

Nonconscious Goal Pursuit

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It appears that I'm the only who actually outsourced part of my talk. Steven has graciously agreed to give the second half of my talk on the implications for evoking behavior, so I will do the first half. It's not really half; I'll do more than half. Of course, we consciously pursue goals all the time, but there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that we also non-consciously pursue goals as well. So the environment can activate goals outside of conscious awareness, and then without intending to, we end up pursuing those goals. So in 1990 John [Bargh] published a chapter where he introduced what he called the "automotive model," saying that goals are mentally represented like other constructs are, and because of this, they should have the capability of being automatically activated by features of the environment. Once activated, these non-conscious goals can operate outside of awareness to guide the way think and the way people behave.

Since then, there have been a number of more sophisticated, more nuance, I guess, models of non-conscious goal pursuit. The way that we look at it is sequentially. "*So what happens when a goal is pursued outside of conscious awareness?*" So some feature of the environment automatically activates a goal, and we then engage in this goal-directed cognition and behavior outside of conscious awareness. We then succeed or fail at a non-conscious goal, and then there are downstream consequences of that.

A lot of my research is actually focused on what happens when we succeed or fail at a non-consciously pursued goal, but I thought given the topic of this conference, it might be better for me today to focus on the first part of this sequence. "*So what aspects of the environment can automatically activate these goals in people?*" That's what I'll do today.

When researchers first started studying this "non-conscious goal pursuit," the paradigm in the lab was to sort of prime the goal directly in the lab environment, which is sort of a proxy for the environmental features that in the real world are what are activating the non-conscious goals. So people are brought into a lab, and they're usually exposed to words that are semantically related to the goal construct. Then that activates the goal, and people look to see if that, in fact, leads people to engage in goal-directed cognition and behavior outside of their awareness.

I'll give you an example of a study that we had done recently in the consumer behavior domain that's done this — that's primed a goal directly and looked to see if that affects people's choice, and in this case, choice behavior.

So consumers pursue conscious goals and this guides their purchase behavior and their choice, so we wanted to test whether these goals can automatically be activated by the environment. We primed people

with a scrambled sentence task with one of two consumer goals — either a value goal or a prestige goal. People are given in each item in the scrambled sentence task five words that are jumbled up. They're told to unscramble these words and use four of the five to form a coherent sentence. Imbedded in the task are words related to the construct that we're trying to prime, and so here, the goal that we're trying to prime. This is the prestige version of the scrambled sentence task, "prestige, expensive, impress others, image-conscious," and so forth are imbedded in this task and there are 20 items.

This is the other version of the task — the value version with "tight-fisted, prudent, save money, price-conscious," and so forth which are imbedded in this version of the task. So they're given one version or the other, and so we've directly now activated or primed this goal to either get a lot of value or get a prestigious item. Then we wanted to see whether this would affect the choices that they make — the consumer choices that they make. People were then given these scenarios where they had to choose between two products. One was high in value and low in prestige, and one was high in prestige and low in value. So here's a scenario. They're told, "You notice it's time to throw away your cotton crew socks and buy new ones." You're considering the two options here, so Nike, the high prestige one, and then the Hanes, which is the high value choice.

What we find is that 90 percent of people who were primed with those value-related words in the scrambled sentence task chose the Hanes, whereas only 68 percent of the people who were given the prestige version of the scrambled sentence task picked up the value choice. Afterwards, we asked them, "Do you remember any of the words from the scrambled sentence task? Was there any theme that stood out to you? Any pattern that you recognize?" In no case—it's very subtle. They're thinking that it's a language task. They're not aware of the theme or pattern, and they're not able to remember any of the words related to the goal that we're trying to activate.

The same thing was done with this other scenario where they're choosing a home theatre system, so Toshiba versus Bose. We've done the high value, and then the high prestige version of this. Again, the choice of value is higher for people who were earlier exposed to those value-related words — 62 percent versus 37 percent in the prestige prime condition.

