THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENDER GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS

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Has gender become increasingly politicized in the United States? Currently a good deal of controversy surrounds this question.

The Substantive Debate

The emergence of a statistically significant gender gap in the 1980, 1982 and 1984 national elections (Lake, 1982; Miller, 1983; Kenski, 1986), the shrinking participation difference between men and women (Baxter and Lansing, 1981), increased institutional strength of women's organizations and the appearance of the first female vice presidential candidate in 1984 all suggest an increased political integration (Shapiro 1983) of women in recent years. Available attitudinal evidence also appears consistent with these trends. For example, Gurin (1985) demonstrated that gender identification among women increased during the seventies. Also, over that same period women increasingly questioned the legitimacy of the lower status and relative lack of influence that women in general have in society. All of this evidence presumably indicates that women have established a strong presence in national politics and it raises the possibility that women are increasingly viewing their social situation in political terms.

Other evidence appears to contradict this conclusion. The relatively poor showing of women candidates generally in the 1984 elections, the inability of Ferraro to mobilize a majority of women to support her ticket in 1984, the failure of women's organizations to gain passage of the ERA amendment, and the absence of any significant impact of ERA on the 1980 vote (Mansbridge, 1985), all presumably suggest that women are not politicized and that gender has a minimal

effect in the political arena.

In addition, some scholars dismiss the recent gender gap as a short-term reaction to the war-mongering image of the early Reagan administration (Ziegler and Poole, 1985). When Reagan moved toward reconciliation with the Soviets the gender gap closed in 1984. Even Gurin (1985) points out that men and women alike have come to endorse pro-feminist attitudes of equality for women. These parallel shifts among men and women presumably imply that little political conflict surrounds concerns about the role of women in society. Indeed, at least some observers (see for example Plissner, 1983) have dismissed gender as an irrelevant dimension in American politics by concluding that other more important and compelling cleavages persist in influencing politics.

The purpose of this paper is to examine this controversy more closely. At the outset a bit of clarification is in order, as part of the controversy appears to arise out of a failure to differentiate political cleavage between men and women from the question of whether or not women view the social situation of their group in political terms. The latter is what we refer to as gender politicization. The two are interrelated in the sense that gender cleavage may be the result of gender politicization. The absence of gender politicization, however, does not necessarily follow from the lack of gender cleavage.

The gender gap literature often considers women as a whole. It thereby assumes that women are a cohesive group and that female solidarity implies polarization with men. But women are not a homogeneous group. Yet it is also a fallacy to conclude, as does some research (Ziegler and Poole, 1985; Plissner, 1983), that because women don't form a homogeneous bloc of political actors gender is not

politicized or relevant to the understanding of politics. How an individual woman feels about other women and the place of women in society more generally may be very important for the political behavior of that person. Therefore, to conclude that gender is irrelevant to politics because the gender gap is not larger totally ignores the relevance that gender may have for the political behavior of women.

The focus of this paper will be gender politicization, not gender cleavage. First, we directly address the question about the extent to which gender identification has become increasingly politicized among women. Next, we draw upon social psychological theories of intergroup behavior to formulate and test alternative empirical explanations for recent trends in gender group consciousness.

The work of Gurin (1985) is an excellent starting point. Her research demonstrated overall shifts in gender group awareness and the attitudes of women toward the status of women in society. She presented trends in these various attitudes not only for the total sample of women but for subgroups of women as well. Clearly, increased political conflict is not implied if the population in general is becoming more concerned about the subordinate position of women, but it is implied when those women who are becoming increasingly identified with women as a group are politicized by their perception of women's relative location in society. Gurin, however, did not directly determine if shifts in gender identification were associated with assessments of women's relative status. Nor did she correlate gender identification with political attitudes or behaviors to determine if gender awareness was indeed politicized. The analysis presented here, therefore, will attempt to determine explicitly the extent to which gender identification has become associated with both perceived

inequities in women's status and political behavior.

