

A REPORT ON MEASURES OF AMERICAN IDENTITY AND NEW
"ETHNIC" ISSUES IN THE 1991 NES PILOT STUDY

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INTRODUCTION

Questions of race and ethnicity have been a perennial source of conflict in American society. Recent demographic and cultural trends are fostering new dimensions of ethnic competition with ongoing implications for public policy and electoral politics. The 1990 Census confirms the rapid growth in the Hispanic and Asian segments of the population initiated by the 1965 reforms in immigration law. This influx of racial and linguistic minorities is occurring in the context of a political climate that increasingly emphasizes the legitimacy of ethnic solidarity and distinctiveness. Advocates of "multiculturalism" have mounted an explicit challenge to the traditional ideal of the melting pot. In the meantime, changes in the global economy have raised doubts about American power and prestige, reinforcing internally generated doubts about national cohesion and power.

The questions we proposed for inclusion in the 1991 Pilot Study were designed to explore the impact of these transformations on public opinion. The principal ethnic fault line in American society divides whites from blacks; accordingly, earlier NES surveys have concentrated on measuring racial attitudes and preferences on racial policies. The focus of these NES questions moved with the times, shifting from general questions about desegregation and the pace of racial change to more policy-oriented items about busing, government aid to blacks and affirmative action policy. Innovation **in** the measurement of **independent** variables produced the feeling thermometers for demographic and political groups, measures of individualism and egalitarianism and, most recently, Kinder's Racial Prejudice Index.

Our inquiry is predicated upon the belief that there will be a somewhat different ethnic agenda in the 1990s. First of all, the growth and mobilization of Hispanic and Asian groups has altered the shape of ethnic competition for jobs, college admissions, government contracts and legislative seats. The debate over the legitimacy of ethnic entitlement has become more complex as the number of players has grown.

Second, the changing ethnic composition of society is making new issues salient: immigration policy, language rights, the content of public education, and foreign policy toward immigrants' countries of origin are the most obvious examples.

Third, the rise of ethnic consciousness has created a potential crisis of

national identity, raising anew the historic American problem of how to forge a common sense of nationhood among many culturally diverse groups. For many ethnic activists, an important political goal is to replace the melting pot and assimilation with the mosaic and multiculturalism as defining symbols of American identity. In this context, the balance of psychic power among national and sub-national loyalties and identifications is a salient empirical issue.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The questions we proposed for the 1991 Pilot Study can be divided into these main categories:

1. Items that measure normative conceptions of American national identity;
2. Items that measure opinions about immigration in general and Hispanic immigration in particular;
3. Items that measure opinions about language policy;
4. Additional feeling thermometers that assess affect toward immigrants and Hispanic groups.

Because these items are new to NES surveys, we are not in the position to comment on how they compare, methodologically, to existing alternatives. Instead, we shall concentrate on describing the internal relationships among these questions and their connections to relevant categories of demographic variables and measures of political predispositions and policy preferences.

From a theoretical perspective, it is worth pointing out that we conceive of one's sense of national identity as an "enduring symbolic predisposition." This general attitude is likely to influence preferences on those specific issues framed by cues that manifestly affirm (or challenge) the respondent's conception of Americanism. To determine whether or not immigration and language policies engage subjective conceptions of American identity is one objective of this inquiry.

The constraints of a ten minute interview limited our questioning to just the two "new" ethnic issues, immigration and language policy, mentioned above.

We also were forced to confine our attention to opinions about only one ethnic minority, Hispanics. Thus we cannot compare feelings about immigrants of diverse origin. We shall, however, use other items in the Pilot Study and the 1990 NES Survey to explore the degree of constraint between the evolving ethnic agenda and earlier racial policies. We also can examine in a preliminary way the extent to which affective orientations toward distinct ethnic minorities are differentiated.

We should state at the outset that limitations of sample size restrict the bulk of our analysis to the attitudes of whites, although for illustrative purposes we do occasionally refer to the opinions of the small number (45) of blacks who responded to Form 1 of the Pilot Study.

AMERICAN IDENTITY

In seeking to measure respondents' subjective conceptions of national identity, we were concerned with the question "Who is an American?" While in most countries national identity is founded on ascriptive characteristics such as language, religion or ethnic heritage, most observers agree that the dominant conception of American nationality is fundamentally different, resting instead on the acceptance of a political "creed."

We define the "sense of American identity", therefore, as the emotional attachment to the symbols and values that constitute this "creed." Operationally, we proceeded by asking people how important certain qualities were for making someone a "true American." In regarding responses as indicators of approval of or attachment to these norms, we clearly are inferring that the attributes of the "true American" are positive symbols. Given that previous surveys consistently report overwhelmingly positive orientations toward emblems

of nationhood such as the flag, national anthem or "country", this assumption seems plausible. Nevertheless, it remains important to provide more direct evidence of a connection between normative conceptions of American identity and positive affect toward the nation.

Table 1(a) reports the marginals for the six American identity items included in the 1991 Pilot Study. Table 1(b) provides comparative evidence from the 1988 California Poll, which first employed a version of these questions. The text of the NES question differed by noting that some people rejected the very idea of a "true American." Second, the response options in the Pilot Study allowed for more disaggregation of the positive responses by including the "extremely important" choice while eliminating the "not too important" category.

A comparison of the marginals in the national and California data suggests that the NES approach is an improvement that succeeds in discriminating levels of intensity among responses. While the proportion of respondents in the national survey who chose either the "extremely important" or "very important" were remarkably similar to those choosing the "very important" response to the equivalent American identity items in the California sample, respondents did avail themselves of the chance to vary the strength of their expressed beliefs. In subsequent surveys that include these items, the distinction between "extremely" and "very" important on the positive end of the continuum should be retained.

Four of the six items described in Table 1a refer to the dominant, ideological definition of American nationality, referring to the values of social equality, political tolerance, self-reliance and civic participation respectively. The first two derive from the liberal strain in the American political tradition, whereas the latter two items endorse a conception of Americanism rooted in the

TABLE 1A
MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY ITEMS
1991 NES PILOT STUDY

1991 NES Text for American Identity Items:

The lead-in read:

'Some People say that there are certain qualities that make a person a true American. Others say that there isn't anything that makes one person more American than another. I'm going to read some of the things that have been mentioned. For each of the following, tell me how important you think it is in making someone a true American - extremely important, very (important), somewhat (important), or not at all (important) in making someone a true American.'

The question wording:

VOTE (V2601)- 'Is voting in elections extremely important, very (important), somewhat (important), or not at all (important) in making someone a true American?'

BELIEVE IN GOD (V2602)- 'How about believing in God? Is it extremely important, very (important), somewhat (important), or not at all (important) in making someone a true American?'

GET AHEAD ON OWN (V2603) - 'Trying to get ahead on your own effort? (Is it...)'

TREAT ALL EQUALLY (V2604)- 'Treating people of all races and backgrounds equally? (Is it...).'

SPEAK ENGLISH (V2605) - 'Speaking English? (Is it...).'

RESPECT OTHERS' SPEECH (V2606) - 'Respecting people's freedom to say what they want no matter how much you disagree? (Is it...).'

	Extremely	Very	Somewhat	Not At All
V2601 VOTE	34%	36	21	8
V2602 BELIEVE IN GOD	25	25	22	28
V2603 GET AHEAD ON OWN	27	43	24	6
V2604 TREAT ALL EQUALLY	40	45	13	2
V2605 SPEAK ENGLISH	26	38	25	11
V2606 RESPECT OTHERS' SPEECH *	38	43	16	3

* This item not asked in 1988 California Poll

TABLE 1B
MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY ITEMS
1988 CALIFORNIA POLL

1988 California Poll Text for American Identity Items:

The lead-in read:

"People have different ideas about what is really important in making someone a true American. I'm going to read a list of things that have been mentioned. For each one, please tell me how important it is in making a person an American. Do you think (insert item) is very important, somewhat important, not too important or not at all important in making someone a true American?"

All question wordings were the same, except SPEAK ENGLISH, which read,

"Do you think speaking and writing English is very important,..."

In addition, one more question was used on the 1988 Field California Poll which was not included in the 1991 NES Pilot questionnaire, this is:

DEFEND U.S. WHEN CRIT (from 1988 Cal Poll): "Do you think defending America when criticized is very important,...etc.?"

	Very	Somewhat	Not Too	Not At All
VOTE	76%	19	3	2
BELIEVE IN GOD	38	21	14	26
GET AHEAD ON OWN	75	20	4	1
TREAT ALL EQUALLY	89	9	1	1
SPEAK ENGLISH	76	18	4	2
* DEFEND US WHEN CRIT	52	30	12	6

* This item not asked in 1991 NES Pilot Study

philosophy of civic republicanism. (On this last point, we should acknowledge the somewhat divergent foci of the VOTING and GET AHEAD ON ONE'S OWN items. It could be argued that the former alone refers to a sense of civic responsibility, whereas the latter simply connotes self-reliant individualism.)

The two remaining American identity items refer to a rival, though not mutually exclusive conception of American identity that developed in the nineteenth century. Nativists could endorse liberal political ideals as inherently American and simultaneously maintain that only some races, religions, or cultures produced the moral or intellectual qualities required for democratic citizenship. The beliefs that believing in God or speaking English makes one a true American are indicators of this "nativist" or "ethnocultural" conception of nationality. As Table 1a shows, these beliefs are more contested than either liberal or civic republican norms.

