APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL GROUPS: MEASURES OF GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND GROUP AFFECT

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Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in the political influence of social groups (see for example: Miller, Gurin and Gurin, 1978; Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk, 1981; Kinder, Rosenstone and Hanson, 1983; Lau, 1983; and Conover, 1984). This interest has been rekindled by research on a variety of questions: the impact of group identification on political perception and thinking (e.g. Conover, 1984,1986; Kinder, 1982; Klein, 1984; and Rhodebeck, 1985); the role of group consciousness in triggering political participation (e.g. Miller et al., 1978, 1981; Gurin, Miller and Gurin, 1980; Gurin, 1985; and Shingles, 1982); the importance of social groups as political symbols (Sears, Hensler and Speer, 1979; and Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen, 1980); and group deprivation and intergroup conflict as sources of social unrest (Crosby, 1982; Rhodebeck, 1981; Sears and McConahay, 1973; and Vanneman and Pettigrew, 1978).

Taken together, this research has forcefully reasserted the political significance of social groups. But, it has also stimulated an awareness of how many questions remain unanswered. And from an empirical perspective, it has created a demand for new information--more and better measures of a wider range of group-related concepts. To some extent, this demand has been addressed by the inclusion of new batteries of group questions on the 1983 NES Pilot Study, the 1984 NES Study and the 1985 NES Pilot Study. These questions present a significant opportunity to advance our understanding of group influence in politics. Yet, before this opportunity may be seized it is necessary to evaluate these new measures and old ones as well. Specifically, we must consider to what extent existing questions provide adequate measures of the concepts central to theories of social group influence. It is that task to which this paper is devoted.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The Concepts

Many different approaches have been taken to the political study of social groups. Nevertheless, although there is some disagreement over precise definitions, it is still possible to identify a set of commonly used concepts. Because these concepts play an indispensable role in various theories of group influence, they are necessarily the focus of our measurement strategies. But, before turning to questions of measurement, it is essential that each concept be clearly defined.

First, group membership is defined as "objectively" belonging to a particular social group. Psychological closeness to the group or even an awareness of one's membership is not necessary to be classified as a member. In contrast, subjective group membership may be defined as an individual's perception that he or she is a member of a particular group. In this discussion, the term ingroup will denote a group of which a person is a member; conversely, the term outgroup will represent any group of which a person is not a member. This use of the terms ingroup and outgroup is a neutral one in the sense that it is not meant to imply either intergroup conflict or dominant/subordinate relationships between groups.

Next, the concept of group identification has been defined in a variety of ways. One approach--the one favored here--treats group identification as having two related components: subjective group membership (i.e. a self-

awareness of one's membership in the group) and a psychological sense of attachment to the group (for similar definitions see Gurin et al., 1980; Miller et al., 1981; and Tajfel, 1981). It is important to recognize that so defined a necessary, though not sufficient, precondition for group identification is objective group membership.

Such a definition of group identification is not universally accepted. Some traditional presentations of "reference group theory" (Hyman, 1942; Newcomb, 1943) define group identification as also existing when people feel psychologically close to social groups to which they do not belong (for a discussion on this point see Lau, 1983). In effect, people might be influenced by social groups that they are psychologically close to even though they are not actually members of that group.

Yet, regardless of how one labels it, I would argue that there are differences between feeling close to a group that one does not belong to and identifying with a group that one belongs to: aspiring to be a "yuppie" is not the same as being a yuppie; nor is caring for the poor the same as being poor. While acknowledging that people feel close to groups that they do not belong to, it is nonetheless useful to maintain a conceptual distinction between the psychological attachment of group members and nonmembers. Both the theoretical and empirical consequences of this distinction may be quite important (Conover, 1984; 1986). Accordingly, in this paper the term "group identification" is reserved for the psychological attachment of group members to their group. And, for the lack of a better term (for a similar discussion see Klein, 1984), the psychological attachment of nonmembers to a group will be referred to as group sympathy.

A fourth concept that has played a key role in research on the political influence of social groups is group consciousness, which may be described as a "politicized awareness, or ideology, regarding the group's relative positions in society, and a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interests" (Miller et al., 1978, p. 18; also see Miller et al., 1981; Gurin et al., 1980). Thus defined, group identification is usually viewed as a precondition for group consciousness.

In contrast, group affect refers simply to the positive or negative valence that an individual attaches to a group. Thus, neither group membership, identification nor consciousness is a necessary precondition to a person experiencing affect towards a group. Instead, an individual may attach positive or negative feelings to any group. That is not to imply, however, that there is no relationship between group affect and group identification (for evidence on this point see, Lau, 1983; Conover, 1986). On the contrary, there is likely to be some reciprocal relationship between the two: positive affect for an ingroup may help trigger the development of group identification which in turn should foster even more positive feelings for the ingroup.

Finally, group interdependence is a broad term referring to the perceived interconnectedness of the interests of various parties (see Sears, Huddy and Jessor, 1985). Self-ingroup interdependence concerns the individual's perception that his or her personal interests are interdependent with those of some ingroup; what happens to the individual is related to the group's outcomes. Similarly, self-outgroup interdependence indicates the perception that personal interests are intertwined with those of some outgroup. Alternatively, outgroup interdependence may occur at the group level; a person may

believe that his or her own group's interests are interwoven with those of some other group.

The Theories

Having defined these concepts, it is possible to review briefly how various theoretical approaches make use of them. In so doing, the goal is merely to acquaint the reader with the theories rather than to present an indepth analysis. Nonetheless, this quick overview should provide an adequate basis for later evaluations of the validity and usefulness of various group measures.

With that caveat in mind, several major strands of research on the political influence of social groups may be identified (for further description see Sears, Huddy and Jessor, 1985; Lau, 1983; Sears and Huddy, 1986a). A substantial amount of research has focused on the impact of group identification on political thinking and behavior. The fundamental idea underlying such research is that people are motivated to support politically the ingroups with which they identify. Within this body of literature, several more specific schools of thought can be distinguished: the reference group approach and the social identification model (see Lau, 1983 for further discussion of this distinction).

The reference group or social cohesion approach depicts group influence as stemming from the cohesiveness and similar self-interests of group identifiers (work in this tradition includes Miller et al., 1981; Gurin et al., 1980; Gurin, 1985). Group influence is expected to increase the greater the perceived interdependence between the individual's personal interests and those of the group, the greater the perceived political relevance of the group, and the clearer the transmission of the group norms (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960; Lau, 1983). Thus, in testing this theoretical approach, it would be useful to have measures of group membership, group identification, self-ingroup interdependence, and the perceived relevance of the group to politics.

In contrast, the social identification model portrays ingroup influence as an outgrowth of cognitive identification with and affective attachment to a group (Tajfel, 1981; for an application of this approach see Sears and Huddy, 1986a, 1986b; Conover, 1984, 1986). When people identify with a group, they naturally experience an "ingroup bias": a tendency to favor the group's interests thereby enhancing the group's status and indirectly their own (see Brewer, 1979; Conover, 1984; Kramer and Brewer, 1984; Stephan, 1985). In effect, group identification raises the personal relevance of group outcomes for the individual; the group's interests take on a symbolic value that is distinct from the individual's own self-interests (Brewer, 1984; Tajfel, 1981). In essence, group identification fosters a sense of interdependence between the individual and the group that is not based purely on self-interest. Thus described, a test of social identity theory would require measures of group identity, self-ingroup interdependence, and group interests.

The symbolic politics literature provides another major treatment of the political influence of social groups (see Sears et al., 1979, 1980, and 1985). The basic idea underlying this research is that people are influenced by how much they like or dislike various groups. Ingroups and outgroups alike

represent symbols that trigger affective responses which in turn may structure political attitudes and behavior. The symbolic politics approach is a broad one since it deals with both ingroups and outgroups. At the same time, with regard to group members the symbolic politics argument has much in common with group identification approaches because it emphasizes the role of positive affect for an ingroup. Tests of symbolic politics explanations require measures of group affect.

Finally, a number of studies have concentrated on the influence of group consciousness and intergroup conflict on political behavior (e.g. Bobo, 1983; Klein, 1984; Gurin, 1985; and Rhodebeck, 1981). These studies often differ from the others in their simultaneous focus on ingroups and outgroups and the potential conflict between them. Group members may perceive intergroup conflicts in terms of their own self-interests (e.g. ego deprivation) or the ingroup's interests (e.g. fraternal deprivation, see for example Crosby, 1982). In both instances, a sense of group identification and consciousness influences the individual's reaction to the outgroup. Alternatively, group identification and consciousness may have little to do with how a person reacts to outgroups. Individual reactions to perceived conflict with an outgroup may be an outgrowth entirely of group affect; whites, for instance, may oppose busing strictly as a function of their dislike of blacks (Sears, Huddy and Jessor, 1985). Or reactions to an outgroup may be the product of both group affect and perceptions of the group; people may oppose busing because they both dislike blacks and perceive that blacks have gotten more than they deserve (Conover, 1986). In addition to measures of group interdependence, tests of theories of intergroup conflict may require measures of perceived group status and the fairness of that status (see Conover, 1986 for further discussion on this point).

GENERAL MEASUREMENT STRATEGIES

The above theoretical overview makes clear one thing: there are a multiplicity of approaches to understanding how social groups influence political thinking and behavior. And, the number of approaches seems to be growing each year. Moreover, not only has the number of theories grown but they seem to have become increasingly specialized often at the expense of specifying the conditions under which a particular theoretical approach is expected to apply. Clearly, the field needs some integration of theory.

Having said that, I take the position--perhaps an overly simplistic one--that basically there are two broad theoretical approaches to understanding how social groups enter into political thinking and behavior. These two approaches stem from a recognition that the processes underlying the impact of social groups fundamentally differ depending upon whether the group is an outgroup or an ingroup that is identified with. Specifically, one approach to studying the political influence of social groups is to focus on how group membership, identification, and consciousness shape political thinking and behavior. If this approach is adopted, it becomes of primary importance first to measure group membership and identification, and subsequently group consciousness. A second approach is to consider how people react to the groups that they do not identify with: how do they feel about them and what do they think about them? From this perspective, measures of group affect become quite important. And various measures of cognitive beliefs about groups--perceptions of group status, group characteristics,

group interests, and group interdependence--are also relevant.