So changing people's consumer choices as a function of this goal that was activated beforehand, and the same thing with an apartment. We gave them two different apartments — one sort of high value apartment, and one more prestigious and a nice apartment. We get movement there as well in these hypothetical scenarios.

But you might argue that it's not clear that we've activated a goal, so how do we know that it's an actual motivational state that's guiding their consumer choices there? We know from work by [Bargh, Chen, and

Burrows, Macrae and Johnson], you can activate traits directly and get people to automatically behave in line with those traits, so if you prime people with helpfulness, they become more helpful. If you prime people with the rude construct, they become more rude. So maybe we just prime people with value, and then they chose the high value option, so it's not necessarily the case that there was a goal involved.

We wanted to see whether motivational properties are present. This is a common theme in the non-conscious goal literature is that people are always saying, "How do you know that's a goal? How do you know that's a goal?" There are some qualities of motivational states that you can look for to see if those are present after non-consciously activating the goal-related construct, and the truth is that probably multiple things are activated by engaging in this scrambled sentence task or by being subliminally primed with semantic associates of the goal construct. That's probably the case, that we are activating traits and maybe a lot of other things in addition to the goal construct, but still, you can look for properties of motivational states to see if at least there are some motivational properties there.

So we did the same exact study, basically, with the same scenarios and everything where we primed people first with either value or prestige. We just introduced a new variable. Here is the manipulation where they either had no delay between the priming and the choice that they made, or there was a nine-minute delay. So if it's just trait activation, the effect should dissipate over time over this nine-minute delay so that nine minutes later they're not activated with that construct anymore. The effects should be less robust, then. But if it is a goal that we're activating and there is actually a motivational component there, then this effect should actually increase over time, according to classic goal theory.

So we replicate what we found before when there is no delay. This is an aggregate of the three scenarios — the socks, the stereo system and the apartments. No delay. We found what we found before. What happens when there is a delay? Does it go away, or does it increase? It increased significantly over the delay, suggesting that there is a motivational component there that is guiding people's consumer choice.

Another component of motivational states is that when a goal is satiated that it decreases in activation. So what would happen if we sort of satiate people's goals here? Would they in fact go away? Well, they should if it's an actual goal state; however, these are hypothetical scenarios that we're giving people. Maybe that's not satiating. You're asking them that hypothetically you're choosing between two apartments, and hypothetically you're choosing between these two stereo systems.

Maybe that's not enough to really satiate people, so we wanted to look at that as well as to see, "*Do hypothetical choices satiate non-conscious goals? Do real choices satiate non-conscious goals?*" So participants were primed, again, with brand image or a value goal. Then they were given a choice about \$6 worth of socks. They could either pick two Hanes socks, or one pair of Nike socks, so the prestige option

and then the value option. Then it was either hypothetical or real, so with the hypothetical they're said, "Okay, imagine that you're choosing between these two sock options." In the real choice we have the socks in there, and they actually picked up and they took it and put it in their backpack.

So they actually made this choice, so how was that choice affected by what they were primed with? Well, regardless of whether it was a real or hypothetical choice, people who were primed with prestige were more likely to pick the Nike relative to the Hanes choice compared to people who were primed with value. So that's not surprising. We've just replicated what we found before.

But then, after this they were given a second real choice of what they would like to get if they win this lottery. So they're told, "Okay, your name is entered in a lottery. If you win, would you like choice A or choice B?" It was watches. One was a high prestige watch. Not crazy Rolex or anything, but like a Guess watch and the other one was Timex. We wanted to see now that they've been satiated or not satiated here, what do they do here at time two. So what we've found is that with real choice we found satiation. There is no difference between people anymore who are primed with brand image — prime or prestige prime versus value. There was no difference anymore, so it wiped out the priming effect making a real choice at time one for this. This is time two.