Table 1b shows that despite the differences in question wording mentioned above, the aggregated distributions for the 1988 California sample are remarkably similar, although the importance of speaking English for making someone a "true" American seems to be more widely accepted in that state with its large and rapidly growing Hispanic and Asian communities than in the country as a whole.

Table 2 compares the responses of familiar demographic and political categories to the six American identity items. There is a virtual consensus on the importance of social equality and tolerance for others' speech in defining the "true" American: in every group, including strong Republicans and strong conservatives, at least 70% of respondents chose the "extremely" or "very important" option. Interestingly, there were only weak gender or racial differences on any item; if anything, women and blacks were slightly more likely to support religious or linguistic criteria of national identity.

TABLE 2

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
AMERICAN IDENTITY ITEMS BY
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES

		BELIEVE IN GOD V2602	VOTE V2601	SPEAK ENGLISH V2605	GET AHEAD ON OWN V2603	TREAT EQUAL V2604	RESPECT OTHERS' SPEECH * V2606
Overall:	(465)	50%	71%	64%	70%	85%	80%
Race: White	(406)	49	71	63	68	84	80
Black	(45)	60	62	73	78	89	84
PEARSON'S R		-.06	.08	-.06	-.01	-.03	.01
Age: 17-29	(99)	33	57	59	57	84	79
30-39	(108)	34	64	58	65	81	85
40-49	(85)	42	67	50	58	86	80
50-59	(55)	71	86	78	86	90	81
60+	(110)	76	84	78	87	89	76
PEARSON'S R		.34	.18	.17	.25	.05	-.05
Sex: Male	(206)	42	66	58	67	86	80
Female	(251)	57	74	69	73	83	80
PEARSON'S R		.15	.08	.08	.03	.02	-.00
Education:							
<HS Dipl	(88)	78	70	74	84	84	79
HS Dipl	(153)	64	68	66	70	87	77
SomeCol	(110)	36	70	66	69	85	85
CollGrd	(80)	28	76	50	60	80	78
Grad Deg	(33)	12	70	52	58	94	88
PEARSON'S R		-.39	.04	-.15	-.14	-.04	.04
Income:							
<\$10k	(140)	60	69	69	71	80	73
\$10-19k	(119)	59	72	66	72	88	88
\$20-29k	(81)	44	72	61	69	90	76
\$30-49k	(70)	29	64	63	63	87	84
\$50k +	(33)	33	88	52	76	91	88
PEARSON'S R		-.20	.08	-.06	-.01	.07	.08
Occupation:							
Exec/Prof	(99)	25	72	53	59	88	83
Cler/Sales	(92)	45	65	59	63	89	78
Service	(51)	65	67	67	84	86	80
BlueColl	(70)	48	37	57	70	86	84

Figures are % responding "Extremely Important" or "Very Important"
(All American Identity items are coded with "Extremely Important" = 1)

TABLE 2 (continued)

1991 NES PILOT STUDY

AMERICAN IDENTITY ITEMS BY
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES

		BELIEVE IN GOD V2602	VOTE V2601	SPEAK ENGLISH V2605	GET AHEAD ON OWN V2603	TREAT EQUAL V2604	RESPECT OTHERS' SPEECH * V2606
Overall:	(465)	50%	71%	64%	70%	85%	80%
Party ID:							
Strong Dem	(92)	53	82	64	73	92	84
Weak Democrat	(82)	54	62	55	72	86	82
Independnt-Dem	(59)	39	64	63	68	85	86
Independent	(46)	48	57	67	69	89	77
Independnt-Rep	(57)	54	75	72	72	82	74
Weak Republicn	(70)	47	76	66	70	84	87
Strong Rep	(56)	54	73	66	64	79	70
PEARSON'S R		.03	.03	.03	-.04	-.06	-.06
Political Ideology:							
Strong Liberal	(45)	18	69	42	56	93	87
Moderate Lib	(53)	30	75	57	64	91	89
Moderate	(110)	57	80	72	77	86	82
Moderate Cons	(74)	43	72	61	62	89	73
Strong Conserv	(61)	61	74	75	84	80	74
PEARSON'S R		.29	.01	.17	.13	-.05	-.15

Figures are % responding "Extremely Important" or "Very Important"
(All American Identity items are coded with "Extremely Important" = 1)

Table 2 does show that the better-educated and younger groups were much more likely to reject, verbally at least, the ethnocultural conception of American nationality, suggesting that for some these two items function as measures of political intolerance. Age and education also are related to support for the idea of self-reliance as a characteristic of the "true" American; the young, as some of us who teach might have guessed, were less likely to endorse the norm of getting ahead on one's own. Finally, while party identification was unrelated to these indicators of American identity, a liberal ideological self-identification diminished acceptance of religious, linguistic or individualist criteria for nationality. As Citrin, Reingold and Green (1990) found in their previous analysis of the California data, the "secular egalitarianism" of the young and well-educated social strata in the national sample similarly infuses their ideas about American identity.

These conclusions are reinforced by the multiple regression analyses reported in Table 3. In these analyses, sex, race, income, age, education, party identification and ideological self-designation were employed as predictors of responses to the six American identity items. As Table 1 showed, on several of these items there is very little variation to explain. For the BELIEVE IN GOD, SPEAK ENGLISH and GET AHEAD ON ONE'S OWN items, however, the effects of age and education survive the imposition of controls in the multivariate model, as do the tendencies of women and conservatives to be more likely to endorse religious belief as a criterion for being a "true American."

One significant negative finding is the absence of a connection between party identification and conceptions of American identity. This suggests that we may be tapping here another cultural issue that divides Democrats and complicates their party's electoral strategy. The relatively strong support of blacks for

TABLE 3

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
AMERICAN IDENTITY ITEMS REGRESSED ON
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES

	V2602	V2601		V2605		V2603		V2604		V2606		
	BELIEVE IN GOD	VOTE		SPEAK ENGLISH		GET AHEAD ON OWN		TREAT EQUAL		RESPECT OTHERS' SPEECH*		
	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta
Race	.35	.08	-.29	-.28	.38	.10	-.02	-.00	.03	.01	.24	.07
Age	.23	.28**	.14	.22**	.09	.13*	.14	.22**	.03	.06	-.02	-.03
Sex	.27	.12*	.22	.12*	.05	.03	-.04	-.02	.08	.06	.05	.03
Education	-.25	-.26**	.01	.01	-.16	-.20**	-.12	-.16**	-.00	-.00	.01	.01
Income	-.06	-.07	.03	.04	-.02	-.02	.03	.05	.04	.08	.06	.09
Party ID	.02	.03	.02	.06	.02	.04	-.02	-.05	-.01	-.03	.00	.01
Political Ideology	.15	.16**	-.04	-.05	.08	.10	.06	.08	-.04	-.07	-.09	-.14*
Adjusted R-squared	.28		.04		.09		.08		-.01		.01	

* Indicates statistical significance at .05 level

** Indicates statistical significance at .01 level

(Coding Note: For Race, White=1 Black=2; Age coded 1=17-29, 5=60+; Sex coded Male=1 Female=2;
Education coded 1=Some HS, 5=Graduate Degree; Income coded 1=<\$10k, 5=\$50k+;
Party ID coded 1=Strong Dem, 7=Strong Republican; Ideology coded 1=Strong Liberal, 5=Strong
Conservative)

speaking English as a defining feature of American identity is an issue to which we shall return, since this suggests that language policy may be one area in which racial and ethnic minorities oppose one other, rather than constituting the so-called rainbow coalition.

We noted above that the American identity items included in the NES Pilot Study do not directly assess traditional patriotic sentiments. Table 4 reports the connections among these items and other indicators of attachment to the nation. Although warm feelings about the flag and love of one's country were positively correlated with both "ethnocultural" and "civic republican" conceptions of national identity, these sentiments tended to be virtually universal. Hence, the positive relationships are relatively weak.

Opinions about the legality of burning the flag were more controversial, of course. Belief in the importance of respecting others' speech understandably was associated with opposition to banning flag-burning. On the other hand, those who endorsed believing in God or speaking English as criteria of American identity were much more likely than those who rejected these ideas to say that burning the American flag should be illegal. These data are an additional hint that an ethnocultural view of American identity is an element in the syndrome of conservative cultural beliefs that has shaped electoral politics in recent years.

The 1991 Pilot Study also included a question about assimilation into "the larger society as in the idea of a melting pot." The sample was quite divided when asked to choose between the values of racial and ethnic groups maintaining their own distinct cultures (39.5%) and blending into the larger society (52.8%). Those who said that it would be better if groups changed to blend into the larger society were more likely to endorse the religious and linguistic criteria for national identity, but these relationships are not strong.

