when it still seemed possible that the Conservatives would reconstitute their 1988 coalition. 1988 preference is indicated by vote in that year, from the 1988 Canadian Election Study for 1988 self-location and by recall of 1988 in the 1993 study for 1993 self-location.

[22] The credibility items are **cpsf8a-d** and the unemployment-deficit item is **pes4a/b**. See Appendix B for exact wording.

[23] The GST seems to have mattered in Quebec; see below.

[24] As an example, we asked a question about how important it was that the Prime Minister speak French. This loaded heavily on the out-groups factor. The loading reassured us in our interpretation of the factor but the item itself hardly seemed like a policy question in its own right and so was dropped.

[25] We considered calling the factor and the scale we ultimately built from it *ethnocentrism*. But the language of such a label seems stronger than the component items warrant, especially as they lack the psychodynamic content of most conceptions of ethnocentrism (Forbes, 1985). We do suspect that many, perhaps most, respondents who reach the anti-outgroup pole of the scale merit being called ethnocentric. But to want to do "much less" for both French Canada and racial minorities and to want fewer immigrants admitted lacks the sting of extreme scores on more traditionally constructed scales. And most of the politically relevant variance on the scale is lower down, well away from the zone of ego defence and the idealized bigot.

[26] The item is **pese15b**. The item nags us, as it is worded in the negative and may thus contain above-average error. 56% agree with it, that is, *reject* the characterization of politicians as peculiarly corrupt. This could be reassuring evidence of moral realism but, in an antipolitical climate, might indicate only that many respondents did not hear the negation. An item on whether governments were no longer even able to deliver programmes and solutions did not get us anywhere. We also investigated attitudes to aboriginal self-government and two crime questions but preliminary analyses suggested that these were unhelpful. On the crime questions, see also below, note 28.

[27] Estimations in the following tables included all respondents who voted or who claimed a vote intention, depending on circumstances.

[28] We also investigated whether or not concern about crime was a factor in Reform support. It clearly was, but the effect was modest and describing the relationship would have occupied more of the main body of the text than its its strength warranted. Two separate crime-related items affected Reform support: a general statement about the priority of fighting crime over securing rights and a question about capital punishment. The general question had a nicely symmetric distribution but a very small effect. The capital punishment item had a larger effect but a

skewed distribution; in fact, a majority of all parties' supporters rejected the proposition that capital punishment is never justified.

[29] The absolute value of interaction coefficients is small, because of the differing metrics of the dependent variable (0-1) and the day counter (0-44). The interaction coefficient indicates the day by day shift expressed as proportions; hence the extra zeroes immediately after the decimal point.

[30] Although in this paper we repeatedly invoke the language of strategic voting, analytically we are silent on the process which generated the Reform-Conservative displacement dynamic. We can imagine three alternative explanations, each of which may be part of the truth. First is a simple floor effect and its removal: as the Conservatives' overall share dropped, cleavages in that share may have been compressed by the fact that zero is the inescapable minimum; expansion of Reform cleavages as that party grew could be this process in reverse. We have done some preliminary work on this, by reestimating relationships in Table 7 with logistic regression, and virtually all interactions remain significant. Second, voters may have shifted to or away from Reform selectively as their understanding of the party grew. This should make selection of Reform progressively less random - more structured - and cleavage widths should expand accordingly. And third is the strategic possibility: voters may have been aware of Reform's position all along but sceptical of Reform's chances. Once it became clear that the Conservatives had no hope of beating the Liberals - when ability to beat the Liberals was their best remaining card - they collapsed even more than would have been indicated by voters' sincere preferences.

[31] For more detail see Gidengil (1994).

[32] Consider the following small estimation, however:

$$\text{NDP Swing} = -3.83 - 0.25 * \text{1988 NDP Share} - 5.3 * \text{NDP Gov't}.$$

Standard errors for "share" and "government" are, respectively, 0.19 and 4.7, the adjusted R^2 is 0.62 and N=10. The equation slightly underpredicts the BC swing (suggesting that about 3 points might be attributable to the Harcourt government), slightly overpredicts for Saskatchewan (Romanow may have saved the party nearly 3 points), and is bang on for Ontario. On this reading, most of the swing in the three NDP-governed provinces is attributable to the party's prior strength. But we hesitate to push the point, given the small number of observations and the minimalist specification.

[33] Two parties with nationalist orientations surfaced earlier in this century, the Bloc Populaire in 1945 and the Ralliement Créditiste in and after 1962, but neither was committed to outright sovereignty for Quebec and neither made so great a breakthrough.

[34] The question is **pese2b**.

[35] The percentage was even higher in the allophone subset.

[36] We do not mean to suggest that just any sovereignist alternative would do as well as the Bloc. It is critical that the Bloc is closely tied to official sovereignist forces and that Lucien Bouchard has been very popular for many years.

[37] Among self-conscious non-sovereignists the Bloc percentage was slightly lower; a majority of "don't know's" voted Bloc.

[38] The next few sentences reflect multivariate estimations in Blais (1994.

[39] As compared with 1988, on which see Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête (1992), Chapters 7 and 8.

[40] The classic statement of this proposition is Lipset (1960). A game theoretic treatment is Sankoff and Mellos (1972), one grounded in decision theory is Brady and Johnston (1993), and an estimation of electoral optimization is Johnston and Ballantyne (1977).

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