

THE PEROT CONSTITUENCY:

A Report to the Board of Overseers
of the National Election Studies

by Jack Dennis
University of Wisconsin--Madison

March 10, 1994

(3D/PEROT) March 10, 1994

Introduction

An occasional feature of most pluralist democracies, but a more recurring and robust theme of American electoral politics, is the special legitimacy of the political outsider. The rank political amateur who comes out of nowhere to challenge the established incumbents typically meets not simply a public disposition of neutrality, but even some presumption in his or her favor in the United States. Such public sentiment that welcomes those who would challenge the established order does not mean that office holders charged with ineptitude, ineffectiveness, arrogance, immorality or corruption will not be able to demonstrate their worth to the voters. We find instead, despite many worthy challenges by various types of reformers, that a great many public officials have managed to insulate themselves from the changing tides of public opinion. Bureaucrats, judges, and legislators especially have discovered some effective ways to deflect public criticism, and thus to preserve their tenure.

Yet, this outsiderist principle of American politics still has considerable public resonance, despite the many successes in office holder self-preservation and entrenchment that we observe. However secure such elites may therefore seem, there is for them always a lurking sense of anxiety that they may become subject, not simply to European-style elite recirculation, but to job termination on a more permanent basis, at any time. This ineradicable, if latent fear of irrevocable recall of their positions and privileges is based on their recognition of the high degree of public acceptance of the principle of outsider challenges in American political culture.

This principle of outsiderism is so potent a threat because it is grounded in at least four essential themes and assumptions of American democracy (Dennis, 1993). First is the principle of participant democracy. If ultimate political wisdom resides not in some small cadre of highly knowledgeable, experienced or virtuous individuals, but is instead the possession of the people as a whole, then the occupiers of political office should be treated merely as temporary custodians of the larger public will that elected them. Under this strain of democratic theory, the only reason for being of office holders is to represent faithfully the public trust, rather than to use their power to gain special privileges, or to insure their continued tenure.

Second is the allied democratic theme of political equality. In the theory of democracy, as applied in the United States, every full-membership adult has an equal right to participate at all levels of government, including the right to seek and hold office. There is no presumption, therefore, in favor of members of a political class, whatever their resources and achievements might be. People with no prior experience in politics are thus in principle as able to represent the sentiments of their fellow citizens as is anyone who has had extensive preparation and experience for public service.

Third, is the application of the irrepressible individualism of Americans. Liberal democracy, founded upon such individualism, puts some sharp restraints not only upon the state, but upon those who would wield its powers. A main mechanism for resisting governmental intrusion into our private lives is the limiting of the powers, privileges and tenure of those who would control us. The threat of summary dismissal by the voters is thus at least an indirect way of preserving the freedom of individuals and out-of-power groups to dissent from the dictates of society and its governing institutions.

Finally, a democratic theme that grows out of such individualism is that of pluralism. The needs, rights and voices of individuals are often most effectively represented through the operation of group-based mechanisms of competition or opposition, and of compromise. Thus, like-minded groups of people who constitute minorities of political opinion have the right to organize themselves for political action and to attempt either to change an existing majority, or to exact some concessions for those who oppose whatever majority coalition happens to be in power at the time. The processes of democratic pluralism thus depend upon having the opportunity for minority groups to represent their interests in an unfettered manner, and to attempt to restructure mass opinion in new directions. This right to opposition means that the representatives of out-of-power groups and their organizations may contest not only the establishment's policies and leadership, but the continuance of the majority's representatives in office.

In each of these four distinguishable themes of democratic theory and practice, there is a basic need for vigilance against the usual kinds of abuses that entrenched political elites may bring--especially lowered effectiveness of performance, loss of vision about the future course of society, arrogance toward those out of power, the creation of special prerequisites and privileges for themselves and their allies, and corruption, immorality, fraud and malfeasance. Lord Acton's dicta are thus the watchwords of outsiderism: "Power corrupts; and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

Americans' endemic mistrust of indefinitely-held and unchecked power has come to the fore recently in the widely popular initiatives on the ballots of many states to set term limits for legislative incumbents. A great many people are thus apparently willing to give up some of their future rights to choose anyone they might want at the time as office holders in order to erect some barriers to the high degree of incumbent entrenchment in Congress and in state legislatures --which has characterized the experience of recent decades. To convey legitimacy to officials through electoral processes thus will carry with it the presumption of a time-defined turnover to others of these positions of public representation--if such term limits are able to withstand court challenges and other means incumbents will marshal to render them inoperative.

The American presumption favoring attempts by outsiders to dislodge those who exercise state authority through the electoral system or in other ways has led, if discontinuously, to repeated waves of insurgency, reform, "good government initiatives," and other such movements in American history. The Jacksonian Democrats' success in dislodging a patrician political elite in the 1830s, the emancipationist Republicans' replacement of the Whigs in the 1850s, the late 19th century Populist agrarian reformer's attacks upon commercial monopolies and other elites, the early 20th Century Progressives' muckraking and anti-party reforms, and the variety of egalitarian and protester movements of the late 1950s through early 1970s--civil rights, feminist, environmentalist, youthful war protest, and others--all exemplify the principle of the legitimacy of challenge to the existing power structure. (See Rosenstone, et al., 1984; Mazmanian, 1974; Gillespie, 1993; Goodwyn, 1978 for example.)

The Perot Phenomenon

If we accept the outsider principle as having continued relevance for our analysis of American politics, then we may ask whether and in what senses such a recurring call to political insurgency applies to the candidacy and movement of H. Ross Perot. Perot appeared from nowhere in 1992. He was in many respects the untarnished political novice who challenged not only the incumbent President, George Bush, but the very structure of the institutions that had created and sustained the power hierarchy in Washington. Perot pitted himself thus not simply against Bush and Clinton, as the standard bearers for the two parties; but he also went up against the two-party duopoly itself, and the wider political establishment in Washington, D.C.

A symbiotic set of relationships had grown up between the two major parties and their allies, according to Perot's gospel. Such allies included the network of special interest groups and their PACs, the behind-the-scenes power brokers who helped assemble the disparate elements of the governing coalition, the relatively permanent corps of federal policy bureaucrats, and the national establishment media of communication. The power coalition's set of interlocking directorates fanned out from the White House and the Capitol in a variety of directions; but all were linked inextricably to a hard-to-break coalitional monopoly on national political power.

What Perot accomplished was in important ways quite remarkable. He inspired, without demonstrating great natural abilities as a charismatic leader, an extensive, rapidly formed, if somewhat disorganized grassroots campaign organization. This quickly spreading set of grassroots formations persisted despite Perot's temporary withdrawal from the presidential race. And it has continued to grow to this day--that is, even after Perot lost his bid in 1992. Thus, United We Stand America threatens to remain an important force in national politics for some years to come. Perot has spent a good deal of his efforts since the 1992 election expanding, consolidating and redirecting this organizational base. Thus, with it he promises to be a factor in the 1994 Congressional Elections; and he has visibly kept the door open for his entry into the 1996 Presidential contest.

He also proved especially skillful in getting the attention of the established mass media, and yet avoiding being directed by them, or ultimately much dependent on whether the main media spokespersons approved of his candidacy or not. He played upon his novelty value to obtain substantial early media attention; and he proved his newsworthiness by rising to an equal level of public approval, by late spring 1992, to that of Bush and Clinton. However jaundiced a view of Perot developed by early summer, at least among the establishment press corps, he was perceived to be, until the time of his withdrawal in July, a needed breath of fresh air for an electorate facing another stultifying round of two-party duopoly politics. When the public opinion soundings showed that he had caught, and perhaps surpassed his two main competitors, then the attention of the established media and other forces of national politics began to take his insurgency seriously. Suddenly the novelty and thus the news value of the other 1992 insurgents--Tsongas, Buchanan, and Brown--faded; and their campaigns began to disappear from the front pages and network evening news.

Perot did, of course, commit what look in retrospect to be major strategic errors of campaign management. His failure by the time of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidate Debates to correct his provisional choice of Admiral Stockdale as his running mate was one. Another was his dropping out of the race after he began to feel the heat of major media investigative journalism. His unsubstantiated claim that the dirty tricks squad from the Bush Campaign had planned to disrupt his daughter's wedding was possibly a third.

But on the upside, Perot worked a few strategic miracles that were the sure sign of an original political mind at work. He knew when and when not to pay attention to the professional campaign handlers that he had hired--Rollins, Jordan, and Co. He turned to his own advantage the attempt by the Bush campaign to use him as a foil in the Debates, to slow Clinton's electoral momentum.

Perot also seemed to understand better than any of the other candidates, early in the campaign, how the media environment of presidential campaigns might be usefully restructured. The Clinton campaign, orchestrated by Mandy Grunwald, et al., also quickly adapted to this new environment. But what made Perot's initiative so impressive was that he conceived from the outset of a form of voter/candidate interaction that would be mediated as little as possible by the Fourth Estate. That the old style screening and filtering by a media elite of potential candidates for high office could, for the most part, be by-passed was Perot's most important insight.

Thus, he capitalized on the more interactive, entertainment, pop culture aspects of the media, such as talk shows, to launch his campaign and to communicate directly with potential supporters. As the fall campaign was completed, Perot also bought heavily into the controllable aspects of the media, especially television advertisements. By getting mostly free publicity in the early stages of the campaign, Perot was able to concentrate his media expenditures in the final stages of the presidential campaign; and he spent more, and with possibly greater persuasive effects, than did either of his main competitors.