TABLE 4

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
AMERICAN IDENTITY ITEMS BY
SELECTED "PATRIOTISM" ITEMS

	V2602	V2601	V2605	V2603	V2604	V2606
	BELIEVE IN GOD	VOTE	SPEAK ENGLISH	GET AHEAD ON OWN	TREAT EQUAL	RESPECT OTHERS' SPEECH
FLAG BURN (V471)	-.42	-.02	-.26	-.20	-.05	.15
FEEL ABOUT FLAG (V2417)	.34	.17	.25	.17	.07	.02
LOVE COUNTRY (V2418)	.24	.22	.17	.13	.14	.03
MELTING POT (V2618)	-.12	.02	-.13	-.03	.09	.05

QUESTION WORDING & CODING VALUES:

FLAG BURN (V471): "Should burning or destroying the American flag as a form of political protest be legal (=1) or should it be against the law (=2) ?"

(Note: Opposition to the legality of flag burning is coded in the opposite direction from the American Identity Items)

FEEL ABOUT FLAG (V2417): "When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel extremely good (=1), very good (=2), somewhat good (=4), or not very good (=5)?"

LOVE FOR COUNTRY (V2418): "How strong is your love for your country...extremely strong (=1), very strong (=2), somewhat strong (=4), or not very strong (=5)?"

MELTING POT (V2618): "Some people say that it is better for America if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct cultures. Others say that it is better if groups change so that they blend into the larger society as in the idea of a melting pot. Which of these positions comes closer to your own opinion?"
(Followup:) "Do you feel strongly about this or not so strongly?"

(Note: Support for the Melting Pot option is coded in the opposite direction from the American Identity Items: Strongly Support Maintaining Cultures=1, Strongly Support Blending In=5)

Figures are Pearson's R

The "melting pot" item poses a trade-off, but it is not clear that respondents generally viewed these options as wholly mutually exclusive. In other words, while Americans may celebrate cultural pluralism provided this does not threaten national unity, the public might well be more divided about the desirability of public policies that seem to institutionalize or legitimize linguistic or cultural differences. If this highly general or symbolic item about the "melting pot" is retained in future surveys, it should be supplemented by another question that is more closely linked to the public policy debate about the proper role of government with regard to helping maintain cultural distinctions.

Until now, we have been speaking of liberal, civic republican and ethnocultural conceptions of American identity as though people endorsed just one or the other. In fact, the marginal distributions reported in Table 1 indicate that many respondents espouse elements of all three. Below we present the distribution of the sample on an index that simply counts the number of "extremely" or "very important" responses:

	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
% of sample	24	25	20	16	9	6	0

The large number of cases at the upper end of the distribution presages the results of the correlation matrix reported in Table 4. A striking feature of the intercorrelations among the six American identity items is that all the coefficients are positive in sign. Respondents who think that belief in God is important for making someone a "true American" also assign great importance to getting ahead on one's own and to treating people of all social backgrounds equally. Similarly, those who think that speaking English is an important attribute of the "true American" believe in the importance of voting. Finally, the smallest correlation, and the only one to fall below conventional levels of

statistical significance, is between the BELIEVING IN GOD and RESPECTING OTHERS' FREEDOM OF SPEECH items. On the surface, this result indicates that these conceptions of national identity are uncorrelated rather than negatively correlated as one might logically expect.

The correlation matrix presented in Table 5 suggests the possibility that the American identity items measure both a generalized response tendency which manifests itself as the propensity to rate any proffered norm as important in defining the "true" American, and a distinct preference for one of the three substantive conceptions postulated by our research design.

To explore this possibility, we undertook a series of LISREL analyses whose purpose was to assess the extent to which the liberal, civic republican, and ethnocultural conceptions of national identity emerge in the data and the degree to which they are intercorrelated. The first model we examined serves as a baseline or null model. In this instance, all the items are assumed to load on a single factor and all errors of measurement are assumed to be random. This model is not well-supported by the data. The chi-square value of 60.6 with 5 degrees of freedom is substantially worse than the result of a nested model based on a postulated three factor solution (chi-square=16.0 with six degrees of freedom). The chi-square difference test (44.6 with 3 degrees of freedom) indicates that this improvement in the goodness of fit is highly statistically significant.

Table 6 reports the intercorrelations among the three hypothesized dimensions. The factor intercorrelations indicate a modest positive relationship between the ethnocultural and liberal conceptions of American identity. Both of these factors, however, are strongly related to civic republicanism, leading one to suspect that method variance is suppressing the observation of a "true"

TABLE 5

**1991 NES PILOT STUDY
PEARSON CORRELATIONS AMONG
AMERICAN IDENTITY ITEMS**

	V2601: VOTE	V2602: BELIEVE IN GOD	V2603: GET AHEAD ON OWN	V2604: TREAT EQUAL	V2605: SPEAK ENGLISH	V2606: RESPECT OTHERS' SPEECH
V2601	1.00 (465)					
V2602	.28 (460)	1.00 (461)				
V2603	.36 (460)	.43 (457)	1.00 (462)			
V2604	.28 (462)	.18 (459)	.40 (460)	1.00 (464)		
V2605	.25 (464)	.39 (460)	.37 (461)	.18 (463)	1.00 (465)	
V2606	.20 (464)	.01 (461)	.22 (462)	.30 (464)	.19 (465)	1.00 (466)

(number of cases for each pairwise correlation in parenthesis)

TABLE 6

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
LISREL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY ITEMS
THREE-FACTOR MODEL

		ETHNO- CULTURAL	CIVIC REPUBLICAN	LIBERAL
V2601	VOTE		.25	
V2602	BELIEVE IN GOD	.46		
V2603	GET AHEAD ON OWN		.52	
V2604	TREAT ALL EQUALLY			.55
V2605	SPEAK ENGLISH	.34		
V2606	RESPECT OTHERS' SPEECH			.17

Chi-sq=16.02, df=6

* Entries are reliabilities - squared standardized factor loadings

FACTOR INTERCORRELATIONS

	ETHNO- CULTURAL	CIVIC REPUBLICAN	LIBERAL
ETHNOCULTURAL	1.00		
CIVIC REPUBLICAN	.86	1.00	
LIBERAL	.38	.76	1.00

underlying negative relationship between ethnocultural and liberal beliefs.

There are two ways of treating the propensity of some respondents to endorse every proffered theme as important for making someone a "true" American. One approach is to regard this general factor that raises the absolute value of all the intercorrelations among the American identity battery as a manifestation of non-random measurement error, the kind of error that emerges when respondents interpret response options in idiosyncratic ways (Green, 1988). By this interpretation, respondents interpret the terms "extremely important" or "not at all important" in systematically different ways, just as some respondents have a tendency to give "warm" or "cold" feeling thermometer ratings whatever the stimulus object. Hence, each respondent's answers to the six American identity items might be understood in terms of a personal frame of reference. From this perspective, across-subject correlations are likely to be misleading.

A second interpretation of the so-called general factor is substantive in nature and holds that while some respondents accept the legitimacy of the notion of a "true" American identity, others do not. And since each of the six items refers to qualities that have been cited by external sources as facets of American uniqueness, those who accept the general idea of a distinctive national identity would tend to assign more importance to each of these norms, regardless of internal inconsistencies among them.

Given that the American identity items were asked in only one common format, we cannot definitively resolve this interpretive issue. We can, however, reanalyze the data in terms of within-person variability; that is, we can show how different individuals ranked the relative importance of each of the six attributes for making someone a "true" American. Transforming the responses from metric to ordinal data results in some loss of information in that someone who

TABLE 7
1991 NES PILOT STUDY
RANKING OF AMERICAN IDENTITY ITEMS

	V2601: VOTE	V2602: BELIEF IN GOD	V2603: GET AHEAD ON OWN	V2604: TREAT EQUAL	V2605: SPEAK ENGLISH	V2606: RESPECT OTHERS' SPEECH
Lowest Rank	4.7%	22.4%	2.8%	3.2%	6.9%	5.2%
Tie for Lowest	19.7	27.3	21.5	13.3	23.0	16.3
Middle Rank	22.4	12.3	29.9	18.9	26.5	16.6
Tie for Highest	37.8	25.4	34.2	49.0	31.4	45.8
Highest Rank	4.7	2.2	1.1	4.9	1.7	5.6
All Ranks tied	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5
Valid N	465	465	465	465	465	465

rates a specific quality, say speaking English, as "extremely important" and all other criteria as "not at all important" would be assigned the same rank ordering as a respondent who ranks speaking English as "very important" and all other qualities as "somewhat important." Nevertheless, the advantage of this approach is to bring to the fore the respondent's relative placement of each of the six criteria, controlling for the propensity to assign importance to all or any proposed conception of American identity.

One further complication with establishing each respondent's rank ordering of the six criteria of American identity is that many gave more than one item the same high or low ranking relative to the others in the list. Indeed, 49 respondents (10.5%) gave all six items the identical ranking. Table 7 therefore takes this into account by indicating when items "tied" for the respondent's highest or lowest importance rating.

As one would expect from the aggregate distributions reported in Table 1, the individual-level rankings show that BELIEVING IN GOD receives the largest proportion of low ranks, with 49.7% of the respondents assigning this quality either their lowest or tied-for-lowest rating. EQUAL TREATMENT and RESPECT FOR OTHERS' FREEDOM OF SPEECH receive the largest proportion of high ranks.

Where the ranked data depart from the metric data becomes clear when we examine the ratings of the six criteria in relationship to one another. Table 8 illustrates this by showing the distribution of low rankings among respondents who rate a specific criterion as particularly important to them.

