GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: Legitimation, Deprivation and Competing Values

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Nothing in 20th Century studies of political behavior predates the connecting of groups and voting. Such pre-WWI pioneers of electoral studies as Giddings, Ogburn, Peterson or Siegfried--to say nothing of the more general contribution of Bentley--all pointed the way to uncovering enduring patterns of collective political behavior based on group membership. This tradition was expanded in the interwar years and early 1940s by those who explored group-based voting in more elaborate detail, such as Rice, Tingsten, Gosnell, Titus, Ewing, Bean and Key.

Such investigations, employing mainly aggregated official voting returns, were superceded however once Lazarsfeld and his colleagues demonstrated the usefulness of the survey method for academic studies of voting. While it was not their original intention to continue to emphasize the group character of the vote, the empirical results of the Columbia studies forced these authors back to a restatement of the earlier lore--that voting decisions are in essence group decisions. The counter-emphasis upon the psychology of individual voter choice, abstractable both in theory and in research operations from group bases, was yet to be sustained.

The Voter Decides (1954) and The American Voter, (1960) represent the major break with the earlier groupist tradition. The social group, while still present in these works, was pushed into the realm of the exogenous and away from the center of investigation. Relative to the more fundamental individual attitudes of party identification, candidate images and positions on policy issues, groups operated in more restricted fashion--at a lower level of ideological con-

ceptualization, at earlier points in political socialization, or in selected membership group contexts where group political distinctiveness, for whatever reasons, still remained high. It was the individual potential voter whose actions thus came to be placed at the forefront of inquiry. And such voters can best be understood as capable not only of reflecting group influences, but also as capable of modifying such influences--or indeed, of pushing the residues of group consciousness away, perhaps into the realm of the unconscious. Such influence as groups are capable of may thus become redirected or ignored, given that groups' effects must be mediated through individual behavior. Observationally this leads to small, and perhaps mostly indirect, effects of groups on the vote. While the authors of these landmark studies did not go as far as the acute individualism of the rationalists--especially those who have drawn out the implications of the work of Downs--they did make the essential break with the dominant "group tradition" that had prevailed to that point. They no longer placed the social group at the center of electoral reality, therefore.

One could thus read the history of American voting behavior research in this century as a progressive divestment of the original stock of group-based voting theory. This divestment was attempted unsuccessfully in the Columbia BASR studies because their operationalization of "the psychology of choice" failed empirically, in The People's Choice (1944) and Voting (1954). Such a divestment was more convincingly made by the early Michigan studies, in that a new set of personal psychological realities replaced groups, or more accurately, pushed groups to the periphery of explanation. Part of what gives the Campbell, et al.'s emphasis its plausibility is that groupism was only demoted, not retired. This allows us all to sleep more easily, knowing that a half century

of scholarly effort in trying to understand electoral behavior was not totally discarded.

Furthermore, these early efforts in the NES series did not take the more radical step implicit in the work of Downs and the neo-Downsians--that of including groups only in arcane, heuristic fashion. Groups, if brought at all into such analysis, consist essentially of uneasy, transitory, Arrow-problem-promoting alliances among shifting sets of like-minded individualists. If groups are merely epiphenomenal coalitions of self-seeking egoists (each with his or her own vision of the good society), then the idea of giving an account of voting behavior in group terms becomes irrelevant, misleading and of declining marginal utility. One might even guess that what gives the latter approach both its high capacity for mathematical elegance, combined with low empirical plausibility, is its nonincorporation of the inherent messiness of political life in groups. The Michigan School, by contrast, never seriously threatened to kill off groupism in electoral studies, but merely to hold it as a permanent hostage.

If this simplified bit of intellectual history is at all accurate, then what does it say for any serious effort that might be made to use the vehicle of NES, either to take stock of what we know about group influences on voting, or to stimulate our thinking about what might be most usefully pursued in future NES reincarnations? First, such an analysis may suggest that whatever group-related variables have been included and will seem most worthy of inclusion in future are those that begin with similar theoretical assumptions to the ones contained in the seminal works. This means especially--and I would say this is borne out by a review of the items actually included on groups from 1952-1984--

that the individual psyche will remain the unavoidable conduit and battleground for attempts by groups to affect the outcome. In particular, the idea of group consciousness, as modeled mostly on political party identification (or perhaps class consciousness) becomes of greatest interest. Membership, identification, commitment, likes and dislikes and such, all filter the group through the prism of person-centered responses. Even the newer versions of this approach that apply concepts from recent and contemporary cognitivist social psychology, such as dissonance, attribution or schemata, again start with the ontological assumption of the personal meaning of groups. Indeed, another essential rock in the foundation of this approach has been a logical corollary, viz., that group influences are of greatest interest in so far as they help supplement what we can learn about voting behavior by examining the primary sets of orientations that focus upon the more overtly political objects and symbols of party, candidate and issue. A different assumption would have been that for many people a group focus is primordial, while parties, candidates, and issues are merely its symptoms. And a further assumption that is different from the original ones is that voters' responses about their own intra-psychic processes of orientation, both cognitive and affective, may incompletely and even inaccurately reflect the sway of group forces in their lives.

My own view of what needs to be done next, including the stocktaking of group-related research in the NES surveys, is that we should be first become more self-conscious about what <u>theoretical</u> direction has been taken. I would not suggest that what I perceive to be the main drift of these studies is irrelevant to the main task of giving a more satisfactory account of voting behavior. Instead, I would guess that the most frequent past effort to capture group influence,

via various operationalizations of group consciousness, is quite helpful, but nonetheless too limited in scope to accomplish our explanatory purposes with complete satisfaction.

This is likely to remain true even when the cognitive aspects of such group consciousness are probed more deeply--as through schema theory, information-processing theory, or other advances in the conceptualization of how we think in social contexts. As Lau and Sears observe in Political Cognition (p. 8): "To be of significant value, this political cognition approach, if it is to be called that, must ultimately prove to illuminate still larger questions of political life, such as why and how reigning authorities are replaced, why people do or do not comply with the wishes of authorities, what allows democratic systems to persist and accommodate to the wishes of the public, and so on."

In the spirit of that observation, applied to the question of group electoral influences, I would suggest that group consciousness is merely a necessary condition for groups to exert their power on individual voter decision-making, but not a sufficient one. I suspect that group consciousness measures, however well observed and appropriately analyzed will, if taken alone, seldom show robust relationships with voting. To reveal more accurately the situations and conditions under which group consciousness variables may give us significant insights into people's electoral lives requires an analysis of both the facilitating and the limiting forces that affect, or define, sufficiency of group influence. What kinds of variables do I have in mind?

Three that I want to pursue here may serve as illustrative of such sufficiency variables:

1. The legitimacy of group political action.

As the authors of The American Voter point out, using the 1956 NES data, "However strong the group identification, and however firm the association between groups and political objects, the member may resist the intrusion of 'non-political' groups upon the political scene. There are cultural values bound up with beliefs about democracy and the individual that inveigh against such activity. The sophisticated view of democracy as a competition between interest groups does not have great popular currency. Voting, whether at the mass or the legislative level, is morally a matter of individual judgment and conscience; recognition of group obligation and interests is thoroughly taboo to some Americans." (p. 321)

Unfortunately, this very suggestive beginning ended with the 1956 data. This was despite the quite surprising finding "that the legitimacy responses bear a considerable relationship to presidential vote even after the effects of group identification are taken into account." (Ibid.) When we examine closely this striking empirical result of what was measured rather briefly in 1956, and the attendant discussion of it in The American Voter (pp. 321-323), we are likely to be puzzled about the course of subsequent group-related electoral research. Here is one of those serendipitous and important substantive results that has high potential for future research--in this case because it apparently links a group focus both to the average person's voting behavior and to his or her implicit theory of democracy. Yet this illuminating beginning never got beyond these three pages and some marginals in the 1956 NES codebook.

In the present paper, I want to begin to explore this intriguing topic in greater detail, looking first at the broader question of just how wide-

spread are these "cultural values bound up with beliefs about democracy and the individual." For this attempt to unpack the sacred text, one is limited in trying to use the NES surveys, given that only a little of such content was ever included there--mostly in 1956 and 1972. Thus, I turn to five surveys that I have conducted in Wisconsin--in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, and 1984--for much of this analysis. I focus in this part of the paper upon previously unreported evidence pertaining to the public's view of the role of ostensibly non-political, especially political interest, groups in politics. How extensive is the average person's support for the idea that groups, including her or his own, ought to be able to operate freely to influence elections or legislation? These are fundamental value assumptions that govern whether group identifications or wider group consciousness has political relevance, as in elections.

2. Another aspect of whether people regard non-political groups as important objects of attention in electoral circumstances has to do with <u>cross-group comparisons</u>. One of the things that probably contributes most to believing that group action in elections is legitimate is perceiving a potential threat, or at least a situation of possible (or actual) relative disadvantage for one's own kind in comparison with people of other kinds. The attempt to overcome perceived relative policy, leadership, or institutional disadvantages of one's own kind in relation to other groups should make group action seem highly legitimate, and therefore politically pertinent.

There are no doubt some important asymmetries here, however. Group action to achieve a better share of the things valued by society may be a

stronger motivation, and thus a more profoundly legitimating reason for action, than is simply the protection of that which has already been achieved. Thus, for any pair of "non-political" groups that oppose each other politically, including in elections, members of the less advantaged groups are more likely to regard group political action as important than do members of their opposite (advantaged) groups. Thus, more jargonistically, a sense of fraternal power deprivation should be greater among blacks (relative to whites), women (relative to men), the poor (relative to the non-poor), unions (relative to business), etc. The belief in the rightful use of group rather than of merely individual resources to promote such claims should therefore also be stronger among such groups. Furthermore, concepts such as group cohesion, polarization, distinctiveness, system-blame and the like are all useful accompaniments of this set of essential relationships. The latter have to do with helping to define the nature of social comparisons that lead to some groups having greater political relevance for their members than do others. Legitimacy and relative deprivation are thus of primary theoretical interest, both individually and in combination.

3. To make such social group comparisons in politically relevant contexts, and to regard group political action as legitimate still leaves open the question of <u>alternative standards of comparison and action</u>. What may be undermining the willingness of some members of society to become or remain strongly group-focused in politics is some set of anti-group values. Dominant groups especially may be composed of people who espouse primarily either norms of individualism in politics, or else those of majoritarianism. Groupism (or its political variant, pluralism) is inexorably caught between

societal values that emphasize either the greatest good being that of the individual or else of the whole society ("the general, national or public interest"). Many people in the United States may thus refuse to recognize the relevance of political reference groups for their own behavior because competing values are more salient to them. And the sense of membership that they have in politically-active groups is likely to remain thus especially weak. They are hardly able to see the relevance of group activity on their behalf, or accord such activity legitimacy, as, for example, in the era of the "Me Generation." This tendency toward strong individualism (and/or majoritarianism) may indeed have become expanded in recent years, even to those who in "objective" terms might still be well served by more vigorous group political action on their behalf.

What I am suggesting, therefore, is that there are some important, but largely unresearched facilitating conditions for making group consciousness politically relevant. But there may be some limiting conditions as well. The latter have to do especially with constellations of values that emphasize individual responsibility, or the general interests of society, and thus stand in opposition to group-enhancing values. To look at these sufficiency conditions in closer detail, I focus here upon evidence of a variety of kinds, including not simply the relatively few NES questions of relevance, but also my own statewide Wisconsin surveys, plus anything else that I have been able to find to shed some light on these matters.

The empirical analysis will begin with a brief consideration of the cognitive limits on group political awareness. I address the question, to what extent do the American people conceptualize clearly the role of groups in poli-

tics? Secondly, if they know about these things, what are their evaluations of group process politics? What kinds of roles do they want groups to play in American democracy, if any? And, in this connection, are we able to detect any cross currents among the "cultural values bound up with beliefs about democracy and the individual"? Third, do people make politically-relevant cross-group comparisons; and if so, do such comparisons dispose them to regard group politics as important and necessary, or as dangerous and disappointing? What competing value systems limit the relevance of such comparisons, or limit legitimation of group process politics in general? Overall, therefore, what does the distribution of public attitudes toward group politics suggest to us about the potentialities and the limits of groups' impacts upon individual voting behavior?