Perot also instituted the "infomercial," which violated all of the conventional wisdom that had existed among media consultants for political campaigning. Not only were these unusually long, but they demanded more audience attentiveness than the professionals believed it capable of. They were delivered in a "talking head," highly factual format, with academic style graphs and charts. This didactic style carried over to Perot's shorter spots, where rather gray, factual, straight-to-the-point talk substituted for what had previously been the dominant forms of campaign commercials. Before 1992, the quick sound bite, trusted observer speakover, subliminal, symbolic, emotive, and personally attacking modes of candidate advertising had predominated. But Perot & Co. had the wit to see that a great many people in the audience had come to regard the use of such persuasive techniques as an insult to their intelligence, and as a reflection therefore of poor political judgement on the part of their creators and users. Thus, Perot's straight talk, Harry S Truman-like appearance and manner, and didactic style actually served him well in this era of the new media and of high audience mistrust of those who would misuse the very media that were supposed to serve as the essential conduits for informing the public.

Perot thus showed himself to be especially able, despite some major lapses, to establish and maintain his credibility with potential voters--at least relative to Bush and Clinton. He more successfully put his campaign--than did the within-party insurgents such as Brown or Buchanan--in line with the high levels of popular discontent with the established political order. "Divided government"--a phenomenon of the Reagan and Bush Eras--had led to a public image of national government ineffectiveness. There was a perception of unremitting bipartisan bickering and gridlock, relative to the pressing problems of a society in the midst of major economic, social, moral and international challenges. Both sides of the party "poligopoly" thus got blamed.

When Perot pointed his accusatory finger at both parties, castigated the subversions of the public's interests by special interests, railed against an intrusive and misguided bureaucracy, pointed out the behind-the-scenes role of the well networked power brokers in Washington, and the like, he seemed to have struck a responsive chord with a great number of anxious, frustrated, disaffected and disillusioned citizens. The latter had perhaps become tired of the endless recycling of the same old partisan and ideological slogans, combined with little effective action. By the early 1990s, despite the end of the Cold War, many people had become fearful not just of the effects of the Recession and other contemporary ills, but had begun to lose some of the usual American optimism about the future for themselves and for their children. There was a strong public impression of our growing lack of international economic competitiveness and living beyond our collective means--as exemplified in the large and growing national government deficit, and the considerable imbalance of international trade--plus failure to address such basic problems as those in the health care delivery and finance systems, the welfare system, education, the control of crime, eradication of poverty, decreasing the extent of homelessness, stopping pollution, and the spread of AIDS, and arresting the ever more visible forms of decay of our public facilities, such as our inner cities and the interstate highway system.

Thus, many of those who had tired of the usual set of political options were greatly disappointed when Perot backed out of the presidential race, at least for the time being. Perot had emerged as the plausible, even possibly electable outsider, who promised, and seemed in some as yet indefinable way, able to "clean out the barn" in Washington. Perot had also emerged as the forceful outsider who was untainted by the transgressions and failures of the incumbents. Thus, an analysis of Perot's effects on public opinion needs to start with the terms of this outsiderism.

Specifics of the Perot Appeal

The central proposition of the following analysis of the Perot constituency is therefore that the unifying theme of Perotism is vigorous reformism presented in the guise of insurgent populism. Perot's attack on "politics as usual," which yielded about a fifth of the 1992 presidential votes cast--i.e., nearly 20 million of the 104 million total turnout--evidently took hold. Despite going up against a well institutionalized party duopoly, and an eventually hostile establishment press corps, plus having inadequately explained his withdrawal and then re-entry into the contest, some lapses in choices of co-campaigners--e.g., Stockdale and Rollins--

occasional emotional outbursts that suggested the possibility of an autocratic, petulant and paranoid personality, a somewhat vague policy program beyond a few key agenda items, and such, Perot had to be doing something right, given the striking levels of his public appeal at various points along the way.

For purposes of the following analysis, using the 1992 National Election Study (pre and post) data, together with the new data from the 1993 Pilot Study, we focus here upon the following five clusters of explanatory variables that pertain to Perot's outsiderism:

1. The central theme of insurgent populism, 1992 style, was probably the high and increasing levels of public political alienation. Outsiderism in the American context nearly always draws upon some essential withdrawal of political support from the incumbents, from their policies, and at some critical junctures, from the institutions and practices that have sustained the incumbents in their positions of power as well. Perot attacked not simply the failures of Bush Administration's policy performance and the resistance of the Democratic Party-controlled Congress--that usually had worked at cross purposes with the Executive Branch--but more fundamentally, he disagreed with the mechanisms of political pluralism that had given rise to this gridlock and petty haggling in the first place.

The center piece in this voicing of public discontent was his insistence upon running as a non-party candidate, and his statements of criticism of the two major parties, i.e., his anti-partyism. So far he has refused to reshape his political movement into a third party, as George Wallace had done in 1968 and beyond. On the other hand, there is still an unanswered question of what precise message about the political parties had greatest resonance with his audience. One might tender the hypothesis that his appeal was mostly based on representing the growing body of self-described Independents, i.e., those who take a non-partisan posture toward American politics. This kind of appeal, even though it has some separable attitudinal components (Dennis, 1988a,b), is essentially different from embracing the idea that we should seek to establish some realistic partisan alternative to the Democrats and Republicans. The latter third-partyism, or multi-partyism--depending upon how many realistic alternatives are envisioned--is not the same as the usual orientation of non-partisans, who like to keep their psychic distance until they find out, in each election, just exactly what it is that each of the two major parties is offering. The Independent in this sense leans one way or the other, when appropriate; and indeed, for some of them at least, there may be an identifiable major party tendency that is at least a latent form of continuing identification with either the Democratic or the Republican Party (Keith, et al., 1992. But, see the critique of this position in Dennis, 1992.)

Both non-partisanship, in all its complexity, especially in terms of the concept of Independence, and a desire for our having available a greater range of realistic party options (third-partyism) are both different from non-partisanship in another sense. Rather than being generally willing to choose, in the end, in favor of one or the other of the two major parties' candidates, there could be a form of non-partisanship that would favor the abolition, or at least much more severe restrictions being placed upon the operation of all political parties. Such anti-partyists would thus prefer non-partisan elections at all levels of American government, and thus

thus presumably, an even more candidate-centered form of electoral politics than we have already achieved in the U.S. (Wattenberg, 1992). Here the form of partisan alienation is comprehensive, in that one desires abolition of the partisanship principle. We suspect that any or all three of these major forms of resistance to the two major parties could have played a role in Perot's relative degree of success with the electorate.

Other alienationist themes of Perotism are probably also worth testing in this connection. There was some significant degree of attention paid in Perot's rhetoric to criticism of Congress. This critique has become such a popular form of political alienation that even Members of Congress feel obliged to use it in their bids to retain office--thus posturing as maverick reformers who will serve as their constituents' St. George to go down to Washington to slay their own institutional dragon (Fenno, 1978; Parker, 1986).

Closely allied in the public mind with the declining effectiveness of Congress in serving the public's trust is the idea that special interests, especially those with permanent staffs and lobbyists who work on Capitol Hill, are important collaborators in the process of undermining the majority's ability to effect its will. Such hypothesized efforts to undermine the popular will come both through lobbying Congress and other agencies of national government. Perot picked out interest group politics for special scorn, promising that significant restrictions would be placed on their power, and on the power brokers who serve them, were he elected.

Aside from such anti-pluralism (vis-à-vis the two major parties, interest groups and their brokers, and Congress), there were several more diffuse refrains of political alienation that Perot set to music in his electoral concerts. One recurrent theme of outsider politics is what one might term the "Chicken Little" strategy. This sky-is-falling, our country-is-going-to-the-dogs, the government-is-spinning-out-of-control message evokes some underlying sense of public anxiety about whether the right questions are being asked, and the right solutions being proffered, by those in authority. In the early 1990s, a variety of sources of public unease might be identified--at the macro level by a rapidly changing and thus uncertain international order, an economy still in a recessionary state of shock, and a growing list of major social problems that have had in recent years little discernable government amelioration attached to them. At the micro level there was some growing sense of political disempowerment of individuals and of their most salient reference groups because of the gridlock, and thus, the unresponsiveness of those who took up space in the halls of national government. A growing, uneasy sense of possible governmental and societal meltdown had begun to appear on a broad front, therefore; and Perot again voiced, along with the other insurgents of 1992, these diffuse senses of public anxiety, anger and disillusionment.

2. Another important definition of the realm of outsiderism in American politics has to do with substantive values--both standards for judging right from wrong and preferred ultimate goals--and with the translation of such normative constellations into operative political programs. The latter domain political scientists somewhat loosely categorize as the realm of political ideology--which has remained one of the most controversial, both in terms of its definition and measurement, of anything that political scientists concern themselves with professionally. The

question that arises in this connection, relative to the supporters of Ross Perot, is what broad band of values, and thus of ideology, did he represent, if any?

We would usually hypothesize that the outsider in politics needs to appeal to some neglected, or at least unenforced, set of values that have resonance with the general public. This does not always mean that the outsider will land smack in the middle of conventional morality or of the dominant ethical system of a society. Rather, such value cards may also be played from either the extreme left or the extreme right of the ideological spectrum. While the insistence on greater governmental rectitude may come thus from any direction, at the level of ideology, the most effective strategy in the U.S. has usually been to couch one's moralist critiques in the language, myths and symbols of the ideological middle.

In the United States, where the "fixed conception of the good society" (Downs, 1957) is in general hyper-kurtotically placed at the ideological middle, the best strategy for candidates then becomes to identify what they are urging as being representative of the values of the middling majority. This tactic may even take the form, given the lowish left/right ideological consciousness of most Americans (Converse, 1964), of reasserting the pertinence of popular values outside any explicit ideological context whatsoever--i.e., avoiding like the plague being termed an ideologue, or an extremist. Goldwater in 1964, McGovern in 1972, and Dukakis in 1988 were forced to learn, to their chagrin, the importance of this basic political lesson.