Table 8 does reveal the tensions between the ethnocultural and liberal egalitarian criteria that did not appear clearly in the preceding inter-item analyses. For example, among those who assigned the highest ranking to RESPECTING OTHERS' SPEECH, 64% placed BELIEVING IN GOD at the bottom of their ratings. By

TABLE 8

**1991 NES PILOT STUDY
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG AMERICAN IDENTITY ITEMS**

(Entries are percentage assigning a lowest or tied-for-lowest ranking among those who rank each criterion as highest or tied-for-highest)

	Value Rated Highest or Tied-for-Highest					
	V2601: VOTE	V2602: BELIEF IN GOD	V2603: GET AHEAD ON OWN	V2604: TREAT EQUAL	V2605: SPEAK ENGLISH	V2606: RESPECT OTHERS' SPEECH
Value Rated Lowest or Tied-for-Lowest						
VOTE	N/A	32%	26%	29%	34%	28%
BELIEVE IN GOD	55%	N/A	48%	57%	49%	64%
GET AHEAD ON OWN	25%	36%	N/A	24%	32%	24%
TREAT EQUAL	21%	30%	20%	N/A	29%	17%
SPEAK ENGLISH	35%	39%	29%	36%	N/A	32%
RESPECT OTHERS' FREEDOM	29%	46%	29%	22%	29%	n/a
Valid N	198	128	164	251	154	239

Note: entries are column percentages; percentages sum to more than 100% due to ties in rankings. 49 respondents with six tied ranks have been excluded from the table.

contrast, only 49% of the respondents who placed SPEAKING ENGLISH at the top of their rankings assigned BELIEVING IN GOD to the bottom.

In sum, while the raw correlations presented earlier implied that people who believe that egalitarian norms define American identity are more likely to ascribe a similar importance to exclusionary norms than those who downplay the role of egalitarianism, the rankings data depict matters somewhat differently. Although equal treatment is a widely acknowledged value for respondents whatever their highest ranking choice, it is more likely to be rated lowest among those who place religious conviction at the top of their rankings (30%) than among those who assign tolerance for others' speech at the top (17%). Presumably, the contrast would have been even sharper had the question format enabled a more precise ranking of the six criteria. Should there be subsequent efforts to measure normative conceptions of national identity, a useful refinement would be to explicitly ask respondents to identify which criterion of Americanism they regarded as most (or least) important.

Based on the theoretical formulation with which we started and the ranking analysis just described, we constructed a five-fold typology of subjective conceptions of American identity. The underlying procedure was to group respondents according to combinations of their highest and lowest rankings. The following types were developed, with membership in each being mutually exclusive:

1. Nativists: respondents who assign their highest ranking (highest includes tied- for- highest) BELIEVING IN GOD or SPEAKING ENGLISH and their lowest ranking to RESPECTING OTHERS' SPEECH. This group comprises 17% of the sample.
2. Liberals (30% of the sample): respondents who assign RESPECTING OTHERS' SPEECH their highest ranking, BELIEVING IN GOD their lowest ranking, and who do not assign a low ranking to EQUAL TREATMENT. (Including all the respondents who gave

EQUAL TREATMENT their highest ranking would put too many respondents in this category and render it meaningless.)

3. Civic Republicans: the 26% of the sample who assign VOTING and GETTING AHEAD their highest rankings.

4. Ritualists: the 11% who assign equal ratings to all six of the criteria. This left an additional 17% of the sample as unclassified.

Admittedly, there is a certain degree of arbitrariness to these classificatory rules. One reason for this is the small sample size which precludes the opportunity to impose more stringent standards. For example, only 16.5% of the sample give their lowest ranking to EQUAL TREATMENT; to add this to the criteria for defining the nativist category would have reduced the number of cases available to an unworkably small number.

Table 9, however, provides demographic and political profiles of these constructed types and shows substantial differences among them. For example, only 18% of the nativists and 10% of the ritualists had completed a college degree compared to 42% of those classified as liberals. 64% of the nativists identified themselves as conservatives, compared to 40% of the civic republicans and only 25% of the liberals. In this regard, the gender differences are interesting. Because women were more likely than men to select believing in God and speaking English as highly important for making someone a "true American," there are relatively more women among the nativists than the liberals despite the oft-reported tendency of women to be less conservative on political issues than men.

Although those with a liberal conception of national identity tended to be comprised of self-identified Democrats, the nativists include large proportions of both strong Democrats and strong Republicans. Indeed, there are almost identical proportions of strong Democrats (24%) among the nativists as among the

TABLE 9

1991 NES PILOT STUDY

AMERICAN IDENTITY TYPOLOGY BY
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES

		TOTAL	NATIV- ISTS	LIB- ERALS	CIVIC REPUB- LICANS	RITUAL- ISTS	OTHER
Overall:	(465)		17%	30%	26%	11%	17%
Race: White	(406)	88%	88	88	90	90	80
Black	(45)	10%	11	9	6	10	16
Age: 17-29	(99)	21	13	27	15	16	31
30-39	(108)	23	16	29	25	22	19
40-49	(85)	19	16	24	14	16	20
50-59	(55)	13	19	8	16	16	6
60+	(110)	24	36	11	30	29	24
Sex: Male	(206)	45	39	56	42	37	39
Female	(251)	55	61	44	58	63	61
Education:							
<HS Dipl	(88)	19	27	10	23	18	23
HS Dipl	(153)	33	40	20	36	43	39
SomeCol	(110)	24	16	29	19	29	26
CollGrd	(80)	17	15	27	18	6	10
Grad Deg	(33)	7	3	15	5	4	3
Income:							
<\$10k	(140)	32	42	19	35	35	35
\$10-19k	(119)	27	20	24	25	38	34
\$20-29k	(81)	18	23	18	19	13	18
\$30-49k	(70)	16	7	25	16	10	12
\$50k +	(33)	7	9	14	5	4	1

Figures are % of each Demographic or Attitudinal group in typology

TABLE 9 (continued)

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
AMERICAN IDENTITY TYPOLOGY BY
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES

		TOTAL	NATIV- ISTS	LIB- ERALS	CIVIC REPUB- LICANS	RITUAL- ISTS	OTHER
Overall:	(465)		17%	30%	26%	11%	17%
Party ID:							
Strong Dem	(92)	20	24	25	16	19	14
Weak Democrat	(82)	18	16	19	15	13	24
Independnt-Dem	(59)	13	8	15	11	13	16
Independent	(46)	10	7	9	11	8	14
Independnt-Rep	(57)	12	9	8	17	19	11
Weak Republicn	(70)	15	16	17	15	21	9
Strong Rep	(56)	12	20	4	14	8	13
Political Ideology:							
Strong Liberal	(45)	13	4	22	12	8	11
Moderate Lib	(53)	16	7	23	16	11	11
Moderate	(110)	32	36	30	32	34	31
Moderate Cons	(74)	22	27	16	20	21	31
Strong Conserv	(61)	18	37	9	20	26	16
Flag Burn:							
Be Legal	(88)	20	0	42	18	4	12
Be Illegal	(361)	80	100	58	82	96	88
Feeling About Flag:							
Extremely Good	(235)	51	61	40	55	65	46
Very Good	(154)	33	31	31	32	29	46
Somewhat Good	(59)	13	4	25	13	4	5
Not Very Good	(13)	3	4	4	1	2	4
Love Country:							
Extrmly Strong	(255)	55	61	46	57	69	54
Very Strong	(167)	36	35	42	34	31	34
Somewhat/Not Very Strong	(40)	9	4	13	9	0	11
Melting Pot:							
Strong Distinct	(95)	21	21	22	19	21	23
Not Strong Dist	(84)	19	15	25	16	13	18
Both/Neither	(33)	7	4	10	8	6	4
Not Strong Blnd	(99)	22	29	20	22	21	19
Strong Blend	(139)	31	31	23	34	38	36

Figures are % of each Demographic or Attitudinal group in typology

liberals (25%), underscoring the cultural divisions among that party's rank and file supporters.

Table 9 shows that traditional patriotic symbols elicit particularly strong positive reactions among both nativists and the so-called ritualist group. Most striking perhaps is the finding that not a single respondent among the nativists accepted the proposition that burning the flag should be legal, as compared to 43% of the liberals and 16% of the civic republicans. The nativists also were more likely than any other group to endorse the idea that different ethnic groups would be better off blending into the larger society rather than maintaining their distinct cultures.

We shall report the relationships between different conceptions of national identity and preferences on specific policies in more detail later in this report. On the methodological front, it is clear that questions concerning the dimensionality of the American identity items remain to be addressed. Nevertheless, a typology based on the ranking approach seems to add to the discriminating power of these items.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For future surveys, we recommend the following revisions in the format of the American identity items:

1. Ask respondents directly whether or not they accept the idea of a "true American;"
2. Eliminate the EQUAL TREATMENT item and substitute an egalitarianism item that has more variance;
3. Ask respondents to indicate which of the attributes of Americanism they believe is most important and which is least important. If time constraints

require, this can be done in conjunction with a reduction of the number of items to four.