What about hypothetical choice? It's still there. That difference is still there. When they just made a hypothetical choice between two socks, that didn't satiate their non-conscious goal, and you'd get this strong difference between people who are primed with prestige versus value at time two on this second choice that they're making. It's also something interesting, I think, about the effects of making these hypothetical choices on non-conscious goals. I haven't done this with conscious goals, comparing the two within the same study here, but it would be interesting to do that.

So in this work, like I said, we're directly priming the goal itself and looking to see whether that leads people to pursue that goal outside of their conscious awareness. But the idea of priming the goal directly like that, that doesn't happen in real life, right? We're hopefully not engaging in all of these scrambled sentence tasks and being primed with these goals like that, but we are primed with things naturally in the environment.

Certain features in the environment can activate these goals in us, so what are these sort of natural antecedents of non-conscious goals? So we can break this or unpack the environment here, and there are three triggers of non-conscious goals that I'll talk about — situational cues, other people and objects seem to be the three general classes of triggers that have been examined so far. It's not to say that this is exhaustive, because this is all pretty recent work.

So situational cues, just to review a little bit what's been done here — power. So situations that power seems to automatically activate is sex-related goals, at least for men who are high in the likelihood to sexually harass. It also leads to people with communal social orientations to have social responsibility goals, which are automatically activated by power environments. Ego threat. If people who get bogus feedback on an intelligence test or have been told that they did very poorly, they have a goal to restore their self-esteem automatically activated and they start stereotyping more. Temptations. Ayelet Fishbach and her colleagues, people who are primed with a temptation like chocolate cake have a goal for self-control automatically activated by just the presence of the temptation. This is particularly true for effective self-regulators.

Sense. There is an interesting article in *Psych Science* about a year ago. [Rob Holland and Henk Aarts] and their colleagues looked at how the citrus scent that was subtly in the room activated goals in people. They found that when they were in a room where there was a citrus scent, they had a goal to clean. They would start picking up their crumbs more and started cleaning by just the scent of the citrus.

Social norms, also Hank Arts and colleagues, so where certain norms like a library will automatically activate goals that are associated with those norms — the library environment will automatically activate a goal to be quiet and a goal to be silent in participants. So those are very situational cues that can automatically activate these goals, and then once activated, people pursue these goals outside of their conscious awareness.

Other people can also be triggers of these non-conscious goals, so stereotype activation. Gordon Moskowitz and colleagues have found that activating among chronic egalitarians — so often some of these effects are moderated by individual differences — but for chronic egalitarians activating the African American stereotype leads to fairness goals being automatically activated. Goal contagions of Hank Arts and colleagues have found that if you are looking at someone and they're engaging in behavior and you perceive this person and their behavior to seem to be fairly goal driven in nature, you will automatically take on that same goal.

So if you see someone engaging in behavior that seems like they're trying to make money, you will yourself have a goal to make money automatically activated and then start pursuing that. The goals are contagions, and we pick up on other people's goals.

Goal contagions can also occur via stereotype activation, and I'll talk a little bit about this work in particular, since I'm involved with this particular project. So not just perceiving individual other people that that can lead you to pick up other goals, but being primed with or seeing social groups or stereotypes can also lead to goals being automatically activated.

So what we did was prime some social groups and look to see whether that led to non-conscious pursuit of stereotyped consistent goals. In the first study, participants were primed with either the names of social

groups associated with a goal to help or not, and this was done in the Netherlands. The pilot test found what groups these were — nurses, volunteers, therapists, rescue workers, collectors — which is funny but this is the Netherlands — and fire workers. They were associated with the goal to help. A scrambled sentence task was done where these social groups were imbedded in the scrambled sentence task, and so there was one version that had these “helping social groups” imbedded, and another version that didn’t have these helping social groups and had “other social groups” imbedded in there that weren’t associated with the helpfulness goal.

Okay, so the DV, the participants after completing one version of the scrambled sentence task or the other sat across from an experimenter. There was a box of tissues on the corner, and there was a dirty — like a nasty, wet tissue on top of the box of Kleenex. So the experimenter pretended that they had a cold and reached for a Kleenex and knocked this dirty one over, and it’s out of reach for the experimenter, but it’s right in reach of the participant. So do they pick up this nasty, used tissue or not? Here there is a clear reason for them not to. If it is a goal, then they should be more likely to do it in spite of this obstacle or reason against doing it.