Definition of Group Identification

The first step in the development of group consciousness is a psychological awareness of shared interests among the categorical members (Jackman and Jackman, 1973; Gurin et al., 1980; Miller et al., 1981). To speak of individual behavior in terms of groups requires that the individuals think of themselves and others as members of certain groups or categories (Tajfel, 1981). In addition, this explicit acceptance of membership in a category must go beyond simply acknowledging that one is a member of the category to an expression of shared solidarity.

Much of the work on the gender gap (e.g., Ziegler and Poole, 1985), and on political group cleavages in general, is limited because it focuses solely on demographically defined groups. The problem with this type of approach is that it fails to measure directly the underlying theoretical reasons often assumed to be the basis of the cleavage — perceived deprivation and intergroup competition for scarce resources. This approach also fails to recognize the fact that individuals can and often do deny the reality of their situation, or they fail to make comparisons between their situation and that of others.

The demographic approach is further limited because it does not draw a distinction between the person who makes social comparisons in individual terms (I make less than my coworker) and one who makes comparisons in terms of groups (blue-collar workers make less than white-collar workers). The latter comparison indicates that the individual thinks of himself in terms of his own group and differentiates that group from other groups in society.

This social identity, that is, thinking of oneself in terms of categorical groups, implies that identification with a group is a positive attribute for the individual. After all, no one would set out to devalue their self-image (Tajfel, 1981, p. 137, 256). Strength of identification with a group, therefore, represents both the degree to which the group contributes to the self-definition of the individual and the extent of solidarity or shared interests among the members of the group.

Another distinction of importance is that between the identification of an in-group member and the sympathetic identification of someone who is not a member of the objectively defined categorical group. A wealthy person, for example, may identify with poor people and may express a sense of shared interest with the poor and be politically supportive of poor people as a group. Nevertheless, there are important differences between this sympathetic identification and the group identification expressed by a poor person. The potentially negative impact on one's self-image that can accompany identification with a subordinate group is clearly absent for the rich sympathizer. Also, others will not treat or act toward the rich person as if they are poor just because they identify sympathetically with the poor. Because of these differences our substantive focus is identification among objectively defined group members, not sympathetic identification.

Trends in Gender Identification

Empirical evidence on gender identification among women demonstrates that the trend found by Gurin (1985) for the seventies has persisted into the mid-eighties (see Table 1). The largest increase in gender identification occurred between 1972 and 1976 when the

percentage of women in the University of Michigan, National Election Study (NES) survey who were not "close" to other women in terms of shared interests dropped from 57 to 40 percent.[1] That percentage remained fairly stable until 1984 when there was again a noticable decrease in the proportion of women who did not identify at all with the category "women."

Although there was a marked increase in the proportion of women expressing a gender identification between 1972 and 1984, the percentage of women indicating the strongest sense of identification with women failed to grow. The percentage of women who said they felt "closest" to "women" when asked to select from a list of 16-19 categorical groups that group to which they felt closest hovered around 10 percent from 1972 to 1980 and then fell to 8 percent in 1984. The consistently small percentage of females who were strongly identified with women suggests that this was never a very intensely held identification and that the intensity appears to have peaked in the late seventies.[2] Despite the recent decline in the percentage of strongest identifiers, the overall level of gender identification, as summarized by a Percentage Difference Index (PDI), attained a new high in 1984.

By comparison with group identification among blacks, however, it is apparent that group solidarity among women has not yet reached the level consistently exhibited by blacks for some time (compare the PDI for blacks and women in Table 1). Relative to blacks a much higher proportion of women fail to identify at all with their gender group. Moreover, the percentage of blacks that are most strongly identified with their group is roughly three times that found for women.

The Political Effect of Group Identification

The high level of group identification evident for blacks is presumably one of the reasons why blacks act as a solidary political group (Verba and Nie, 1972, chapter 10). The relatively lower incidence and strength of identification for women suggests that we cannot expect women to act as cohesively in the political arena as blacks. Nevertheless, the rise in gender identification among women suggests the potential for increased participation and political solidarity among women.

Furthermore, if gender identification does indeed spill over into the political arena, as does race identification for blacks, we would expect correlations between gender identification and politically relevant variables such as participation, partisanship and vote choice. Likewise, if increased politicization of the identification htion has accompanied the increase in identification, we would expect the correlations to be even stronger in 1984 than they were in 1972.