4. Retain the response options employed in the 1991 Pilot Study.

HISPANICS, IMMIGRATION, AND LANGUAGE ISSUES

In many states, the influx of Hispanic and Asians already has placed new issues on the political agenda. In California, for example, Governor Wilson has initiated a debate on how much immigration costs the state in terms of public expenditures for health, welfare, and education. For their part, Hispanic and Asian interest groups lobby to retain liberal immigration policies and to extend the rights of aliens. The federal Voting Rights Act and the Bilingual Education Act have made the scope of language rights an ongoing legal and political issue. As interpreted by the courts, the Voting Rights Act also implies that citizens are best represented by legislators of their own ethnicity and has stimulated the creation of new, largely Hispanic districts at all levels of government. Underlying the elite debate over ethnic entitlement are conflicting views concerning how civic identity should be defined and whether rights pertain to groups as well as to individuals.

The 1991 Pilot Study included two items that referred to immigration, two that dealt with language policy, and one item that asked explicitly about approval of job quotas for racial and ethnic minorities in proportion to their representation in the general population.

The immigration issue was introduced to respondents with a general question that has been asked frequently in national polls: "Do you believe that the number of immigrants who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased or kept about the same?" Only 4.4% of the respondents

avored increased immigration, while 39.7% advocated decreasing the level of immigration. Opposition to immigration was associated ($r=.45$) with "cooler" feeling thermometer ratings for "immigrants from foreign countries," a comforting finding from the perspective of measurement validation.

Support for decreasing the current level of immigration also was associated with a lack of positive affect, as measured by feeling thermometer ratings, toward Hispanics ($r=.25$), Asian-Americans ($r=.25$), Mexican-Americans ($r=.25$), Cuban-Americans ($r=.30$) and Puerto Ricans ($r=.25$). As these virtually identical relationships imply, respondents did not discriminate in their affective ratings of the disparate Hispanic groups. The mean correlation among the feeling thermometer ratings for Hispanics, Mexican-Americans, Cuban-Americans and Puerto Ricans was .69, with a .84 relationship between the Hispanic and Mexican-American feeling thermometer scores.

The general immigration question was followed by items that focussed explicitly on the specific consequences of "the growing number of Hispanic people in the United States," a set of items that drawn from our earlier analysis of the 1988 California survey already cited.

Two points about the wording of these five "Hispanic impact" items (V2620-V2624) are worth mention. First, although the question stem refers to "groups of people who have come to the United States at different times in our history," the term "Hispanic people" was deliberately vague and did not explicitly mention recent immigrants. Secondly, while questions about the likely consequences of more Hispanics call for a cognitive judgment, it seems clear that generalized affect toward this ethnic group would influence one's estimates. This inference is supported by the evidence that respondents who anticipated negative social and economic consequences from the growing number of Hispanics in the country

TABLE 10
MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF HISPANIC IMPACT ITEMS
AND CULTURAL POLITICS ITEMS
1991 NES PILOT STUDY

1991 NES Text for Hispanic Impact Items:

The lead-in read:

"Many different groups of people have come to the United States at different times in our history. In recent years the population of the United States has been changing to include many more people of Hispanic background. I'm going to read a list of things that people say may happen because of the growing number of Hispanic people in the United States. For each of these things, please say how likely it is to happen -- extremely likely, very likely, somewhat likely, or not at all likely?"

The question wording:

IMPROVE CULTURE (V2620) - "How likely is it that the growing number of Hispanics will improve our culture with new ideas and customs?"

TAKE JOBS (V2621) - "(How likely is it) to take jobs away from people already here?"

INCREASE TAXES (V2622) - "(How likely is it) to cause higher taxes due to more demands for public services?"

INCREASE CRIME (V2623) - "(How likely is it) to cause an increase in crime?"

THREATEN ENGLISH (V2624) - "(How likely is it) to threaten the place of English as the country's common language?"

	Extremely	Very	Somewhat	Not At All
* IMPROVE CULTURE	4%	12	50	34
TAKE JOBS	12	26	40	22
INCREASE TAXES	20	35	35	10
INCREASE CRIME	14	30	38	17
THREATEN ENGLISH	7	15	26	53

* This item not asked in 1988 California Poll

TABLE 10 (continued)
MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF HISPANIC IMPACT ITEMS
1988 CALIFORNIA POLL

1988 California Poll Text for Hispanic Impact Items:

The lead-in read:

"I am going to read a list of possible results from the increase in the number of Hispanics in California. For each of these items, please tell me how likely it is to happen. What's the likelihood of (insert item) occurring as a result of the increase in the number of Hispanics in California - - very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?"

Four items from the 1991 NES Pilot study were on the 1988 California Poll: IMPROVE CULTURE, INCREASE TAXES, INCREASE CRIME, and THREATEN ENGLISH.

	Very	Somewhat	Not Too	Not At All
Improve Culture	32%	43	17	8
Increase Taxes	45	37	15	4
Increase Crime	33	43	17	7
Threaten English	28	24	21	27

TABLE 10 (continued)

MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF HISPANIC IMPACT ITEMS
AND CULTURAL POLITICS ITEMS
1991 NES PILOT STUDY

1991 NES Text for Cultural Politics Items:

OFFICIAL ENGLISH (V2607-V2610) - "Do you favor a law making English the official language of the United States, meaning government business would be conducted in English only, or do you oppose such a law? Do you favor/oppose such a law strongly or not so strongly?"

Strongly Favor	Not Strongly Favor	Neither	Not Strongly Oppose	Strongly Oppose
43%	12%	6%	22%	18%

ENGLISH INSTRUCTION (V2611) - "There are several different ideas about how to teach children who don't speak English when they enter our public schools. Which one of the following three statements best describe how you feel?
One, all classes should be conducted only in English so that children have to learn English right from the start.
Two, children who don't know English should have classes in their native language just for a year or two until they learn English.
Three, there should be two sets of classes all the way through high school so that children can keep up their native language and culture if they want to."

Only English	Transition Years	Language Maintenance
25%	56%	19%

IMMIGRATION (V2619) - "Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or left the same as it is now?"

Increased	Left the Same	Decreased
4%	56%	40%

JOB RESERVE (V2612-V2615) - Some people say that it is only fair that some good jobs be reserved for racial and ethnic minorities in about the same percent that they make up in the overall population. For example, if minorities made up 30% of the U.S. population, then 30% of all the jobs would be reserved for them. Others say that reserving positions for minorities like that would be unfair because it doesn't treat people as individuals. Are you for or against reserving jobs for racial and ethnic minorities according to their percent in the whole population? Are you strongly for/against this or not so strongly?"

Strongly Favor	Not Strongly Favor	Neither	Not Strongly Oppose	Strongly Oppose
7%	6%	2%	24%	62%

were more likely to give the Hispanic ethnic groups mentioned above "cool" feeling thermometer ratings. The "Hispanic impact" items asked about the consequences for "improving our culture with new ideas and customs," for job competition, taxes, the crime rate and the place of English as "our common language." The response options were similar to those employed for the American identity items, once again including the "extremely" response, a change from the wording used in the original California survey.

Table 10 presents the marginal distributions for these items for both the 1991 Pilot and California surveys and indicates a strong similarity in aggregate opinion, despite the much larger proportion of Hispanics in California than in the nation as a whole. Table 11 shows the relatively weak relationships between the standard demographic variables and estimates of the consequences of increased Hispanic immigration. The most consistent observation is that having a college education diminishes the likelihood of perceiving a negative impact.

The fear of economic competition is often cited as an important source of hostility toward immigrants. Table 11 does indicate weak bivariate relationships between income and responses to both the Hispanic impact items. Low income respondents were more likely to perceive a negative impact of the growing number of Hispanics on employment opportunities ($r=.11$), and were also more likely than better off respondents to advocate decreased immigration. However, low income respondents also were more likely to perceive a negative impact from the influx of Hispanics when we asked about non-economic consequences such as crime ($r=.09$) or threats to the status of English ($r=.12$). This pattern of findings suggests that general attitudes toward Hispanics rather than short-run economic anxieties were governing responses.