But we may take a somewhat more complex view of what ideology consists of in the United States than simply being identified as liberal or conservative. We may thus ask what particular values or other referents may serve as the main conduits of ideological expression, and as the bases of whatever popular appeal such expression may have. In the case of Perot, one detects readily, at the surface level, an essentially non-ideological campaign, and thus most probably a low public connection to him in simple, surface left/right terms. We would expect to find relatively low levels of voter attributions of ideological positioning to his candidacy, therefore.

Below this surface level, however, one needs to take account of the major political value and group identification narratives that may, in pieces, compose some broader form of ideological discourse. What we would suggest are two kinds of hypotheses about the outsiderism of Perot. One is that he was more likely to be perceived and appreciated in terms of his alienationism than of his ideologism. But, when we carefully decompose left/right ideology, as it exists in the U.S. at the present time, into some of its major sub-themes, then it may well be that Perot did connect to his audience in limited ideological senses. Our second proposition is thus that there may well be some value terms that are susceptible of ideological translation relevant to our explanation of Perotism as a political phenomenon.

What might such decomposed elements or sub-dimensions of ideology consist of? First, there is the definition of left/right ideology that is presented simply in the context of the two major political parties. In this perhaps restricted and most obvious sense, there is in the United States, as there is elsewhere, the phenomenon of party ideology (Aberbach, et al., 1986). This

consists mainly of what the parties stand for, programmatically, relative to each other. Such content may shift considerably over time. The parties' attempts to differentiate themselves from each other is the process that puts real wine into what, for many Americans, would otherwise be empty ideological bottles. Despite the considerable diffuseness and overlap of ideological positions among those who speak in the name of each party, there is nonetheless some public recognition that the Democrats are, broadly speaking, more to the left and the Republicans are more to the right, in recent times. If this handy, party-positioning way of defining what ideological differences are has meaning to particular people, it probably does so because their more basic form of political identity is that of partisanship rather than having been socialized with greater primacy to a left/right perspective (Converse and Pierce, 1986; Percheron and Jennings, 1981.)

Separable from this kind of definition of left/right ideology in the United States are a variety of wider group and value conflicts which exist apart from their partisan incarnations. In the ideological politics of recent years in America, a major form of "culture war" has focused on the role of religious beliefs and of certain aspects of conventional morality in politics. In some uniquely American way, but which has some parallels in the long standing political debates in Europe over clericalism versus secularism for example, Americans in recent years have debated hotly such matters as the role of state in supporting or inhibiting the use of abortion and other means of family planning, the use of prayers in public schools, programs that recognize or attempt to inhibit pre- and extra-marital sex, homosexuality, the use of recreational drugs (beyond alcohol and tobacco), and the like (see for example, Leeger and Kellstedt, 1993; Wald, 1992).

In the 1992 election this cluster of value conflicts took the form of a mainly Republican Party-, and to a lesser extent, Bush campaign-sponsored emphasis on the need to protect "traditional family values" and other aspects of national morality. The Republican Party's National Convention reverberated with these calls for a return to public rectitude, morality and Christianity, especially by speakers such as news commentator and candidate Buchanan, Vice President Quayle and the Reverend Robertson. The Christian Right was especially active in pushing these morality themes, and in helping to write the Republican Party Platform to reflect these "traditional values" concerns.

Just as for political party-defined left/right ideology, where Perot clearly stands aside from such differentiation, as it were by definition, we might also expect that such themes of moralism and religiosity would not have much resonance among Perotistas. Perot projected a more rationalist, technological, secular image than he did any religio-moral themes and concerns. Thus, if any relationship exists for this sub-dimension of American value focused ideological thinking, then it is likely to be a negative one.

A third important sub-theme of the American version of left/right ideology revolves around the question of the acceptability, and thus the need for extension of more equal social and economic status to various disadvantaged groups. The most fundamental basis of inequality in the contemporary United States has been not social class, as would be true in many European societies, but rather race and ethnicity. Thus, the dimension of ideology that has to do with the

"haves versus the have nots" has focused especially on the condition of African-Americans, people of varied Hispanic origins, those from a variety of Asian countries, and Native Americans such as Indians and Eskimos. Here the content, or question, that defines left versus right is whether the state, acting on behalf of American society more generally, should institute programs to limit discrimination against such groups, and indeed to provide "affirmative action" to improve their relative status as collective entities. Those on the left, the "modern liberals," push for state intervention to improve the relative status of these groups; whereas contemporary conservatives believe that members of such groups should strive individually to advance their status without government or other societal intervention.

In general, Perot did not address this set of issues very directly. Perhaps in a more indirect sense, his strongly patriotic and protectionist postures did lend themselves to some nativist interpretation. This emphasis might have intersected broadly with anxiety about the continuing tide of immigration, as well as concerns about competition for jobs with cheaper foreign labor. Thus, there might be some significant impact of certain specific aspects of the politics of racial and ethnic equality, relative to Perot's appeal.

The place of women in society, and of the feminist push for greater gender equality might be another form of left/right differentiation that could, in theory, have relevance to the analysis of Perot's constituency. By taking a clear pro-abortionist stance, however, Perot may have blunted some of the relevance women's issues might have had. And women's liberation could in the public mind also be part of some wider issues of the "new politics" variety. Thus, the inequality aspects of women's issues might possibly have become submerged relative to the traditional values debate. Thus, a possible empirical outcome is that feminist symbols and issues would relate strongly to the demands of other "new politics" groups--environmentalists, homosexuals, or other non-religiously based moral and social reformers. Whether this kind of attitudinal structure, if it exists, would relate well to Perot is again in some doubt, given his lack of forceful attention (some would say, mainly avoidance) of this realm of ideological debate.

What else might be buried in the American version of left/right ideology? McClosky has noted that our form of conservatism probably contains some broader philosophic tenets, such as strong emphasis upon the value of liberty (i.e., unfettered individualism, and a restricted role of government in society). The "modern liberal" by contrast, puts greatest stress upon correcting inequalities in society, putting some restraints upon individualism, and arguing for government intervention to protect and encourage the less advantaged.

Perot's programmatic approach seems to fall on both sides of such distinctions. While there is no particular emphasis upon greater equalization of status and in his program, he did at times project willingness to use government to solve major problems of society, while at the same time wanting to narrow its scope in other senses--e.g., cutting the national government's budget (and thus deficit), which means presumably cutting some of the costly entitlement programs. He even advocated a higher level of taxation as one remedy for the growing imbalance in the government revenue versus services equation. We are able to test in at least

limited ways with the 1992-93 panel the extent to which philosophical conservatism or liberalism shows a significant connection to Perot's base of support.

Finally, a classic sub-theme of left/right ideology, and in some respects its most basic original basis is that of social class conflict and cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). While the U.S. is not a strongly class-focused society, relative to a variety of European democracies, there are nonetheless at least some undertones of such ideological differentiation that surface occasionally, as in the Presidential elections of the 1930s or in the 1948 election.

One suspects that the 1992 election was not one of these class-polarized instances, even though George Bush represented an old-line Eastern establishment in terms of his background; while Bill Clinton emerged from quite modest circumstances. Perot was able, despite being one of the richest men in the country--probably in the top half-dozen--to play upon his self-made career projectory; and indeed he came closest of the three major candidates in affecting successfully the "common man" aura of Harry S Truman. Whether this common man image actually attracted any support still remains to be seen, however. But we are able, with the '92-'93 data, to test in limited respects the possible effects of class-based ideology and identification upon his support.

In general, the approach adopted here will be to look both at several facets of political alienation, at the relative significance of alienationist themes versus ideological/value/group themes, and to consider ideology in terms of the more specific sub-dimensions that are indicated above.

3. A third possible cluster of antecedents of Perot support has to do with degree of political engagement. The usual image of the outsider attacking the system in the U.S. carries with it the notion of activating those who had been sitting, disaffected, on the sidelines. Those whose participation had not been valued before, and who had thus remained unmotivated to pay any close attention to politics or to the election at hand, should suddenly begin to see political relevance for themselves and become politically mobilized, as happened, for example, in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).

The question here for studies of Perotism as a political movement is the extent to which there were such mobilizing effects, or whether the people who were already strongly politically engaged, but frustrated by "politics as usual," were the ones most likely to join the Perot insurgency movement. At least in a relatively straightforward sense, we are able to test the degree of both psychological and behavioral involvement of the Perotistas relative to the supporters of the mainline candidates. The 1992 commercial poll data on such matters had been inconclusive. One could find evidence there both that some relatively activist-minded people sided with Perot, and that those who had remained somewhat disengaged before 1992 also became mobilized.

One is able to index a variety of political engagement variables using the '92-'93 panel. For example, there are measures of organizational activity, campaign efforts, campaign media

consumption, political knowledge, voter turnout over several elections, interest in and concern about the election at hand, as well as interest in politics more generally, and even the sense of obligation to participate to fulfil one's civic obligations. These have all been indexed, after our conducting the usual dimensional analysis that we used throughout for our indexing procedures. We expect some, if only modest, relationships with Perot support for these variables. And we expected to find that Perotistas were modestly on the high side of these indicators, given the kinds of enthusiasm Perot seemed to have evoked in his followers (Barta, 1993). While such political involvement measures are likely to be a little connected to the category of measures outlined above in terms of political alienation, they are also largely independent of them, and thus bear separate scrutiny.