If we use the findings of The American Voter as our point of departure--that individuals' perceived legitimacy of group political action is a significant feature of their voting behavior--then we are led to ask first what lies behind such a finding? What causes people to feel that it is right or wrong for some group or groups with which they are affiliated to take an active role in promoting their concerns politically?

We could think of a variety of ways of approaching such a question. At a simple level--and that is all we are able to do with most of the evidence presently available--we can ask first about the extent of public awareness of the roles that groups of various kinds take in politics. How robust a cognitive image is there about these processes? The American Voter authors have suggested that "The sophisticated view of democracy as a competition between interest groups does not have great popular currency." How great is that currency, if we

look at whatever evidence there is that allows us to estimate it? If virtually no one sees politics in such terms, then it puts severe limits upon our capacity to theorize about or test how people connect a group focus to their own political behavior. Group politics would not operate at all at this level; or else it would do so in a mostly unconscious manner.

The Identity of Indiscernibles

Given the lack of an officially sanctioned institutional status, except through sporadic, limiting government regulation, political interest groups in America have generally had a low public profile. This effect is no doubt heightened by the tendencies of most interest groups to work mainly behind the scenes, as in lobbying, or indirectly, as through PAC contributions to election campaigns. In addition, what little has emerged from political socialization research on these matters suggests that most Americans grow up with a very dim awareness of interest group competition in public policy-making, given the rather limited contexts in which such content is provided (Litt, 1963; Sears, 1975). It should not surprise us to find a less than full-fledged public image of group politics therefore among our respondents.

The first important cognitive boundary that needs to be crossed is that of connecting groups that are apparently non-political in origin or major foci of activity to some form of political representation. A sophisticated observer could, of course, do much more than simply make such a political connection. She or he would be able to tell us which groups do what--which pursue certain kinds of policies, which lean to one political party rather than another, which are more conservative or more liberal, which line up together on certain kinds of issues but apart on others, which tactics are typically used in pursuit of

their goals by such groups, and the like. This greater awareness may come through the establishment of symbolic schemata that help sort out clusters of organizations or other symbolizers of the nature of group political competition (Conover, 1984, 1985; Conover and Feldman, 1984a, 1984b) or through first establishing whom one likes and dislikes among such groups. The latter may provide the necessary set of cognitive referents (Brady and Sniderman, 1985,) when reacting to groups relative to one's electoral decisions.

However arrived at, the group-aware average voter may still experience considerable psychic discomfort if pressed to give any full account of what all the connections are among various competing or cooperating groups, the issues, the parties, liberal/conservative ideology, group symbols, the political modus operandi of particular groups, and his or her own situation of decision or affiliation. There is also the problem of what kind of vision voters may have of the wider context of group politics. Do they regard such matters as an important, indeed unavoidable, aspect of American politics or not? What might one use to test the latter kind of awareness?

Some evidence that seems to have relevance to the questions of extent of group politics awareness is as follows:

1. Various commercial polls conducted from 1949 through 1969 (Table A, Appendix) suggest that only about half of adult Americans are able to define correctly what a lobbyist is. Gallup, in two polls in 1949, found 49% to be correct, 7% vague, and 44% wrong in their attempts to define a lobbyist. The Minnesota Poll found about the same thing in 1951: 45% correct, 7% vague, and 48% wrong. In 1959, such general public awareness seemed a little lower, according to a Minnesota Poll

that showed 31% correct, 17% vague and 52% wrong. But an Iowa Poll found that among its respondents in 1969 that 51% were correct, 46% were vague, and 3% were wrong. Given the obvious differences in sample, timing and wording of these measurements, one cannot attach too great a significance to precise comparisons among them. But one comes away from these observations with a sense that only about half of the population of adults is able to cross an important cognitive threshold--that of being able to give a minimally correct account of the political role of groups.

2. Furthermore, even when people are given a definition, they are not in the aggregate highly aware of, or attentive to, political interest group activity. I asked this question in Wisconsin in 1970 (see Table B, Appendix, for a fuller description): "As you probably know, there are a number of groups besides political parties that try to let people in the government know about the views and desires of their members. These organized groups--or special interest groups, as they are often called--put forward the wishes of people like businessmen, farmers, labor unions, teachers, or others with common interests. Which groups of this kind--if any--have you paid particular attention to?" What I found was that more than half (53%) had not paid attention to such groups. The interest-group-attentive public is thus on this measure, as for those of above, less than half of the whole.
3. Another more indirect possibility for measurement is assumed in questions about whether people say that the groups they belong to take some active role in politics. There is at least an implicit recogni-

tion of this wider role in such questions. Since the early study of Woodward and Roper (1950), a variety of data of this kind has appeared from time to time. This goes beyond merely saying that certain proportions of the public belong to groups that you or I may know engage in political activity, such politicization may be by no means as apparent to many members of, or identifiers with, such groups and organizations. What these studies generally show is that a much smaller fraction of the general public combines membership and awareness of group political activity. This percentage varies from time to time and from survey to survey; but is generally in the range of one quarter or less of the whole public.

Almond and Verba found, in comparative context, that Americans are relatively high in perceiving that some organization they are members of involves itself in politics. They found that 24% of Americans, 19% of the British, 18% of Germans, 6% of Italians and 11% of Mexicans did so. My 1970 Wisconsin survey asked, "Do you belong to an organization that sometimes takes a stand on public issues, either at the local, state or national level? In answer, 24% said they did. Thus, on this measure, the fraction of the American population who combine membership and group political awareness is about a quarter, as is also indicated by other studies such as that of Almond and Verba.

4. A fourth test of political interest group awareness is the extent of perceived power and impact of such groups. In 1974 in Wisconsin, I asked respondents to rate how powerful they thought "various branches of government and institutions of the American political system" were on a seven-point scale, ranging from "not powerful at all " (1) to "extremely

point scale, ranging from "not powerful at all " (1) to "extremely powerful" (7). The organized interest groups (see Table C, Appendix) were seen to be only slightly less powerful on average than were political parties and elections (interest groups, $\bar{X}$ = 5.0; parties $\bar{X}$ = 5.1; and elections, $\bar{X}$ = 5.1), but less powerful than the Supreme Court, $\bar{X}$ = 5.8, Office of the President, $\bar{X}$ = 5.7. Congress, $\bar{X}$ = 5.4; and slightly more powerful than Federal Administrative Agencies, $\bar{X}$ = 4.9. Thus, by placing interest groups near the bottom of this line-up, the general public is clearly not assigning the kind of political primacy to groups that Arthur Bentley did (1908).

In a similar vein, I asked Wisconsin respondents in 1970 to rate which one of several parts of the political system, including organized interest groups, "does the most important things in deciding how (1) 'Americans' and (2) 'people in Wisconsin' are going to live?" Of the six institutions compared for "Americans", parties and interest groups each drew 7% of the first choices, while all of the others did better (elections, 18%; Supreme Court, 10%; President, 16% and Congress, 34%). For "people in Wisconsin", the ordering was: State Legislature, 45%; elections, 18%; Governor, 16%; organized interest groups, 7%; parties, 5% and State Supreme Court, 4%. (see Table D, Appendix). Interest groups are again not the highest in perceived power, although they do a little better in a relative sense in the state-level comparisons. They do at least as well as that other instrument of pluralist representation, the political party, moreover; but not as well as elections in terms of first choices. While their influence is not perceived to be anything close to as great as Bentley [or even Truman, (1951)] believed, they are nonetheless not entirely negligible in the public's per-

So far, we can say that the evidence tends to support The American Voter observation that "the sophisticated view of democracy as a competition between interest groups does not have great popular currency." In a gross sense, probably around half of the general population crosses a straightforward cognitive threshold of substantial awareness of the group political process. A half are substantially aware in the sense of being able to define lobbying, or who pay attention to interest group activity. But only about a quarter belong to organizations that they connect to such activity. This is not to say that more people than this, when given a fuller set of contextual cues about the attributes or relative status of such groups, are unable to make such influence comparisons. And when such comparisons are made, one finds relatively few true Bentleyans--i.e., those who regard interest group competition as the overriding force in American politics, or more strongly, that groups are the basis of all political life. Interest groups are perceived rather more as middling to low in such terms. Thus, their popular visibility as a set of primary political actors is relatively modest. This may suggest that there are some limits on how much aggregate relevance a group politics focus may have. While this lack of universal salience of the interest group concept is by no means a total barrier to the average person's having relevant feelings and behavioral manifestations of group forces, it makes our task of investigating group-based behavior a more challenging one. We need to keep in mind that by no means everyone has group politics at the forefront of his or her thinking.

Ambivalent Legitimation

If the average American's opinions of groups that are active politically depended solely upon press accounts of interest group politics, then opinion

should probably be expected to be negative. The journalistic themes of undue influence, pressure tactics, unequal access and lobbying's undermining the will of the majority are all too common for us to ignore (Sabato, 1985, p. 162). Such negativism in press treatment of group politics is in principle a quite testable proposition. Unfortunately, no systematic evidence has thus far been presented that allows us to check these impressions. What we are able to examine are public opinion data of various kinds that indicate that public reception is not simply negative, but something more complex. Let us review some of this evidence, after first making clear what we are looking for.

In general three kinds of questions about the extent of legitimacy of group politics probably deserve an answer. Most generally, we want to know whether people in this society regard such activity as a legitimate part of a democratic system. Such legitimation means that members of the American political system are willing to recognize a proper role of political competition among organized groups, including those not originally or exclusively organized for political purposes. Several kinds of abstract norms feed into such a consideration of institutional status. In particular, the right of association, or assembly, and the right of free expression seem natural value bases of group action in a liberal democracy (Dahl, 1971, p. 3). There is thus the right of people who find themselves in the minority on public questions to organize for more effective representation of their point of view, including overt dissent from the policies and leadership of government. Thus, we expect people in a free society to extend the meaning of what is rightful political action to groups or organizations that serve to aggregate and articulate their political points of view.

Such abstract endorsement of group politics needs to be matched, however, by support for the rights of dissenter groups in an immediate, practical sense

for such legitimation to have full meaning. We know from a long string of studies of political tolerance in the United States that the abstract or normative level of democratic values may be quite different from the applications people are willing to make in the here and now. (Prothro and Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1982; Zellman and Sears, 1971; McClosky and Brill, 1983).

The second variety of legitimation of group politics thus follows from this possible discrepancy. Is there wide acceptance of the idea of letting other, possibly unfriendly, groups or representatives participate equally in the process of affecting political outcomes? Are there indeed groups that many survey respondents would feel should be excluded from full participation? People could conceivably be in favor of interest group politics so long as certain limits, such as exclusion of extreme, marginal or deviant groups, are observed.

A different form of delegitimation would pertain to those instances where people deny the right, or the relevance, of participation in the group competitive process to groups with which they are themselves affiliated. This is in an important sense the most severe form of limitation on legitimating group politics. Resistance to a more active, group-focused political role could be supported perhaps by a value system of political abstinence. Religious organizations that have resisted the politicizing efforts of the Moral Majority would be a contemporary example. And some groups that do not necessarily have doctrinal objections to interventionist activity may nonetheless believe that such activity is futile or self-defeating. The latter might be grounded in a fear of contamination by what is perceived as an unwholesome political process, in a sense that their own members lack politically relevant commitment, expertise,

and organization, or in the fear of awakening heretofore politically quiescent sources of political opposition to their goals. This may all seem irrational to someone who conceives that politics is unavoidable in the pursuit of one's wants, and that group power is the key to success in politics. But not everyone need share that view.

Now the data that I have been able to accumulate, or which exist in surveys such as those conducted by NES, give us only preliminary and fragmentary answers to this range of questions. If we start with the case of those who reject the idea that their own groups ought to be politically active, then we should first review the 1956 NES data. What was asked is whether or not the respondent thought that his or her membership group (in particular, people in labor unions or in farm organizations, or Negroes, Catholics and Jews) should try to get Congress to pass laws that the respondent's group is interested in, and whether the respondent's group ought to try to help certain candidates get elected.