The results of the multiple regression analyses reported in Table 11 supports

TABLE 11

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
MELTING POT, IMMIGRATION, AND HISPANIC IMPACT ITEMS
BY DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES

		MELTING POT V2618	INCREASE IMMIGTN V2619	IMPROVE CULTURE V2620	TAKE JOBS V2621	INCREASE TAXES V2622	INCREAS CRIME V2623	THREATN ENGLISH V2624
Overall:	(457)	39%	60%	16%	38%	55%	45%	22%
Race: White	(402)	38	60	14	38	55	44	21
Black	(42)	43	61	35	52	63	56	41
Age: 17-29	(99)	53	62	17	40	56	39	18
30-39	(108)	36	66	17	32	47	41	17
40-49	(85)	44	58	14	40	47	35	14
50-59	(55)	42	57	22	41	64	54	28
60+	(110)	27	57	14	40	63	56	33
Sex: Male	(206)	39	65	20	37	50	41	21
Female	(251)	39	57	13	40	59	47	23
Education:								
<HS Dipl	(88)	39	55	22	49	66	63	33
HS Dipl	(153)	38	51	14	44	61	53	23
SomeCol	(110)	41	64	13	38	53	39	19
CollGrd	(80)	36	71	18	24	44	26	16
Grad Deg	(33)	44	84	18	21	30	24	9
Income:								
<\$10k	(140)	44	57	20	42	60	51	27
\$10-19k	(119)	39	61	19	42	53	44	21
\$20-29k	(81)	41	63	10	37	59	44	22
\$30-49k	(70)	36	56	16	24	53	36	17
\$50k +	(33)	36	73	9	30	30	27	12

Figures for "Melting Pot" are % responding "Maintain Culture" rather than "Blend Into Larger Society"

Figures for "Increase Immigration" are % responding "Increase Immigration" or "Keep Same Level"

Figures for Hispanic Impact items are % responding "Extremely Likely" or "Very Likely"

TABLE 11 (continued)

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
MELTING POT, IMMIGRATION, AND HISPANIC IMPACT ITEMS
BY DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES

		MELTING POT V2618	INCREASE IMMIGTN V2619	IMPROVE CULTURE V2620	TAKE JOBS V2621	INCREASE TAXES V2622	INCREAS CRIME V2623	THREATN ENGLISH V2624
Overall:	(457)	39%	60%	16%	38%	55%	45%	22%
Occupation:								
Exec/Prof	(99)	42	69	12	29	39	30	16
Cler/Sales	(92)	45	56	14	45	57	43	18
Service	(51)	38	55	26	47	67	52	32
BlueColl	(70)	47	61	20	38	57	46	19
Party ID:								
Strong Dem	(92)	47	58	78	43	50	48	21
Weak Democrat	(82)	41	64	84	43	62	48	24
Independnt-Dem	(59)	48	61	88	36	48	33	12
Independent	(46)	45	65	85	46	58	37	22
Independnt-Rep	(57)	33	54	84	37	58	43	29
Weak Republicn	(70)	29	59	82	35	54	40	25
Strong Rep	(56)	30	63	89	27	57	48	20
Political Ideology:								
Strong Liberal	(45)	67	68	73	29	27	35	18
Moderate Lib	(53)	49	67	91	44	33	33	6
Moderate	(110)	34	57	85	37	59	46	23
Moderate Cons	(74)	31	64	86	42	59	45	25
Strong Cons	(61)	29	60	83	36	61	48	33

Figures for "Melting Pot" are % responding "Maintain Culture" rather than "Blend Into Larger Society"

Figures for "Increase Immigration" are % responding "Increase Immigration" or "Keep Same Level"

Figures for Hispanic Impact items are % responding "Extremely Likely" or "Very Likely"

TABLE 12

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
HISPANIC IMPACT ITEMS REGRESSED ON
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES

	V2620 IMPROVE CULTURE		V2621 TAKE JOBS		V2622 INCREASE TAXES		V2623 INCREASE CRIME		V2624 THREATEN ENGLISH	
	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta
Race	.14	.05	.01	.01	-.15	-.04	-.22	-.06	-.17	.04
Age	-.03	-.06	.01	.02	-.06	-.09	-.05	-.08	-.05	-.07
Sex	-.16	-.10	-.15	-.08	-.28	-.16*	-.09	-.05	-.15	-.08
Education	.09	.15*	.12	.16*	.11	.14*	.22	.28**	.10	.13*
Income	-.07	-.11	-.03	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	-.03	.02	.03
Party ID	.02	.04	.04	.09	.01	.03	-.03	-.06	-.02	-.05
Political Ideology	-.08	.13*	-.07	-.09	-.10	-.14*	-.06	-.09	-.03	-.04
Adjusted R-squared	.04		.02		.07		.10		.02	

* Indicates statistical significance at .05 level

** Indicates statistical significance at .01 level

(Coding Note: For Race, White=1 Black=2; Age coded 1=17-29, 5=60+; Sex coded Male=1 Female=2; Education coded 1=Some HS, 5=Graduate Degree; Income coded 1=<\$10k, 5=\$50k+; Party ID coded 1=Strong Dem, 7=Strong Republican; Ideology coded 1=Strong Liberal, 5=Strong Conservative)
(All Hispanic Impact Items coded with 1=Extremely Likely, 4=Not At All Likely, with the exception of Improve Culture, which is coded with 4=Extremely Likely, 1=Not At All Likely)

this conclusion. In the multivariate model, the apparent, even if weak, observed effect of income disappears, and only education has a consistent, independent relationship to responses to the Hispanic impact items. The better-educated are significantly more likely to deny that immigration and the growing number of Hispanics might have negative social or economic consequences, even after the imposition of statistical controls. In two of the five instances, a liberal ideological self-identification has a similar, though weaker statistical effect. Once again, party identification plays no independent causal role; feelings about immigration cut across party lines.

We explored the possible influence of economic adversity on attitudes toward immigration in another way. The 1990 NES election study asked the familiar questions concerning one's present, recent and expected future financial circumstances. While it should be pointed out that these data were collected during what now would be considered relatively good times, these subjective indicators of economic anxiety were almost entirely unrelated to opinions about the proper level of immigration and the consequences of the growing number of Hispanics in the United States. In the array of eighteen relationships generated by these cross-tabulations, only one correlation coefficient is as high as .09. The only hint that economic vulnerability fuels opposition to immigrants is the finding that 46% of those who said their financial situation had deteriorated over the past year advocated decreasing the level of immigration, compared to 35% of those who said their economic circumstances had improved.

In the current political climate, then, it appears that opinions about immigration policy and about Hispanic immigration in particular are governed to a considerable degree by egalitarian norms rather than personal circumstances.

And if immigration policy is framed as a matter of tolerance or solidarity with minority groups, it is not surprising that the better-educated are more likely to give the "politically correct" verbal response.

Table 13 presents the intercorrelations among the five Hispanic impact items. These tend to be robust, with the exception of the lack of a consistent relationship between the one item that refers to a favorable effect of an increased number of Hispanics and the four that ask about the possibility of unfavorable consequences. This is additional evidence of the response bias encountered in our analysis of the interrelationships among the American identity items. A number of survey respondents reflexively give the same response to a series of stimuli in a list, without attending to or comprehending the differences in the manifest content of these stimuli.

To simplify the following analysis, we have constructed a Hispanic Impact Index by simply summing responses to the five items listed above. The single "positive" item was recoded for purposes of consistency and respondents were given an index score within the potential range of 5 (negative consequences extremely likely) to 20 (negative consequences not at all likely). The sample mean was 12.8 and the distribution such that we have created the following trichotomies: High Negative Hispanic Impact Score of 5-11, comprising 32% and sample, Moderate Impact Score of 12-14, comprising 36% of the sample and the Low Impact score of 15-20, comprising 32% of the sample.

The Pilot Study asked several questions about language policy. The first asked whether there should be a federal law designating English the official language of the United States. This legislation, which has been passed in numerous states, was favored by 54.1% of the sample and disapproved by 40%. As the marginal distribution reported in Table 10 shows, however, advocates of official English

TABLE 13
1991 NES PILOT STUDY
PEARSON CORRELATIONS AMONG
HISPANIC IMPACT ITEMS

	V2620 IMPROVE CULTURE	V2621 TAKE JOBS	V2622 INCREASE TAXES	V2623 INCREASE CRIME	V2624 THREATEN ENGLISH
V2620	1.00 (459)				
V2621	-.06 (455)	1.00 (459)			
V2622	.11 (456)	.44 (455)	1.00 (459)		
V2623	.07 (453)	.39 (452)	.53 (453)	1.00 (456)	
V2624	-.04 (452)	.30 (452)	.41 (453)	.42 (449)	1.00 (456)

(number of cases for each pairwise correlation in parenthesis)

were more intense in their feelings than those who opposed such a law. Table 1 indicates that the relatively young and the college-educated were more likely to disapprove of official English, a finding that parallels analyses of opinion in California and other southwestern states (Citrin, Green, Reingold and Walters, 1990).

Table 10 indicated that only 22 per cent of the NES respondents believed it was extremely or very likely that the growing number of Hispanics would threaten the status of English as the nation's common tongue. Yet 64% felt that speaking English was very important in making someone a true American. In general, respondents expressed a strong attachment to English as a symbol of American nationality, but did not perceive a strong current threat to linguistic unity despite the growing numbers of people of Hispanic origin.

In addition to being asked whether they favored a law designating English as the official language of the United States, respondents in the 1991 Pilot Study were asked about how children who don't speak English should be taught. Bilingual education is a controversial issue in many states, with intense debate about the relative merits of English immersion, transitional classes and cultural maintenance programs. We have some reservations about whether the Pilot Study question (Variable 2611) framed the policy alternatives clearly and sharply enough. In any event, the largest proportion of respondents (56.5%) favored the transitional approach in which children could take classes in their native language "just for a year or two"; 24.7% advocated teaching exclusively in English from the start, while the remaining 19.3% favored the creation of two sets of classes all the way through high school.

As one might expect, those who believe that English should be named the country's official language and those who think speaking English is extremely

important for making someone a true American are more likely than the rest of the sample to prefer that all classes should be taught only in English. Of the nativists, 35.6% opted for the English immersion approach, compared to 19% of those with what we have labeled a liberal conception of American identity. But these groups did not differ at all in their acceptance of two sets of classes in different languages through high school: 17% within each typological group chose that approach. This again suggests that a consensual conception of Americanism might combine recognition of the special place of English as the country's common language with acceptance of the value of people voluntarily choosing to maintain ties to their cultural origins. Both linguistic assimilation and cultural pluralism are components of American national ideology.