What we’ve found is that more than percentage-wise, twice the percentage of people in the control group picked it up if they had earlier been exposed to social groups associated with helping, so nurses and therapists and so forth. They were more likely to pick up these tissues. In another follow-up study to this, we wanted to replicate it, but to see whether there was another motivational quality present. So in this case, overcoming obstacles. If a goal is actually present as a motivational state and not just some trait construct — for example, or non-motivational construct — then there should be persistence in the face of obstacles. [Bargh] in 2001 found that this is the case, so people were, again, present. This was run in the Netherlands as well. So the pilot test determined that there were certain groups that were associated with the goal of making money and not surprisingly it was accountants, stockbrokers, mortgage advisor and so forth.

Again, a scrambled sentence task activated these groups for a control set of social groups that weren’t associated with the goal of making money. Now, once they’ve been primed with these social groups or not, we wanted to see whether they seemed to have a goal to make money and whether they were acting as if they had this goal.

They were told that they were going to have an opportunity to make money in this lottery game at the end, but first they had to do this mouse-clicking task. They had to get through this before they got to the moneymaking opportunity. Half were given an imposed time constraint. Half of the people were told, “If there’s time at the end when you’re done with this mouse-clicking task, then we’ll do the moneymaking lottery game at the end. If not, if there’s no time for it — oh well, we’re not going to do that.” The other half

were given no time constraints, so no matter what, whenever you finish this mouse-clicking task — we will do the lottery game at the end where you have an opportunity to make money.

So the dependent measure is the actual speed of the mouse-clicking task. So we purposely didn't want our DV here to be anything about making money. We wanted to look at how quickly they're trying to get through this obstacle that's in their way of potentially making money. If they have a goal to make money, then they should be much quicker. The reaction time should be quicker on this mouse-clicking task, because this is in their way of what they want to get to — but only if there's a time constraint. Otherwise, they know that it's coming anyway.

There was no imposed time constraint. They were going to be able to make the money no matter what was at the end of the study. There is no difference between the people who were primed with the money social groups versus not, but we did find a big difference if there was an imposed time constraint. People who were primed with "goal to make money" social groups, those folks if there was the time constraint were suddenly much quicker on this mouse clicking task. They wanted to get through that and get to the chance to make some money. So again, looking for the existence of motivational qualities here to make sure that it is a goal, in fact, that's being activated and not just some sort of passive trait construct, for example.

Significant others. These are other people — stereotypes, looking, perceiving another person who seems to be engaged in goal consistent behavior, but what about people who are actually meaningful to us, our significant others? They probably also activate goals in us, and probably more often than other people do. So how does this happen? Well, [Grainne Fitzsimons and John Bargh] have a nice paperwork. They show that significant others automatically activate goals that individuals pursue when they're with those particular significant others. If I'm always friendly with my friends, then just being primed with my friend or seeing my friend will automatically activate that friendliness goal in me, and then I'll pursue it.

Jim Shaw, the same year, had a similar paper where what he found is that significant others automatically activate goals that they chronically have for individuals. So if my mother wants me to achieve, then me being primed with my mother — seeing my mother — is going to automatically activate an achievement goal in me. So these are two interesting ways, these two interesting mechanisms by which significant others can activate these goals in us.

One thing that we started wondering about is, *"Do you always get assimilation with this? Am I always going to take on the goal that's associated with the significant other, or would you sometimes get reactance or get a contrast effect basically where people are going to automatically take on the opposing goal — the opposite of what their significant other wants them to do?"* So we wanted to test this. We thought that one moderator of this might be individual levels of reactance, so some people are more reactant than others naturally, and

so we wanted to identify those people — the highly reactant people and the low reactant people and seeing how they differ in terms of what goals they have automatically activated by the mere presence of their significant others.