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

These NES data show that the level of acceptability of political activity by groups that respondents identify with varies both by group and by type of political activity. Blacks (at that stage in history), with about 80% in favor, were those most willing to assert the rightness of group action on their behalf, whether through lobbying or by helping candidates win election. Catholics and unionists, by contrast, had less than half of their identifiers showing approval of such activities. This is perhaps especially surprising in the case of unions, given their long history of political activity of these two types. That their members fail to accord full legitimacy to such activities -- or at least

as full legitimacy as is the case for blacks -- suggests an important reason for the difficulty that union leaders have had for some time in rallying their troops for electoral battles. The nearly even party split of union members in the 1980 election was simply a recent manifestation of such rank and file resistance. The high solidarity of blacks on the other hand in support of Democratic candidates in recent elections reflects not simply agreement on which party is best for blacks but a much stronger collective commitment to use group power to influence political outcomes favorably. These differences were apparent even in the 1950s. The same differential causal forces apparently hold in the 1980s, if only more sharply.

Lying behind such group differences in the legitimacy of political action are no doubt some wider values that confirm or undermine such particularized commitments. What is the more general culture saying about the role of groups in politics that provides a foundation for such divergent senses of appropriateness of interest group activity? This is an area for which the literature of political science has so far provided virtually no direct treatment. It is not that no one has ever recognized the existence of the problem. We indeed find in such early pioneering work on legislative behavior as by the authors of The Legislative System that there has been some recognition of the relevance of norms relating to interest group activity -- at least among American state legislators (Wahlke, Buchanan, Eulau and Ferguson, 1960). What such data suggest is that some elites, probably legislative elites in particular, take such activity for granted and thus as legitimate (Also see Wahlke, et al. 1962; Zeigler and Baer, 1969; and Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963). This may not be true for other elites, however. Resistance to group politics conflict may be much

greater among bureaucrats, particularly those of the ideological center and right (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981: pp. 150-153; 176-178).

Despite there being thus a few scattered clues about elite receptiveness to interest group activity, there is virtually nothing that tells us empirically about wider societal norms. One searches in vain, for example, through the dozens of works on the politics of interest groups for any empirical examination of the cultural status of group politics. Most of what is discussed there is typically confined to a few brief remarks on what Madison or Tocqueville might have said about this some time ago (eg., Schlozman and Tierney, 1986, pp. 2-3: or Ornstein and Elder, 1978, pp. 9-10).

The little that has appeared recently on the ambivalent state of public reception of political action committees is perhaps a step in the right direction (see especially, Sabato, 1985; Sorauf, 1984; Sethi and Namiki, 1983, and Anagnoson and Deaton, 1986). The findings of these recent studies suggest that the general public is either somewhat negative -- i.e., as manifested in "the public backlash against PACs" -- or else ambivalent -- i.e., that the public has a "love-hate relationship with PACs". It also turns out that public approval of PACs depends on whose PAC we are talking about. A majority, for example, believe that women's PACs and environmental PACs are good influences in political campaigns (and on government); whereas only smallish minorities believe that conservative PACs, labor union PACs or big company PACs are a good influence (Sabato, 1985, p. 163). What we do not know from these emerging studies of the public's opinion of PACs is what wider themes may lie behind such mixed judgments. I mean here not simply differences in public preferences that apply to the evaluations of particular groups, or to categories of groups, but broader public sentiment about the political role of groups per se.

My own highly provisional efforts to develop some indicators of public support or disapproval of the role of interest groups in politics began with a series of questions used primarily in Wisconsin in 1970 and 1974, with some extensions of these questions in state-wide surveys that were conducted in 1972, 1976 and 1984. The first battery of such general items, administered in 1970, are shown in terms of how they interrelate in Table 2. Their distributions are presented in Table 3. Table 2 shows in particular a summary of a principal components analysis of twelve agree/disagree questions used to measure general reactions to group politics.

[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

These questions represented an attempt to move the respondent's attention away from images of particular groups, or clusters of groups, and to focus instead on the whole system of interest group representation. Not everyone felt comfortable with this task. Indeed, a full quarter of the sample was not includable in this analysis.

Two different dimensions of public sentiment had been assumed. One was what I thought might be a normative endorsement or rejection of the role of interest groups in a democratic society. The other was focused more on the practical level of organized groups' performance as a representational institution. The operationalization made use of the kinds of issues raised in the usual interest groups literature, viz., the possible conflict between the general public's interest (or majority will) and various minorities' demands, the unequal capacity for influence through group politics of certain "big interests" such as labor unions or business corporations, the somewhat ambiguous

role of lobbyists, together with allegations of interest-group corruption of officials, and the like.

What this dimensional analysis revealed however was not two dimensions of public orientation, but three. There indeed did appear a relatively positive form of orientation toward political interest groups which pertained mostly to their general role in a pluralist system of representative democracy (Factor I). Because perhaps of their agreement with abstract norms of freedom of association and of expression, most people carry over such value legitimacy to an institution (or set of organizations) that in theory embodies these freedoms.

This abstract positive role contrasts however with other types of sentiments. One of these is a negative public response to what are perceived as too many special advantages that accrue to politically active groups. This more practical, perceptual, performance dimension (Factor II) contrasts with the more positive, abstract statements encompassed by the first dimension.

The third dimension pertains not so much to unequal effects as to the feature of interest groups that either contributes to efficiency in government, by providing needed information on the potential impact of policies, or else the lowering of efficiency by raising the level of political conflict.

[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Table 3 shows that public sentiment about the role of political interest groups is mixed. About a quarter of the whole sample is unable to make these assessments. But for those who are able to offer opinions, the Factor I items suggest a relatively favorable public reception. More agree than disagree for every one of these items (Table 3, part 1). Such supportive sentiment varies

from 46% in favor on item 10 to a high of 65% on item 5. Thus, while generally favorable, there is nonetheless some admixture of dissent.

By contrast, strong criticisms of the interest group role seem indicated in the Factor II cluster of items. While such negative sentiment is not overwhelming (see item 6, for example), there is clearly more manifest hostility when we focus on the possibility that interest group competition produces unequal outcomes or access. Thus, the weight of opinion runs mostly opposite to that of the Factor I item responses.

Factor III complicates our picture even more, because the item responses suggest public reluctance to reform or remove this system; yet there is a recognition that it is not conflict-free. We have thus additional evidence that the general public contains cross currents of feeling about the place of political interest groups in the American system. At the level of abstract norms of democracy that pertain to interest group representation, we see here, as for other related areas such as political tolerance, relatively high positive agreement. But as has been found for tolerance of dissenter groups, the idea that some groups are attaining disproportionate influence through the political process dampens public enthusiasm as we move to a more practical level. And opinion is mixed again when we look at the group process in terms of government efficiency. Despite some substantial perception of unneeded conflict, opinion is weighted against substantial change in the way this system operates. What Sabato observes about public opinion with respect to PACs may indeed have therefore more general application:

"In sum then, the public may simply be reflecting the bad press PACs have received when they condemn PACs generically. In truth, people's evaluation of

political action committees varies dramatically from group to group; and their own actions in joining and contributing to organizations sponsoring PACs suggest that the electorate's attitude toward PACs is far more ambivalent than the popular polls have frequently led us to believe." (1985, pp. 163-164).

What the 1970 Wisconsin data seem to reveal is that more general assessments of interest group activity conform to such a characterization. Such lack of a single direction of mass opinion may reflect both the complexity of people's experiences with political groups as well as echoes of the deeper debate, waged mostly in the press and academic circles, about the proper role and limits of this aspect of pluralist democracy.

Cross-Group Comparisons

To say that emotion is mixed is but a starting point for giving an account of the role of group processes in the average person's theory of democracy and in his or her experiences relevant to personal political behavior. We need to track this public ambivalence both in terms of possible antecedents and likely consequences. Something that could give us possible insight into this complex state is how people interpret actual or imagined contests among groups. Which groups become the foci of people's needs, demands or symbolic expressions of value, if any do? Which groups represent the enemy -- the ones who threaten to take more than their rightful share of the political pie -- if indeed groups are perceived at all in such terms? One suspects that a major motivation for favoring one's own groups' taking an active role in lobbying or electioneering is that there is a perception of potential disadvantage -- or what some theorists label as the potential for relative deprivation (eg., Gurr, 1970; Crosby, 1982).

If people believe that there should be the opportunity for nongovernmental groups to make themselves heard in policy making, or in the choices of officials, they may do so in part on self-interested grounds -- that of avoiding being taken advantage of by better organized opposing interests. Their experience, on the other hand, in having their own demands represented in politics may be quite mixed. They may come to see that their own demands are often effectively countered by those of other people. Of they may perceive that the whole process of representational brokering of competing demands leads more often than not to their own goals being compromised. While they thus agree in principle with abstract values of group process pluralism, and even perhaps covet the opportunity to protect their interests, they may nonetheless feel uneasy about probable outcomes. How does the average person perceive that group political competition works out in practice?

What my own data seem to suggest is that the perception that other groups do better politically is a very common one. Not only is there overwhelming consensus that one's own kind gets the short end of the stick, but that this result is an illegitimate one! Table 4 presents some data from four Wisconsin surveys on this point.

[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

We find that there is a relatively constant high level of public perception that other people's groups do better politically. More than 80% of the whole sample in every case believe that other groups have more influence. The evaluation most commonly joined to this perception of relative power deprivation is a negative one. Over this small time series a slightly increasing majority

regards this result as wrong (51% in 1972; 59% in 1984). Obviously, one should not make too much of small differences on what are admittedly imperfect instruments of measurement. Thus, we don't know whether collective resentment about relative group advantages in influence--apparently high to begin with--is actually increasing or not. But such group focused resentment is certainly not on the wane!

Our hypothesis therefore is that what may lie behind the findings shown earlier on general public sentiment about the actual performance of interest group politics--that leads to a modification of one's faith in group process pluralism -- is the perceived experience that one's own kind may have had. In this case, a relatively negative evaluation comes out of such experience. These kinds of collective judgement--shown with these few data points--seem to be relatively independent of the ups and downs of policy or who is at the focus of national leadership. The strong earlier sense of relative fraternal power deprivation remains unmoved by having a popular president in office in 1984, for example.

If people are asked to volunteer their responses about which groups have such an unjust degree of political influence, then the wealthy, big business and labor unions are those most often targeted.

[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Table 5 presents the distributions in 1974 and 1976 on a follow-up question to what was asked about relative power deprivation in Wisconsin (Table 4). Aside from these leading representatives of capitalism in America (wealthy people, big business and labor unions), and the more general category of lobbyists and

interest groups, politicians also come into focus here for at least some noteworthy public antipathy. There may be some assumption on the part of average persons that politicians constitute simply another category of self-seeking influentials -- equivalent in these terms to any other group of people with demands that compete with one's own.

This set of findings about who is perceived to be too influential is reinforced by the more closed-ended questions and the more extensive list of "groups" used in the 1972 and 1974 NES surveys What was asked there was:

"Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while other people feel that certain groups don't have as much influence as they deserve. On this card are three statements about how how much influence a group might have ['too much influence', 'just the right amount of influence' 'too little influence',]. For each group I read to you, just tell me the number of the statement that best says how you feel."

[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

The category of "wealthy people" was not included in these measures. But "big business", "politicians" and "labor unions" were all judged to have overweening influence by each of these national samples taken collectively. There is a sharp degree of differentiation in public consciousness between these overly influential categories of persons and those who have too little influence. Near consensual levels agree that "poor people" and "old people" have too little influence, in stark contrast to the near-consensus for "too much influence" perceptions of business and politicians. (For more detailed analysis of the feelings of hostility toward business, labor and political leaders, see Lipset and Schneider, 1983). The 1972 and 1974 NES evidence suggests both a high degree of cognitive differentiation in the general public about the relative placement of various groups in the pecking order of political influence;

but it also says something important about the perceived nature of group competition. This is, simply put, that political competition among groups is unequal.