4. A fourth area useful for trying to account for the Perot phenomenon is that of issue positions. While Perot's policy agenda was perhaps narrower than is that of the usual (major party) presidential candidate, he nevertheless had a few themes that he hit upon quite forcefully, such as reducing the federal deficit. Thus, we should reasonably expect that those who found themselves closer on these "hot button" issues should have been more supportive of Perot, whether by becoming, in the course of the campaign, persuaded of the virtues of his position, or by matching his proposals to the voter's pre-existing policy positions, or through post-hoc rationalization of one's own positions, given the attraction to the candidate on other grounds (Brody and Page, 1972). NES '92-'93 provides a fair range of major issues touched upon in the campaign as a basis for assessing Perot's relative attraction. Of these matters of substance, we expected the reduction of the federal deficit issue to be especially compelling, given earlier work that has related the issue positions of voters to their support for the various major candidates (Zaller, 1993; Miller, 1993). Other issues where we might expect significant effects were for NAFTA (by 1993), and matters relating to the economy, such as ending the recession, or becoming more competitive in the international economy.

5. A final set of suspects for significant antecedent relationships with Perotism are some fairly straightforward types of demographic variables, such as age, sex, race, education and income. The exit-poll data reported from V.R.S. (New York Times, Nov. 5, 1992) suggested at least modest relationships for race, sex and age, such that white younger males were rather more likely to have supported Perot than were their opposite members, i.e., black (or other ethnic) older females. We shall try to take cognizance of such possible, if often difficult to interpret, kinds of relationships in the analysis below. Some kinds of people (in social status terms) were more attracted to the outsiderism of Perot than were others, therefore, we hypothesize.

Summary

For purposes of simplicity, we have, therefore, grouped our explanatory variables under five major headings: 1) political alienation (including both partisan and other aspects of such alienation), 2) ideology and values (including, for example, such sub-dimensions as traditional values versus new politics, ethnic equality versus ethnocentrism, social class as a basis of

differentiation, "party ideology," and philosophical liberalism versus conservatism including individualism, egalitarianism, etc.), 3) political engagement (including political information, political interest, political activity, media monitoring of campaigns, etc.), 4) policy issues positions (such as the federal deficit, NAFTA and other recurrently emphasized Perot agenda items), and finally, 5) a few socio-demographic variables, particularly age, race, and sex.

The Dependent Variable

One of the features of the large and complex data set that constitutes the three-wave '92 (pre- and post) and '93 NES surveys is that more than one measure of Perot support is available for our investigatory purposes. There are reports from respondents about whether or not they voted for Perot, whether he was ever their first choice, whether they considered voting for him at all, whether they felt warm or cold toward him, a la the feeling thermometer (in all three waves), and in '93, what their specific emotions toward, and trait perceptions of, Perot might be. One may construct a variety of Perot support measures therefore with these questions. Such Perot support indexes are essentially of two basic types. One is a straight Perot preference or evaluation measure without much explicit reference to his competitors. The other type of measure answers the question, "compared to what?" Since the present analysis is geared more to the future than to the past, we have focused here more on Perot/Clinton comparisons than on Perot/Bush comparisons. The indexes of support for Perot used in the analysis which follows are:

- Perot V1 - was consistent in Perot preference or not. This is a three point index based on vote intention in 1992 (Pre), choice of Perot in the November election (Post), and the trial heat in 1993.
- Perot VX - a nine point additive index with respondents given 1 point each for: not voting for Perot, but considering him; Perot vote intention in pre-election; vote choice for him in November (post); vote preference for him in 1993 trial heat; voting for Perot while never considering voting for Bush or Clinton; voting for Perot while reporting a strong preference for him, considering self a supporter of Perot or UWSA; and paying dues to UWSA.
- FT Perot 1, 2, 3, X - feeling thermometer Pre, Post, '93 and average
- Perot C2 - FT Perot - FT Clinton, 1992 Post
- Perot C3 - FT Perot - FT Clinton, 1993
- Perot B2 - FT Perot - FT Bush, 1992 Post
- PTRAIT - mean of 5 perceived Perot traits in '93
- PEMOTN - 2 positive emotions toward Perot minus 2 negative ones
- PCTRAIT - mean of difference between 5 Perot traits and 5 Clinton traits in '93 (Perot is high)
- PEMONEG - Perot negative emotions (angry and afraid) scored together
- PEMOPOS - Perot positive emotions (proud and hopeful) scored together

PCEMOTN - mean of difference between net Perot emotions and net Clinton emotions in '93

EMOTRAIT - combines PCTRAIT and PCEMOTN

We also scored and analyzed the relationships pertaining to each individual trait and emotion for both Clinton and Perot. We do not report these results below.

Independent Variables

We constructed, mostly after a somewhat laborious series of exploratory factor analyses, a large number of mostly multi-item indexes in each of our areas of hypothesized antecedent influences. For the category of demographic variables, we simply used the measures more directly provided in the '92-'93 NES data file.

By category the number of antecedent variable indexes that were created and will be reported here are:

1. Partisan alienation: 9
2. Other alienation: 7
3. Ideology and values: 7
4. Policy issue positions: 6
5. Political engagement: 2
6. Demographics: 4

Appendix A provides a technical description of each of these variables as well as some others of the 150+ that we looked at. A less technical description of them will be provided shortly below. While we will not try to recount the entire 6 week-long process of developing and testing these indexes relative to explaining Perot support, let us at least illustrate this process of index construction, by first recounting a little about our initial cut at the data, before we move on to a summary of our findings.

Initial Findings

The way we began the search for explaining Perotism was first to think about the alienation versus ideology dichotomy. The most extensive set of fully comparable tests in the NES data that one might use to define these dimensions, and thus to describe the attitudinal structures that serve as substrata for more particularistic responses to Perot, are the feeling thermometers. The feeling thermometers used in '92 and '93 covered a variety of political persons and politically relevant groups. We hypothesized that the major Perot dimension, or attitudinal substrate, would be an alienation one rather than an ideological one, no matter how the latter was defined. Thus, we wanted to give attention both to the expected differentiability of an alienation dimension from each of a possible variety of ideological sub-dimensions, and

to the expectation that FTPerot would load only on the alienation dimension--or at least, would be only moderately diverted from the alienation dimension into one or another type of ideological space.

Using exploratory factor analysis, we plotted the feeling thermometers on Perot versus feelings about other individual political figures and candidates, as well as about specific groups of people. What we found, in part, is laid out in Figures 1-3. Each figure is a plot of where each thermometer used fell along a series of two orthogonal dimensions, using varimax rotation of principal components. Thus, the "Perot" dimension, within this somewhat limited feeling thermometer, or global affect, domain, is crossed with various sub-dimensions of ideological consciousness--as these are defined in terms of a "group" and political figure "heuristic" (Brady and Sniderman, 1985). Attitudes toward Perot fall toward one end of an anti-government establishment dimension; whereas the feeling thermometer ratings of such objects as the Federal Government, lawyers and Congress fall toward the other. It is noteworthy that Congress, that "keystone of the Washington establishment" (Fiorina, 1977), is placed quite opposite to Perot using these emotive ratings.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 presents a plot of the coordinates of a set of feeling thermometers plotted on two orthogonally rotated dimensions. These two factors were part of an eight factor principal components analysis of the 28 feeling thermometers indicated in the legend at the bottom of the figure. The horizontal axis is "party ideology"--in that its end points are Bush, conservatives and the Republican Party on one side, and the Democratic Party, liberals and Clinton on the other side.

The vertical dimension is a pro- versus anti-government establishment dimension, with Perot placed clearly on the "anti" side. The Federal Government, Congress, and lawyers are clustered at the pro-establishment end of the continuum. This means that those who feel warmly toward the political establishment are likely to feel coldly toward Perot, and vice versa. Furthermore, feelings generated for the objects at both ends of this insider/outsider dimension fall at about the same place on the Republican-Party-and-conservatives to Democratic-Party-and-liberals dimension.

Now from the same factor analysis as that used in Figure 1, we may plot the Perot vs. Government Establishment factor against other hypothesized sub-dimensions of left/right ideology--to see whether Perot moves in a more liberal or conservative direction, or whether he stays essentially in the middle when other kinds of ideological positioning are brought to bear.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

Figure 2 shows the Perot vs. Government Establishment dimension plotted against a pro- vs. anti-ethnicism dimension. On the horizontal axis one finds at one end positive feelings about Asian-Americans, recent immigrants, Hispanic-Americans and Blacks. At the other end of this

ethnicism dimension one finds feelings about feminists, labor unions, the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, J. Jackson and P. Buchanan. Environmentalists, liberals, and conservatives, for example, are more in the center on this dimension relating to feelings about various minority ethnic and racial groups. Perot is found, in these terms, slightly on the anti-minority (ethnocentrism) side of the ledger.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

This slight drift toward the less liberal end of the horizontal continuum is also found for Perot on a different ideology versus alienation plot--in this case the pro- versus anti-establishment dimensions plotted orthogonally to a "new politics" or "traditional values" dimension. Here the people most clearly on the traditionalist side in terms of public reactions are fundamentalist Christians, Patrick Buchanan, and Justice Thomas. At the "new politics" end of this horizontal dimension are feelings toward women and feminists, with liberals, homosexuals, and environmentalists all somewhat toward the anti-traditionalist values end. But Perot is still found near the center point, as is true for the other aspects of left/right ideology that are symbolized in these various people and group category terms.

In general, therefore, we may conclude several things from these analyses of attitudinal structure. First, the populist, outsider, anti-establishment posture of Perot evokes popular feeling that is quite discriminable from various aspects of ideology, whether this is measured in terms of "partisan ideology," pro- and anti-ethnicism, or pro- and anti-traditional values. We also find that Perot is fairly middle of the road for all of these dimensions of ideology thus identified.