In a prescreening participants listed the names of significant others who wanted them to work hard and relax. So they were asked, “List the name of the significant other who really wants you to work hard,” and a bunch of other things, and imbedded there was also, “List the first name of the significant other who wants you to relax.” Then they were brought in and subliminally primed with either the person who wanted them to work hard, or the person who wanted them to relax and that was between subjects. It was a subliminal priming procedure and so they didn’t see it — that’s my mom’s name — but they didn’t see the name that was flashed. So they had no awareness that they had been activated with their significant other. They don’t see the name at all. Then they’re given a difficult anagram task, and they’re all pretty difficult but solvable.

Then they completed the Hong reactance scale, which measures individual differences in sort of the propensity to react and rebel against what other people want you to do. Reactance, as [Brehm] conceptualized it many years ago, is sort of the signature of it is really feeling that your freedom is threatened. If someone is threatening your freedom, then you have this reactance response in an attempt to get that freedom back — to restore your threatened freedom.

The DV was the performance on the anagram task. If you weren’t thinking about the possibility of reactance and just looking at Jim’s prior work, then you would say, “Well, okay. People who are primed with a person who wants them to work hard will work harder and do better on the anagram tasks than people who were subliminally primed with the person who wants them to relax. And that will have an unconscious—people will automatically take on these goals that the significant others have for them, so we thought that would be true, but only for low reactant people. For highly reactant people we might get people to automatically take on the opposite goal. These are the slopes of the regression line, so this is reactance on the X-axis here, and these are the slopes for the three different priming conditions.

So the red line is the control condition, and so what you see is compared to the control condition if you look at the pink line, which is relaxed, as chronic reactance levels go up, people work harder on the anagram task and do better on it. They work harder here as reactance levels get higher. People actually perform worse, even though they were primed with the work hard significant others, they actually do worse. If you do a spotlight analysis just looking at these points too — the standard deviations below — very low reactant people where you get a significant difference, and so low reactant people, this is replicating Jim’s work earlier. If people are primed with the work hard significant other, they do better. If they’re primed with the relaxed significant other, then they do worse. So that makes sense, but here just looking at highly reactant people, you get the opposite pattern. You’re getting this contrast effect. You’re getting this automatic

reactance, where people who are primed with word hard significant other actually do worse, and people who are primed with relaxed significant other actually do better.

So I think that the relationship between significant others and the goals that we automatically take on and pursue is a little bit more nuanced than maybe originally thought, in that we don't always just take on the goal that others have for us.

Objects. So situational cues, and other people can be triggers of non-conscious goals. Objects also can be. You can think of objects and classify them here as non-anthropomorphized objects and anthropomorphized objects. I'm making this distinction, because you get different types of effects. So with non-anthropomorphized objects [Aaron Kay, Wheeler, Bargh and Ross] have this nice demonstration that people who are primed with objects that are associated with certain things; for example, objects that are associated with a competitive environment or a work environment like a briefcase, boardroom and so on — if they are primed with those kinds of objects, they actually are more competitive in a prisoner's dilemma game, than people who are primed with non-work-related or non-competitive objects.

Brands can be thought of as non-anthropomorphized objects. *“Can brands automatically activate goals in consumers?”* In a recent study we tested this. This was actually a follow-up to the prestige and value prime study, but this is where we actually didn't just prime the value or prestige goal directly. Instead, we activated stores that we thought were associated with these particular goals, so participants were either primed with high end stores like Nordstrom, Tiffany and so on, or with low end stores like Wal-Mart or the Dollar Store. They were primed with these things subliminally, so they had no awareness that they were being exposed to these things. *“Do these activate goals in people through either value or prestige, high end brand image and so forth?”* If so, then being activated with these brands should lead people to their consumer choices to differ accordingly, and they should be more likely to choose the prestigious option, if they were previously flashed with Nordstrom.