Nevertheless, the Pilot Study data do reveal consistent, positive relationships among the items asking about whether speaking English is important for making one a true American, about the need for an official English law, about how children who don't speak English should be taught, and about the impact of the influx of Hispanics on the status of English. These four items could readily be combined into a single Language Policy Index.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Retain the general question concerning the proper level of immigration, but disaggregate the "decrease" respondents by including "somewhat decrease" and "greatly decrease" response options.
2. Retain questions about the impact of increased immigration, with a possible reduction in number. The impact questions should include a question focussing on economic consequences and another on cultural consequences.
3. If several such impact items are included, respondents should be asked to rank

the perceived consequences in terms of salience.

4. In order to investigate whether attitudes toward immigration vary according to the ethnicity of the immigrant groups, a split-sample design should be adopted, with one-third of the sample being asked about Hispanics, another third about Asians, and the final third about immigrants from Europe.

5. The question about passage of an official English law should be retained.

6. Respondents should be asked about bilingualism in several distinct domains, including education, court proceedings, government offices and ballots.

POLICY CORRELATES

Above we have reported the relationships between many of our proposed questions and the standard demographic and political background variables. The results suggested that conceptions of national identity and preferences on what we have labeled the "new" ethnic issues may be elements of a broader cultural conflict.

Another line of analysis would be to investigate how residential context influences attitudes toward immigrants or linguistic minorities. Unfortunately, it was impossible to merge the Pilot Study data with 1990 census figures, since these were not available. We did code each Pilot Study respondent on a set of contextual variables that focussed on his or her county's ethnic composition and examined whether the 1980 percentages of Hispanic residents, black residents, total minority residents or non-English speakers were associated with responses to the attitudinal items described above.

Without providing a complete, tedious recitation of these findings, we can report that the only hint of a relationship refers to the tendency of respondents from counties with more than 5% Hispanic residents to be more likely to favor

passage of an official English law; 65% of this group advocated official English, compared to 49% of respondents living in counties with less than 1% Hispanic residents. However, respondents from counties with a relatively high proportion of Hispanics did not differ from the rest of the sample at all in their opinions on the right amount of future immigration, on whether people should "blend in the larger society as in the idea of a melting pot," or in their perceptions of the likely consequences of increased Hispanic immigration. The influence of ethnic context and contact on these issue preferences remains a topic worth investigating, but this should await the availability of more current and finely tuned measures of respondents' intergroup experiences.

It is not the purpose of this report to try and provide exhaustive explanations for the variation in conceptions of American identity or in attitudes on immigration or language policies. Nor do we feel that the utility of the items we proposed for the Pilot Study depends on their contributing, in the statistical sense, to an explanation of the presidential vote. Instead, we have tried to map out an arena of emergent political debate and to show that conceptions of American identity are an element in the multifaceted cultural and ideological conflicts that do have electoral manifestations.

The final results we shall present, therefore, identify the policy correlates of attitudes toward American identity, Hispanic immigration and official English. We have grouped the potential correlates of these variables into the following categories: 1. new ethnic issues; 2. group affect 3. candidate predispositions; 4. foreign policy attitudes; 5. racial policies 6. Welfare liberalism-conservatism; 7. Social liberalism-conservatism; 8. General values.

We have organized this large array of findings into two lengthy tables. Table 14 compares the issue preferences of nativist, liberal, and civic republican

TABLE 14

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
AMERICAN IDENTITY TYPOLOGY BY
ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES

	TOTAL	NATIV- ISTS	LIB- ERALS	CIVIC REPUBLICANS
Overall:		17%	30%	26%
<u>New Ethnic Issues:</u>				
High Relative Hispanic Impact: (V2620-	32%	50%	16%	37%
Low Relative Hispanic Impact: V2624)	32	20	47	25
Decrease Immigration (V2619)	39	55	26	41
Reserve Jobs Ethnic Minorities (V2615)	85	92	81	83
Favor Official English (V2607)	54	66	49	58
Favor English Immersion in Education (V2611)	24	36	23	27
<u>Group Affect (Mean Feeling Thermometers):</u>				
Immigrants (V2229)	52	47	58	50
Illegal Aliens (V2234)	29	28	33	27
Whites (V2231)	70	74	68	72
Blacks (V2232)	63	63	67	61
Hispanics (V2233)	55	52	59	54
Asian Americans (V2235)	56	50	62	57
Mexican-Americans (V2236)	57	55	62	53
Cuban-Americans (V2237)	52	49	59	48
Puerto Ricans (V2238)	53	47	58	52
Palestinians (V2221)	47	46	51	47
Japan (V2223)	54	48	59	52
Israel (V2225)	57	57	57	57
<u>Welfare Liberalism:</u>				
Govt Should Spend More for Health and Education (5-7 on V2600)	55	51	55	54
Less Government (V333)	34	35	39	34
Should Govt Provide Child Care (V488)	56	53	57	52
Std of Living by Govt (1-3 on V446)	31	28	30	23
More Fedl Spending on Environment (V377)	56	49	70	48
More Fedl Spending on AIDS (V379)	60	52	63	55
More Fedl Spending on Social Security (V380)	61	69	57	53
More Fedl Spending on Drugs (V381)	61	55	54	55
More Fedl Spending on Food Stamps (V382)	14	14	14	13
More Fedl Spending on Public Schools (V383)	64	56	69	55
More Fedl Spending on Homeless (V384)	63	52	65	59

TABLE 14 (continued)

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
AMERICAN IDENTITY TYPOLOGY BY
ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES

	TOTAL	NATIV- ISTS	LIB- ERALS	CIVIC REPUB- LICANS
Overall:		17%	30%	26%
<u>Social Issues:</u>				
Should be Law to Protect Women				
Against Job Discrimination (V459)	91%	88%	97%	88%
Absolutely No School Prayer (1 on V467)	16	5	27	14
Approve Death Penalty for Murder (V477)	76	84	69	76
Govt Should Pay for Abortion (V482)	52	34	62	38
Abortion: No Restrictions (V479)	44	17	65	43
Should be Completely Unavailable	9	15	3	11
<u>Values:</u>				
Agree Equal Opportunity a Need				
In Society (V426)	57	64	60	50
Equal Rights Pushed Too Far (V427)	41	63	31	60
Fewer Problems if Have More Equality (V431)	61	61	63	58
Traditional Family Ties (V502)	46	56	31	57
Attend Religious Services (V524)	70	80	57	68
<u>Candidate Predispositions (Mean Feeling Thermometers):</u>				
George Bush (V2205)	72	79	64	76
Ronald Reagan (V138)	55	60	47	59
Jesse Jackson (V2211)	48	44	52	47
Bush Job Approval (V2115)	80	90	71	83
<u>Foreign Policy Issues:</u>				
Agree the Cold War is Over (V2400)	69	60	87	63
US Should Be Extremely/Very Willing				
To Use Force (V2402)	26	24	18	28
US Did Right Thing in Gulf (V2408)	80	92	74	83
Approve of Bush's Gulf Policy (V2410)	85	92	79	86
Better to Adopt Isolationist Stance (V2485)	22	16	16	27
Increase Limits on Foreign Imports (V432)	35	28	37	29
Increase South Africa Sanctions (V433)	40	25	57	41
Should Spend Less on Foreign Aid (V378)	68	67	73	62
Decrease Defense Spending (V439)	45	35	56	40
<u>Racial Policies:</u>				
Less Fedl Spending to Assist Blacks (V386)	13	18	11	16
Oppose Affirmative Action for Jobs (V2558)	70	75	69	68
Gov't Should do More to Aid Blacks				
(1-3 on 7-point scale, V447)	23	23	34	18
Oppose College Quotas for Blacks (V465)	67	81	58	73
Integrating Schools not Govt Business (V470)	47	67	39	56
Civil Rights Being Pushed too Fast (V518)	28	40	16	31
Blacks Gotten Less than They Deserve (V520)	33	29	40	25

conceptions of national identity by reporting the percentages of these groups advocating particular policy positions. Table 15 reports the correlations (Pearson's r) between the numerous issue variables and the Hispanic Impact Index and the official English question respectively.

Table 14 shows a clear connection between conceptions of American identity and the so-called new ethnic agenda. Nativists in the Pilot Study sample were more opposed to immigration, more pessimistic about the impact of Hispanic immigration, more supportive of an official English law and more likely to advocate English immersion as the best approach to teaching children who don't speak English than the liberals. Civic republicans tended to fall between the two groups.

Nativists also were least favorable of the three groups in their feeling thermometer ratings of minority ethnic groups. The differences are not large, but there was a consistently greater reluctance among the nativists to express positive affect toward immigrants or various Hispanic groups. This tendency extended to Asian-Americans, blacks, Palestinians, and even Japan. Only whites received a higher rating from nativists than from egalitarians or civic republicans.

We note in passing that the overall sample rating of Hispanics and Asian-Americans was lower than those for whites or blacks, the two racial groups that constituted virtually the entire Pilot Study sample. Mexican-Americans were more warmly viewed than Cuban-Americans or Puerto Ricans, reflecting perhaps differences in the popular images of their native countries.