Obviously, within each of these broad approaches more specific theories must be reconciled with one another, and the interplay between these two major theoretical strands must be specified. In order for this to be accomplished theories must be tested against one another. And, this in turn requires that the key concepts embodied in those theories be operationalized and measured within in the same study. At first glance, this may seem like an enormous task. Yet, upon further examination, it becomes apparent that the relatively few concepts outlined earlier are, indeed, core concepts common to a range of theories. If we can do a good job of measuring them, meaningful tests comparing various theories becomes possible.

Though not impossible, such a measurement task is formidable. This is true because though these two approaches are distinct theoretically, empirically they overlap. Individuals inevitably vary in terms of their perspectives on the same group; for some a particular group may be an object of identification while for others it may be a negatively perceived outgroup. Consequently, our measurement strategies must accomodate a wide range of perspectives toward the same group. With that in mind, let us consider two broad classes of measures: those tapping group membership and identification, and those concerning group affect.

MEASURES OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND IDENTIFICATION

Previous NES studies have adopted two basic approaches to measuring group identification and related concepts: an individual and a group-based approach. The individual-based approach is clearly the most prevalent one. This approach focuses on the individual with the goal being to ascertain how each person's group identities shape their political behavior. Thus, the approach concentrates on measuring whether or not respondents identify with a wide range of groups. Underlying this approach is the assumption that people's group identifications inevitably color their perception of the world and behavior. Therefore, the key to understanding the political influence of social groups is to determine for each individual which groups he or she identifies with and the extent to which those identities are politically relevant.

In contrast, the group-based approach is a relatively new one that was adopted in the 1983 and 1985 NES Pilot studies. Rather than trying to pin-point each respondent's group identities, this approach begins with specific social groups that are assumed to be politically important, and then attempts to determine how much individuals identify with those groups. So, for example, if women are thought to be a potentially important political influence, the appropriate measurement strategy is to determine how much women respondents actually identify with other women and the extent of their group consciousness. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that at any point in time only a few social groups are likely to have substantial political relevance, and those are the groups that should be focused on (Sears and Huddy, 1986a, 1986b). For remaining members of the public who do not belong to such politically salient groups, the impact of their group identifications on their political behavior is implicitly assumed to be relatively unimportant.

In assessing these two strategies, Sears and his colleagues (Sears and Huddy 1986a, 1986b; Jessor and Sears, 1986) are, perhaps, the strongest proponents of abandoning the individual-based approach in favor of the group-based one. As they note, "existing measures try to assess whatever group-based factors are important to all voters at the expense of measuring in depth the influence of those few groups that may really have a mass impact in any given election" (Sears and Huddy, 1986, p. 1). Put more strongly, they argue that the individual-based approach "has never had the empirical payoff it promises in theory" (Jessor and Sears, 1986, p. 15). Yet, upon reflection this judgment seems unduly harsh and premature as well.

The assessment is overly harsh in two respects. First, it suggests that the primary reason for studying group identification and related concepts is in order to understand election outcomes. If, indeed, that were the case the argument for a group-based approach might well be more appealing. But, that is not the case. The justification is much broader. Group identification and consciousness influence far more than voting behavior; they help structure how people perceive politics and what they consider relevant. Second, the evaluation of Sears and his colleagues is too harsh because it implies that the individual-based approach has failed to uncover much evidence of group effects. Yet, even a quick perusal of previous research suggests otherwise. Using the 1976 NES data, Miller et al. (1978) found: that group identification (as measured by the group closeness question) was significantly correlated with perceptions of policy differences between groups; that group identifiers tended to adopt issue preferences in line with those attributed to their group; and that identifiers were cognizant of shared policy interests with other group members (also see Gurin et al., 1980). Similarly, Lau (1983) has found that assessments of potential group benefits influence the voting behavior of group identifiers. Both Conover (1984) and Rhodebeck (1985) have demonstrated that group identification has a significant impact on policy preferences. And, group identification has also been shown to influence what people find politically relevant (Conover, 1984).

The argument that individual-based measures should be supplanted with group-based ones is also premature in the sense that the individual-based approach has not yet been given a fair test. As will be discussed shortly, there are a number of problems with the measures of group identification associated with the individual-based approach. Yet, as just mentioned, despite these problems group identification has been found to have a wide range of political effects. Given this, were better measures developed the individual-based approach might well produce even stronger findings. At this point in time, then, it is simply too early to judge between the individual and group-based approaches. At the very least, two things must be done before such a choice can be made: existing individual-based measures of group identification should be evaluated with an eye toward developing and testing new measures, and the existing group-based measures of identification should be carefully evaluated. Once that has been accomplished, we will be in a better position to pick between these two strategies. But, even then, such a choice may not be necessary. As we shall see, there is no inherent reason why both of these strategies could not be pursued. Indeed, it may be possible to devise new measures that combine the two. With that in mind, let us consider briefly the validity of existing measures.

Individual-Based Measures of Group Identification

In keeping with the individual-based approach, previous NES studies have included two basic measures of group identification. The first, the "group closeness question", has appeared for many years and has functioned as the primary source of measures of group identification (see Conover, 1984; Miller et al., 1978, 1981; Gurin et al., 1980; Gurin, 1985). To explain, respondents are given a list of groups along with the following instructions:

> Please read over the list and tell me the letter for those groups you feel particularily close to--people who are most like you in their ideas and interests and feelings about things.

Once the respondents have finished rating how close they feel to all the groups, they are asked to pick the one group to which they feel closest. The second measure, the "economic group question", is much newer appearing in the 1983 NES Pilot Study and the 1984 NES. The wording for that question is:

> Sometimes people think about other groups of people in society when they think about their own economic well-being, people who are being helped or hurt by economic conditions. When it comes to economic matters, what groups of people do you feel close to?

As measures of group identification, the face validity of both of these questions is problematic. Let us consider the problems with the "group closeness" question first. For one thing, it blends into one question the conceptually distinct matters of belonging to a group and the feelings of attachment to the groups one belongs to. In effect, it does not distinctly measure either of the two components of group identification--subjective membership and psychological attachment--though it comes much closer to being a measure of attachment than it does to being a measure of subjective membership. As a consequence, in order to measure group identification most researchers have found it necessary to supplement their analyses with other measures of group membership (typically objective in nature). Second, even if we treat it simply as a measure of psychological attachment (as opposed to group identification which has a membership component) the question has problems. Asking people how "close" they feel to a group is ambiguous, even with the qualifying statement accompanying the request. The question could be eliciting feelings of psychological attachment, or it could be evoking feelings of sympathy, empathy, or simply just proximity (Eulau, 1981). Moreover, how people interpret the question is likely to vary depending upon whether they belong to the group in question (Conover, 1986). Third, the question does not measure variations in the intensity of the respondent's attachment to various groups; it only taps the presence of an attachment (i.e. does or does not the respondent feel close to the group). And finally, to some extent the phrasing of the question rests implicitly on the asssumption that group identification and influence stem from a sense of shared self-interests. Thus, the question measures psychological attachment in a fashion best suited for testing the social cohesion approach to group identification.

The follow-up question asks the respondent to pick the group he or she feels closest to in a general sense. In so doing, the purpose is to identify a single group that is presumably especially relevant in determining a person's political attitudes and behavior. But, in fact, how meaningful is this for political analyses? The group that a person generally feels closest

to may not be the same group that he or she feels closest to when it comes to politics. In effect, the follow-up question does not force the respondent to make his or her choice in a political context.

Like the group closeness question, the economic group question is a questionable basis for measures of group identification. It does not distinctly tap group membership; instead it deals more with the respondent's sense of psychological closeness to the group. Nor does it measure the intensity of the attachment. Moreover, the economic group question is implicitly based on the assumption that group identification and influence are rooted in a sense of shared personal interests between the individual and the group. However, a major difference between the two questions is that the economic group question focuses on an explicit set of interests--economic ones. This may increase the usefulness of this question for measuring group influence on economic matters; but it also limits the utility of the question to the economic realm.

Frequency Distributions

Given the apparent ambiguities in both the group closeness and the economic group question, it is useful to consider empirically the extent to which the two questions tap similar group attachments. In order to facilitate such a comparison, the original responses to the open-ended economic group question were collapsed into eight categories, as were the eighteen groups mentioned in the group closeness question. Presented in Table 1 is the distribution of responses to both questions that occurred in the 1984 NES.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

There are certain similarities in the responses to the two questions. In both cases about half of the respondents named a group falling into one of the three economic categories--poor/working class, middle class and specific occupations (e.g. businessmen/women, professionals). Yet, there are also differences. People were more likely to name women as a group that they felt close to generally rather than in economic terms. And, more people felt close to the elderly in economic terms than did generally.

But, the biggest difference in the two patterns of responses lies in the "don't know" category. Over 15% of the public could not volunteer the name of a group that they felt close to economically while only 2.5% were unable to pick a group that they generally felt close to. Part of the difference may be due to the fact that for some the saliency of groups is not a function of the interdependency of economic interests. Over a third of the respondents who failed to answer the economic group question named a non-economic group in response to the group closeness question. However, the discrepancy may also be due to the difference in question types. People who cannot supply the name of a group may willingly pick one when supplied with a list. And indeed, 42.1% of those respondents who could not volunteer a group for the economic group question actually named an economic group on the group closeness question. The fact that they later named an economic group suggests that such respondents may have had difficulty answering the economic group question.

This suspicion is reinforced by other evidence as well. Specifically, if on the economic group question respondents did not understand what was meant

by "groups" they were read the following explanation: "Some people have mentioned farmers, the elderly, teachers, blacks, and union members". There are significant differences in the distribution of responses to the economic group question depending upon whether the respondent was read the description of groups. Groups that were mentioned in the description, like the elderly, were named more frequently by those who heard the description than those who did not. Thus, in response to the economic group question some people may have been confused and therefore named a group with which they did not identify or have common interests.