Empirical evidence, however, only partly supports these expectations. In 1984 genderdeed consistently more strongly related with political attitudes and behaviors than in 1972 (see Table 2). For example, in 1972 there was virtually no difference in the partisan orientation of women y identified with their gender group and those who were not at all identified. Come 1984, on the other hand, those expressing the stongest gender identification were significantly more Democratic in their partisanship than non-identified women. Similarly, in 1972 there was little variation in the vote choice across categories of gender identification, but in 1984 those closest to women voted predominantly for Mondale while non-identified women voted heavily for Reagan.

Nevertheless, the increased politicization of gender identification suggested by Table 2 is at best only modest. Although there is a statistically significant relationship between the political variables and gender identification in 1984, the correlations are quite weak. The most strongly identified women appear somewhat distinct from other women in their political views and behavior, but they represent only 8 percent of all women. In addition, at least for 1984, the non-identified women appear to be somewhat less interested in politics and more Republican than the other women. But, overall the differences by level of gender identification are not substantial and in 1972 they fail to reach statistical significance.

In short, the evidence apparently fails to support the argument that gender identification is highly politicized. The slight increase in gender identification could help account for the recent gender gap, but only in a very limited way given the weak correlation of identification with the vote. The growth in gender identity may reflect increased solidarity among women, but apparently it does not imply greater political or group cleavages. Perhaps, as is suggested by Gurin's (1985) finding of a parallel shift in gender attitudes for men and women, the rise in gender identity simply represents a population-wide increase in positive affect towards women without any broader political implications.

Politicized Gender Identification

Theoretical and empirical considerations, however, argue against accepting the above conclusions. Empirically, the assumption that there was a population-wide rise in positive affect toward "women" is simply unfounded. Between 1976 and 1984 the average thermometer rating of women as a group fell from 78.8 to 74.2. The decline occurred for

both women (79.5 to 76.0) and men (78.0 to 71.9). This shift runs counter to expectations as identification has generally been found, at the individual level, to be correlated with group affect. Indeed the 1976 and 1984 data are no exception. Nevertheless, across time there was a decline in affect toward women, even for identified women. Clearly, to understand this trend further disaggregation is needed, a point we return to later. For now it is sufficient to note that increased gender identification does not merely reflect rising positive feelings about women.

There are also good theoretical reasons for not immediately accepting the conclusion that gender identification is no more politicized today than it was ten years ago. Particularly relevant is the conceptual distinction that has been made between identification and group consciousness (Gurin, Miller and Gurin, 1980). Identification, as indicated above, refers to a person's awareness of themselves in relation to others within a particular group or category. It implies that the person believes that they have ideas, feelings, interests and characteristics in common with others who are members of the same category and that they are distinct from members of other groups. Group consciousness reflects cognitions that arise out of comparing the social status of one group with another (Tajfel, 1981). Group consciousness develops when individuals believe that their own group is unfairly in a subordinate position and that collective action in the political arena is a legitimate and necessary avenue to redressing the situation.

Because group identification and consciousness are conceptually distinct, it is possible that an individual may identify with a group, even a subordinate group, without seeing the group's relative position

in society as unjust or believing that political action is necessary for changing its relative position in society. Individuals may accept their relatively lower status for a variety of reasons (see Tajfel, 1981 for a discussion of these) and believe that individual rather than collective or political action is the best way to improve either their own situation or that of the group.

The results presented earlier in Table 1 failed to differentiate group identification and group consciousness. For the study of blacks this may not be a problem as their group identification and consciousness may have empirically converged because of historical circumstances. In contrast, informed observation of the women's movement suggests that women have not uniformly adopted a political action orientation with their identification. Some women, those generally thought of as feminists, might approve of a collective approach. But, more traditional women, those vocally represented by Phyllis Schafly in recent years, might identify very closely with "women," meaning a particular <u>type</u> of woman, but not endorse the political approach of the movement.