If those groups perceived to be dominant had maintained only modest advantages over those not so well placed, then public perceptions of group politics would not be a serious contributor to a rising sense of political inefficacy or mistrust. But if the "big" influencers have continued to gain in public perceptions of their power, then one would suspect that group-referenced efficacy and trust items would show corresponding increases in negativity. This assumes, of course, that most people do not identify themselves with big business, politicians or labor unions. (In population frequency terms, all of these are relatively small groups--even organized labor, which is probably less than a fifth of these employed, and thus an even smaller percentage of all adults in the United States).

For the political trust item that makes the most direct reference to group politics (i.e., to "big interests") in the NES series, one does find evidence of increasing group-focused cynicism over most of the past twenty years. Of course, one is always hard-pressed to interpret precisely what these political trust items are about, from the respondent's point of view (Miller, 1974; Citrin, 1974; and Abramson, 1983). But the question about whether "the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people" comes as close to our concerns here as do any of the standard items from the NES efficacy or trust series. The well-known time series observations on this item show that there was a quite remarkable reversal of public opinion from 1964 to 1980. What became predomi-

na nt (more than 2 to 1) was the perception of overweening "big interests" in fluence on government.

[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

Were this item a purer indicator of the public's approval of interest group politics, one could conclude that the counterweight of negative public perception has grown heavier, relative to whatever positive sentiment about the role of organized groups there might be--sentiment that stems perhaps from endorsement of abstract democratic norms of relevance. Let us turn next to the level of these norms, to consider at least briefly some possible alternatives to pluralist politics in the average person's thinking about politics.

Counter Norms

As was indicated earlier, the system of values that sustains group process politics as a legitimate form of activity may be offset by important counter values in American society. One of these is what a great deal of the critical attention in works on "pressure group politics" has been concerned about, viz., the possibility that group-based minorities are able to subvert the will of the majority of citizens.. Majoritarianism thus assumes that "the general will" (national interest, public interest, etc.) is the preferred standard of democratic government. Anything that detracts from the expression of the majority view is therefore less desirable. Pluralist politics, at least in the form of political interest group competition, is one of the possible detractors (see, for example, Schattschneider, 1960).

At the other extreme is pure individualism. This set of values puts its primary faith in the unfettered capacities and rights of individual persons.

This says that so long as individuals are allowed to pursue their own interests in a way that does not infringe upon the rights of others, then good people and a good society will result. Organizing groups to compete more effectively in politics may be one way for people to pursue their own ends, but at some point the group, and even more acutely, the system of institutionalized struggle among groups over scarce resources, will submerge the needs of the individual to broader objectives. Thus pluralism may represent as much a threat as an opportunity for individuals to express their demands.

In the United States one finds considerable support (impressionistically) for the existence of these three partially competing value constellations. Pluralism is caught between the other two -- in some part overlapping both majoritarianism and individualism -- but also standing as an alternative form of interpretation of what democracy is supposed to be about. Individualism and majoritarianism thus also constitute alternative dimensions to group-focused orientations when people try to make sense of what they stand for, and as they cope with such decisions as whether to vote or whom to vote for. Given the abstract and complex character of these differing value constellations, one immediately faces difficulties in measuring them successfully in public opinion surveys. They are the kind of broad-gauged, mostly implicit assumptions that people have but are usually difficult for them to articulate. There is relatively little of direct use in the National Election Studies in connection with these alternative value systems -- especially in the studies where we might be able to connect them to group-process variables of the kind addressed to this point.

In my own surveys, I have tried in several different, but still quite preliminary ways to take account of such matters. Let me give a couple of brief

examples. One is for the realm of individualistic values. The implicit argument of Neo-Downsians and other voting theory rationalists about how we ought to treat human behavior in political contexts is that people may be assumed to act primarily on the basis of their self-interest. Indeed, this assumption is often more than simply that people will probably act this way. It is an assumption that is taken as a universal induction. In a previous report (Dennis, 1986a), I tried to operationalize this basic assumption (and also several related Downsian assumptions) in connection with a study of election turnout.

What I found in brief in that study was that such elements of individualistic beliefs and values operationalized in terms of the Downsian analysis, and to a smaller extent as derived from Fiorina's and Ferejohn's minimax-regret principle (which is equally individualistic), did show significant relationships with turnout. I refer those interested in the fact that such derivatives of individualism do show significant relationships with turnout to that work.

An important point from that investigation is not just about turnout, however. What is implied further from the earlier analysis is that not everyone can be counted on to be group-focused in such decisions. Some significant portion of the electorate may well be quite Downsian; or most of us may show Downsian tendencies some of the time. To say this however is to alert us to two things: (1) Not all voter behavior can be expected to have a group focus, especially for those true individualists among us; (2) but this is very far from saying that the basic values of all of us all of the time are essentially individualistic--as would be assumed in the usual egoistic hedonism of conventional economics. Indeed I am suggesting that, while significant, individualistic values probably emerge to affect voting behavior only for a minority of persons or of instances of behavior (see, for example, Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979).

A corollary of the latter hypothesis is that group-focused behavior in voting probably takes the bigger slice of what we are interested in. How might one demonstrate that? Consider two simple pieces of evidence. In 1972 and 1974, two questions were asked in Wisconsin, as shown in Table 8.

[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]

If we compare the marginal distributions across Parts A and B of the table, we see that the placement of individual vs. group efforts to influence government is very different. And the response strongly favors groups. There is nonetheless a smallish band of hardy individualists -- those who staunchly believe that they can do it on their own.

This general impression of a system weighted toward group action over individual action is reinforced by the responses to a question asked in the 1972 NES. The question was: "Some people feel that (the group the respondent feels closest to) should organize, work together, and bring pressure as a group in order to have influence and get the things they want. Others feel (the group the respondent feels closest to) should not organize in this way. They should work as individuals doing such things as voting, writing letters to officials and generally making their opinions known. [Interviewer hands card to respondent.] Suppose people who think (the group respondent feels closest to) should organize as a group are at one end of the scale -- at point number 1. And suppose those who feel (the group the respondent feels closest to) should work as individuals are at the other end of the scale -- at point number 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?" Table 9 presents the distribution of such self-placements.

[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]

A fifth of these respondents are found to have a preference for more individualist strategies (options 5, 6, 7); but these individualists are considerably outnumbered by those at the groupist end of the scale (53%).

Something a bit more indirect so far as measuring individualist tendencies are concerned, but which is perhaps equally suggestive of a general limit on group-oriented behavior, is, what we might term the salience of reference group behavior--or more to the point, a lack thereof. In connection with the study conducted in Wisconsin in 1972, this question was posed: "Many times when people think of how well they are doing in their lives, they compare themselves with other people. These might be certain people that they know, or groups of people they know about but haven't necessarily met. What kinds of people do you usually compare yourself with on how well you are doing in life?" Having begun with the assumption of the universality of reference group behavior (See Hyman, 1960; and Hyman and Singer, 1968), I was somewhat surprised to find that 41% of the sample did not or could not make such referenced comparisons.

If it is the case that a substantial minority of persons in American society do not see themselves in terms of reference groups or of referent others, then some of the things we believe about the relevance of groups and politics to our understanding of individual behavior may well not be true. For example, most group competition analysis assumes that people have made the necessary social comparisons and thus sense potential advantage or disadvantage that can be addressed through group action. But if many people are unable to, or refuse to, make such social comparisons in the first place -- even in the

mundane sense of assessing their own relative status -- then such a theory has a more limited sphere of application than might have been assumed. These data are hardly conclusive on such a limitation; but they suggest that we need to be careful about how much we assume for the relevance of group symbols and emotions to the whole range of the population. There may be fewer group referencers than we are wont to imagine.

Majoritarianism

Another of the great themes of democratic theory, at least since Rousseau, has been that of populistic or majoritarian primacy in government. The will of the people, or "volonté générale," has also become the main counterargument to the operation and effects of organized minorities of opinion. Dahl's interpretation of "Madisonian democracy," for example, poses this opposition of value systems quite forcefully (Dahl, 1956). If one is a strong majoritarian, as presumably was Madison, then one wants to provide governmental machinery or some other means to check the dangerous tendencies of political factions to "tyrannize over others" and to undermine "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." While majoritarians need not be so absolute in their faith in the popular will as was Rousseau or Tocqueville ("the absolute sovereignty of the majority"), they need at least for our purposes to have considerable faith in the probity of the mass public; and thus they should prefer its rule to that of compromises worked out by a series of competing minorities, factions or organized special interests.

Aristotle (if we leave aside the dimly recorded contributions of the Pre-Socratics) was the first of a long series of political philosophers to work on the problem of justifying a role in government of the vast majority of citi-

zens. Aristotle had no clear and simple preference for "rule by the many"; but he did provide some essential arguments that justify such regimes. One of these arguments very simply put is that more wisdom resides in the great mass of people taken together, than in any smaller set of people however noble and enlightened they might be (Barker translation, The Politics of Aristotle, 1958, p. 123). While Aristotle was by no means opposed to participation in governing by various groups or classes, he did put the idea rather strongly that majoritarian participation in the life of the state was a necessary ingredient (indeed, "a state with a body of disenfranchised citizens who are numerous and poor must necessarily be a state full of enemies"; Ibid., pp. 124-125).

Now despite this enlightening lead from Aristotle, or from others who have trod the same path, operationalizing majoritarianism, especially when it must be contrasted with values supporting a group focus, is not a simple task. Even if we confine ourselves to an Aristotelian version alone, and do not try to bring in more absolutist versions such as those of Rousseau or Tocqueville, the task is complex and daunting.

Despite there being a few promising items, such as Question C8 in the 1972 NES Post-Election Study ("In general, do you feel that more issues should be decided at the polls?"), there has never been a serious enough effort made in this area to conduct a full-fledged analysis of majoritarian values. Thus, in 1984, I made a first try to develop some questions that would measure majoritarianism, in a dimensional analysis sense, to provide an operational window for seeing just how widely majoritarian sentiment is shared within a large normal population of Americans. I also had in mind to ask this in such a way that measures of pluralistic orientations, both those that apply to interest groups

and to political parties, could be contrasted with these majoritarianism questions.

[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]

Table 10 presents the distribution of opinion on four questions designed to tap majoritarian sentiment. These items clustered together over a number of factor analyses quite well. A typical pattern of rotated factor loadings for these four items was: #1: .68; #2: .64; #3: .62; and #4: .44.

The distributions of response on these questions suggest less than unbridled enthusiasm for how well majority rule has worked. The first item indeed is the only one with a majority on the positive end (52% "very well" and "quite well"). But there is by no means a flat rejection of the Aristotelian position either. The majority has a somewhat mixed perception of majority performance, therefore.

Now this set of items, when scored together, turns out to be quite independent of my measures of individualism (in the Downsian, et al. mode) and of pluralism (which includes both the normative role and special privileges dimensions of interest group orientations, as well as a measure of support for the party system (For explication of the latter, see Dennis, 1966, 1975, 1980, 1986b). In a Pearson r sense, these interrelationships look like this:

[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE]

Factor analyses (not shown) of the 1984 Wisconsin data for items dealing with these areas of value orientation show their relative independence from each other. Interest group pluralism indexes correlate only about .05 with indexes

of majoritarianism and of individualism; and the two latter are correlated with each other about .20. Interest group pluralism and political party pluralism correlate slightly higher with each other (r = .24), as one might expect.