Having compared the aggregate distribution of responses to the two questions, it is useful to consider the degree of overlap in responses at the individual level. Are the groups that people feel close to in economic matters the same groups that they generally feel close to? As shown in Table 2, there is a relatively low level of overlap in the two ratings (as indicated by the entries along the main diagonal). Most striking is the number of people who say that they feel closest to a social class but they fail to name that class in response to the economic group question. For each of the categories in the economic group question, fully a quarter of the respondents named one of the poor/working class groups in the group closeness question; and another 15-20% named the middle class. In effect, when presented with a list of groups and forced to make intergroup comparisons, a number of people name a social class that they did <u>not</u> name when asked about group attachments in strictly <u>economic</u> terms. Such findings create doubts about the relative salience to the individual of the group named in response to the economic group question. Moreover, these findings also suggest that the two questions are tapping different sorts of group attachments. To some extent, this should be the case; the two questions are, after all, framed differently. On the other hand, whether the differences actually reflect meaningful variations in group attachments or simply ambiguities in the questions is not at all clear.

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

<u>Group Membership and Affect</u>

To gain a better sense of what these two questions are measuring, it is useful to examine the patterns of objective group membership and group affect that characterize various responses to the two questions. First, to what extent are people who feel close to a group either generally or economically actually objective members of the group? Unfortunately, it is considerably easier to specify objective membership in certain categories, such as gender and race, than it is for other groupings where objective boundaries are more difficult or even impossible to define. For this reason, only groups related to gender, race, age, and income will be considered.[2] With that in mind, presented in Table 3 are the objective group memberships associated with various responses to the two group attachment questions.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

The most striking finding in Table 3 is the between group variance. For both questions, objective membership is highest for those noneconomic groups where membership is ascribed (e.g. race and sex) rather than earned. Objective membership in the economic categories where objective boundaries are arbitrary and difficult to define hovers between 50% and 60%, though for both

questions it is higher for those naming the middle class. Such findings suggest that neither the group closeness question nor the economic group question taken alone constitutes an adequate measure of group identification as defined earlier. Both questions fail to take into account either objective or subjective membership. Moreover, the extent to which either question approaches being a measure of group identification varies depending upon the group named. For women and blacks both questions are nearly equivalent to a true measure of group identification. For the economic groups, the mixture of members to non-members approaches fifty-fifty suggesting that caution must be used in interpreting the meaning of such group attachments since for some respondents such attachments do not appear to constitute group identifications. Finally, in the past the lack of a group membership component in the group closeness question has been dealt with by focusing only on respondents who were objective members of the group in question (see for example, Conover, 1984; Miller et al., 1981). It would be wise to follow this same strategy in using the economic group question if results are to be interpreted from the perspective of group identification, as defined here.

It is also useful to consider the degree of affect which people feel towards the groups they name. For both questions, presented in Table 4 are the mean feeling thermometer ratings for the reference groups associated with each category of response. Also presented are the differences between the mean ratings of those mentioning the group and the ratings for the remainder of the sample. In looking at Table 4, several patterns are important to note. For virtually every category there are significant differences in the feeling thermometer ratings of those naming the group and the remainder of the sample, with group affect being higher for those naming the group. Thus, both questions identify groups that people feel affectively attached to. Yet, at the same time, it is critical to note that while statistically significant in most cases the differences between those naming the group and the remainder of the sample tend to be quite small. The major exception to this pattern occurs for those groups based on gender and racial distinctions. For those groups, the feeling thermometer ratings are considerably higher among respondents naming the group in one of the two questions. In summary, the economic group question and especially the group closeness question reveal groups to which people are affectively attached. But, in most instances the feelings are not particularly strong. Futhermore, the strength of the feelings varies across groups.

Summary

In summary, then, what have we learned about these two potential measures of group identification: the economic group question and the group closeness question? For one thing, substantially more people are unable to respond to the economic group question than to the group closeness question. This may be function of the differences in format or of the questions themselves. For another thing, the two questions produce different aggregate patterns of response; and there is relatively little overlap in individual responses. In noting such differences, I do not mean to suggest that there should be a tremendous amount of overlap. Indeed, it is quite reasonable that people would name different groups in response to the two questions. Nonetheless, it is also reasonable to expect that people naming an economic group in response to the group closeness question would name the same group when asked the more specific economic group question. Yet, less than 30% of the people naming the poor, the working class, or the middle class in response to the group close-

ness question volunteered the same group on the more specific economic group question. This suggests that at least some people may well have been confused by the economic group question; consequently, their responses may not reflect true group attachments. In this regard, an unusually large number of people mentioned the elderly in answering the economic group question; almost three-quarters of those respondents named a different group in the group closeness question and less than half were actually elderly. Such findings might be a function of the question prompt on the economic group question: when confronted with a question that they did not fully understand some people simply picked the most general group--the elderly--mentioned by the interviewer in the question explanation.[3]. Thus, the economic group question appears to evoke more confusion and uncertainity among respondents than the group closeness question, which itself is by no means unambiguous.

Despite such differences, the two questions are similar in several ways. Neither makes any explicit reference to subjective group membership, and thus both are incomplete measures of group identification as defined earlier. Both are ambiguous in their use of the phrase "feel close to". Both questions do not tap intensity of attachments. And both questions appear to produce qualitative differences between people in the meaning of their responses. In particular, individuals naming racial or gender groups on the economic group question and especially the group closeness question tend to be members of the group with strong affective ties to it. In such instances, the two questions appear to come close to tapping group identifications as defined earlier. In contrast, the meaning of their responses is less clear for people naming the elderly or the various economic groups (e.g. poor, working class, middle class). For both questions, though especially the economic group one, such respondents are frequently not members of the group they name, and their affective attachments to the groups are not particularily strong. In short, their responses do not appear to reflect group identifications. This suggests that various people may have different things in mind when they respond to these questions: some may name a group with which they closely identify; others pick a group with which they share interests but have no strong attachment to; others may choose an outgroup with which they sympathize; and still others may pick a group based simply on the question prompt. Such variations in the apparent meaning of these questions must be taken into account in any research utilizing these questions, and in any attempts to design new questions.

Group-Based Measures of Group Identification

The group-based approach to measuring group identification is a relatively new development that was used in the 1983 and especially 1985 NES Pilot studies. Two assumptions underlie the use of this approach to date. First, it is assumed that it is useful and feasible to specify apriori which social groups are most relevant politically. In particular, in the 1985 NES Pilot Study, which is focused on here, women and the elderly were chosen as two broad social groupings that were likely to be important in contemporary politics. Implicitly, this focus suggests that if gender- and age-related group identifications have little political impact then it is unlikely that other social groupings will have much impact either.

Second, it is assumed that the conceptualization of group identification posited by advocates of "social identity" theory is most useful. This assumption is reflected in the actual measures included in the 1985 NES Pilot

Study. These measures depart from the "closeness" measure in two important ways (for a background discussion of the origins of these measures see Sears, Huddy and Jessor, 1985). First, they explicitly focus on subjective identification: the respondent's own assessment of the connection between some group and the self. And second, they incorporate a recognition of the potential importance of ingroup heterogeneity and disunity as reflected in the existence of subgroup identifications. In effect, rather than focusing solely on a broad social group such as women, this measurement strategy explores the nature of subgroup identifications with groups such as feminists, homemakers, and working women. So, for example, respondents sixty or older were asked the following question:

"People think of themselves in different ways at different times. Take age for example. Sometimes a person might think of herself as old, sometimes as middle-aged, sometimes as young, and sometimes she might not think about her age at all. I am going to run through a list of different ways in which people have told us they sometimes think about themselves and I'd like you to tell me for each, how often, if ever, you think of yourself in that way. Let's start with 'elderly'. Do you think of yourself as 'elderly' most of the time, some of the time, occasionally or never? (repeat for older working person, retired, middle-aged, young, older)."

Along the same lines, women were asked:

"Sometimes a women might think of herself as a woman, as a working woman, and sometimes as a homemaker. Do you think of yourself as a 'homemaker' most of the time, some of the time, occasionally, or never?" (repeat for woman, working woman, and feminist)."

This group-based strategy for assessing the political influence of group identifications may be assessed on two grounds. First, and most fundamentally, to what extent does this approach result in valid, useful measures of group identifications. Second, and much more generally, to what extent does a group-centered approach further our understanding of the role of social group identifications in political behavior. The first question will be focused on here.

Subgroup Distinctions

One approach to assessing the new questions is to ask to what extent they deal with meaningfully different and potentially important subgroup identities? Presented in Table 5 are the frequency distributions for the two sets of social identity measures. As can be seen in part A of Table 5, there is variation in the extent to which people over sixty describe themselves. Such respondents think of themselves as "older" and "retired" more frequently than they do as either "elderly" or an "older worker". Nonetheless, all four identities--older, elderly, older worker, and retired--are used by people over sixty and there is a fair amount of variation in their use.

INSERT TABLE 5 HERE

The same cannot be said with respect to the gender-related identities. As part B in Table 5 reveals, there is very little variation in identification as a "woman", so little, in fact, as to render the category potentially useless. Similarly, the distributions for "working woman" and "homemaker" are

skewed with over three-quarters of the respondents saying that they think of themselves in those terms more than occasionally.[4] Only the "feminist" category is associated with much variation in how women think of themselves.

To what extent are these identities distinct? As shown in Part A of Table 6, "older worker" is perhaps the most distinctive age-related category. Identification as an "older worker" is only modestly related to the "elderly" category and is surprisingly independent of the "retired" category. In contrast, the two identities that overlap the most are "older" and "elderly", but even there the correlation is not especially strong (r=.37).

INSERT TABLE 6 HERE

The pattern of relationships among the gender-related identities is more complex as illustrated in Part B of Table 6. Thinking of oneself as a woman is positively related to all the other identities, though the correlation is strongest with the "homemaker" category. In contrast, thinking of oneself as a "feminist" is relatively independent of the other identities. Finally, as might be expected, the relationship between the identities of "working woman" and "homemaker" is predictably negative, but surprisingly weak.

In summary, the four age-related categories appear to be relatively distinct. Moreover, there is a fair amount of variation in the extent to which members of the broader social group (people over sixty) think of themselves in these terms.[5] Finally, Sears and Huddy's (1986b) analysis of these items suggests that the "older", "elderly", and "older worker" identities all have significant political effects. Thus, these subgroup categories appear to be good candidates for future study.