Operationalizing Gender Consciousness

Operationally group consciousness could be indicated by how strongly an individual endorsed various politically active organizations that represent the group's interests. For example, for blacks it may be represented by support for civil rights leaders or activist black organizations such as PUSH, for the elderly by an endorsement of the gray panthers, and for women by support for NOW or the women's liberation movement more generally.

Available survey evidence is rather limited in the number of items that could be used to measure gender consciousness. The one

questionnaire item consistently asked between 1972 and 1984 was the feeling thermometer rating of the "women's liberation movement." Over that period the average rating of the movement among women rose from 45 to 59 degrees. In 1972 only four out of ten women rated the movement positively (i.e., above 50 degrees), by 1984 that figure had risen to almost six of ten. Yet, women as a whole exhibited far less group consciousness than blacks. In both 1972 and 1984 somewhat more than 80 percent of blacks were equally as positive about civil rights leaders.

In both 1972 and 1984 gender identification and ratings of the women's movement were correlated. The overtime rise in ratings of the movement was, however, only slightly greater for those most closely identified women. Moreover, in both years a significant proportion of identified women gave the movement a negative rating (in 1984 roughly 40 and 26 percent of close and closest identifiers respectively rated the movement 50 degrees or lower). Thus, as suggested above, identification and endorsement of a collective orientation are not one in the same for women. For this very reason we would expect the combination of identification and collective orientation to produce a more valid measure of politicized identification than would identification alone.

It should be noted that this proposal to combine gender identification and support for the women's liberation movement into a single measure is more than merely a methodological statement. We are not saying that the NES gender identification measure is a weak or invalid indicator of the underlying concept, and that the only way to improve it is by combining it with another indicator. Rather, we contend that substantively the measurement model underlying the concept of group consciousness can <u>only</u> be fit by combining these two

components into one. If previous research and social psychological theories on intergroup relations are correct, the result should be a substantively more relevant and empirically more powerful measure of politicized group identification. We now turn to an empirical test of this assumption.

Trend and Political Effects of Gender Consciousness

The resulting distribution of gender consciousness among women as determined by the combined measure for the period 1972-1984 is presented in Table 3. The measure was constructed by dichotomizing the "women's liberation" thermometer ratings (above 50 degrees or below) and then using this split to divide identified women into four categories which were subsequently collapsed into the two top categories of consciousness displayed in Table 3. Included in the first category of gender consciousness are the women who were the closest and close gender identifiers in Table 1 who rated the movement positively, the second category incorporates closest and close identifiers who rated the movement negatively, and those women who were not identified at all comprise the third category.

A second measure of gender consciousness was also constructed by employing the median instead of the 50 degree rating of the "women's liberation movement" to dichotomize collective orientation. In 1972 and 1976 the median rating was 50 degrees thus the two measures are the same for those years (see Table 3). For 1980 and 1984, however, the two measures differ because the average rating of the movement was significantly higher in those two years. By using the median rating (60 degrees) rather than 50 degrees to divide respondents, the second measure controls somewhat for the population wide rise in positive affect toward the movement. In addition, those in the top category of

the second measure feel significantly stronger about the women's movement and presumably should also be more politicized. In short, the two measures are constructed in exactly the same way, but the second employs more stringent criteria, thus it should be more refined and theoretically show stronger correlations with political variables.

The across-time trend for both these variables suggests an increase in gender consciousness during the past decade and a half. But is this a valid conclusion? The first piece of evidence supporting the conclusion that these are valid measures and that we can confidently accept the conclusion of increased gender consciousness comes from the correlation of these measures with affective ratings of "women." Both of the consciousness measures are more strongly associated with thermometer ratings of "women" than was gender identification alone. Moreover, the across-time pattern of change in the ratings of "women" is also clarified when examined by levels of gender consciousness. The decline in positive feelings about women did not occur for women in general. In fact the ratings fell only among those women who were not identified and did not share a sense of gender consciousness (see Table 4). Among women who strongly felt a sense of gender consciousness, affective ratings of women were not only significantly higher in each year but they actually increased between 1976 and 1984. These divergent trends suggest that between 1976 and 1984 the category "women," or gender more generally, had become increasingly politicized.