In all of these cases, we are inferring to one or another type of underlying value system, or of ideological perspective, based on the symbolic value that we as observers expect clusters of such groups and individuals to have for real people. Such "heuristically derived" ideological positioning is however a relatively common and verifiable phenomenon in the U.S. Indeed, one may find this to be true even of youngsters growing up in our society. Before they have developed any clear and explicit ideological definitions or connections among various ideological elements, American preadults may nonetheless have provisionally sorted out "the good guys from the bad guys" in terms of an inexplicit and still latent left/right attitudinal structure (see Owen and Dennis, forthcoming). Having now identified these putative sub-dimensions of political ideology in terms of public feelings about some actual life forms, we are then able to press these ideological themes and other measures of political alienation further, in terms of their possible relevance to Perot support, using the other information available in these NES studies. We are thus able to bring such possible explanatory variables to bear in a somewhat wider explanatory universe than simply that of the feeling thermometers. Let us turn next to that task.

Adding a Few Predictors

Having established that a distinction between alienation and ideology might be well worth making when considering the problem of Perot, how might we then most usefully elaborate such a distinction, to glimpse the possible contours of the contributions each type of explanation might be able to make?

One important further distinction within the political alienation domain is that between partisan alienation and other aspects of political alienation. A core message of the Perot candidacy was that the two major parties have failed. But was this a Perotistic appeal geared mainly to Independents, in some uncomplicated sense, and to those who do not have much identification with one of the two major parties? Alternatively, was this instead a different kind of partisanship-relevant message, which is actually geared more toward evoking sympathy either for establishing more viable parties than two--to provide greater competition and more options of leadership and policy--or for disestablishing the two major political parties even further. The latter might entail total removal of partisan labels from the ballot and of party organizational backing, and thus the institution of more free-floating, candidate-centered, or interest-group-centered, elections.

Earlier, a distinction among four separable bases of political independence had been shown to exist among American voters, using the 1980 NES and other evidence (Dennis, 1988b). These four dimensions of independence attitudes were labelled anti-partyism, partisan indifference (or neutrality), partisan instability (of self-perception), and sense of political autonomy. All but the last of these are indexable in some analogous form in the '92-'93 NES data. The measure of partisan stability available here is based more on reported behavior than upon self-perception, however.

Other aspects of anti-pluralist alienation might be from Congress, as the central representative institution of national government, or from interest group politics, which is connected to the operations of Congress in the public mind (Dennis, 1981, 1987). Perot expended a lot of rhetorical energy attacking both Congress and "special interest groups," as well as the system of entrenched privilege and power, in which they along with the two major parties all share.

Beyond such appeals to feelings of anger and frustration about such institutional objects, Perot may have also connected with his audience (just as Clinton did as well) in terms of the general need for major changes of programmatic direction by American national government. Clinton made this his main slogan. But Perot more than joined the chorus. Both were saying that things governmental, and thus societal, had begun to get seriously out of whack, and that we were on the wrong track as a country.

Clinton and Perot thus harmonized their pitch so far as the need to get the Bush Administration out of Washington to get federal government turned around. Clinton spent somewhat less of his time gratuitously attacking Congress and other insiders, even though he too

was trying to run as much as possible on the outsiderist/populist/insurgency ticket. In the end, we suspect that (but this is something we still need to test) Perot ended up with most of these credits, as Clinton was forced to become an insider and reformed insurgent once he took on the mantle of the majority party. The acid test of this proposition is whether, when we compare support for Perot directly with that for Clinton, the "country-on-the-wrong-track" and "time-for-a-change" people end up more often preferring Perot to Clinton. Fortunately, we have a few fairly direct ways of attacking this problem with the NES evidence.

Some other aspects of alienation, both political and social, are part of the usual battery of measures that NES carries along as its core, or necessary baggage. These include measured sense of general political mistrust, government unresponsiveness, internal and external inefficacy and mistrust of others (misanthropy). In 1992 was also included a small battery on the extent of social disconnectedness, such as not knowing one's neighbors and not contributing to charities. In all there are more than a dozen such aspects of political and more general alienation that we are able to apply.

Related to these measures perhaps, are also some specific features of economic alienation, such as loss of optimism, or a rise in sense of anxiety about one's or one's children's economic prospects, and assessments of how well off economically things are at present. In 1992, a lot of the talk of the campaigners and their staffs, and thus of the media messengers, focused on the presumed centrality of the economics-centered sense of public disquiet. The question is however whether it was only Clinton and the Democrats who profited from this attention; or did Perot do so as well?

The list of major political alienation indexes to be used in the following efforts to identify significant antecedents of Perotistic sentiment are as follows. (See the Appendix for more technical details):

Partisan Alienation

- ANTIPTY: anti-party system or anti-partisanship attitudes, combines FTPTY3 and NEEDPARTIES negatively
- PARDIFF: degree of believing that the two major parties have substantial policy differences
- NEEDPARTIES: denial that we no longer need political parties anymore
- FTPTY3: feeling thermometer on political parties in general
- UNSTABLE: degree of stability in one's reported party identification between 1992 and 1993
- FTIND3: feeling thermometer for "people who call themselves political independents"
- INDEP: strength of self-reported independence from the two major parties
- PTYAFFIL: strength of party affiliation (collapsed 4 point version of party identification index)
- NONPARTY: choosing to have no parties on the ballot rather than to keep the present two parties, or to add some new parties

NEWPARTY: choosing to add new parties rather than to keep the present two parties or to have no parties on the ballot

Other Political Alienation

FTGOVT: mean of feeling thermometers on federal government, Congress and lawyers
 POLTRST: sum of the usual four political trust items
 EXTEFFIC: index of external efficacy: sum of "no say in government," and "officials don't care"
 CIVDUTY: sum of should vote and duty to serve in military
 INTEFFIC: internal efficacy: sum of the other four efficacy items
 CONGRESS: strength of disapproval of Congress' performance
 UNRESP: sum of the two usual government unresponsiveness items
 SPECINT: special interests have too much power
 CHANGE: the country needs a big change
 WRNGTRK: country is on wrong track '93, minus country is on wrong track '92
 PTYFEEL: sum of FT Democrats and FT Republicans
 WARANX: sum of worry about war and worry about nuclear war

Economic Alienation

ECONANX: sum of three items on personal economic future (pessimism)
 ECONOMIC: sum of four items on country's economic failure (pessimism)

Social Alienation

MISANTH: sum of two items on whether one can trust other people and whether they try to be helpful
 ANTISOC: sum of four items on social disconnectedness (volunteer work, talk with neighbors, join organizations, contribute to charity)

In the Ideology and Values domain, we used the following indexes:

RELIGION: sum of seven items reflecting religious belief
 GAYRITES: sum of four items on the rights of homosexuals
 PATRIOT: sum of two items on patriotism
 FEMINIST: sum of four questions on women's rights and feminism
 MORAL: mean of four questions on conventional morality
 FEMEQUAL: mean of two items on sexual harassment and one item on child care

 ANTIMMIG: sum of nine items on stereotypes of ethnic minorities (Hispanics, Asians, recent immigrants) and their projected effects on the rest of society
 INEQUAL: mean of six questions on general egalitarianism
 MATERIAL: Inglehart index with materialists scored high
 FTMILT: feeling thermometer on the military

- FTPOLICE: feeling thermometer on the police
- PARTYNDX: sum of standardized difference between FT Republican Party and FT Democratic Party plus the party identification index
- SELFIND: mean of three items on individualism (children should be independent, curious and self-reliant)
- TRADNDX: traditional values: sum of FT feminists, women, homosexuals and environmentalists, minus FT fundamentalists and P. Buchanan
- TOOBIG: sum of less government better, government too big and fund private schools
- ETHNIC: sum of FT Hispanics, illegal immigrants, immigrants, and Asian-Americans
- BLACK: sum of FT African-Americans and J. Jackson, plus feel close to African-Americans, minus feel close to whites, and minus agreement with items saying that blacks are lazy, unintelligent, and violent
- CLASS: respondent social class identification
- CLASSNDX: sum of FT people on welfare, the poor, labor unions, plus feel close to unions and to the poor, minus feel close to business, and feel close to the middle class
- CONSVNDX: sum of self-identified ideological position, feel close to conservatives, FT conservatives minus FT liberals, and feel close to liberals

For Political Engagement, we developed these indexes:

- TALKSHOW: listen to politics on radio plus listen to politics talkshows
- NEWS: watch campaign on TV plus attention to news
- KNOWPOL: mean of correct answers to eight factual knowledge questions
- CONTACT: sum of been contacted by parties, contacted by other campaign organizations, or by others, and registered to vote
- CONTRIB: sum of gave contribution to parties, contributions to other organizations, contacted about contributions, and get mail requests, and phone requests for contributions
- ACTIVE: sum of display of campaign buttons, stickers and signs; attend political events; work for parties or candidates; and made contribution to candidate
- TURNOUT: sum of 1993 recall of voting in 1992; 1992 recall of voting in 1988; intention to vote in 1992 (before the election); and report of having voting in 1992 in post-election survey

Issue Indexes

We also indexed a large number of issue positions and proximities on the premise that, despite Perot's somewhat restricted presentation of an issue agenda, he did project some important elements of policy wonkedness that might have proved appealing to his audience. We

used both '92 and '93 questions for this indexing; and over a selected range of such indexes, we conducted exploratory factor analysis to see how this large volume of issue content might be reduced. In the end we focused on only about six such composite or specific issue indexes. These were: the federal deficit, NAFTA, government power, the Clinton versus Perot comparison on the 7-point liberal/conservative identification scale, health ('93) and women's issues. See the Appendix for the technical details on the scoring of these indexes.