With respect to the gender-related categories, it appears that the broad category of "woman" is relatively useless and probably should be dropped from future studies (Sears and Huddy, 1986a reach a similar conclusion). If that category is dropped, the study of gender-related group effects must necessarily focus on subgroups. Of the three subgroups studied--working woman, homemaker, and feminist--the feminist subgroup is most problematic. Unlike the other two subgroups which may be defined in terms of objective demographic criteria like work status and marital status, "feminist" is a category defined in terms of ideological criteria. Moreover, strictly speaking, "feminist" is not even necessarily a subgroup of the broader category of women; men, as well as women, might be feminists. As a category, "feminist" may have as much in common with other ideological labels such as "liberal" and "conservative" as it does with the gender-related subgroups of "homemaker" and "working woman". Consequently, before "feminist" may be treated solely as a gender-based category of identification, its meaning to men and women alike should be explored.

Question Validity

Given that "social identity" theory serves as the theoretical foundation for these new measures, it is appropriate to assess their validity in the context of that specific theory. In that regard, Tajfel (1981, p. 255) defines a social or group identity as that "...part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group...together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership". So, in keeping with the definition of group identification

presented earlier, social identity theory depicts objective group membership as a necessary precondition for the existence of group identification. Consequently, from this perspective a valid measure of group identification would have several qualities: it would focus on known group members, and it would assess both the individual's cognitive perception of membership and his or her emotional attachment to the group. Do the new social identity measures meet these criteria? No, not entirely.

First, there is the question of objective group membership. In contrast to the "group closeness" question, this approach does explicitly focus on objective members of certain broad social groups. Only women are asked about their attachment to women and sub-groups of that category; similarly, only people over sixty are asked to respond to questions about older people. This explicit recognition of the importance of objective group membership as a precondition to group identification represents a valuable and clear advance over the ambiguity of the individual-based group identity measures. But, it is a limited advance.

A large number of the social identity measures focus not on the broad social groups of older people and women, but on subgroups. And, unfortunately, objective membership in these subgroups is not explicitly taken into account in the measurement strategy. So, for instance, all women--not just working women--are asked to assess their subjective identification as a "working woman". Of course, part of the problem in taking into account objective membership is that the nature of the criteria defining membership varies across subgroups. For example, "working women" is a category where objective membership may be defined relatively easily according to work status; "homemaker" is a more ambiguous category whose boundaries might be loosely defined according to objective criteria such as marital status and/or children at home; and "feminist" is a category whose boundaries may not be defined simply in terms of some objective criteria. Thus, for certain subgroups it may be difficult to assess objective membership. Nonetheless, it is a task that should not be completely overlooked if measures of group identification are to be used in a meaningful fashion.

For example, in the 1985 Pilot Study people over sixty were asked about their identity as "older workers" and "retired". It can be argued that work status constitutes a relatively objective basis for defining the boundaries of these two categories. Given that assumption, from the perspective of social identity theory, what is of interest is the extent to which older people who work think of themselves as "older workers" and older people who do not work think of themselves as "retired". But, wait. The Sears and Huddy (1986b) analyses of these questions reveal that among older people who work 52% think of themselves as "retired" more than occasionally, and among those who do <u>not</u> work 54% think of themselves as an "older worker" more than occasionally.

How are we to interpret such findings? In effect, given that the measurement of objective group membership is not explicitly taken into account in most of the social identity measures, how do we treat findings resulting from the use of these measures. One possibility, and by far the simplest, is simply to ignore the underlying theoretical precondition of objective group membership in our use of the social identity measures. In effect, the importance of objective group membership as a necessary condition for group membership is minimized. This seems to be the approach adopted by Sears and Huddy (1986a, 1986b) in their analyses of the social identity measures; and it

is a common solution employed by researchers using the group closeness question. While empirically expedient, such an approach may be ultimately unsatisfying theoretically.

Another possibility is to acknowledge that the group identity measures may be tapping different phenomena for members and nonmembers. Group identity may be at work among older people who work and think of themselves as older workers; some other process may account for older people who do not work but nonetheless think of themselves as "older workers". Given this, it may be appropriate to limit our analyses of group identity to those respondents who meet our criteria of objective group membership. Generally, the extent to which this strategy may be adopted will depend upon the availability of appropriate measures of objective group membership within the broader survey.

One final possibility in interpreting such findings is to go one step further and evaluate carefully the defining criteria of objective group membership. For example, in this instance "current work status" might be replaced by "previous work status" as the defining criteria. More generally, this example suggests that in identifying the criteria used to define categories we must begin by exploring what the categories mean to our respondents. Knowing how often respondents think of themselves as "older workers" is of very little use if we do not know what the category "older workers" means to people. Thus, objective group membership may be dealt with in a variety of ways: by ignoring it; by acknowledging its theoretical importance and subsequently making use of available questions to tap objective membership; or by carefully exploring the meaning of group categories and then intentionally devising measures of objective group membership.

Setting aside the question of objective group membership, the new social identity questions may be evaluated in terms of how well they tap subjective membership (i.e. the cognitive ties to the group) and the affective linkages between the self and the group--the two components of group identification. With respect to the cognitive ties, the key measurement task is to determine whether people perceive themselves as belonging to a particular social group category; that is, do they think of themselves as a member of that category. With regard to the affective ties, the major measurement task is to assess the value and emotional importance to the individual of his or her group membership. On the face of it, the new social identity questions seem to be directed toward <u>both</u> measurement tasks at once. If the primary intent is only to measure the cognitive ties that individuals perceive between themselves and various groups, it would suffice simply to ask people if they <u>ever</u> thought of themselves as a member of a particular category (e.g. "Do you ever think of yourself as a homemaker?").[6] However, this was not done. Instead, respondents were asked <u>how frequently</u> they thought of themselves in particular group terms. In so doing, the questions also seem to be trying to get at the emotional significance of the group identity for the individual.

Is this the best way to tap the strength of the affective ties underlying group identification? It is not clear. For instance, over 90% of the female respondents say that they think of themselves as a "woman" most of the time. Is this a reflection of the emotional significance of that social identity or its permanence? Similarly, over 50% of the women asked said that they thought of themselves as "homemakers" most of the time. Is this an indication of the emotional significance of that identity or the time spent in enacting the role?

If the new social identity questions are, indeed, tapping variations in emotional attachment to groups, one might expect them to be related to measures of group affect. To examine this possibility the social identity measures were correlated with feeling thermometer ratings of appropriate groups. In addition, they were also correlated with the traditional group closeness measures of group attachment. Both the social identity and closeness measures range from frequent identity or closeness (low scores) to infrequent identity or lack of closeness (high scores). In contrast, on the feeling thermometer measures low scores indicate more negative affect and high scores more positive feelings. As evident in Table 7, the findings are mixed.

INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

For the age-related categories, there are no significant relationships between the social identity measures and the feeling thermometer ratings of the old. Nor, for that matter, are the social identity measures related to the closeness measures of group attachment.[7] At the least, such findings suggest that there may be some problem with treating the age-related social identity measures as indicators of the emotional significance of these categories to people over sixty.

With respect to the gender-related categories, the findings are not so clear-cut. As might be predicted from our earlier discussion, the "woman" identity measure, with its lack of variation, is generally unrelated to the measures of group affect though it is slightly related to the "closeness to women" question. The "working woman" identity is positively, though weakly, related to positive affective feelings towards women and the women's movement; and it is positively related to feelings of closeness towards both women and feminists. The same pattern appears in the case of the "feminist" identity, but the relationships are considerably stronger with the one exception of the "closeness to women" measure. Finally, the "homemaker" identity, as might be expected, presents a contrasting pattern of correlations: generally, the more frequent the identity as a homemaker the more negative are the affective reactions to women and the women's movement. But, the relationships are relatively weak. Moreover, a breakdown of the affective ratings according to the frequency of the social identity reveals that in the case of the "homemaker" identity the relationships are nonlinear. Women who think of themselves as homemakers some of the time tend to rate women and the women's movement more highly than <u>either</u> women who think of themselves as homemakers most of the time or those who do so only occasionally.

At best, then, the social identity measures appear to be inconsistent measures of the emotional significance of group attachments. In the case of age-related categories, the social identity measures do not seem to be tapping variations in the emotional significance of group ties. In the case of the gender-related categories, the findings are more inconsistent. However, only for the "feminist" identity may a strong argument be made that the social identity measure is tapping variations in affective attachment.[8] These findings suggest that further work must be done before the social identity measures are accepted as anything more than an elaborate measure of an individual's cognitive link between the self and some group (i.e. subjective group membership).

Summary

In summary, the new social identity measures have introduced several innovations into how we approach the study of group identification. In broad terms, their use depends upon a group-based approach to measuring the effects of group identification. In more specific terms, these measures have introduced two important innovations into our measurement strategies: a recognition of the importance of subgroups, and an explicit focus on subjective self-identification. Of the two innovations, I think that, to this point, the former is the more valuable one. Sears and Huddy's (1986a, 1986b) analyses as well as my own suggest that there exist distinctive subgroup identities that are politically relevant. Moreover, for some social group categories, such as women the subgroup identities may represent more meaningful distinctions than the broad category itself. Thus, future measures should definitely incorporate a subgroup focus.

Not as strong a case can be built for the validity of the new questions as measures of group identity. For one thing, like the "group closeness" and the "economic group" questions, the new social identity measures fail to deal explicitly with the precondition of objective group membership. Certainly, this problem can be handled, but the solution is not necessarily a simple one. More so than in the case of broad social groupings, membership in subgroups may be defined by criteria that vary substantially in their objectivity. It is likely that measures of objective group membership in various subgroups may require substantial pretesting in order to identify how respondents define potential categories of membership.

Apart from the question of objective group membership, the new questions easily may be used to form an adequate measure of subjective group membership. By collapsing the first three categories (most of the time, some of the time, occasionally) into one, a simple dichotomous measure of subjective group membership may be obtained. Such a measure would correspond nicely to the conceptualization of the cognitive side of group identity developed by Tajfel (1981) in his social identity theory. This would appear to be the most appropriate use of such questions. The use of these social identity questions to measure also the affective attachment of the individual to the group is problematic. The type of affective attachment, if any, that is measured by these questions may vary from group to group. For "feminists" such questions may, indeed, be tapping the emotional significance of the category; in contrast, for the "working woman" category such a question may be measuring the amount of time that a woman perceives herself to be working rather than the category's emotional significance. Further research is clearly warrented before such questions may be used confidently as overall measures of group identity.