The most telling evidence of this increased politicization appears in Table 5. As hypothesized above, the gender consciousness measures were more strongly correlated with partisan attitudes and political behaviors than was identification alone.[3] Perhaps even more

important is the fact that the correlations with political variables have gotten stronger across time. Furthermore, the stronger correlations have appeared at the very same time that the percentage of women sharing a sense of gender consciousness has also increased.

The difference in the partisan attitudes and political behavior for women who strongly share a sense of gender consciousness and those who do not is quite substantial. For example, in 1984 strongly identified women voted overwhelmingly for Walter Mondale while those low in gender consciousness heavily supported Ronald Reagan (the actual percent voting Republican was 34.4 and 65.2 for the high and low consciousness categories respectively). In general the difference in the political orientation of these two groups of women appears to fit with an informed understanding of the distinction between feminists and traditional women.

In summary, the gender consciousness measure provides a more relevant and meaningful political classification of women than was obtained with identification alone. Both the across-time trends and the stronger correlations with political variables in 1984 support the conclusion that there has been an increase in politicized gender identification, that is, politically relevant gender consciousness. Whether or not this trend will continue into the future, however, depends on the durability of the factors producing the politicization of gender identification.

Explanations of Politicized Gender Identification

The literature suggests a number of alternative explanations for gender consciousness. Some researchers have suggested that fundamental changes in the social and economic situation of contemporary women have led to the rise of gender consciousness. Entry into the work place for

an ever increasing number of women has been given particular emphasis (Klein, 1984; Anderson, 1985). Others have argued that marital status is a particularly important discriminating demographic variable among women (Ziegler and Poole, 1985), and Gurin (1985) argued that during the seventies four demographic characteristics (marital and work status, age and education) were significant correlates of gender consciousness.

The relationship between gender consciousness (i.e., politicized gender identification) and these background variables can be readily seen from figures 1-4. Clearly, single, working, young, and better-educated women are much more likely to express a strong sense of gender consciousness than are older, married, less well-educated and non-working women. The trends across time show some variation by demographic feature that suggests a long-term growth in consciousness. Although some increase in gender consciousness has occurred across all these demographic categories, the youngest and oldest women continue to diverge and the differences across education level have remained fairly stable over time. As women on the whole continue to become better educated and younger women replace older women through generational turnover, we can expect a continuation in the trend toward gender consciousness.

Other, social psychological and political factors have also been offered as explanations for changing group consciousness more generally. Tajfel (1981) has proposed a general theory of intergroup relations that is relevant for understanding group identification. He suggests that there are two important elements in the development of group consciousness. The first concerns an awareness of inequities that arises if the individual feels that his group lacks status or

influence unfairly. The second involves the attribution of these inequities to either shortcomings in the individual or barriers in the society. Presumably group consciousness develops among those who perceive the status inequities as unjust and believe that the cause for these status differentials lies within the social structure rather than individual failings.

Alternatively, some of the work on the gender gap suggests that the recent growth in gender consciousness may reflect the policy concerns of contemporary women (Frankovic, 1982; Deitch, 1986; Miller, 1983). Some women, particularly single heads of families, are in a situation characterized by economic uncertainty and anxiety. These women may feel that it is important for government to provide economic security for needy groups. In part this preference may arise out of economic self-interest, but alternatively it may also reflect a generic concern for all underprivileged groups and not simply women.

Measures operationalizing these alternative explanations for gender consciousness were constructed and entered into a multivariate analysis to determine their relative direct effects. The results of the analysis demonstrate that age and education were the only demographic variables that consistently influenced gender consciousness between 1972 and 1984. Marital status, contrary to what some have suggested (Plissner, 1982; Ziegler and Poole, 1985), played no significant role in either promoting or deterring the development of gender consciousness. Similarly, working outside the home was not consistently related with the politicization of gender identity, although it did have some impact in 1984. In part the weak influence of work status may arise from the fact that some women work outside the home because of economic necessity rather than free choice. The

interpretation of the work status variable is also complicated because self-selection into the work place is confounded with change in attitudes that may take place after a woman enters the work situation. The overall weakness of demographic variables to explain gender consciousness points to the limitations of research that employ only such variables.