They were asked after being primed to rate two pairs of socks and two microwaves, so how likely are they buy the Nike versus Hanes — the high prestige versus the value socks and the Sharp versus the Haier microwave for prestige versus value. For the socks and the microwave you get the same pattern where people who are primed with Nordstrom, Tiffany, Neiman-Marcus, etc. — the high end stores — were more likely to have higher numbers and indicate a greater preference for the prestige option on this 1-7 scale and had a higher preference for the prestige than people who were primed with Dollar Store, Wal-Mart, Kmart and so forth. The same with the microwave choice, so priming these brands seemed to give people these non-conscious goals for prestige or for value, and then that affected their choice in another domain that wasn't necessarily related to the store that they were primed with.

Anthropomorphized objects also can trigger non-conscious goals. So animals — I'll just mention this first because I'm not going to talk about this — animals oftentimes are anthropomorphized and treated as if they have human characteristics, and of course, they do. For all of your pets out there, I'm sure that they do. But what we've actually found is that if you prime animals, you actually get people to have their goals that are associated with the stereotypes of those animals automatically activated. So if you prime people with dogs, they have a goal to be loyal. If you prime people with cats, they have a goal to be independent automatically activated, and we're following that up now.

What I wanted to turn to was brands as anthropomorphized objects, so before brands as non-anthropomorphized objects — activating Nordstrom's leads people to choose more high value or high prestige kinds of goods, but brands also are thought of as having personalities. So Jennifer [Aaker] in her work, with her colleagues, have talked about this for the last ten years or so arguing that brands are really anthropomorphized. They have personalities. We can think of the personality associated with Nike, for example, and that it has a very specific personality because of that. *"Because they're anthropomorphized, goals may be associated with these brands. If so, can brands then activate the corresponding goals in individuals?"*

Now, this isn't about choice behavior. This isn't about priming Nordstrom and getting people to choose more expensive socks. This is about activating goals that are just associated with the brands that aren't related to purchase behavior at all, so what about the Apple brand? We'll take this as an example. The Apple brand has really constructed this creative brand personality over the years through this advertising campaign of innovation and standing out — being different, think different and creativity.

So we wanted to see if we primed the Apple logo or the Apple brand, and will that lead people to have a goal to be creative? So people were subliminally presented with the Apple logo or the IBM logo, and there are different logos that we used that were matched for color between subjects, and then they're given a standard creativity measure. "Just think of as many different uses for a brick that you can come up with," and what we've found is that compared to a control condition people who were primed with the Apple brand came up with more uses for a brick than people who were primed with the IBM logo.

We also had a couple of judges code for how creative, how innovative and unusual these uses for a brick were, because it could be that they're just writing — they're very prolific and writing down all sorts of uses, but they're actually not very creative. But when you look at the judges' ratings of creativity, you get the same patterns. The same thing with uniqueness, you get the same pattern. People who were subliminally primed and so they're not aware of this link, but people subliminally primed with the Apple brand were more creative. *"Did they have a goal to be creative?"* We also did this delay task with a five-minute delay and found that if there's no delay we replicated

it — Apple more creative than IBM. With the delay it got significantly stronger, so it is that they have a goal to be creative.

They want to be creative, so anthropomorphized brands like Apple that had these personalities, including creativity associated with them, can activate goals that are in line with the brand and lead people to engage in this goal-driven behavior.

This is the last study. This is another sort of quality of motivational states, is that if people are given goal progress, because we talked before about goals being satiated or not satiated, but if people are given progress reports that you're either making great strides towards meeting your goals or you're not doing so well in meeting this particular goal — if it is a motivational state, that should impact the way that they pursue that goal going forward.

So we primed people with either the E! Channel or the Disney Channel, and pre-testing had shown that they're equally liked, actually, these two channels. People equally liked them, but the Disney Channel is associated with more honesty than the E! Channel, not surprisingly. We wondered whether the Disney Channel would lead people to have a goal to be honest, so we primed them with one or the other.