MEASURES OF GROUP AFFECT

Group membership, identification and consciousness represent one path through which social groups shape political thinking and behavior. It is not, however, the only path. People also think about and react emotionally to the social groups to which they do <u>not</u> belong. In effect, various social groups act as political cues. For group members, such cues are frequently bound up in the processes surrounding group identification and consciousness. For nonmembers, such group cues may structure political thinking and feeling. It is important, therefore, that this path to group influence be considered as

well.

Two directions may be taken in the study of the reactions people have to social outgroups. One approach is to concentrate on people's cognitive reactions. For example, the 1985 Pilot Study contained measures of both the perceived social status of certain groups and the respondent's perceived interdependence with various groups (see Sears and Huddy, 1986a, 1986b; and Jessor and Sears, 1986). In addition, the 1985 Pilot Study contained several batteries of questions probing explanations for racial differences and poverty (see Kinder and Sanders, 1986a and more generally Kluegel and Smith, 1986). And, earlier NES studies have incorporated measures of perceived group influence (for a discussion of some of these measures see Miller, Gurin, and Gurin, 1978). Such cognitive assessments of social groups represent a potentially important factor in the explanation of how people react politically to social groups.

A second approach, the one taken here, is to focus on people's affective reactions to groups. Symbolic politics theory provides the most well-developed theoretical basis for studying group affect (see for example Sears et al., 1979, 1988). Recall, that theory suggests that group labels act as cues which trigger affective reactions which may then influence political evaluations. While symbolic politics theory constitutes a good starting point, it does not necessarily provide a complete understanding of the role of group affect in political evaluation. The triggering of affective reactions may be more complex than originally thought (see for example Fiske and Pavelchak, 1985) as may be the manner in which affect influences cognitive processing and behavior (see Fiske and Taylor, 1984). Thus, from a theoretical perspective, we need to explore further the role group affect plays in political evaluation and behavior. Such theoretical development must necessarily go hand in hand with our efforts to devise measures of group affect. And until that time, any evaluation of current measures of group affect must be considered incomplete. With that caveat in mind, let us turn now to a consideration of two types of measures of group affect: feeling thermometers and emotion checklists.

Feeling Thermometers

Feeling thermometer ratings of social groups and political figures have been a standard part of NES studies for some time now. Such measures have been commonly accepted as indicators of group affect and have been employed in a variety of theoretical contexts. Generally, the outcome of such empirical tests has been to establish the importance of group affect. For example, Conover and Feldman (1981) found that thermometer ratings of groups have a large effect in determining liberal-conservative self-identifications. Similarly, more recently Brady and Sniderman (1985) revealed that group affect, as measured by thermometer ratings, has a substantial impact on attitude attributions about groups. Finally, thermometer ratings have played an important role in tests of symbolic politics theory (see Sears, Huddy and Schaffer, 1985; Sears and Huddy, 1986a, 1986b). In such tests, group affect is often pitted against group identification as a possible explanation for political evaluation. While empirically it is possible to distinguish thermometer ratings of groups from measures of group identity, it is not clear if the distinction is a particularly meaningful theoretical one. Group affect and group identity are so closely interwoven (see Conover, 1986; Lau, 1983; and Tajfel, 1981) that such empirical tests are not likely to provide a clear picture of the importance of group affect per se. A much better test of

the importance of group affect is to explore its impact among nonmembers.

Two tests of that kind are made here using the 1985 Pilot Study data. First, among men the impact of affect toward the women's movement is examined; and second, the influence of affect toward the "disadvantaged"--the old, the poor, and people on welfare--is considered among the "advantaged" (people under 65 with incomes over $10,000). Group affect toward the women's movement is measured by averaging the respondent's feeling thermometer ratings towards the "women's liberation movement", the "women's movement", and "feminists" (coefficient alpha = .80). Similarly, group affect toward the disadvantaged is measured by averaging the thermometer ratings towards "poor people", "older people" and "people on welfare" (coefficient alpha = .72).

Two sets of control variables are also used in the analyses. (For further details on these measures see Appendix A). Specifically, five political control variables are employed, all of which have been rescaled to range from zero to one: party identification, liberal-conservative identification, individualism, egalitarianism, and moral traditionalism. High scores on these measures indicate, respectively, "strong Republican", "very conservative", high sense of individualism, strong commitment to egalitarianism, and "moral traditionalist". The second set of control variables deals with the following background factors: education, age, income, race, and sex. On the first three, high scores indicate, respectively, high education, older, and high income; race and sex are dummy variables in which one equals, respectively, "nonwhite" and "female".

In the first analysis, the dependent variables concern five issues relating to the well-being of women: abortion, whether the government should help improve the social and economic well-being of women (Aidwom), and whether spending should be increased on improving the position of women (Spwom), on affirmative action for women (Spaffirm), and on childcare for working women (Spchild). On all five issues, low scores indicate the position of the women's movement (i.e. abortion rights, increased governmental activity, and increased spending). In the second analysis, the dependent variables have to do with the welfare of disadvantaged citizens: increasing aid to minorities (Aidmin), increasing spending for services such as health and education (Serv/spend), and whether spending should be increased on food stamps (Spfood), solving problems of big cities (Spcities), and government jobs for the unemployed (Spunemp). On all five issues, low scores indicate the pro-disadvantaged response.

Presented in Table 8 are the results, for men, of the regressions of the five women-related issues on the measure of group affect towards the women's movement, the political control variables, and the background control variables. As can be seen, group affect has no impact on men's attitudes toward abortion; instead, men's assessments of the abortion issue are determined by their education, their commitment to egalitarianism and their sense of moral traditionalism. On the remaining issues, however, group affect has a significant and consistently strong effect on men's policy evaluations. And, the pattern also appears on issues for which the evidence is not presented such as spending on public schools and food stamps. Thus, even with a variety of political and background factors controlled, group affect proves to be an important predictor.

INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

A similar pattern occurs when the impact of group affect toward the disadvantaged is considered among nonmembers of that group. Presented in Table 9 are the results of the regressions of the five "disadvantaged"-related issues on the measure of group affect, the political control variables, and the background control variables. Again, group affect emerges as a very potent predictor: people who feel warmly toward the disadvantaged are more likely to support policies that benefit that group. This is true for the issues presented in Table 9, and it is also true for other issues such as spending on welfare, medicare and programs dealing with crime. Moreover, such findings are even more impressive when it is recognized that the impact of group affect persists even when powerful political variables like party identification and egalitarianism are controlled.

INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

To date, then, the evidence suggests the importance of group affect as measured by the feeling thermometer ratings. That is not to say, however, that the feeling thermometer ratings are infallible or that we should not investigate alternative measures of group affect. With regard to the latter, through the years various researchers have noted a number of troublesome aspects in the feeling thermometer ratings. For one thing, a "positivity bias" tends to characterize people's thermometer ratings of various groups (see Miller et al., 1978). However, such a bias does not appear to be specific to the feeling thermometer instrument; instead, the presence of a "positivity bias" in ratings of people is a well-documented finding in studies employing a variety of measures (see Sears and Whitney, 1973; and Sears, 1983). Moreover, despite such a bias, there is still sufficient variation in people's ratings to make differences in thermometer ratings substantively meaningful. A second potential problem is that individuals may vary significantly in the range of their feeling thermometer ratings and the meaning of specific ratings. This problem, however, can be dealt with. Individual ratings of a particular group may be standardized according to the respondents' reactions to the remaining groups (for an example of this technique, see Sears, Huddy, and Schaffer, 1985). Finally, along the same lines, context effects may be created by the order in which groups are listed in feeling thermometer batteries. Further study is needed to determine the possible seriousness of such effects.

Despite such problems, the feeling thermometer instrument is one of long-standing use with proven utility. It should be maintained on future NES studies. At the same time, however, we should continue efforts to develop measures of more differentiated forms of affect. Two such efforts were incorporated into the 1985 Pilot Study. Let us turn now to a consideration of them.

Emotions Batteries

In the past few years, an encouraging beginning has been made toward understanding the role of emotions in politics. Emotional reactions to political candidates (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, and Fiske, 1982), the state of the economy (Conover and Feldman, 1986), and public affairs organizations (Roseman, Abelson, and Ewing, 1986) have been studied with considerable success. In such research, the most common measurement technique has been to give respondents an emotions battery in which they are asked whether they have

experienced a particular emotion in response to a particular stimulus object.

In the 1985 Pilot Study, two new types of stimulus objects were used in conjunction with such an emotions battery: "preferential treatment of blacks", and "changes over the last 20 years in relations between blacks and whites in this country". With respect to each stimulus object, respondents were asked if they had ever felt "angry, hopeful, afraid, uneasy, proud, disgusted, sympathetic, infuriated, happy or bitter". It is important to recognize that neither of these new emotions batteries deals directly with emotional reactions to a social group per se; instead, both concern emotional reactions to a race-related issue. And, of the two, the preferential treatment battery is the more specific one, especially given that it was asked immediately following a series of questions on affirmative action in the hiring and promotion of blacks and the use of racial quotas in higher education.

How useful are these new batteries in furthering our understanding of policy preferences on racial issues? Kinder and Sanders (1986a, 1986b) have examined the emotions battery for the preferential treatment issue. In an interesting analysis, they used the emotions battery as a means of uncovering differences in the meaning of two frames for a preferential treatment question. In particular, they found that negative emotions were more strongly correlated with attitudes towards affirmative action when the issue was framed in terms of "unfair advantages" rather than "reverse discrimination". As they explain, "inducing whites to think about affirmative action in the ethical language of merit appears to recall their sentiments towards blacks" (Kinder and Sanders, 1986b, p. 14). Thus, when couched in terms of a particular issue, an emotions battery <u>does</u> prove useful in getting at the role of group affect in political evaluation. But, at best, it is an indirect and imprecise demonstration of the importance of emotional reactions to social groups. Unfortunately, it is not clear how much of the negative affective reaction to affirmative action is attributable to the "undeserved advantage" frame and how much reflects a pure affective reaction to blacks.