Among the social-psychological explanations, concerns about equality for women and self system blame stand out as most important. Perceptions of inequity in the influence and status of women, as well as the belief that social barriers rather than individual limitations account for the subordinate position of women, both contributed substantially to the development of gender consciousness. In addition, in 1984 concerns about welfare assistance for the needy also contributed to the growth of consciousness and the differentiation of feminist and traditional women. This welfare concern was not, however, merely a reflection of economic self-interest as the measures of economic attitudes were significantly related with gender consciousness. In general, the larger degree of explained variance in 1984 again adds support to the broader conclusion that gender identity had become more politicized.

Conclusion

Women are increasingly viewing their social situation in political terms. This increased politicization has occurred primarily among younger and better-educated women. As these women are gradually replacing older, more traditional women we can expect a continued growth in gender consciousness. A further implication of this trend is that the recent emergence of gender as an important variable in understanding American politics will also extend into the future.

The development of women's consciousness is not simply a short-term response to the Reagan administration. This is not to say that Reagan and his policies have had no effect on the politicization of gender identity. On the contrary, a measure of Reagan approval is statistically significant (.05 level) when added to the 1984 equation in Table 6. Moreover, Reagan's attack on welfare policies in general is, no doubt, a major reason for the increased impact of welfare policy preferences on gender consciousness in 1984.

The more enduring and most important element in the development of gender consciousness, however, involves perceptions of the relative status of women in society. An increasing proportion of women are coming to view the lower status of women in society as unjust and requiring change gained through political action. As long as women earn less than men for comparable work; as long as women occupy fewer positions of influence despite comparable levels of competence; and as long as the predominant male ideology maintains that their position of privilege is legitimate, gender consciousness will continue to rise and become increasingly politicized.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The actual survey question used to measure a minimal degree of identification was "Here is a list of some of the groups we just asked you about. Please read over this list and tell me the letter for those groups you feel particularly close to--people who are most like you in their ideas, interests and feelings about things."

[2]In 1984 "feminists" was added to the list of groups from which the respondent was asked to select the one group to which they felt "closest." Only 1.1% of women selected feminists as their closest group. When constructing the gender identification measure those women who selected "feminists" were combined with those who chose "women" as their closest group.

[3]The increased correlation is not simply an artifact of increasing the variance on the independent variable (identification versus consciousness) nor is it all due to using the women's liberation thermometer. In a regression analysis with each of the five different political variables of Table 5 as the dependent measure and two independent variables (identification and the women's liberation thermometer), identification remains significant. In short both identification and collective orientation add to the explanation for political behavior. In addition, when gender consciousness II is added to this analysis it is significant in two-thirds of the equations. Thus, consciousness adds some explanatory power over and above the individual components from which it is constructed.

Although consciousness II is used for the data presentation in Table 5 the results with consciousness I are very similar. The correlations are slightly weaker with consciousness I but in every case they are still stronger than with identification alone and the across time increase in the correlations is evident for both measures.

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Table 1: Group Identification Among Women and Blacks

	1972	1976	1980	1984
Women				
Closest Identifiers	9%	11%	10%	8%
Close Identifiers	34	49	47	60
Not Identified	57	40	43	32
	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1238)	(1064)	(783)	(1044)
PDI*	-48	-29	-33	-24
Blacks				
Closest Identifiers	33%	32%	36%	32%
Close Identifiers	51	49	51	56
Not Identified	16	19	13	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(211)	(163)	(160)	(192)
PDI*	+17	+13	+23	+20

*The PDI was computed by subtracting the percentage not identified from the percentage closest.