Then we added this feedback manipulation here where they either were given no feedback, or they're given this feedback where they're told, *“Thinking about the aspects in your everyday behavior that you could change to become a more honest person, how honest do you believe that you are?”* So this is a sort of a failure feedback. Think of all of the ways in which you're not honest, so people aren't feeling that they're doing very well in terms of their goal to be an honest person, versus this manipulation — thinking about the aspects of your behavior that show that you are an honest person. “Yes,” they're writing this down. “Yes, I am an honest person,” so their progress report is that they are in fact honest, that they are making great strides towards their goals. *“Now, how does that affect their honest behavior?”* We assess this by giving them a social desirability scale and looking to see how honest they were on that scale.

What we've found is that low progress people, you're getting this difference — higher numbers are more dishonest responses and lower number are more honest responses. So low progress people, they aren't making enough progress towards their goal. They have a goal and it's in a motivational state there, and people who are primed with Disney are more honest than people who are primed with E!. But high progress, you're making lots of progress. You're very honest. They're just thinking about all of these ways in which they're honest — that effect goes away. Now, they think of this as another way of showing goal satiation. Now, their goals have been satiated, and now you get no difference between the two.

So these are the three triggers that I mentioned of non-conscious goals, the situational cues, other people and objects. As I mentioned, after this happens, success and failure at the non-consciously held and pursued goals, and then there are downstream consequences of that as well, but we won't talk about that today. For implications, we're going to turn the stage over to Steven. (*End of Chartrand_1 file*)

[new speaker]

There are just a couple of things that I wanted to mention based on what I just saw that I didn't have anything up on a slide, so I just wanted to make mention of it since it's not on slide. First, I couldn't unscramble those first sentences so I don't know what that says about me. (*Laughter*)

The other thing is this stuff I read, I guess if it had the primes, I wasn't reading closely enough last night. But that primed stuff is really cool. Of course, I start thinking about political advertising, and the question is, of course, "Can you get away with it?" Many of you probably remember the infamous "bureaucrat rats" ad, right? So I just kind of wonder in these days when everybody is probably going frame by frame on every political ad ever made, but there is clearly a really strong potential there to do something with that. But, obviously, you probably would be caught, so the thing to do would be more just non-subliminal primes and actual primes. I guess that dogs would be good, you know. I guess that Nixon knew what he was doing with Checkers.

I don't know if any of you have seen this ad in Maryland. "Michael Steele hates puppies." That's a good ad. The Democrats came back with a nice, "Well, maybe he does love puppies, but he's still bad for the senate" and what not. So I don't have a lot of coherence here, but I just had some ideas in response to this. The first is thinking about non-conscious goal pursuit. "*What are some political goals that we have that might be non-consciously pursued?*" I'm a political parties guy, among other things, so I started thinking about the goals of political parties, participation and material goals — maybe not so much, but actually some, yes. Attitude expression or purposive or expressive goals, certainly those are some.

Solidary affiliation. Obviously, our affiliation with groups or desire to associate with others can certainly be something that we can see as a non-conscious goal, and there has been a lot of talk about social identity theory here. I think that is something that political scientists need to think more about, and this would suggest as well to think about that as a possible non-conscious goal.

Certainly, people have a desire of a goal for policy change. I don't know if that's good for a non-conscious goal, but hey, it's a goal. I put it up there, and certainly information processing — how we're going to respond to all of the political messages that we are receiving and the degree, and then the "dot, dot, dot," because I'm sure there are like a dozen more that I just didn't think of them, because I'm not smart enough.

So non-political goals with political implications I thought about. Then, one of the things that really occurred to me, of course, is surveys and, of course, hey! ANES, right? So certainly there's your self-presentation. We've learned a lot about social desirability. We know the effects here. Political knowledge, people want to appear knowledgeable. For example, we know that this is more the case with men than women, right? Men guess more on political knowledge items than women do, or are probably more likely to say that they know the answer when they don't.