The individualism index that I focus upon hereafter is composed of these four items:

a. "Have you ever felt that there was something you personally might gain by voting in an election?" (yes, 46%; no, 51%; DK/NA, 3%)

b. "Have you ever felt that there was something you personally might lose by not voting in an election?" (yes, 57%; no, 40%; DK/NA, 4%)

c. "For an election such as the one coming up in November, how hard do you try to weigh the likely costs or benefits to you personally from voting or not voting: (1) extremely hard, (2) fairly hard, (3) not very hard, or (4) not at all"? ((1) 22%; (2) 32%; (3) 24%; (4) 17%; DK/NA, 5%)

d. "In elections such as the one this November, how hard do you try to compare how well the people in office have done in meeting your needs and concerns versus how well the other side's candidates would do if they were in office? Do you usually try (1) extremely hard, (2) fairly hard, (3) not very hard, or (4) not at all to make such comparisons before deciding how to vote?" ((1) 27%; (2) 53%; (3) 14%; (4) 4%; DK/NA 2%)

Interest Group Pluralism and the Predictors of Turnout

The political interest group pluralism index is composed of four items scored together. These are items 1, 2, 4 and 11 shown in Table 2, when used again in 1984. Are we able to gain any additional insights into the phenomenon of voting by taking into account these wider systems of value -- at least as operationalized somewhat restrictively in the manner outlined above? Let us focus here upon turnout, given that the 1984 Wisconsin study was designed mostly with that side of the problem of voter behavior in mind.

What I have done as an initial step in considering some possible effects of interest group pluralism, as well as of majoritarianism and of individualism, is to compute turnout prediction equations within subgroups, where these value

system variables are first used to partition the sample. What we are trying to see here is whether the configuration of predictor coefficients changes markedly once we introduce these controls. Let us first take a three-way partition by high, medium and low interest group pluralism.

In an earlier report (Dennis 1986a), I outlined the relative effects of three different conceptual approaches to the study of turnout behavior. In brief, these approaches were alienationist, rationalist, and demographic. Alienationist measures that proved most successful in predicting turnout in Wisconsin were essentially The American Voter political involvement measures, or elaborations and improvements thereupon. The rationalist variables that showed greatest power to predict turnout were those surrounding the idea of rational abstention, as derived from the work of Downs (1957). Demographic variables included the kinds of turnout-related social attributes discussed, for example, by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) -- particularly age, education and income. I had found in Wisconsin in 1984 that age in particular seemed to be strongly related to turnout behavior.

To simplify our analysis below, I have used a single multiple regression equation with six predictor va iables -- citizen duty to vote, political efficacy, intensity of partisan attachment, electoral alienation, rational abstention, and age. This is in essence an "improved" version of The American Voter model, therefore. For these equations, electoral alienation combines interest in the election and concern for the outcome (reversed). Rational abstention combines both high cost and low return aspects. Partisan intensity is simply the folded-over, or four-point scale version of the traditional SRC/CPS political party identification index. My measures of political efficacy and of citi-

zen duty to vote are fairly close to the original versions (See Dennis, 1986a, for further measurement details).

What I present below are the regression equations that apply to various subpopulations represented in my 1984 Wisconsin sample -- in this case, divided first by how they fall on interest group pluralism, and then divided into four categories that cross interest group pluralism with majoritarianism, and finally interest group pluralism versus individualism. Tables 11, 12, and 13 present these findings.

[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE]

Table 11 shows first that those low in approval of an interest group role in politics are most likely, for any of these antecedents of turnout, to be affected by rational abstention. While this does not quite reach statistical significance, we are led to hypothesize in a relative sense that a Downsian perspective of this kind plays a declining part in affecting people's willingness to vote as we move up the scale of interest group pluralism. Thus, for those we have identified as high pluralists, the regression coefficient on rational abstention becomes virtually zero; whereas for low pluralists b is -.32.

Citizen duty to vote behaves in a different way, being significant only among those who are medium in interest group pluralism (b = .53). Indeed, the contrast in relative contribution to our ability to account for turnout is very sharp between the middling pluralists and those who are either low (b = .09) or high (b = -.05). By contrast, partisan intensity seems to be a factor in explaining turnout only among those who are high in interest group pluralism.

Electoral alienation turns out to have a very different coefficient across the three groups, ranging from b = +.11 at the low end of interest group plura-

lism, to -.30 in the medium range, and -.71 for the highs. This means that a feeling of satisfaction with the electoral process increases turnout the most for the high pluralists; and dissatisfaction has a very small positive contribution at the low end of the pluralist scale.

Political efficacy turns out to have no significant effects on turnout in this context, so that it is not much affected by pluralism. Age is also relatively constant in its effects as well, with only a very small increase in its relationship with turnout as we move to higher pluralism.

In summary, we can say that controlling for interest group pluralist sentiment does seem to affect somewhat the character of the relationships of the best predictors of turnout. Obviously, with only a state sample, smallish numbers of cases for our categories, a rather indirect way of measuring group politics legitimation relative to group activity in elections, and a single cross-section to work with, one should not expect dramatic results. But these coefficients seem to move around just enough, and in a varied fashion, to raise the question of whether respondents' value premises that affect the legitimacy of group politics might be something well worth taking into account in more ambitious future efforts.

Now we can follow the logic of our presentation to this point a step or two further. One way to extend our thinking here is by trying to consider joint effects of these various types of value premises. What I present next, in Tables 12 and 13, are joint controls for values, first interest group pluralism vs. majoritarianism in Table 12, and then interest group pluralism vs. individualism in Table 13.

[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE]

Table 12 reveals that adding a measure of majoritarianism to that of interest group pluralism, as a way of partitioning the 1984 Wisconsin sample, seems to affect the relative weights of our six predictors of turnout in a number of interesting ways. The most significant effects are for those who are high both in pluralism and majoritarianism. These respondents have sizable regression coefficients both for electoral alienation and for partisan intensity --which is not true in the other three combinations of value perspectives.

The effect for intensity of party identification for the high/high category is a negative one, suggesting that independence contributes more to turnout for this particular combination of evaluations. What this adds to what we knew already, from the evidence presented in Table 11, is that this finding (which is counter to the accepted lore) is more pronounced among the high majoritarians than it is for those less approving of the majority's political wisdom.

Citizen duty to vote and age show more even effects across the four cells, with a moderately good size b on citizen duty (b = .31, .34, .41, and .45), and for age a relatively low one (b = .04, .04, .05 and .08). Rational abstention seems to enter the picture more for the low pluralists, with not much additional difference achieved by dividing on majoritarianism. Among high majoritarians, however, there emerges at least a small difference (b = -.30 and .06 respectively) from low to high pluralism. Political efficacy, despite a sign reversal from low to high pluralism, again shows no significant effects. We see also some increase from low/low to high/high in the capacity of the six predictors as a group to predict turnout behavior (R^2 = .18, .25, .36, and .46).

[INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE]

Table 13 extends this form of analysis one further step, in this case predicting turnout within the four partitions defined by low and high interest group pluralism versus low and high individualism. Here we see perhaps more interesting differences across the four cells in the relative size and direction of the regression coefficients than was true in Table 12. First of all, electoral alienation shows three different significant effects, and one less significant one; but there is one sign reversal among these. The people who are both low in pluralism and in individualism are stimulated by their electoral alienation to vote; whereas the reverse is true in the other three cells.

The pattern for citizen duty to vote is more varied in this combination of evaluations than was true for pluralism versus majoritarianism. Among high individualists, pluralism splits the relative impact into b = .09 for low pluralists, but b = .47 for high pluralists But among low individualists, pluralist evaluations show the opposite pattern.

Political efficacy, in terms of the data presented thus far, finally shows a significant relationship with turnout. This is for the low/low combination, where b = -.29. Precisely why people who are neither strong pluralists nor individualists should have their turnout increased by a low sense of political efficacy (and vice versa) is not apparent. We are, of course, likely to be able to think only in terms of positive relationships here. But that apparently does not work for everyone.

Partisan intensity also shows a good deal of "texture". It has its only clearly significant relationship in Table 13 for the low/low category, and that is a positive one. But the relationship is reversed in sign for those high in pluralism -- as we have noted earlier.

Rational abstention makes its best showing under this combination of evaluations (b = -.95) for low/low. People who are high both in pluralism and individualism show a small positive relationship of abstentionist thinking with their turnout (b = .11); but those who are in the low/low category are strongly affected negatively -- which is to say that they turn out to vote more when they do not think that there are high costs and low returns for voting. Age as elsewhere in these tables has relatively small, but nonetheless significant effects in two cells (low/low and high/high).

In general then, one may be led to the conclusion by these data that various kinds of political value perspectives make some difference to what one would estimate as the effects of major predictors of turnout. While the data I have available here merely scratch the surface of the potential relationships, what is found is enough to suggest that wider cultural themes of democracy and the individual may lie buried just below the surface of our usual approaches to the study of voting--in so far as the latter focus on the relevance of groups to political behavior. Pluralism, majoritarianism and individualism are three sets of potential "cultural values bound up with beliefs about democracy and the individual" that might well enjoy closer scrutiny, therefore.

Types of Pluralism in Relation to Political Alienation

So far I have tried to steer our attention to forces that may affect our analysis of political behavior in terms of a number of elements of what I would term a "group focus". Here I am trying to unearth group-related forces manifested as political attitudes that are beyond simple group consciousness. To identify with a group or a set of groups that impartial and informed observers agree takes political action does not entail that the person so identified

understands the political implications. or desires them. There is a set of limiting conditions, some cognitive, some affective, and some evaluational that I have tried to sketch out above. What we need then is term that describes this wider set of group-limiting or group-facilitating orientations. Just as for the distinction one might make between political party identification and party system support, we need a distinction between being identified with groups that are politically active on the one hand, and approving or not of a system of political group competition on the other. Provisionally, I call this the difference between simple group consciousness (see Miller, et al., 1981) and a wider group focus. Such a wider group focus has elements such as those I have outlined to this point -- relative legitimacy of group action and of the system of politically competing groups, cross-group comparisons of political advantage and disadvantage, pluralism together with the partially overlapping, but also competing value systems of majoritarianism and individualism.

With this in mind, then another relevant analytical distinction here is the orientational equivalent for members of the general public of the political scientist's difference (which we all believe is carved in stone) between political parties and interest groups (see, for example, Sorauf, 1985; or Epstein, 1986). Parties and interest groups as we usually think of them have different, if occasionally overlapping functions. Each also tries to influence the actions of the other; and one may improve its scope of activity at the expense of the other. More important, one of them, the party, has been at the center of the dominant theory of voting; whereas the other, the group, has not. If we are thinking broadly about the extent to which people find high political relevance of political parties in their lives, then probably a "group focus" versus a "party focus" differentiation is what we need to consider.

If we try to tease out this more general concept that pertains to the political relevance of groups in our lives, then we could begin by using the variables discussed to this point. Such a "group focus" might even ultimately encompass the variety of things that have been adumbrated under the heading of group consciousness; but for the time being I leave the latter out of account. On the "party focus" side, I would include not simply measures of party consciousness (party identification, party images, etc.), but also wider orientations toward parties, such as what I have tried to measure under the heading of "party system support" (see Dennis, 1966, 1975, 1980, 1986[b]).

Once we have made such a distinction, then we may ask how are each of its terms related either to such specific acts and decisions as individual voting behavior, or to those general political orientations that are related not only to voting but to other aspects of political behavior. In other words, how does a "group focus" and a "party focus" -- as two separable aspects of pluralist orientation -- each relate to such generalized aspects of political orientation as "political involvement" or "political alienation"? Past theory on voting such as contained in the NES surveys assumes that a party focus is primary and that a group focus is of secondary consequence -- given that party identification is located at the center of the voting universe in such theory. Is this indeed the case once we look more carefully at those syndromes of political orientation (such as political involvement or political alienation) that have quite wide implications for political behavior? What I have in mind is an causal ordering that looks something like this:



In earlier work, I argued that one major theory alternative in the study of voter turnout is the constellation of feelings and beliefs that go under the general rubric of "political alienation" (Dennis, 1986a). Political alienation indeed encompasses much of what , since The American Voter, we have generally used to explain individuals' relative propensities to participate in elections. What lies buried in a causal sense in such measures as intensity of political party identification, political efficacy, or citizen duty to vote -- as well as in the ostensibly short-term orientations of interest in the election at hand or concern over which party wins this time -- are certain kinds of political experiences that people have had. These experiences reflect how well their needs and concerns have been met via the operations and performance of government, or reflected in the way government is organized.