Multiple Regression Results

In a simple bivariate sense, virtually all of the antecedent variables listed above have significant bivariate correlations with one or another of our measures of Perot support. Thus, in one sense our fairly laborious process of indexing a wide array of possible explanatory variables of different kinds was not done in vain. The problem, so far as anticipating which of such Perotism predictors might be most usefully carried forward to the 1994 Congressional Election, or to 1996 Election, is not resolved however by finding a large field covered with many small gems of covariance, rather than just a few big ones. Thus, we need to find ways to achieve some greater predictive parsimony, in order to find the smallest set of measures available that can still give us a good chance of accounting for whatever continued public support Perot might have at these future points.

One procedure we employed was to take each cluster of putative predictors, more or less in the order presented above, to include in a multiple linear regression, relative to each of our 16 specific measures of Perot support.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

Table 1 presents a comparative assessment of the impact on Perot support of our partisan alienation or support measures. Each column represents a separate multiple regression estimation. Some of the measures used are indexes such as UNSTABLE and PARDIFF. UNSTABLE, which shows no significant multivariate relationships with Perot support, measures the extent of cross-time (1992 to 1993) inconsistency of self-reported partisan preference. PARDIFF, which by contrast has a number of significant relationships with various indexes of Perot support, measures the extent to which the respondent believes the two major parties actually differ on a variety of important issues. Thus, we find that the respondents who see such two major party differences are less supportive of Perot.

The other antecedent measures included in Table 1 are mostly individual items: feeling thermometers on "political parties in general" and on "people who call themselves political Independents," whether we need parties anymore (NEEDPARTIES), strength of independence (INDEP), the 4-point folded over political party identification index (PTYAFFIL), and two dummy variable measures constructed from the trichotomized Harris Poll question that we used in Pilot '93 which asks the respondent to choose among wanting non-partisan elections, keeping

the present two party system, or opting for the entry of a viable third (or more) party. These two measures are NONPARTY and NEWPARTY.

What we find for these less complex measures is that all except strength of independence and the folded-over traditional party identification index do reasonably well--i.e., having persistently significant predictive power over a wide range of Perot support indexes. The disaggregated Harris question is indeed significantly related at both ends (i.e., preferring either non-partisan elections, or preferring more realistic party options than two). And this significance appears despite an artifactual colinearity of around .5 between the two measures.

The two feeling thermometers (on parties in general and on Independents) do reasonably well also. And the question brought up from the 1980 NES, on whether we still need political parties in this country, also shows a fair number of significant relationships with Perot support.

Thus, all of the partisanship questions, except perhaps strength of independence that were introduced or reintroduced in the '93 Pilot Study, relative to their possible future utility for tracking Perotism, seemed to have worked out. We will return presently to look at some of these measures again, in a broader context, i.e., as included in a covariance structural estimation a la LISREL.

Other Alienation

We have argued all along that Perot's quarrel with the national political system was not simply with the party system. Thus, we need also to give high priority to this wider context of Perotistic outsiderism, in-so-far-as-possible. Here the analysis is somewhat captive to whatever other political alienation variables happened to get asked about in the three waves of the panel. Fortunately, there are a number of old standbys that get included on almost every round--such as political efficacy, trust, citizen duty, government responsiveness and such. Table 2 presents a selected list of such variables; and it includes both some of the long-term, core indexes as well as a few things that arose in connection with the more specific forms of public disgruntelment that arose in 1992 and 1993.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

We find at least seven kinds of alienationist/supportive attitudes of relevance beyond those related to the parties. All of these show persistently significant relationships with Perot support. Warm feelings about the federal government, Congress, and lawyers (FTGOVT), are negatively related to more than half of our Perot support measures. Sense of civic duty, except for the Perot/Bush feeling thermometer comparison (B2) has a positive relationship with supporting Perot. Sense of external political efficacy has generally positive relationships to Perot support. The exceptions are for the Bush/Perot comparison, and for our negative emotions score (PEMOTN-), which is scored high for anger and fear.

Thinking that the country is still on the wrong track in 1993, relative to how this evaluation was made in 1992, also shows this pattern, except for the first feeling thermometer on Perot, where the sign is negative (WRNGTRK). Believing that the country needs some important changes is also related to Perot support, in a variety of senses. The respondent's relative sense of anxiety about the economic future, while less consistently associated with our Perot measures, works similarly. Finally, disapproval of the job performance of Congress also is related in a variety of senses to Perot support. Political alienation more generally, thus, shows some importance for our account of Perot's constituency, as was hypothesized earlier.

Ideology and Values

We have tried in this analysis to keep in mind that there may be some underlying value themes that could be related to some degree to the Perot constituency, even though at a surface level Perot was not overtly ideological. But there are some senses at least in which matters that may converge with ideology along its various dimensions could be seen to have relevance. Table 3 presents some of these possibilities.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

Given that we discovered earlier (Figure 1 above) that the two-party bipolarity helps to define one element of liberal/conservative ideology--what we term here "party ideology"--we have included first a measure of two party bipolar partisanship. We combine the usual 7-point political party identification index and a standardized version of the differences in feeling thermometer ratings of the Republican Party minus those for the Democratic party. This combination is used to try to smooth out some of the intransitivity bumps in the usual index of partisanship (see the references in Dennis, 1988a, for literature on this measurement dispute; also see Keith, et al., 1992, and Dennis, 1992). We find in Table 3 that where comparisons of Perot and Clinton (or in one instance with Bush) are made, then party identification does play a role (C2, C3, B2, PCTRAIT, PCEMOTN, and EMOTRAIT). The latter combines the comparisons of Clinton and Perot on both emotions and traits. Party identification also impacts a little on the positive emotions side of reactions to Perot per se (PEMOTN+).

Religious belief also has significance here, at least negatively (RELIGION). Perot appeals more to a secular than a religious audience, it would appear. This was more true at the time of the election or just after than was true in the pre-election period or in 1993, however. There is also some suggestion that those higher on the need for adherence to conventional morality (MORAL) were attracted to Perot. These relationships work better for the emotions and traits domains than for feeling thermometers and candidate preferences, however.

Positive feelings about the police and the military also relate to support for Perot, mostly on the emotions and traits measures rather than on the others. By contrast, positive feelings about women, feminists, homosexuals, environmentalists, combined with negative feelings about P. Buchanan and about Christian fundamentalists, (TRADNDX) are negatively related to Perot

support. Perot supporters are also somewhat hostile to recent immigrants such as Hispanics and Asians (ANTIMMIG).

In general, we do find that some kinds of at least latent ideological/value themes have Perotism relevance. The strongest of these fall probably in the area of the ideology galaxy that has to do with party ideology, even though there are some significant relationships with other important "culture wars" and "ethnicism" themes.

Issues

After a fairly lengthy process of constructing issue position and proximity indexes over the whole of the 1992-3 data set, we eventually boiled down our analysis to six that we regarded as especially important potential antecedents of Perot support. These are shown in Table 4.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

The "issues" thought most germane in the case of Perot were the deficit, extent of government power, NAFTA, women's issues, health reform and a proximity measure of Clinton versus Perot on liberal/conservative ideology. Of these, the one most consistently associated with Perot support, even well before the time of the great Gore vs. Perot televised debate, is NAFTA. Women's issues, health reform and whether the government seems too powerful or not also have selected significant relationships to Perot support.

CLINPER2 suggests that there is at least some ideological image differentiation that was possible for Perot and Clinton; and this discrimination applied somewhat even to the respondent's emotions about Perot per se--at least in a positive emotions sense (PEMOTN+). Thus, all of these issues except the deficit give us some purchase on the Perot phenomenon.

We were surprised to find that, no matter what kind of index we used for the problem of the federal deficit, as measured in 1993, we were not able to evoke any multivariate significance of this issue. This was despite findings by others that this issue had played an important role in defining the Perot Constituency in 1992 (Zaller, 1993; Miller, 1993). Either the salience of this issue had faded by the time of the Pilot data collection, or the questions included did not work well for our problem. This may be simply because, in the flow of history since November 1992, almost all sides to the debate had come to accept Perot's position. And therefore if all accepted his agenda, then nothing very differentiating among constituencies remained by 1993. Even NAFTA, which is the most persistent of these policy matters across Perot support measures, could suffer the same fate by late 1994, as a Perotism differentiator.

Political Engagement

Table 5 presents the two political engagement indexes that seem to hold up best in a multivariate context for our Perot support indexes. Paying attention to talk shows is positively related to Perot support, and having greater political knowledge is negatively related.

[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]

Demographics of Perotism

Table 6 shows four demographic variables that have persistent relationships to Perotism: education, race (and ethnicity), sex, and age. The categories that are high on Perotism are younger, white, less educated males.

Broader Comparisons of Effects

Table 7 shows what happens when we throw together most of the antecedent variables that were displayed according to the theoretical categories outlined above. These "grand" multiple linear regressions, as summarized in Table 7, sort out for each Perot support measure as the dependent variable, how well the various antecedents shown above in more restricted contexts (Tables 1-6) then hold up.

[Insert Table 7 about here]

In the first part of this table, we have combined two items on pro- anti-partyism together to form ANTIPARTY2. WE have eliminated UNSTABLE from this analysis. In the issues portion, we try a different measure of the respondent's position on the deficit issues (DEBTCUT), but again to no avail.

In general, Table 7 shows the same patterns as before; but it trims somewhat the number of significant relationships with Perot support measures, given this wider multivariate context. Thus, we are given here a second opinion on the relative worth of these particular measures relative to our indexes of Perot support. All categories of antecedents show some utility in accounting for Perotism at various stages and at various levels. And only one of these (PTYAFFIL, the folded over traditional party identification index) disappears entirely from this medal winner list.