Civic duty. The desire to be a good citizen. It's well proven that people lie to some degree when asked whether they voted, and that these numbers tend to be inflated. Autonomy is one that occurred to me from my own work, and people want to show that they are independent and they are an autonomous political actor. In my own research I look a lot at party ID, and one of the interesting things is that nobody — not nobody — but we have all of these people who say, "Oh, I'm an independent," but then you go and look at their other attitudes and their other behaviors, and they're basically, practically a party line Democrat or Republican. There is this goal of appearing independent and autonomous. "Oh, I vote for the person and not the party." Again, I'm not sure of how conscious or non-conscious that is, but that certainly is something I think that plays in there as well.

So as political scientists I think that certainly one of the questions — some of these goals such as social desirability is something that we've looked at a lot and how that affects the survey response, and probably with the civic duty as well and how that affects people's lying. We've done validated vote studies and what not, but maybe what are some of these other non-conscious goals — what I've listed here and others that, again, I'm surely not thinking of that maybe affecting the types, the quality, the validity of the survey responses that we're seeing. Again, one of the questions is, "*How conscious are these goals when answering a political survey?*" To what degree is it automatic that people just say, "Oh, I know that I can't admit that I'm a racist," versus people again consciously processing, "Oh, I don't know, I can't say that I'm a racist. I don't know." Again, that's something to think about.

The triggers of this non-conscious goal activation, those that I thought seemed especially politically relevant was this idea of goal contagions and looking to others along with the stereotyped activation. "Hmm, stereotypes?" Political parties, right? Political figures. "*So to what degree does seeing George Bush or hearing something about the Republican Party or the Democrat Party trigger these goal motivations?*" That's obviously something that we can very much look at, and furthermore, what are the goals? We think with the schemas, and what not, that we associate with a political party or a particular political candidate. "*What type of goal pursuit is that going to perhaps create in people?*" is another thought that occurred to me.

Also, thinking of the triggers, "*What are the triggers in our political environment that are going to lead to potentially non-conscious goal pursuit?*" The voting booth, obviously, one that we're going to care a lot about

and just any political situation like that in this survey environment. *“What are the triggers in being called up by Gallup or any survey organization or what not and being asked, or the ANES, and being asked all of these questions or having somebody come to your door face-to-face?”* Again, all of these findings, which would suggest that we should think a little bit more about what sort of non-conscious goals may be triggered or activated.

Again, this idea of just any exposure to political information from seeing George Bush on TV to seeing “Keep Mike Nifong” on a yard sign that we’re seeing out here. I have this nice little quote from one of Tanya’s papers, “Exposure to names of social groups activates goals consistent with group stereotypes.” So, again, the stereotype activation with the goal contagion, politically what are we seeing going on there? Then the question mark, because again, surely there are more political triggers. This is just like top-of-my-last-night’s-head list.

Then the idea of success or failure. Success leads to greater self-efficacy and persistence of goal-directed behavior. When we talk about politics, this, of course, made me think of political efficacy — the idea that you matter and the idea that you can affect the political system. So in theory, success with your political goals should lead to greater political efficacy and, of course, failure with less efficacy. Again, this struck me as something that certainly would be looked at through this perspective. One of the things is that success leads to more persistence. *“To what degree do we see that? “How is success defined?”* Is voting for your candidate and your candidate won, is that success? I don’t know. Again, it’s something to think about.

Certainly, ANES has a lot that we can do, with virtually all of these things. We have political efficacy, and we certainly have great measures for candidate and party stereotypes, group affiliation, party ID, and obviously, I think that this is something, though — this idea of group affiliation where the study could improve. The closest measures, I think, don’t give us enough of what we want and, of course, the information exposure. There are all sorts of great questions on political knowledge of where you’re getting your news from, if you know who Katie Couric is, etc.

Then as far as the non-conscious aspects of it, and using ANES, I don’t know if one can tease out the non-conscious for the conscious — or I’m not really even sure that it matters all that much, so maybe it’s not the big problem. That kind of struck me as the place where I would end on my political implications. All right.
(End of Chartrand_2 (Steven) file)