Political alienation thus defined has a considerable impact on people's willingness to take part, moreover. One can demonstrate with the measures available that this theory does as well or better than other major approaches, such as that focusing on rationalistic behavior or upon demographic characteristics (Dennis, 1986a). What I want to do here is to move our explanation of turnout back a step -- to see whether we can find any evidence for there being some group basis for political alienation.

In the particular terms used here, are we able to see whether one of the contributing sets of forces acting upon people as they become more politically alienated (or supportive) might be a group focus? The hypothesis is that people who exhibit a stronger group focus should be less alienated, and thus eventually more supportive in a behavioral sense, such as participating in elections. Indeed, I want to go beyond this simple hypothesis to test the idea that at some level, groups may be more important than parties. Thus, I need to look at the relative contributions to (a lessening of) political alienation of a "group focus" versus a "party focus".

I shall use for this analysis the 1984 Wisconsin surveys, which have both advantages and disadvantages for such an inquiry. Ideally, one needs both the kind of content that has to do with identifications (affiliation) and with the broader, more normative aspects of orientation to these objects discussed above. In the case of a party focus, both kinds of content are present in the 1984 Wisconsin surveys--various measures of partisan attachment as well as indexes of two dimensions of party system support. On the side of a group focus however, we lack in these particular surveys questions that refer to a wide variety of groups individually (as is present in the 1972 NES, for example), simply because this could not be done well enough in what were two relatively brief telephone surveys. Thus, part of our case is not demonstrable with these data. Indeed, one might expect that a group focus would do less well in comparison with a party focus in contributing to (lessened) political alienation without the inclusion of group consciousness indexes.

To test these propositions, a covariance structure analysis was performed with the available relevant indicators discussed thus far (or previously, in the

case of "political alienation"). LISREL V provides the algorithm most conveniently available to conduct such an analysis (see Long, 1983a, 1983b; and Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1981). Covariance structure analysis allows us to estimate the relative magnitude of structural relationships among several "unobserved" variables--in this case, between a group focus and political alienation, versus between a party focus and political alienation. LISREL thus allows us to take advantage of the fact that we have multiple measures for all three "unobserved" variables in our equations--group focus, party focus, and political alienation. Figure 1 and Table 14 present an outline and summary of the results of a LISREL V analysis of political alienation, relative to the presumed antecedents, "group focus" and "party focus".

[INSERT FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE]

Figure 1 shows the list of indexes used to measure each of the "unobserved" variables. Table 14 presents the estimates of relevant coefficients. To measure a group focus as well as possible, I have divided the interest group pluralism index into its normative and special benefits subcomponents as differentiated in Table 2 above. The questions on "relative fraternal power deprivation" have also been indexed (see Table 4 above). An index of acceptance of the role of a minority of people to get their candidates elected was also created from these two questions:

a. "Do you think that there are or are not groups of people in this country who are less than a majority, but are able to get their candidates elected?" (are: 71%; are not, 21%; DK,8%)

b. "Is that a good thing or a bad thing, from your point of view?" (good,

22%; bad, 52%, DK/NA, 5%; and Inappropriate, 8%)

I also included the majoritarianism index used earlier, on the premise that it would, in a negative way, indicate acceptance of the role of groups who are in the minority. "Party focus" was indicated first by two dimensions of party system support which were labeled "normative partisan loyalty" and "party system performance and reform" in an earlier report of these data (Dennis, 1986b). Secondly, both the traditional SRC/CPS party identification index, as folded over to measure intensity, and a newer measure of partisanship, from the Partisan Supporter Typology (PST) series, were included (on the latter, see Dennis, 1981). The latter was scored for relative closeness to a party on a four-point scale. I call this "PST closeness." Another measure from the PST series was also included here, that of strength of independence identification (scored 1-7).

To measure the dependent unobserved variable, political alienation, I used seven indexes. Five of these have been detailed in earlier work -- electoral alienation, general political alienation, political efficacy, citizen duty to vote and government performance (Dennis, 1986a). Two new indexes were created for present analytical purposes. These are: "election output satisfaction" and "the worth of voting". The election output satisfaction index uses the following items from the 1984 Wisconsin post-election survey:

a. "How do you feel in general about the outcome of the November 6th elections? Which one of these best applies to your own feelings: I was extremely happy with how the election turned out; I was happy; I had mixed feelings; I was unhappy; or, I was really depressed by how the election turned out."

b. "Now that the election is decided how well do you think the needs and concerns of people like yourself will be heard by the leaders of the federal government in Washington over the next few years -- extremely well, well enough, or not very well?"

The "worth of voting" index uses these two questions from the 1984 pre-election survey in Wisconsin:

a. "From what you know now, how worthwhile will it be for you to participate in the national election November 6th? Do you think it will be very worthwhile, fairly worthwhile, only a little worthwhile, or a complete waste of time for you?"

b. "How worthwhile is it to you personally to try to vote in every election, including primaries and elections for offices at local, state and national levels -- very worthwhile, worthwhile, not worthwhile, or a waste of time?"

Turning to the LISREL V results, we find in Figure 1 that a group focus, at least as measured here, does at least as well in accounting for political alienation as does a party focus. This may of course be a function of what was available in this instance to measure these constructs. But the result seems to indicate that this realm of content is well worth further investigation in related studies in the future. Knowing as we do that political alienation has a strong bearing on whether people participate in elections, we may then find that some of this causal force is derived from the extent to which individuals develop a group focus. Such a group focus, at least as operationalized here, goes well beyond simply group consciousness in the usual senses.

Conclusion

In an era in which that great instrument of popular representation, the political party, has seen a marked decline in its popular support, we need to reconsider the potential role of non-party groups in linking individuals to the political system. We may well want to renew and reapply Truman's observation, "that such groups are receiving an increasing measure of popular and technical attention suggests the hypothesis that they are appreciably more significant in the complex and interdependent society of our own day than they were in the simpler, less highly developed community for which our constitutional arrangements were originally designed" (1971, p. 11). That "simpler day" may also include a time when political parties had a larger presence in the minds of potential participants in the American political process than they do now.

What I have tried to do here is enlarge the area of our thinking about the potential role of groups in helping to orient the behavior of individuals in elections. I have tried to draw attention to a realm of possible effects that lie behind the usual kinds of treatment group politics has received in electoral studies to this point. I am not arguing that there is no longer any place for studies that link demographically-defined social locations to voting patterns, as in the early sociological studies that dominated the field of electoral research for the first half of this century. And I am even more reluctant to rule out the potential contributions of studies of group consciousness for individual voter decisions, as in the recent efforts that apply major new concepts from cognitivist social psychology. I am suggesting only that there is an additional set of questions about groups and pluralism that may hold some promise for future work on elections

In a strong sense, the kinds of suggestions I have been making are implicit in the original NES efforts to make sense of group electoral effects -- and represented best in The American Voter. The kinds of questions that flow from the insights of the pioneers and which need to be put to new cohorts of respondents have also been represented at least fleetingly in subsequent NES surveys-- as illustrated in some of the survey questions displayed above. What has been missing, however, is a more explicit theoretical rationale, not only for including such interview items, but also for more serious efforts of operationalization -- to give us eventually better answers in this realm. Whatever theory there was to guide the original efforts on group effects, as in The Voter Decides and The American Voter, was mostly implicit. One has great difficulty reconstructing the premises of what was referred to there as reference group theory, and thus finding the precise guidelines for asking new questions, as this line of research progresses. The originators of "The Mother Church" were curiously vague when it came to saying, for example, which variants of the reference group idea they might be endorsing.

The result of this lack of clear theoretical guidance has meant that the predominant group-consciousness operationalizations have been somewhat confined by the idea that identification with groups that take political action affects voting -- on the assumption that unless one identifies with a politically active group, it can not affect one's voting behavior. But sometimes a "purer" version of reference group behavior creeps into these questions, in the form of social comparisons that are independent of the respondent's affiliations. We should remember that one important original reason for proposing the concept of reference groups in the field of social psychology was to distinguish it from

that of membership groups (including those with which one has only psychological membership).

A simple example of the kind of confusion that may result from a lack of decision about what is being referred to by "reference groups" is seen, I believe, in a question put to the 1984 NES respondents (V0169, Question E12). Question E12 asks this: "Sometimes people think about OTHER groups of people in society when they think about their own economic well-being, people who are being helped or hurt by economic conditions. When it comes to economic matters, what groups of people do YOU feel close to? (PROBE: Any others)." Having served on two of the NES committees that design these studies (1972 and 1980), I know full well how a perfectly sensible question with an excellent theoretical rationale can end up as unusable, once it is put into the hands of a planning committee. It would appear that poor Question E12 must have suffered such a "crippling by committee". From a reference group theory point of view it is hard to interpret, because it first asks people about social comparisons, but then goes on to ask them about affiliation groups. The respondent who takes this task seriously is thus put in a quandary, especially if she or he thinks first in terms of a negative reference group, when asked about "OTHER groups in society when they think about their own economic well-being" (underlines mine). The stem question thus seems to draw attention to groups other than the respondent's own -- which means, if my data presented above on relative power deprivation are correct, that respondents are quite likely to think about certain kinds of people, e.g., the wealthy, whose influence they resent. If this is indeed what happens in particular cases, then what sense does it make to ask the followup question about which group they feel closest to? In attempting to

follow this through the 1984 NES Codebook from this point, I fail to find any corollary question about the groups they hate -- which may be the part of such questions that is most likely to contain the significant variance!

This question that thus appears to be so garbled from a reference group theory point of view may of course have other legitimate theoretical uses. But if one has taken seriously the few clues given in The American Voter about how we should think about group phenomena in relation to voting, then puzzlement is a likely outcome. Such questions particularly leave one in doubt about the status of the original theory of groups as these electoral studies have proceeded. Has such theory been discarded somewhere along the way, so that only its residues in "core items" remain?

Another and more fundamental problem about these efforts is that they have missed a very nice chance to connect the study of voting to wider themes of democracy, such as to pluralism or to the place of the individual in a participant society. The recognition of this level of group and elections analysis was not absent in the landmark studies. Such recognition reappears nowhere explicitly thereafter, however. Nonetheless, given how few and ambiguous were the references to reference groups in these works, they nonetheless somehow spawned a respectable body of interview questions and some informative research. By contrast, the absence of any theoretical perspective on other possible meanings of group participation through the electoral process has meant a mostly unconscious, occasional, and operationally fragmented strategy of investigation for wider groups and politics meanings.

What little I have been able to put together here, mostly out of low-budget, regionally-constrained, and small-N surveys suggests that we may be missing

some important opportunities. Expanded attention to the themes adumbrated above could hold high interest in a future society that is substantially different from the one that surrounds the elections of our day. This future could possibly be one in which highly segmented, group-competitive electoral systems (a new feudalism?) could emerge. The great growth of PACs since the mid-70s and the increasing willingness of individual givers to contribute to group-organized electoral efforts may signal this shift. Should the parameters of the electoral system thus become transformed, we will need to do more about group phenomena, rather than less, in these studies. This means not simply reassessing what has been covered before, and perhaps repeating some of it in time-series fashion, but also expanding our horizons to take better account of the full range of group-based, and indirectly group-affected, voting behavior.

I have tried to set out a few of such considerations in the present essay. In particular, I have tried to point out some of the constraints upon group-related voting as well as conditions that may facilitate it. Some of the limits are both cognitive and normative -- in that political interest groups are not, as yet, for everyone. The kind of status that such groups have recently had in the eyes of the average American is somewhat mixed. Nonetheless, those who are group-focused may show quite distinctive patterns of voter behavior, both in terms of whatever pluralist orientations they may have, or in combination with other kinds of political values. In addition, for broader patterns of election-related orientations, such as political alienation or support, a group focus may turn out to be just as robust as is a party focus. This obviously puts a rather different cast than the usual one upon what we believe to be our main theory of why people bother to vote, or to make the choices of candidates that they do.