Source: NES

Table 2: Political Attitudes and Behavior
by Gender Identification[a]

	1972	1984
Party Identification for:		
Closest Identifiers	19.8	18.4
Close Identifiers	16.2	12.0
Not Identified	17.3	6.4
Presidential Vote for:		
Closest Identifiers	-13.6	5.6
Close Identifiers	-22.4	- 6.0
Not Identified	-27.4	-26.2
Party Best on Important Problems:		
Closest Identifiers	0.0	4.3
Close Identifiers	-4.1	-0.5
Not Identified	-1.1	-5.5
Which Party Avoids War:		
Closest Identifiers	-5.8	14.8
Close Identifiers	13.1	4.3
Not Identified	16.9	-7.7
Interest in Campaign:		
Closest Identifiers	3.5	10.3
Close Identifiers	10.6	4.2
Not Identified	-6.9	-7.4

[a]Table entries are percentage difference values calculated for the first four variables by subtracting the Republican proportion from the Democratic proportion. Negative values thus indicate a predominance of Republican over Democratic partisanship, voting on party assessment. The interest in the campaign entries reflect the percent interested minus the percent not interested.

Source: NES

Table 3: Trend in Gender Consciousness Among Women 1972-1984

	1972	1976	1980	1984
Consciousness I				
High	19%	32%	36%	41%
Low	23	26	20	26
Not Identified	58	42	44	33
	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1201)	(1022)	(770)	(1027)
PDI	-39	-10	-8	+8
Consciousness II				
High	19%	32%	26%	30%
Low	23	26	30	38
Not Identified	58	42	44	33
	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1201)	(1022)	(770)	(1027)
PDI	-39	-10	-18	-3

Source: NES

Table 4: Affective Ratings of "Women" by Gender Consciousness[a]

	1976	1984
Total Women	79.5	76.0
Gender Consciousness I		
High	82.0	81.1
Low	79.0	69.7
Not Identified	75.3	72.5
Gender Consciousness II		
High	82.0	85.2
Low	79.0	73.1
Not Identified	75.3	72.5

[a]Table entries are mean thermometer ratings of "women."

Source: NES

Table 5: Political Attitudes and Behavior by Gender Consciousness[a]

	1972	1984
Party Identification for:		
High Consciousness	13.2	33.4
Low Consciousness	18.3	-0.2
Not Identified	17.3	6.4
Presidential Vote for:		
High Consciousness	- 2.8	31.2
Low Consciousness	-38.0	-30.4
Not Identified	-27.4	-26.2
Party Best on Important Problems:		
High Consciousness	2.0	26.7
Low Consciousness	-8.1	-18.3
Not Identified	-1.1	- 5.5
Which Party Avoids War:		
High Consciousness	-1.7	23.6
Low Consciousness	20.9	-9.5
Not Identified	16.9	-7.7
Interest in Campaign:		
High Consciousness	19.6	24.1
Low Consciousness	4.8	1.6
Not Identified	-6.9	-7.4

[a]Consciousness measure II was used in the analysis presented here. Table entries are percentage difference values calculated for the first four variables by subtracting the Republican proportion from the Democratic partisanship, voting or party assessment. The interest in the campaign entries reflect the percent interested minus the percent not interested.

Source: NES

Table 6: Multivariate Analysis of Gender Consciousness

	1972	1984
Predictors[a]		
Demographics:		
Age	.09	.12**
Education	-.13*	-.13**
Marital Status	.01	.01
Work Status	.03	-.10
Blue Collar	-.09	-.01
White Collar	-.07	-.05
Other Workers	.00	-.04
Income	-.06	.01
Race	.03	-.02
Political:		
Women's Equality	.12**	.16**
Self/System Blame	.11**	.12**
Welfare Policy	.04	-.15**
Concerns About War	-.08	-.06
Personal Finances	-.05	.05
National Economy	-.03	-.03
R	.30	.45
Explained Variance	.09	.20

* p<.05 ** p<.01

[a]The dependent variable used for this analysis was consciousness II. See the Appendix for a definition of the political predictors.

FIGURE 1: POLITICIZED GENDER IDENTIFICATION BY MARITAL STATUS



FIGURE 2: POLITICIZED GENDER IDENTIFICATION BY WORK STATUS



FIGURE 3: POLITICIZED GENDER IDENTIFICATION BY AGE



FIGURE 4: POLITICIZED GENDER IDENTIFICATION BY EDUCATION



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