The emotions battery pertaining to changes in race relations has a more general referent, and therefore might be useful in understanding racial attitudes beyond the preferential treatment question. With that in mind, for white respondents, the ten item battery was subjected to a principal components factor analysis which revealed three factors accounting for 61% of the variance. Four of the negative emotions--angry, disgusted, infuriated, and bitter--loaded strongly on the first factor. Three of the positive emotions--hopeful, proud, and happy--loaded strongly on the second factor; sympathetic, the fourth positive emotion, loaded positively on this second factor, but not nearly as strongly as the other three positive emotions. The third factor was defined by the remaining negative emotions--afraid and uneasy. Based on these findings, three emotions indexes were created by summing the number of affects from that factor that the respondent mentioned having experienced. ("Sympathetic" was not included in the positive emotion index). These indexes were then divided by the number of emotions loading on the factor to produce three indexes ranging from "zero" for those people experiencing none of the emotions on that factor to "one" for those individuals mentioning all of the emotions.

Three sets of potential correlates of the emotions scales were identified (see Appendix B for measurement details). First, two feeling thermometer scales were created. One represents the average rating for "status quo" black

subgroups--blacks, black politicians, black young people, and working class blacks. The other is based on the average rating of black activists and black militants. Second, two measures of basic racial predispositions were calculated. One taps symbolic racism and the other perceived racial conflict. Third, and finally, eleven different racial issues were considered. For ease of presentation, these specific issues were divided into three groups based on the work of Kinder and Sanders (1986, p.12): issues dealing with the "general responsibility of the federal government to ...grant equal rights and guarantee equal opportunities for blacks"; issues concerning "specific obligations of the federal government to ensure that blacks" be free of discrimination in housing, jobs and education; and issues pertaining to the "appropriateness of affirmative action...in employment and college admissions procedures." For each group of specific issues, the average correlation across the individual issues is presented. With that in mind, for white respondents, Table 10 provides the correlations of the emotion indexes with these three sets of measures.

INSERT TABLE 10 HERE

To begin, it is interesting to note the relatively moderate correlations of the emotion indexes with the two feeling thermometer scales. The emotion indexes are definitely getting at something different than the simple feeling thermometer ratings. On the one hand, this is to be expected given that the emotion measures are based on affect differentiated into specific emotions while the feeling thermometers are a more global measure of affect. On the other hand, these modest correlations among different measures of racial affect may also be a reflection of the somewhat ambiguous stimulus--changes in the relations between blacks and whites--which served as the basis for the emotion questions. Thus, further research is needed in order to specify better the relationship between feeling thermometer measures of group affect and measures of emotional experiences.

In contrast, all three of the emotion indexes are significantly related with the measure of symbolic racism. Certainly, this is gratifying given that symbolic racism is supposed to represent "a blend of anti-black affect and the kind of traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic" (Kinder and Sears, 1981, p. 416). If the emotion measures were not at all related to symbolic racism, it would create considerable doubt about their validity and possibly that of the symbolic racism measure itself. And, as might be expected, the negative emotion indexes are significantly correlated with a measure of perceived racial conflict. At the same time, however, it must be noted that the correlations of the emotion indexes with the measures of both symbolic racism and racial conflict are not especially strong.

Finally, presented in the third part of Table 10 are the average correlations of the emotion indexes with three types of racial issues. Overall, the average correlations are disappointingly weak. Of the three indexes, the angry/disgusted one demonstrates the strongest pattern of correlations across the issue types; but even in its case, the correlations are, at best, moderate in strength. Moreover, when specific issues of each type are regressed on a particular emotion index as well as background and political control variables (including symbolic racism and racial conflict), the emotion indexes fail to achieve statistical significance in most cases.

What accounts for the relatively weak correlations of the emotion indexes

with preferences on racial issues? One obvious possibility is simply that emotional reactions to social groups do not color a person's specific issue positions. Before that explanation can be accepted, however, a second one must be ruled out. Specifically, it must be established that the weak correlations are not attributable to poor measures of emotional experience.

In that regard, the general emotions battery may be criticized on two grounds. First, the stimulus in the question is ambiguous and it does not deal directly with the relevant social group: blacks. Unfortunately, one problem in making the question stimulus less ambiguous and more directly tied to blacks per se is that one runs the risk of creating a racially offensive battery of questions. Nonetheless, the search should continue for a question frame that more clearly focuses the respondent on the relevant social group without being offensive.

A second problem with the emotion battery lies with the implicit underlying assumption that all emotions are equally relevant to understanding how feelings about social groups enter into policy preferences. People think about social groups in the context of certain political situations. In particular, social groups enter into political thinking most commonly in the context of distributive or redistributive issues. Therefore, those are the sorts of contexts within which emotional responses to social groups should be examined. Moreover, the focus should be on those emotions most likely to occur in such contexts. For example, of the positive emotions studied here, feelings of pride and happiness towards a social group may be relatively irrelevant to a person's assessment of a political issue. On the other hand, feelings of sympathy toward a social group would appear to be quite relevant to how an individual evaluates an issue such as affirmative action or welfare. And indeed, as illustrated in column 4 of Table 10, the single emotion of sympathetic is correlated with specific issue preferences as highly as any of the emotion indexes. Thus, not only must our question frames be sharpened, but we must also focus more clearly on those emotions which are most likely to be related to issue preferences.

Summary

In summary, measuring group affect is important to a number of theoretical perspectives. The feeling thermometers constitute global measures of group affect. As such, they have been used with considerable success in a variety of endeavors. The usefulness of the feeling thermometers should not deter us, however, from the development of additional measures of group affect. In particular, measures that differentiate among emotions could contribute to a greater understanding of the role of group affect in shaping political attitudes and behavior. In that regard, the emotions batteries included in the 1985 NES Pilot study were of limited utility. Nonetheless, their inclusion in that study has provided insight into how we ought to approach the study of emotional reactions to social groups.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Where does all of this leave us? It seems clear that our current approach to the measurement of group membership and identification is woefully in need of revision. Current measures of group membership and identification reflect a mishmash of theoretical perspectives; they are ambiguous; and they have proven to be less than smashing successes in predicting political beliefs

and behavior. The verdict on measures of group affect is more encouraging. The feeling thermometer measure is a proven workhorse despite its problems. And, batteries of emotional reactions to social groups, while in need of considerable work, still represent a promising avenue for future research. Having said that, it is time to go out on a limb and make some specific recommendations.

Measures of Group Membership and Identification

(1) GENERAL APPROACH:

It is not necessary to pick between the individual-based and group-based approach to the study of group identification. There is room for compromise. Not all of the groups traditionally included in the individual-based approach necessarily warrent consideration; nor must a group-based approach be as limiting as originally suggested. With that in mind, I recommend that a limited list of groups with relevant subgroups be drawn up for study. In so doing, the focus should be on social groups rather than ideological groupings or formal organizations. Thus, from the traditional listing of groups, the following would be eliminated: liberals, labor unions, feminists, people seeking to protect the environment, conservatives, and evangelical groups. This is not to say that all of these groups are unimportant but rather that different measurement strategies must be employed in their study. In particular, the feminist group is clearly important politically but it is not clear whether it can be dealt with properly within this framework. With respect to the groups that might be included on such a list, the following are good candidates: for women only--homemakers, working women; for people 65 or older--older people, the elderly, and perhaps older workers (if the meaning of the category can be clarified); for blacks only--subgroups decided upon after pretesting; for all respondents--poor people, middle-class people, working-class people, businessmen and businesswomen, and farmers. (Note, the restrictions listed are relevant for the discussion of subjective group membership only).

(2) OBJECTIVE GROUP MEMBERSHIP

For all groups included in the final listing, some efforts need to be made to establish the meaning of the categories to respondents. In addition, there should be a commitment to include objective measures of group membership for each category employed. While the measurement of objective group membership need not necessarily be incorporated into the actual instrument measuring group identification, it is important that there be available adequate measures of objective group membership.

(3) SUBJECTIVE GROUP MEMBERSHIP

In keeping with the social identity approach, it is important to measure a respondent's sense of subjective membership in particular groups. Such a measurement, however, should be distinct from any effort to assess the emotional attachment of the respondent to the group. Accordingly, the following question format is suggested:

"I am going to read a list of groups or categories of people. For each one, please tell me "yes" if you ever think of yourself as being in that category, and "no" if you do not. It doesn't matter whether you feel close to

the category of people named or even how often you think about them. We just want to know whether you ever think of yourself as part of that category. The first one is...INTERVIEWER READS THOSE GROUPS APPROPRIATE FOR THAT PARTICULAR RESPONDENT.

The clear advantage of such a question is that it disentangles the measurement of subjective group membership from that of psychological attachment. Moreover, for those interested in social identity theory, it provides a measure that more closely corresponds to the concept of subjective group membership--the cognitive link between the self and the group.

(4) PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT

In order to maximize our ability to test a variety of theoretical perspectives, it is essential to measure the pyschological attachment of people both to the groups that they are members of and the ones that they do not belong to. For instance, from the perspective of social identity theory, a close psychological attachment coupled with subjective group membership would be taken as an indication of "group identification"; a close psychological attachment in the absence of group membership might constitute "group sympathy" but it certainly would not be considered indicative of group identification. In contrast, those adopting a broad view of reference group theory might relax the requirement for group membership and thus interpret any evidence of psychological closeness as an indication of group identification.

In order to serve this variety of theoretical purposes, the question would ask all respondents about all groups regardless of the individual's membership in the group. Specifically, the proposed question is:

"People differ in how emotionally attached or close they feel to various groups in society. What about you? How close do you feel to INTERVIEWER READS NAME OF EACH GROUP...very close, somewhat close, or not very close."

Obviously, this proposed measure of "psychological attachment" is a variation of the old group closeness question, but there are some important changes. First, unlike the old question, the proposed one does not make mention of shared interests, and thus it is not biased toward an interest-based interpretation of group identification. Second, the new question elaborates on what is meant by "closeness", and therefore, hopefully reduces the ambiguity that existed in the old question. And third, the new question allows us to measure variations in the intensity of psychological attachment whereas the old one tapped only the <u>presence</u> of psychological attachment.