The above arguments and illustrative evidence also suggest that, like people, our theories need to expand and grow as they face ever changing circumstances across their life cycles if they are to remain viable.

Author's Note

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TABLE 1. The Legitimacy of Lobbying: Should One's Own Group Lobby?

(Percent)

Legislative lobbying	Farmers on Farm Organizations	Union Household Rs on Union Organizations	Negroes on Negro Organizations	Catholics on Catholic Organizations	Jews on Jewish Organizations
All right	63%	49	80	45	54%
Stay out	17	35	12	48	44
DK, NA, Other	19	16	8	6	5
	99%	100%	100%	99%	100%
N =	213	462	146	372	56
Helping Candidates					
All right	52%	49	79	44	59%
Stay out	31	39	10	52	38
DK, NA, Other	17	13	11	4	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	213	462	146	372	56

Source: ICPSR: 1956 NES.

TABLE 2: Components of Support for Interest Group Representation, Wisconsin 1970.

Question:	Rotated Factor Matrix			
	I	II	III	h^2
1. "The best interests of the general public are usually hurt by the lobbying activities of various interest groups."	-.04	.59	.31	.45
2. "Democracy works best where organized interest groups can make themselves heard in government decision making."	.57	-.13	-.31	.44
3. "Interest groups that try to influence the Wisconsin legislature should be regulated very strictly."	.17	.49	.40	.43
4. "Too many special privileges have been obtained from the government through lobbying by various organized interests."	-.07	.80	-.04	.64
5. "Interest groups should continue to provide legislators with information about what the groups' members want."	.48	.13	-.56	.57
6. "The big organized groups such as business, veterans, labor unions, and farmers too often get their own way in government programs."	-.04	.52	.19	.31
7. "Lobbyists who work for political interest groups are usually honest and do not try to corrupt people in the government."	.24	-.45	.09	.27
8. "Political interest groups should have the same right to influence the government as anyone else."	.42	.06	-.40	.34
9. "In the interest of good government, we should get rid of all influence organized interest groups have in public policy making."	.02	.16	.71	.53
10. "Except for elections and political parties, the activities or organized groups are about the only effective means of getting the government to pay attention to what the ordinary person wants."	.75	-.08	.14	.59

Table 2. (continued)

	I	II	III	h^2
11. "Without the participation of organized interest groups in government, democracy would be very difficult to maintain."	.79	-.13	.01	.65
12. "More often than not, organized interest groups create conflict where none really exists."	-.01	.32	.62	.49
Percent of total factor variance	35.5	33.3	31.3	100.0
Percent of total variance	16.8	15.8	14.8	47.5

TABLE 3. Distribution of Response to Items on Support for Interest Groups, Wisconsin 1970

Factor I. THE DEMOCRATIC ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS

(Percent)

	Rotated factor loading	Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree/ Dis- Agree	Dis- Agree	Strongly Disagree	DK	NA	Total %
11. "Without the participation of organized interest groups in government, democracy would be very difficult to maintain."	.79	3%	47	9	14	1	25	2	101%
10. "Except for elections and political parties, the activities of organized groups are about the only effective means of getting the government to pay attention to what the ordinary person wants."	.75	4	42	11	15	2	25	1	100%
2. "Democracy works best where organized interest groups can make themselves heard in government decision making."	.57	5	51	11	6	1	25	1	100%
5. "Interest groups should continue to provide legislators with information about what the groups' members want."	.48	10	55	6	4	-	25	1	101%
8. "Political interest groups should have the same right to influence the government as anyone else."	.42	2	53	10	9	-	25	1	100%

(Table 3 continued)

Factor II. SPECIAL BENEFITS OBTAINED FROM LOBBYING

(Percent)

	Rotated factor loading	Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree/ Dis- Agree	Dis- Agree	Strongly Disagree	DK	NA	Total %
4. "Too many special privileges have been obtained from the government through lobbying by various interests."	.80	9%	39	12	10	1	28	1	100%
1. "The best interests of the general public are usually hurt by the lobbying activities of various interest groups."	.59	6	31	16	20	2	25	1	101%
6. "The big organized groups such as business, veterans, labor unions, and farmers too often get their own way in government programs."	.52	4	24	14	29	3	25	1	100%
3. "Interest groups that try to influence the Wisconsin Legislature should be regulated very strictly."	.49	7	42	9	15	2	25	1	101%
7. "Lobbyists who work for political interest groups are usually honest and do not try to corrupt people in the government."	-.45	1	17	18	30	6	27	1	100%

(Table 3 continued)

Factor III. INTEREST GROUPS' IMPACT UPON EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT

(Percent)

	Rotated factor loading	Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree/ Dis- Agree	Dis- Agree	Strongly Disagree	DK	NA	Total %
9.	.71	2%	13	10	44	5	26	1	101%
12.	.62	1	29	15	26	2	26	1	100%
5.	-.56	10	55	6	4	-	25	1	101%
3.	-.40	(See above, Factor I)							
8.	.40	(See above, Factor II)							

TABLE 4: The Legitimacy of Other Groups' Influence on Government Leaders, Wisconsin 1972, 1974, 1976 and 1984.

(Percent)

Question A. "Some people claim that certain groups have a lot of influence on the leaders of the government. Do you think that there are any groups of people who have more influence than persons like yourself?"

	1972	1974	1976	1984
Yes (there are such groups who have more influence)	82%	86%	81%	82%
Depends	1	--	1	1
No (there are not such groups)	9	6	10	13
Don't know	7	7	5	4
Not ascertained	1	--	3	--
	100%	99%	100%	100%
N =	841	916	581	554

Question B. "In general, do you think this is all right, or is it wrong, or doesn't it matter to you?"

	1972	1974	1976	1984
This is all right	18%	18%	15%	14%
It is wrong	51	55	54	59
It doesn't matter	9	9	8	6
Don't know	3	4	3	3
No, don't know to Question A	16	13	15	17
Not ascertained	3	2	4	1
	100%	100%	99%	100%
N =	841	916	581	554

TABLE 5: The Targets of Majority Resentment about Relative Power Deprivation, Wisconsin, 1974 and 1976

(Percent)

Question C.

"Which people are you thinking of?"

	1974		1976	
	First response	Second response	First response	Second response
The wealthy class, those with more money, upper class	16.3%	4.7	19.6%	4.3
Big business, corporations, oil companies, monopolies	20.9	15.6	18.9	10.7
Labor unions, big labor	18.7	10.3	12.7	4.3
Lobbyists, lobbying groups, special interest groups	7.7	3.4	3.6	3.6
Politicians, office holders	3.9	2.5	3.6	2.2
Educated, professional people	1.4	.7	1.9	.9
Racial groups, minorities	1.6	2.1	1.9	.9
Radicals, rioters, extremists	1.0	.4	.3	.3
Other	9.7	9.1	16.3	6.7
Don't know	17.5	49.9	18.1	63.0
Not ascertained	1.3	1.3	3.1	3.1
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N =	916	916	581	581

TABLE 6: Evaluations of Various Groups' Influence, U.S. 1972 and 1974.[a]

(Percent)

		Too much	Just right	Too little	DK	NA	Total %
Labor Unions	1972	55%	32	4	7	1	99%
	1974	55	31	6	6	2	100
Poor People	1972	5	19	70	5	1	100
	1974	4	15	75	4	2	100
Politicians	1972	67	24	2	5	2	100
	1974	60	28	3	6	2	99
Big business	1972	73	18	1	7	1	100
	1974	74	17	2	5	2	100
Blacks	1972	27	33	32	7	2	101
	1974	29	35	25	8	2	99
Liberals	1972	22	45	10	22	2	101
	1974	25	42	10	20	3	100
Young people	1972	14	53	26	5	2	100
	1974	12	50	29	6	2	99
Women	1972	6	57	29	5	2	99
	1974	6	50	36	5	2	99
Republicans	1972	24	60	3	10	2	99
	1974	20	56	9	13	2	100
Farmers	1972	4	42	44	7	2	99
	1974	6	32	53	7	2	100
Old(er) people	1972	1	27	65	5	2	100
	1974	2	21	71	4	2	100
Democrats	1972	14	64	9	11	2	100
	1974	15	60	9	13	2	99
People on welfare	1972	27	29	32	9	2	99
	1974	29%	27	29	12	2	99%
1972 only							
Jews		13%	50	14	23	1	101%
Southerners		7	60	15	17	1	100
Protesters		50	25	15	8	1	99
Workingmen		3	48	43	4	1	99
Catholics		8	65	7	18	2	100
Intellectuals		13	62	12	21	2	100
Television commentators		43	43	3	8	2	99
Middle class people		3%	62	26	7	2	100%
1974 only							
Policemen		10%	50	33	4	2	99%
The military		17	61	9	10	2	99
Newspaper editors		27	56	5	11	2	100
The average citizen		1%	30	62	5	2	100%

1972 N = 2191; 1974 N = 2523 (weighted).

[a] Data from ICPSR.

TABLE 7. Perceived Influence of "A Few Big Interests" on Government, U.S. 1964-1984

(Percent)

The government is run	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984
1. For the benefit of all.	64%	52	51	41	38	24	24	24	21	29	37%
2. By a few big interests looking out for themselves.	24	33	40	50	53	66	66	65	69	60	52
3. Other, depends, both boxes checked, refused to choose.	4	6	5	5	2	2	3	1	-	1	4*
4. Don't know.	3	7	4	4	6	7	7	8	8	9	6
5. Not ascertained.	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1*
Total %	99%	99%	100%	101%	100%	100%	101%	100%	99%	100%	100%
N =	1450	1291	1336	1507	2285	2523	2871	2304	1614	1418	1989

* This is my best guess, since the 1984 NES Codebook does not differentiate NA from Other, depends, etc.

TABLE 8: Individual versus Group Capacity to Influence Government, Wisconsin 1972 and 1974

(Percent)

Question:

A. "Suppose that you yourself tried to influence the leaders in the government. What chance of success do you think you would have... rating them on a 7 point scale with "1" meaning you have no chance at all, and "7" meaning your chances are extremely good to influence the leaders in the government? (SHOW CARD)"

	1972	1974
1. No chance at all	37%	44%
2.	21	24
3.	14	12
4.	13	12
5.	9	5
6.	3	2
7. Extremely good chance	2	1
Don't know	1	--
Not ascertained	1	1
Total %	101%	101%
N =	841	916

B. "What chance do you think people like yourself -- working together -- would have in influencing (1974: the leaders in the government; 1972: the national government in Washington; the state government in Madison; the local government around here)?

	1972			1974
	National	State	Local	the government
1. No chance at all	9%	7	6	7%
2.	8	7	4	7
3.	10	9	5	13
4.	22	18	13	22
5.	21	21	23	24
6.	17	22	26	16
7. Extremely good chance	10	11	20	10
Don't know	2	3	2	--
Not ascertained	1	1	1	1
Total %	100%	99%	100%	100%
N =		841		916

TABLE 9. Individualist vs. Group Strategies of Influence, U.S. 1972

(Percent)

1.	Organize as a group	28%
2.		13
3.		12
4.		24
5.		6
6.		5
7.	Work as individuals	9
	Don't know	1
	Not ascertained	1
		99%
	N (responding)	2059
	$\bar{X}$ =	3.2

Source: ICPSR: 1972 NES Codebook.

TABLE 10. Majoritarianism in Wisconsin, 1984

(Percent)

Question:								
	Very Well	Quite Well	Only So-So	Poorly	DK	NA		Total%
1. "In general, how well does the idea of majority rule really work in this country -- very well, quite well, only so-so, or poorly?"	15%	37	38	7	2	*		99%
	Very Smart	Fairly Smart	Fooled Often		DK	NA		Total%
2. "How smart are the voters about whom they elect -- are they very smart, fairly smart, or do the voters get fooled fairly often?"	8	41	48		4	0		101%
	Great	Very Good	Mixed	Poor	Very Poor	DK	NA	Total%
3. "Overall, how good a record have the people of this country had in choosing wise, honest, and effective political leaders over the past 25 years? Has it been a great record, very good, mixed, poor, or very poor?"	1	28	61	5	1	1	1	98%
	All The Time	Most Of The Time	Some-times	Almost Never	DK	NA		Total%
4. "How often are the majority of the people able to come up with the best answers to difficult questions of public policy -- all the time, most of the time, sometimes, or almost never?"	2	32	61	4	1	*		100%

* less than 1%; N = 554.