As the above results might indicate, nativists, egalitarians and civic republicans differed in their preferences on racial policies. Although these differences are often quite modest, nativists were most opposed to government

programs targeted at assisting blacks, whether the question focussed simply on more government spending to assist blacks or on specific policies such as reserving jobs or places in college for blacks. On these issues, the civic republicans, reflecting their belief in self-reliance as an American virtue, often resembled the nativists. For example, 18% of the civic republicans took the liberal position (1-3) on the seven-point item concerning whether government should do more to aid blacks (V447), compared to 23% of the nativists, and 34% of the egalitarians.

The distinctive position of the nativists emerged most clearly on questions that dealt with the effort of government to enhance racial equality. For example, there was only a six percentage point difference between nativists and liberals on whether the public schools should be integrated (V465), but a 37 percentage point difference on whether integrating the schools was "the government's business" (V469).

In the terminology of Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo (1985), therefore, disagreement centers on the implementation of racial equality not on rhetorical commitments to the principle. Indeed, the findings grouped under the "VALUES" heading show that nativists were as likely as liberals to agree that "equal opportunity is a need for society" and that "there would be fewer problems in society if there were more equality" but much more likely to feel that "equal rights had been pushed too far."

In the foreign policy domain, a nativist conception of American identity was associated with support for a militant foreign policy outlook. Nativists in the Pilot Study were not isolationists in the traditional, nineteenth century mode. Of the three American identity "types," nativists were most likely to support the use of force, most approving of national policy in the Gulf War, and most

opposed to reducing defence spending.

A look at the findings under the WELFARE LIBERALISM and SOCIAL ISSUES headings completes the evidence for considering conceptions of American identity as elements of more encompassing political cultures that are separated by conflicts of values rather than interests. The differences among nativists, liberals and civic republicans with respect to domestic spending were small and inconsistent. Egalitarians were more likely than nativists to advocate more federal spending on the environment, but the positions of the two groups were reversed when it came to spending on social security. On many questions, including whether or not government should provide child care, spending on food stamps and even the more symbolic item concerning the size of government, there simply were no differences.

When it came to social issues, however, the familiar pattern of greater conservatism among the nativists and civic republicans emerged. These groups were more supportive of school prayer and the death penalty and more opposed to government funds to pay for abortions than their liberal counterparts.

We shall discuss the results of Table 15 primarily to point to contrasts between the American identity, Hispanic impact and language policy variables. Nativists, of course, comprise a large segment of the respondents who viewed increased Hispanic immigration with foreboding. So it is not surprising that the pattern of relationships between the Hispanic Impact Index and the policy and group questions often resembled those summarized above. A negative estimate of the impact of more Hispanics was related to lower affect toward all minority groups, to conservatism on racial and social issues, and to approval of President Bush. The Hispanic Impact Index had virtually no relationship to questions concerning domestic spending and was less consistently tied to a militant foreign

TABLE 15

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
POLICY CORRELATES OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS
HISPANICS AND LANGUAGE POLICY

(Entries are Pearson's R, statistically significant at $p < .05$)
(Unless otherwise noted, all policy variables are coded with low scores in the conservative direction, consistent with the direction of coding for Hispanic Impact and Official English)

	HISPANIC IMPACT INDEX (low values = negative impact)	OFFICIAL ENGLISH (low = Approve)
<u>New Ethnic Issues:</u>		
Immigration (V2619)	.33	.18
Reserve Jobs for Ethnic Minorities (V2615)	.11	ns
Official English (V2607)	.28	NA
English Immersion in Education (V2611)	ns	.28
Melting Pot or Maintain Culture (V2618)	.12	.19
<u>Americanism Items</u> (coded Extremely Important=1, Not At All Important=4):		
Voting (V2601)	.10	ns
Believing in God (V2602)	.35	.10
Getting Ahead on One's Own (V2603)	.20	ns
Treating All Equally (V2604)	ns	-.09
Speaking English (V2605)	.28	.29
Respecting Others' Speech (V2606)	ns	ns
<u>Group Affect</u> (Feeling Thermometers, Cool=1 to Warm=100):		
Immigrants (V2229)	.40	ns
Illegal Aliens (V2234)	.32	.22
Whites (V2231)	-.08	ns
Blacks (V2232)	.18	ns
Hispanics (V2233)	.37	.12
Asian Americans (V2235)	.29	.11
Mexican-Americans (V2236)	.31	.12
Cuban-Americans (V2237)	.32	.10
Puerto Ricans (V2238)	.31	.10
Palestinians (V2223)	.40	ns
Japan (V2235)	.22	ns
Israel (V2237)	ns	ns
<u>Welfare Conservatism-Liberalism:</u>		
Govt Spending on Social Services (V2600)	ns	ns
Size of Government (V333)	ns	-.09
Govt Provide Child Care (V488)	ns	.09
Govt Guarantee Standard of Living (V446)	ns	.11
Federal Spending on Environment (V377)	.11	ns
Federal Spending on AIDS (V379)	.08	ns
Federal Spending on Social Security (V380)	-.12	ns
Federal Spending on Drugs (V381)	ns	ns
Federal Spending on Food Stamps (V382)	ns	ns
Federal Spending on Public Schools (V383)	ns	.09
Federal Spending on Homeless (V384)	ns	.10

TABLE 15 (continued)

1991 NES PILOT STUDY
POLICY CORRELATES OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS
HISPANICS AND LANGUAGE POLICY

(Entries are Pearson's R, statistically significant at $p < .05$)
(Unless otherwise noted, all policy variables are coded with low scores in the conservative direction, consistent with the direction of coding for Hispanic Impact and Official English)

	HISPANIC IMPACT INDEX (low values = negative impact)	OFFICIAL ENGLISH (low = Approve)
<u>Social Issues:</u>		
Law to Protect Women Against Job Discrimination (V459)	.16	.11
School Prayer (V467)	.14	.09
Death Penalty for Murder (V477)	.16	.13
Govt Financing of Abortion (V482)	.11	ns
Abortion (V479)	.12	ns
<u>Values:</u>		
Equal Opportunity a Need In Society (V426)	ns	ns
Equal Rights Pushed Too Far (V427)	.25	.14
Fewer Problems if Have More Equality (V431)	ns	ns
Traditional Family Ties (V502)	.20	.14
Attend Religious Services (V524)	ns	ns
<u>Candidate Predispositions (Feeling Thermometers):</u>		
George Bush (V2205)	.08	.15
Ronald Reagan (V138)	ns	ns
Jesse Jackson (V2211)	-.09	-.19
Bush Job Approval (V2115)	ns	.09
<u>Foreign Policy Issues:</u>		
Cold War is Over (V2400)	-.11	ns
US Should Be Extremely/Very Willing To Use Force (V2402)	.16	ns
US Did Right Thing in Gulf (V2408)	ns	ns
Approve of Bush's Gulf Policy (V2410)	ns	ns
Better to Adopt Isolationist Stance (V2485)	.13	ns
Increase Limits on Foreign Imports (V432)	ns	ns
Increase South Africa Sanctions (V433)	ns	.10
Spending on Foreign Aid (V378)	.10	ns
Defense Spending (V439)	.15	.10
<u>Racial Policies:</u>		
Federal Spending to Assist Blacks (V386)	.10	.15
Affirmative Action for Jobs (V2558)	.10	.16
Govt Aid to Blacks (V447)	.16	.14
College Quotas for Blacks (V465)	.11	.17
Integrating Schools Govt Business (V470)	.15	.11
Pace of Civil Rights (V518)	.20	.14
Blacks Gotten What They Deserve (V520)	.16	.20

policy outlook.

Opinions about language policy, finally, appear less tied to the cleavages reported above. Support for the designation of English as America's official language has a broad consistency, at least when this issue is posed in the abstract, and respondents in the Pilot Study who favored such a law were not as distinctively conservative or "cool" toward minority groups as those who worried about Hispanic immigration. Language policy preferences were unrelated to opinions on both the foreign policy and domestic spending issues, but retained a consistent association with opposition to more government efforts targeted toward blacks.

OVERVIEW

In mapping out the interrelationships among the multiple issue and value domains, the existence of substantial overlap has become clear. We have not ourselves completed either the lengthy task of searching for underlying structure or dimensionality or the multivariate analyses designed to isolate the unique effects of the items we proposed and the location of these variables in a causal chain. We suspect, however, that at this juncture such analyses are at this juncture bound to be inconclusive.

From an objective point of view, it is clear that issues relating to ethnic competition, immigration, and its consequences for language policy are on the national agenda. Even this preliminary data analysis shows that public opinion on such issues is divided and that these cleavages are associated with ideological conflicts that have helped reshaped the post-New Deal party system. Certain conceptions of American identity and attitudes toward immigrants and their integration into American society are part of the cultural gestalt that

Edsall and Edsall (1991) have labeled traditional, conservative egalitarianism and that has had an important impact on electoral politics since 1968.

The inclusion of some questions related to the hypothesized new ethnic agenda in future NES surveys would enable researchers not only to continue to explore old questions concerning the structure of public opinion, the foundations of prejudice, and the influence of personal experiences and needs on political outlooks, but also to provide some access to studying fundamental changes in American political culture. The Pilot Study has provided an opportunity to test some of these questions and to suggest improvements and refinements for the future.

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