(5) MOST IMPORTANT GROUP

Perhaps the most difficult problem in devising new measures for the study of social groups is how to identify a group to ask follow-up questions about. Should it be the group that people generally feel closest to (i.e. as in the old group closeness battery); should it be the group that people have the most in common with economically (i.e. as in the economic group question); or should it be the group that they feel is most relevant politically? For both practical and theoretical reasons, I argue that we should be focusing on the groups that are perceived as most relevant politically.

Practically speaking, NES has already asked follow-up questions

concerning economically relevant groups and groups which respondents feel closest to in general terms. Thus, less explored avenues warrent more attention at this point. An even more compelling reason for focusing on political relevance is the theoretical argument that the perceived relevance of a group to politics is crucial in determining the group's influence. In effect, if we want to uncover the role of social groups in political thinking and behavior, we must focus not only on those groups that are identified with but also on those groups that are politically relevant.

Accepting that, however, there is still disagreement over how best to identify the group that an individual feels is most relevant to his or her political beliefs and behavior. At least three aspects of question construction are potentially controversial:

(a) The Nature of the Question Frame: should we ask which group the person cares the most about, thinks the most about, talks the most about etc. in relation to politics?

(b) The Group Context of the Question: in making their choices should we limit respondents to those groups that they are subjective members of, or to those groups that they identify with (i.e. subjective members plus psychological attachment), or should we allow them also to pick from groups that they sympathize with (i.e. psychological attachment in the absence of membership)?

(c) The Scope of the Question Frame: should we provide specific political referents in the question or should it be framed in very general terms?

Given such potential disagreement, probably the best way to proceed is to conduct a series of experiments using split-samples that would allow us to compare different question formats. For example, an experiment focusing on the scope of the question frame, while holding constant the nature of the question frame and the group context, might compare the following two questions:

(a) Form One--Narrow Frame

"People often care whether the groups they feel close to have been helped or hurt by the government and its policies. Of the groups you just mentioned feeling close to...INTERVIEWER READ GROUPS RATED "VERY CLOSE TO" OR "SOMEWHAT CLOSE TO" ON GROUP PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT ITEM...which one do you care about the most when it comes to politics?

(b) Form Two--Broad Frame

"Of the groups you just mentioned feeling close to...INTERVIEWER READ GROUPS RATED "VERY CLOSE TO" OR "SOMEWHAT CLOSE TO" ON GROUP PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT ITEM...which one do you care about the most when it comes to politics?

Once a single group has been identified as important, a variety of follow-up questions might be asked. For example, the respondent's interdependence with the group is likely to be important. Similarly, the group's social status and economic well-being might be investigated. But, before any of these interesting avenues can be pursued, we must devise a new measurement strategy for identifying the group on which to focus.

Measures of Group Affect

(1) GENERAL APPROACH:

In approaching the study of group affect, two concerns should be kept in mind in choosing which groups to consider. First, in studying group identification it would be useful to have global measures of group affect to complement the measures of psychological attachment. And second, the lesson of the group-based approach to group identification should be taken to heart in measuring group affect. That is to say, it is particularily important that we devise measures of group affect for those social groups that figure prominently in political issues.

(2) FEELING THERMOMETERS:

The feeling thermometers have proven to be a useful and durable instrument for studying group affect. As such, they probably should be maintained on future NES studies. In determining which groups to include in the feeling thermometer battery, the guidelines outlined above should be kept in mind. Thus, any groups included in a new group identification battery should also be included in the feeling thermometer battery. In addition, groups that play a role in contemporary politics should be included (for example: evangelicals, feminists etc.) And, it might even be useful to include groups that are relevant to foreign policy questions (e.g. communists).

(3) EMOTION BATTERIES:

The new emotion batteries included in the 1985 Pilot Study proved to be of some use, but clearly further work is needed. In particular, I recommend that a general question frame that can apply to a variety of social groups be devised, and that a limited number of emotions be focused on. This battery could then be used for a few select groups that play a major role in American politics. For example, a battery composed of the following type of questions might be created:

(a) "People sometimes care whether various groups in society have been helped or hurt by the government and its policies. When it comes to political issues, how much do you care about what happens to...SOCIAL GROUP? Extremely much, very much, some, or not very much?"[10]

(b) "People sometimes get angry because they think the government and its policies favor some people more than others. How about you? Have you ever been angry at ...SOCIAL GROUP...because you thought the government and its policies favored them more than others?
IF YES: Would you say you were very angry or just somewhat angry?"

(c) "Sometimes people feel sympathetic towards various groups in society. When it comes to political issues, how sympathetic do you feel toward...SOCIAL GROUP? Extremely sympathetic, very sympathetic, somewhat sympathetic, or not at all sympathetic?"

This battery could then be asked for a limited number of social groups such as poor people, older people, blacks, women (or perhaps working women or feminists), and businessmen and businesswomen.

Parting Words

Over the last fifteen years, a considerable amount of effort has been devoted to devising new measures of group concepts. In some instances, those efforts have proven to be unproductive; in others, the measures appear to be very useful. But, neither the disappointment over our failures nor the enthusiasm associated with our successes should unduly influence our approach to the task at hand. In developing, testing, keeping and discarding measures our first concern must always be their value to the enterprise of theory development.

NOTES

1 The group closeness categories were collapsed in the following fashion: (1)women and feminists = women; (2) blacks = blacks; (3) elderly = elderly; (4) poor, labor unions, and workingmen and workingwomen = poor/working class; (5) middle class people = middle class; (6) businessmen/women, and farmers = specific occupations; (7) young people, and evangelicals = family/friends; (8) hispanics = minorities; and (9) whites, men, liberals, conservatives, and southerners = other. Examples of the groups in each category for the economic group questions are as follows: (1) women, working women, mothers = women; (2) blacks, middle class blacks = blacks; (3) working class, blue collar people, people on welfare, manual workers, unemployed, labor unionists = poor/working class; (5) middle class, average people, the Silent Majority = middle class; (6) the rich, white collar people, professionals, business people, teachers, civil servants, farmers = specific occupations; (7) young people, children, young marrieds, single parents, people with families, friends, the clergy, church people = family/friends; (8) minorities (nothing specific), hispanics, indians, immigrants = minorities; (9) whites, urban dwellers, suburbanites = other.

2 The minorities category is not considered because it encompasses a variety of racial and ethnic groups, thus making it difficult to specify objective membership.

3 The other groups mentioned in the question prompt were farmers, teachers, blacks and union members.

4 Given such a distribution, in their analysis Sears and Huddy (1986a) dichotomize these social identity variables so that those saying "most of the time" constitute one category, and the remaining responses make up the second category.

5 Whether there is much variation in how actual subgroup members think of themselves is not clear. It would depend, in part, on the definition of subgroup boundaries.

6 In designing these questions, the original intent seems to have been to develop first a measure of subjective group membership. And, indeed, the questions originally proposed followed the "do you ever think of yourself" format (see Sears, Huddy, and Jessor, 1985).

7 Of course, some caution must be used in interpreting this lack of correlation given the uncertain meaning of the group closeness question itself.

8 Perhaps this is true because the question may be less ambiguous for the feminist category. Unlike the "homemaker" and "working woman" identities, the "feminist" identity is not also a role that consumes part of a woman's everyday waking hours. Alternatively, it might be that the affective measures are more related to the feminist identity because they are more closely tied to the concerns of a feminist than they are to the concerns of a homemaker, for example.

9 In these regressions, in addition to an emotion index the following variables were included: party identification, liberal-conservative identification, egalitarianism, individualism, moral traditionalism, symbolic racism, racial conflict, education, age, income, and gender. The regressions were done using only white respondents.

10 This question has been pretested on a student sample and a small sample of Chapel Hill residents. The results are quite encouraging. How much people care about a group influences issue preferences even when a variety of political and background factors are controlled.

APPENDIX A: MEASURES USED IN THE FEELING THERMOMETER REGRESSIONS

I. Feeling Thermometers

Affect toward women's movement: feeling thermometers for women's liberation movement (V5233), the women's movement (V8116), and feminists (V8121).

Affect toward the disadvantaged: feeling thermometers for the poor (V5219), people on welfare (V5228), and older people (V5222)

II. Political Measures

Party identification (V7110)--rescaled to a 0 to 1 scale
Liberal/conservative identification (V8211)--rescaled to a 0 to 1 format
Individualism--based on V8202, V8204, V8206, V8402, V8404, and V8406. Items reversed where necessary, added and rescaled to a 0 to 1 format. Coefficient alpha = .60. High scores equal high individualism.
Egalitarianism--based on V8201, V8203, V8206, V8401, V8403, V8405. Items reversed where necessary, added and rescaled to a 0 to 1 format. Coefficient alpha = .57. High scores equal high egalitarianism.
Moral traditionalism--based on V7101, V7102, V7103, V8101, V8102, V8103, V8104, V8104, and V8105. Items reversed where necessary, added and rescaled to a 0 to 1 format. Coefficient alpha = .73. High scores equal a high sense of moral traditionalism.

III. Background Measures

Education--V819
Age--V810
Race--V1202. Recoded to a dummy variable where 1=black
Gender--V1201. Recoded to a dummy variable where 1=female
Income--V1119

IV. Dependent Variables

Women-related regressions: Abortion (V803, reversed), Aidwom (V733), Spwom (V7233), Spaffirm (V7237), Spchild (V7240)
Disadvantaged-related regressions: Aidmin (V714), Serv/spend (V5819, reversed), Spfood (V5745), Spcity (V7235), Spunemp (V7238)

APPENDIX B: MEASURES USED AS CORRELATES FOR THE EMOTION INDEXES

I. Emotions Indexes

Positive Emotions: hopeful (V7511), proud (V7514), and happy (V7518) Coefficient alpha = .75

Angry/Disgusted: angry (V7510), disgusted (V7515), infuriated (V7517) bitter (V7519). Coefficient alpha = .82

Afraid/uneasy: afraid (V7512), uneasy (V7513). Coefficient alpha = .78

II. Feeling Thermometers

Blacks: blacks (V8118), black politicians (V8123), black young people (V8124), and working class blacks (V8126). Coefficient alpha =.89

Black activists: black activists (V8125), black militants (V5226, V8127) Coefficient alpha = .84

III. Basic Racial Predispositions

Symbolic Racism: V8222, V8224, V8225, V8226. Reversed where necessary, added and rescaled to a 0 to 1 format. High scores equal high symbolic racism. Coefficient alpha = .63

Racial Conflict: V8337, V8334, V8335. Reversed where necessary, added, and rescaled to a 0 to 1 format. High scores equal a high degree of perceived racial conflict. Coefficient alpha = .61.