TABLE 11. Predictors of Turnout Behavior within Low, Medium, and High Interest Group Pluralism, Wisconsin 1984.

(Regression coefficients)

Low Interest Group Pluralism (N = 82)	b	se	β	T	Signif.
Electoral alienation	.11	.41	.06	.26	.79
Citizen duty to vote	.09	.22	.08	.43	.67
Political efficacy	.01	.18	.01	.05	.96
Partisan intensity	.08	.48	.03	.17	.86
Rational abstention	-.32	.20	-.32	-1.60	.12
Age	.04	.04	.18	1.15	.26
	R^2 = .16				

Medium Interest Group Pluralism (N = 250)	b	se	β	T	Signif.
Electoral alienation	-.30	.12	-.19	-2.42	.02
Citizen duty to vote	.53	.11	.39	4.66	.00
Political efficacy	.07	.09	.06	.75	.45
Partisan intensity	.07	.21	.02	.31	.75
Rational abstention	-.12	.09	-.10	-1.27	.21
Age	.04	.01	.24	3.37	.00
	R^2 = .36				

High Interest Group Pluralism (N = 101)	b	se	β	T	Signif.
Electoral alienation	-.71	.19	-.48	-3.79	.00
Citizen duty to vote	-.05	.20	.03	.26	.80
Political efficacy	-.03	.18	-.02	-.18	.86
Partisan intensity	.66	.36	.20	1.83	.07
Rational abstention	.02	.19	.01	.09	.93
Age	.13	.04	.41	3.76	.00
	R^2 = .47				

TABLE 12. Predictors of Turnout Behavior within Categories of High and Low Interest Group Pluralism vs. High and Low Majoritarianism, Wisconsin 1984. (Regression coefficients)

Majoritarianism		Interest Group Pluralism: Low					Interest Group Pluralism: High				
		b	se	β	T	Signif.	b	se	β	T	Signif.
Low	Electoral alienation	-.03	.29	-.02	-.10	.92	-.20	.22	-.14	-.93	.36
	Citizen duty to vote	.34	.28	.23	1.23	.23	.31	.18	.26	1.79	.08
	Political efficacy	-.06	.16	-.06	-.34	.73	.15	.16	.14	.95	.35
	Partisan intensity	.04	.47	.01	.09	.93	-.09	.40	-.03	-.21	.83
	Rational abstention	-.25	.17	-.24	-1.45	.15	-.19	.17	-.15	-1.12	.27
	Age	.04	.04	.17	1.04	.30	.04	.03	.16	1.31	.20
		R^2 = .18					R^2 = .25				
		N = 79					N = 102				
		b	se	β	T	Signif.	b	se	β	T	Signif.
High	Electoral alienation	-.02	.32	-.01	-.07	.94	-.62	.15	-.39	-4.19	.00
	Citizen duty to vote	.45	.24	.37	1.89	.07	.41	.15	.26	2.65	.01
	Political efficacy	-.11	.21	-.08	-.50	.62	.14	.16	.09	.89	.39
	Partisan intensity	.08	.41	.03	.20	.84	-.65	.29	-.20	-2.26	.03
	Rational abstention	-.30	.19	-.27	-1.54	.13	.06	.14	.04	.42	.68
	Age	.05	.03	.27	1.82	.08	.08	.02	.36	3.96	.00
		R^2 = .36					R^2 = .46				
		N = 88					N = 136				

TABLE 13. Predictors of Turnout Behavior within Categories of High and Low Interest Group Pluralism vs. High and Low Individualism, Wisconsin 1984. (Regression coefficients)

Individualism		Interest Group Pluralism: Low					Interest Group Pluralism: High				
		b	se	β	T	Signif.	b	se	β	T	Signif.
Low	Electoral alienation	.54	.27	.26	2.01	.05	-.44	.21	-.29	-2.11	.04
	Citizen duty to vote	.39	.21	.28	1.88	.07	.21	.19	.16	1.12	.27
	Political efficacy	-.29	.11	-.30	-2.62	.01	.11	.16	.09	.66	.51
	Partisan intensity	.79	.35	.25	2.25	.03	-.55	.40	-.18	-1.38	.17
	Rational abstention	-.95	.19	-.78	-4.95	.00	-.35	.17	-.25	-1.99	.05
	Age	.09	.03	.35	3.46	.00	.05	.03	.23	1.80	.08
		R^2 = .67					R^2 = .33				
		N = 79					N = 102				
		b	se	β	T	Signif.	b	se	β	T	Signif.
High	Electoral alienation	-.24	.25	-.17	-.97	.34	-.58	.14	-.37	-4.07	.00
	Citizen duty to vote	.09	.22	.07	.42	.68	.47	.15	.32	3.20	.00
	Political efficacy	.29	.18	.26	1.61	.11	.09	.14	.06	.61	.55
	Partisan intensity	.38	.41	.14	.92	.36	-.38	.30	-.11	-1.28	.21
	Rational abstention	.01	.16	.01	.07	.95	.11	.13	.09	.84	.40
	Age	.04	.03	.18	1.24	.22	.07	.02	.34	3.20	.00
		R^2 = .27					R^2 = .36				
		N = 90					N = 142				

FIGURE 1.

LISREL Model of Pluralist Effects on Political Alienation



TABLE 14. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Two LISREL Models for Political Alienation.

	Parameter	Uncorrelated errors, Model 1	Correlated errors, Model 2
Structural Coefficients	γ_{11}	-.578	-.143
	γ_{12}	-.398	-.235
	COR (ξ_1 ξ_2)	.292	.218
Measurement coefficients (factor loadings)	λ^{y}_{11}	.548	.566
	λ^{y}_{21}	.317	.302
	λ^{y}_{31}	-.592	-.562
	λ^{y}_{41}	-.643	-.635
	λ^{y}_{51}	-.321	-.396
	λ^{y}_{61}	-.313	-.355
	λ^{y}_{71}	-.831	-.815
	λ^{x}_{11}	.133	.160
	λ^{x}_{21}	-.294	-.268
	λ^{x}_{31}	-.288	-.467
	λ^{x}_{41}	.627	.797
	λ^{x}_{51}	.166	.160
	λ^{x}_{62}	.624	.615
	λ^{x}_{72}	-.390	-.381
	λ^{x}_{82}	.881	.878
	λ^{x}_{92}	.449	.476
	λ^{x}_{102}	-.442	-.441
	COR (ϵ_5, ϵ_1)		.174
	COR (ϵ_5, ϵ_2)		-.107
	COR (ϵ_4, ϵ_3)		.089
	COR (ϵ_5, ϵ_4)		-.142
	COR (δ_{10}, δ_1)		-.159
	COR (δ_6, δ_2)		-.074
	COR (δ_4, δ_3)		.308
	COR (δ_7, δ_3)		.254
	COR (δ_{10}, δ_9)		.175
Reliabilities	REL (η_1, y_1)	.300	.320
	REL (η_1, y_2)	.101	.091
	REL (η_1, y_3)	.350	.316
	REL (η_1, y_4)	.414	.405
	REL (η_1, y_5)	.103	.168
	REL (η_1, y_6)	.098	.126
	REL (η_1, y_7)	.690	.664

TABLE 14 (cont.)

Parameters	Uncorrelated errors, Model 1	Correlated errors, Model 2
REL (ξ_1, x_1)	.018	.025
REL (ξ_1, x_2)	.086	.073
REL (ξ_1, x_3)	.083	.239
REL (ξ_1, x_4)	.393	.636
REL (ξ_1, x_5)	.028	.026
REL (ξ_2, x_6)	.389	.379
REL (ξ_2, x_7)	.152	.148
REL (ξ_2, x_8)	.776	.770
REL (ξ_2, x_9)	.201	.226
REL (ξ_2, x_{10})	.195	.211
Summaries of Adequacy of Model		
R^2 (for y s)	.611	.654
R^2 (for x s)	.844	.961
R^2 (for structural equation)	.402	.254
χ^2	845.7	718.7
df	116.	107
prob.	.000	.000
Goodness of Fit	.757	.782
Adj. Goodness of Fit	.679	.688
Root mean square	.114	.106

APPENDIX

TABLE A. The Public's Capacity to Define "Lobbyist".*

(Percent)

	U.S.[a] 1949	U.S.[a] 1949	Minn.[b] 1951	Minn.[b] 1959	Iowa[c] 1969
Generally correct definition	49%	49	45	31	51%
Vague, indefinite	7	7	7	17	46
Wrong, don't know, not ascertained, other	44	44	48	52	3
Total%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	2192	2751	595	595	595

* Data obtained from The Roper Center:

a. A.I.P.O. 0439 and 0442: "Will you tell me what a 'lobbyist' in Washington is?"

b. Minnesota Poll 90 and 179: "What does the term 'lobbyist' mean to you in connection with our state legislature?"

c. Iowa Poll 195: "What is your understanding of the term 'legislative lobbyist'?"

TABLE B. Perceived Power of Interest Groups, Parties and Elections, Wisconsin 1974.*

(Percent)

	Organized Interest Groups	Political Parties	Elections
1. Not powerful at all	1%	1	1%
2.	1	1	3
3.	7	3	6
4.	21	24	20
5.	29	34	26
6.	20	19	22
7. Extremely powerful	13	12	16
Not ascertained	8	5	6
Total %	100%	99%	100%
N =	916	916	916
$\bar{X}$ =	5.0	5.1	5.1

* The other institutions' means were:
Congress, 5.4; Supreme Court, 5.8; Office of President, 5.7;
and Federal administrative agencies, 4.9.

TABLE C. The Institution Perceived to Have Greatest Impact on the Lives of People in America and in Wisconsin, among Organized Interest Groups, Political Parties, and Elections, Wisconsin 1970.*

(Percent)

	Organized Interest Groups	Political Parties	Elections
1. The one that does the most important things in deciding how Americans are going to live	7%	7%	18%
2. The one that does the most important things in deciding how people in Wisconsin are going to live	7%	5%	18%

* The questions were: (1) "Now I would like you to look at this next card which lists various parts of the national political system. In your opinion, which one of these does the most important things in deciding how Americans are going to live? (SHOW CARD)". The percentages for the other options were: Supreme Court, 10%; President, 16%; U.S. Congress, 34%; Don't know, 6%; and Not ascertained, 2%. (2) "This next card lists various parts of the political system of Wisconsin. Which one of these do you think does the most important things in deciding how people in Wisconsin are going to live? (SHOW CARD)". The percentages for the other options were: State Supreme Court, 4%; Governor, 16%; State Legislature, 45%; Don't know, 4%; and Not ascertained, 2%.

TABLE D. Predictors of Three Dimensions of Support for the Institution of Interest Group Representation, Wisconsin 1970.

Independent Variable	Standardized Regression Coefficients			Significance Level		
	Component*			Component		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
Belongs to an organization that takes a stand on public issues	.16	-.16	-.06	.00	.00	.19
Have worked through an interest group to change a law or decision	.01	-.08	-.18	.87	.11	.00
Years lived in this community	-.07	.05	-.01	.16	.39	.78
Occupational prestige (Duncan index)	.07	-.07	.13	.18	.18	.01
Education	.22	-.11	.10	.00	.05	.07
Age	-.01	-.27	-.22	.90	.00	.00
Sex	-.12	.18	-.01	.01	.00	.84
Income	.06	-.00	.00	.19	.97	.99
Size of place of residence	.09	.03	.08	.05	.52	.08
R^2 =	.10	.10	.17	(N = 469)		

* These components have been labelled as follows:

I. The Democratic Role of Interest Groups

II. Special Benefits Obtained Through Lobbying

III. Interest Groups' Effects upon Efficient Government

(See Tables 2 and 3 above)