LISREL Models

To provide yet a third opinion on the relative utility of at least some of these Perotism predictors, we focused on the first two categories, partisan alienation and more general

alienation, as bases of Perot support using covariance structural analysis. Figures 4-7 show these results.

[Insert Figure 4 about here]

Figure 7 presents a model of the relative effects of three partisan domain variables on Perot support, using LISREL estimation. Perot support is measured there in more absolute rather than comparative terms. While not overwhelmingly robust, this model does suggest that anti-partyism (observed variously in 1993) and partisan indifference (also measured with multiple indicators), both have more impact on Perot support than does partisan instability (change in party identification over time).

[Insert Figure 5 about here]

Figure 5 makes the same kind of model estimation for a more comparative latent construct measure of Perot support. The structural coefficients in this version of the partisan alienation model are a little larger, and the overall fit is a little better, therefore.

A similar kind of model estimation is applied to our other central theoretical domain of political alienation in general. Figures 6 and 7 present the findings for both absolute and comparative measures of Perot support, in terms of covariance structure models.

[Insert Figure 6 about here]

Figure 6 shows that at least two kinds of latent antecedent variables, "anti-government establishment" and "change needed" have important connections to "absolute" Perot support, where both the independent and the dependent variables of interest are assumed to be latent. "Civic consciousness," by contrast, has a somewhat weaker connection to this form of Perot support.

We also see in Figure 6 that FTGOVT and POLTRST are the best of these measures relative to the kind of outsiderism defined by Perot & Co. And the CHANGE variable is a stronger indicator of desire for change in national government than is the "wrong track" variable.

[Insert Figure 7 about here]

A slightly different picture emerges on the latter point when a different latent Perot support variable is estimated relative to these latent variable antecedents. Here "wrong track" is a better indicator, and indeed contributes to a more impressive gamma coefficient with the "change needed" construct.

What these analyses contribute is some better relative perspective on which of these main antecedent indicators might be given highest priority in future work that attempts to track and account for the Perotism phenomenon.

Conclusion

Within the confines of the 1992-1993 NES panel, we have therefore tried to provide some overall guidance to what works best in giving an account of the Perotism phenomenon. The various tables and figures presented above contain most of the explanatory variables available in NES '92-'93 that seem to hold some promise for tracking the Perot constituency as it evolves over the next few years. This is not to say that all of these thus identified antecedents that show some significant explanatory power will continue to do precisely as well in future. Perotism, as would be true for any new political movement, is still in process of formation. New people may be joining up as others are abandoning the cause. A great deal of the attraction of Perot as a voice of discontent, and as a mobilizer of the angry and frustrated voters of the mid-1990s, could change greatly, depending on unanticipated events including the actions of Perot himself.

At present Perot shows no signs of disengagement from national politics. He has built a considerable war chest to supplement what was already almost unlimited financial resources to use for political purposes. He has probably also done very well in the bond market--both taxed and untaxed--since the '92 election, given that most national leaders have now adopted his fiscal strategy and thus have created a favorable investment climate for bonds. Some estimates are that he has made more than \$250 million in that time from his investments, all of which have added to his politically disposable income. His organization has also been reshaped and filled out since late 1992. Thus, he seems poised on the brink of diving again into the fray, once public disapproval has softened after the public relations setback of the NAFTA debate. He also has promised publicly to use some of his muscle in the 1994 congressional contests.

Some of the tools, both conceptual and methodological, that we need to track Perotism can be given a preliminary assessment on the basis of the 1993 Pilot data therefore, especially when these are joined with the data gathered in the 1992 Pre- and Post-Election Studies. There are indeed more lessons potentially available for our study of the emergent Perotista constituency than we have been able to explore in the relatively short time available since the 1993 Pilot Study data were released. And we will continue to make such explorations in the months ahead. But for now, this brief report must serve to summarize what little we have learned to this point.

Author's Note: I am greatly indebted to Gregory Flemming and to Diana Owen for their help in making the calculations of Perotism relevant relationships reported above. Kathy Kruger was most helpful in producing a readable manuscript.

References


- Aberbach, Joel D., et al. (1986) Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)
- Barta, Carolyn (1993) Perot and His People (New York: Summit Group)
- Brady, Henry E. and Paul M. Sniderman (1985) "Attitude Attribution: A Group Basis for Political Reasoning" American Political Science Review 79: 1061-78
- Converse, Philip E. (1964) "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe), pp. 206-61
- Converse, Philip E. and Roy Pierce (1986) Political Representation in France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)
- Dennis, Jack (1981) "Public Support for Congress" Political Behavior 3: 319-50
- ____ (1987) "Groups and Political Behavior: Legitimation, Deprivation and Competing Values" Political Behavior 9: 323-73
- (1988a) "Political Independence in America, Part I: On Being an Independent Partisan Supporter" British Journal of Political Science 18: 77-109
- (1988b) "Political Independence in America, Part II: Towards a Theory" British Journal of Political Science 18: 197-219
- (1992) "Political Independence in America III: In Search of Closet Partisans" Political Behavior 14: 261-96
- (1993) "Do We Believe Aristotle? American Beliefs About Democracy" paper presented at the Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago, April)
- Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row)
- Fenno, Richard F., Jr. (1978) Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston: Little, Brown)
- Fiorina, Morris (1977) Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven: Yale University Press)
- Gillespie, J. David (1993) Politics at the Periphery: Third Parties in Two Party America (Columbia, SC: University of Carolina Press)

- Goodwyn, Lawrence (1978) The Populist Movement: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America (New York: Oxford University Press)
- Keith, Bruce E., et al. (1992) The Myth of the Independent Voter (Berkeley: University of California Press)
- Leege, David C. and Lyman A. Kellstedt, et al. (1993) Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe)
- Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (1967) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press)
- Mazmanian, Daniel A. (1974) Third Parties in Presidential Elections (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press)
- Miller, Arthur H. (1993) "Economic, Character and Social Issues in the 1992 Presidential Election," American Behavioral Scientist 37: 315-27
- Owen, Diana and Jack Dennis (forthcoming) "Preadult Learning of Political Ideology in America," Chapter 9 in Communication and Political Socialization
- Page, Benjamin I., and Richard A. Brody (1972) American Political Science Review 66: 979-95
- (1972) "Policy Voting and the Election Process: The Vietnam War Issue" American Political Science Review 66: 979-95
- Parker, Glenn R. (1986) Homeward Bound: Explaining Changes in Congressional Behavior (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press)
- Percheron, Anrick and M. Kent Jennings (1981) "Political Continuities in French Families: A New Perspective on an Old Controversy" Comparative Politics 13: 421-36
- Rosenstone, Steven J., Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus (1984) Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
- Rosenstone, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen (1993) Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America (New York: Macmillan)
- Wald, Kenneth D. (1992) Religion and Politics in the United States, 2nd ed., (Washington, DC: CQ Press)
- Wattenberg, Martin (1992) The Rise of Candidate Centered Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)

Zaller, John (1993) "The Rise and Fall of Candidate Perot" paper delivered at the Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington, September)

Figure 1. *Antiestablishment versus Party Ideology*


HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1 VERTICAL FACTOR 3



SYMBOL	VARIABLE	COORDINATES	SYMBOL	VARIABLE	COORDINATES
1	FTBUSH1	(.77969, .06972)	2	FTCLINT1	(-.41114, .32067)
3	FTPEROT1	(.24241, -.22758)	4	FTBUCHAN	(.71182, -.11208)
5	FTJESSE	(-.04066, .11378)	6	FTDEMS1	(-.38122, .39994)
7	FTREPS1	(.78822, .09329)	8	FTHILL	(-.31234, .11439)
9	FTFOLEY	(-.11194, .29123)	10	FTTHOMS	(.63456, .02079)
11	FTLIBS	(-.30613, .50890)	12	FTCONS	(.65453, -.01074)
13	FTCONG	(.05701, .76238)	14	FTFEDGOV	(.19081, .78151)
15	FTLABOR	(-.10356, .37901)	16	FTFEMS	(-.18780, .22679)
17	FTWELF	(-.01547, .20554)	18	FTPOOR	(.08859, .09176)
19	FTBUSIN	(.48660, .28887)	20	FTBLACK	(.07569, .09146)
21	FTWOMEN	(-.10497, .20219)	22	FTHISP	(.02766, .10446)
23	FTENVIR	(-.01646, .15207)	24	FTLWYR	(.12476, .60819)
25	FTILLEG	(-.07282, .22950)	26	FTGAYS	(-.24704, .03832)
27	FTIMMIG	(.03556, -.00817)	28	FTFUND	(.50711, .22021)
29	FTASIAN	(.13090, .13585)			

Figure 2. *Anti-establishment versus Ethnicism*


HORIZONTAL FACTOR 2 VERTICAL FACTOR 3



SYMBOL	VARIABLE	COORDINATES	SYMBOL	VARIABLE	COORDINATES
1	FTBUSH1	(.00621, .06972)	2	FTCLINT1	(-.01281, .32067)
3	FTPEROT1	(-.06237, -.22758)	4	FTBUCHAN	(-.09315, -.11208)
5	FTJESSE	(.08527, .11378)	6	FTDEMS1	(-.06218, .39994)
7	FTREPS1	(-.01667, .09329)	8	FTHILL	(.12360, .11439)
9	FTFOLEY	(.24281, .29123)	10	FTTHOMS	(-.01908, .02079)
11	FTLIBS	(.16073, .50890)	12	FTCONS	(.13363, -.01074)
13	FTCONG	(.16578, .76238)	14	FTFEDGOV	(.12261, .78151)
15	FTLABOR	(.02919, .37901)	16	FTFEMS	(-.00057, .22679)
17	FTWELF	(.35481, .20554)	18	FTPOOR	(.31445, .09176)
19	FTBUSIN	(.16984, .28887)	20	FTBLACK	(.59782, .09146)
21	FTWOMEN	(.15097, .20219)	22	FTHISP	(.74282, .10446)
23	FTENVIR	(.20666, .15207)	24	FTLWYR	(.15587, .60819)
25	FTILLEG	(.54905, .22950)	26	FTGAYS	(.41043, .03832)
27	FTIMMIG	(.80047, -.00817)	28	FTFUND	(.11358, .22021)
29	FTASIAN	(.78755, .13585)			