IV. Issue Preferences

General responsibility: V714, V7106, V7231, V7311

Specific obligations: V7416-V7415, V7412-V7411, V7414-V7413

Affirmative action: V7425, V7427, V7421, V7423

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TABLE 1
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR GROUP QUESTIONS

Category	Economic Group Question	Group Closest To Question
Women	1.4%	4.8%
Blacks	2.6%	2.8%
Elderly	17.6%	8.6%
Poor/ Working Class	16.7%	25.3%
Middle Class	19.6%	17.4%
Specific Occupations	15.6%	8.7%
Family/ Friends	5.8%	7.2%
Minorities	1.9%	1.2%
Other	1.6%	7.1%
Don't Know	16.7%	2.5%
Not Asked	1.3%	15.3%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(2257)	(2257)

TABLE 2
CROSSTABULATION
OF
ECONOMIC GROUP AND GROUP CLOSEST TO

ECONOMIC GROUP

GROUP CLOSEST TO	Women	Blacks	Elderly	Poor/ Working	Middle Class	Specific Occupa- tions	Family/ Friends	Minor- ities	Other
Women	25.9%	6.1%	2.6%	3.3%	7.3%	2.9%	3.3%	2.8%	7.1%
Blacks	3.7%	36.7%	2.6%	5.2%	1.8%	.7%	1.1%	5.6%	10.7%
Elderly	0.0%	14.3%	25.5%	4.9%	2.8%	7.5%	9.8%	2.8%	14.3%
Poor/ Working	33.3%	26.5%	27.4%	41.2%	30.1%	26.1%	29.3%	33.3%	35.7%
Middle Class	18.5%	8.2%	21.6%	18.0%	32.2%	15.3%	20.7%	19.4%	14.3%
Specific Occupa- tions	3.7%	0.0%	5.8%	6.5%	8.4%	31.6%	1.1%	5.6%	3.6%
Family/ Friends	14.8%	4.1%	7.7%	6.2%	6.3%	10.1%	25.0%	2.8%	7.1%
Minor- ities	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.3%	.3%	1.6%	1.1%	25.0%	3.6%
Other	0.0%	4.1%	5.8%	12.5%	11.6%	4.2%	8.7%	2.8%	3.6%
TOTAL	99.9%*	100%	100%	100.1%*	100%	100%	100.1*	100.1%*	100%
(N)	(27)	(49)	(310)	(306)	(395)	(307)	(92)	(36)	(28)

*Does not total 100% due to rounding

TABLE 3

OBJECTIVE GROUP MEMBERSHIPS FOR SELECTED GROUPS

Group Category	Reference Variable	% Objective Group Member: Economic Group Question	% Objective Group Member: Group Closest To Question
Women	Sex	100.0% (32)	88.9% (63)
Blacks	Race (Black)	75.4% (43)	96.4% (55)
Elderly	Age (68+)	49.9% (196)	60.8% (165)
Poor/ Working Class	Income ($0-19,999)	53.9% (186)	49.8% (219)
Middle Class	Income ($20-65,000)	66.8% (263)	61.6% (181)

TABLE 4
MEAN FEELING THERMOMETER RATINGS

Group Category: Group Rated	Economic Group Members	Group Closest To Members
WOMEN:		
Women	81.4 (+6.7)	86.3 (+12.7)*
Women's Liberation Movement	68.8 (+10.0)*	68.7 (+11.8)*
BLACKS:		
Blacks	78.7 (+14.7)*	85.6 (+22.3)*
Black Militants	49.8 (+18.4)*	55.9 (+24.4)*
Civil Rights Leaders	72.5 (=18.4)*	74.6 (+21.3)*
ELDERLY:		
Older People	80.1 (+2.7)*	82.4 (+4.3)*
POOR/WORKING CLASS:		
Poor	72.1 (+2.4)*	73.3 (+2.2)*
Labor Unions	58.9 (+5.0)*	58.2 (+5.2)*
People on welfare	53.6 (+1.0)	52.7 (+.10)
MIDDLE CLASS:		
Middle class people	76.7 (+3.9)*	75.4 (+2.0)*
SPECIFIC OCCUPATIONS:		
Big Business	53.3 (+1.6)*	53.8 (+1.8)*
FAMILY/FRIENDS:		
Catholics	62.7 (-1.2)	62.3 (-1.2)
Evangelicals	45.2 (-.5)	53.5 (+8.4)*
MINORITIES:		
Hispanics	69.8 (11.2)*	84.4 (+25.5)*

Unparenthesized entries are the mean feeling thermometer ratings for group members. Parenthesiszed entries are the differences between the group means and the means for the remainder of the sample.

* = difference in means significant at the .05 level

TABLE 5
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR SOCIAL IDENTITY ITEMS

A. Age-Related Identities

Category	Older	Elderly	Older Worker	Retired
Most of the time	17.3%	5.3%	16.8%	42.5%
Some of the time	27.1%	25.6%	25.2%	11.2%
Occasionally	30.1%	24.8%	14.5%	17.2%
Never	25.6%	44.4%	44.3%	29.1%
TOTAL	100.1%[a]	100.1%[a]	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(133)	(133)	(131)	(133)

B. Gender-Related Identities

Category	Woman	Working Woman	Homemaker	Feminist
Most of the time	90.7%	62.6%	51.3%	23.7%
Some of the time	5.5%	12.3%	25.0%	19.3%
Occasionally	2.1%	5.5%	16.9%	29.8%
Never	1.7%	19.6%	6.8%	27.2%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(236)	(235)	(236)	(228)

[a] Does not equal 100.0% due to rounding

TABLE 6
CORRELATIONS AMONG SOCIAL IDENTITIES

A. Age-Related Identities

Identity	Older	Elderly	Older Worker	Retired
Older	1.00			
Elderly	.37*	1.00		
Older Worker	.14	.18*	1.00	
Retired	.27*	.26*	.06	1.00

B. Gender-Related Identities

Identity	Woman	Working Woman	Homemaker	Feminist
Woman	1.00			
Working Woman	.13*	1.00		
Homemaker	.21*	-.15*	1.00	
Feminist	.10	-.11	.05	1.00

Entries are Pearson Product-moment correlations

* = ($p \leq .05$)

TABLE 7
CORRELATIONS AMOUNG SOCIAL IDENTITY, GROUP AFFECT, AND CLOSENESS MEASURES

A. Age-Related Identities

	Older	Elderly	Older Worker	Retired
Ftold[a]	-.03	.07	.04	.06
Ftold[b]	-.07	.12	.06	.00
Close to elderly[a]	.12	.10	.07	-.02

B. Gender-Related Identities

	Woman	Working Woman	Homemaker	Feminist
Ftwomen[a]	-.04	-.16*	.14*	-.11*
Ftwomen[b]	-.05	-.02	.07	-.07
Ftwomen's lib. movement[a]	.13*	-.18*	.18*	-.35*
Ftwomen's movement[b]	.07	-.12*	.18*	-.34*
Ftfeminists[b]	-.02	-.01	.15	-.40*
Close to women[a]	.12*	.16*	.04	.03
Close to feminists[a]	.05	.16*	-.10	.26*

[a]In the 1984 Post-election survey

[b]In the 1985 Pilot Study

*=($p \leq .05$)

TABLE 8
REGRESSIONS FOR WOMEN-RELATED ISSUES

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables: Abortion	Aidwom	Spwom	Spaffirm	Spchild
I. Group Affect	-.01	-.24**	-.42**	-.20*	-.33**
II. Political Variables					
Party	.06	.04	.14	.00	.04
Ideology	.09	-.12	-.05	.21	.17
Individualism	.01	.01	-.01	.04	-.29**
Eqalitarianism	.16	-.02	-.16	-.13	-.08
Moral tradit.	.30**	.08	.01	.10	.04
III. Background Variables					
Education	-.17	.00	-.07	.10	-.03
Age	.06	.15	-.10	.01	.13
Race	.09	-.27**	-.12	-.12	-.22**
Income	-.06	.02	.01	-.02	.03
Adjusted R^2	.13	.08	.24	.20	.25

**=($p \leq .05$)

*=($p \leq .10$)

TABLE 9
REGRESSIONS FOR DISADVANTAGED-RELATED ITEMS

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables: Aidmin	Serv/Spend	Spfood	Spcity	Spunemp
I. Group Affect	-.24**	-.23**	-.35**	-.18**	-.22**
II. Political Variables					
Party	.06	.15**	.11*	.15**	.08
Ideology	-.02	.22**	.03	-.05	.12
Individualism	.03	.07	-.03	-.07	.00
Eqalitarianism	-.27**	-.03	-.18**	.01	-.04
Moral tradit.	.15**	.09	.17	.19**	.09
III. Background Variables					
Education	-.05	.02	-.05	.05	.04
Age	-.10	.11	-.12*	-.04	.02
Race	-.22**	-.05	-.16**	-.35**	-.19**
Income	-.00	.01	.04	-.12*	.06
Gender	.02	.02	-.06	-.05	-.13*
Adjusted R^2	.30	.21	.34	.19	.18

**=($p \leq .05$)

*=($p \leq .10$)

TABLE 10
CORRELATES OF THE EMOTION INDEXES

	Emotions			
	Positive	Angry/ Disgusted	Afraid/ Uneasy	Sympathetic
I. Feeling Thermometers				
Blacks	.26¥	-.07	-.17¥	.22¥
Black Activists	.13¥	-.20¥	-.12	-.02
II. Basic Racial Predispositions				
Symbolic Racism	-.29¥	.22¥	.13¥	-.25¥
Racial Conflict	-.09¥	.21¥	.17¥	-.22¥
III. Issue Preferences[a]				
General Govt. Orientation	-.16	.18	.12	-.18
Specific Obligations	-.11	.20	.17	-.19
Preferential Treatment	-.13	.12	.03	-.14

[a]Entries in this section are the average correlation for a set of specific issues.

¥ = ($p \leq .05$)