Figure 3. *Anti-establishment versus Traditional Values*

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 3 VERTICAL FACTOR 4



SYMBOL	VARIABLE	COORDINATES	SYMBOL	VARIABLE	COORDINATES
1	FTBUSH1	(.06972, -.05537)	2	FTCLINT1	(.32067, .13239)
3	FTPEROT1	(-.22758, .15280)	4	FTBUCHAN	(-.11208, -.18477)
5	FTJESSE	(.11378, .29686)	6	FTDEMS1	(.39994, .15811)
7	FTREPS1	(.09329, -.02735)	8	FTHILL	(.11439, .36349)
9	FTFOLEY	(.29123, -.01053)	10	FTTHOMS	(.02079, -.25379)
11	FTLIBS	(.50890, .47198)	12	FTCONS	(-.01074, -.04894)
13	FTCONG	(.76238, .13436)	14	FTFEDGOV	(.78151, .17239)
15	FTLABOR	(.37901, .18642)	16	FTFEMS	(.22679, .73749)
17	FTWELF	(.20554, .26186)	18	FTPOOR	(.09176, .19260)
19	FTBUSIN	(.28887, .13106)	20	FTBLACK	(.09146, .30642)
21	FTWOMEN	(.20219, .77146)	22	FTHISP	(.10446, .19179)
23	FTENVIR	(.15207, .55710)	24	FTLWYR	(.60819, .17474)
25	FTILLEG	(.22950, -.02839)	26	FTGAYS	(.03832, .51799)
27	FTIMMIG	(-.00817, .06927)	28	FTFUND	(.22021, -.20962)
29	FTASIAN	(.13585, .10040)			

Table 1. Perot Support versus Partisan Alienation (N=749)
(β)

	NONPARTY	UNSTABLE	FTIND3	PARDIFF	INDEP	FTPTY3	NEEDPARTIES	PTYAFIL	NEWPARTY	Adj.R ²
PEROTVI	12		20	-15		-09		-08*	16	12
PEROTVX	13		21		07*	-13			17	14
FTPEROTI	13		08*				-08*		16	05
FTPEROT2	13		22			-08*			14	09
FTPEROT3	18		25	-10		12	-09		22	15
FTPEROTX	16		21	-08*			-10		19	12
PEROTC2	12		16			-20			14	08
PEROTC3	15		13	-10		-17			18	07
PEROTB2	10		20			-10			19	10
PTRAIT			12	-13			-09		10	04
PEMOTN				-14			-11		12	05
PEMOTN +			11				-08*		17	04
PEMOTN-				18		-08*	08*			04
PCTRAIT	10		10	-11		-15			11	04
PCEMOTN	12			-10		-10			15	04
EMOTRAIT	12		09	-11		-12			14	04

no asterisk = significant at .01 level or better; * = significant from .01-.05

Table 2.

Perot Support versus Other Alienation
(β)

	FTGOVT	CIVDUTY	EXTFFIC	WRNGTRK	CHANGE	ECONANX	CONGRESS	Adj.R ²
PEROTV1	-10		13		08*		09*	05
PEROTVX	-15				10		12	07
PEROTFT1				-09*	09		08*	02
PEROTFT2			07*				16	03
PEROTFT3	09*		12				11	03
PEROTFTX			11		09		15	04
PEROTC2	-20			13		13	14	17
PEROTC3	-09	11	10	29	15	11	12	24
PEROTB2		-10	-21			-10		07
PTRAIT		09	07*	08*	10			03
PEMOTN		08	14	13				05
PEMOTN+			09		12		11	05
PEMOTN-	-08*		-12	-14				04
PCTRAIT	-14	12		31	16			24
PCEMOTN	-08*	11	11	34	14	11	09	25
EMOTRAIT	-11	12	09	35	16	11	08*	28

* = significant between .01-.05 level; no asterisk = significant at the .01 level or better

Table 3. Perot Support versus Values and Ideology
(β)

	PARTYNDX	RELIGION	ANTIMMIG	FTPOLICE	MORAL	FTMILT	TRADNDX	Adj. R ²
PEROTV1		-15	12					03
PEROTVX		-16	11					04
PEROTFT1		-09						00
PEROTFT2		-15		10*				03
PEROTFT3		-08						01
PEROTC2	33	-12					-18	20
PEROTC3	36		08				-15	24
PEROTB2	-44	-12						27
PTRAIT			10		08*	09*		05
PEMOTN	09*				10	11	-08	07
PEMOTN+	12	-10			08*			05
PEMOTN-			-07*	10		-11		03
PCTRAIT	36		08*	-10	08*	08*	-14	23
PCEMOTN	33		07*	-08*	10	10	17	26
EMOTRAIT	37		08	-10	09	10	-17	28

Table 4.

Perot Support versus Issues
(β)

	DEFICIT	GOVPWER	NAFTA	CLINPER2	WOMISSUE	HEALTH2	Adj.R ²
PEROTV1		09	-18				04
PEROTVX		09*	-19		-09*		04
PEROTFT1			-13		-09		02
PEROTFT2			-13				01
PEROTFT3		07*	-17				04
PEROTC2		13	-10	15		-16	11
PEROTC3		13	-17	21	10	-22	22
PEROTB2			-12		-21	24	13
PTRAIT			-15				04
PEMOTN			-15	08*	10		05
PEMOTN +		07*	-09	09			02
PEMOTN-			14		-11		03
PCTRAIT		08	-15	21	08*	-25	20
PCEMOTN			-16	18	13	-24	21
EMOTRAIT		07*	-16	21	12	-26	23

Table 5. Perot Support versus Engagement
(β)

	TALKSHOW	KNOWPOL	Adj.R ²	EDUCATION	MINORITY	FEMALE	AGE	Adj.R ²
PEROTVI			00	-12	-16	-11	-13	05
PEROTVX	08		01		-15	-15	-13	05
PEROTFT1	07*		00				-11	02
PEROTFT2			00		-15		-17	05
PEROTFT3		-13	01	-08*	-09	-08	-21	05
PEROTC2		08*	01		-23	-07*	-15	08
PEROTC3			00		-14	-08*	-20	06
PEROTB2			00				-11	01
PTRAIT			00	-11	-19	-07*		04
PEMOTN		-15	02	-13	-10	-07*	-08*	03
PEMOTN+	12		01		-18		-13	04
PEMOTN-	07*	20	05	19				03
PCTRAIT			00		-20	-09	-15	06
PCEMOTN	07*	-08*	01	-07*	-16	-09	-17	05
EMOTRAIT			00		-19	-09	-17	06

Table 6. Perot Support versus Demographics
(β)

Table 7.


Perot Support Index versus All Independent Variable Indexes
(β)

Ind. Variable	V1	VX	F1	F2	F3	FX	C2	C3	B2	PTR	PEM	PEM+	PEM	PCT	PCEM	EMTR
NONPARTY	11	12	12	11	12	13		10	12						07*	07*
ANTIPTY2					17	07*				12	17	12	-12		07	06*
PTYAFFIL																
FTIND3	18	18		17	22	17	12	11	16	11		08*				07
PARDIFF	-11					-10	-08*			-10				-09		-06*
INDEP		07*										08*				
NEWPARTY	14	15	13	12	19	16	09	14	16	11	12	12			12	11
EXTEFFIC							07*	07*							08	06*
WRNGTRK								17			10		-12	19	22	22
CIVDUTY																06*
CONGRESS	07*	08*		15	09	12	10	10	08*							
CHANGE								09		07*					09	12
ECONANX							06*		-07*							
FTGOVT				09*	08*	07*	-12									
RELIGION	-09	-09		-09*					-07*							
ANTIMMIG		08*														
FTPOLICE				09*									09*	-09		-08*
MORAL										-08*	10	08*			08	07*
FTMILT								07*		09*	09*			11	11	11
TRADNDX							-13								-09	-09
PARTYNDX				-13			19	20	-45					-17	18	18

Ind. Variable	V1	VX	F1	F2	F3	FX	C2	C3	B2	PTR	PEM	PEM +	PEM	PCT	PCEM	EMTR
TALKSHOW			07*									10	07*			
KNOWPOL											-11*		11*			
DEBTCUT																
CLINPER2							07*	12						13	10	13
NAFTA	-15	-17	-12	-11	-18	-17	-10	-16	-08	-15	-14	-09	12	-15	-16	-17
GOVPWER													08*			
HEALTH2								-10						-13	-10	-12
WOMISSUE	-09*	-10*	-09*													
FEMALE	-09	-11			-10			-06*							-08	-08
MINORITY	-13	-12		-18	-13	-15	-13	-07*		-20	-11	-17		-13	-11	-13
AGE				-14	-14	-13	-09	-14				-12		-10	-11	-11
EDUC							07*									
Adj.R ²	20	22	07	17	24	20	34	45	37	15	17	16	11	44	45	49

* significant of .01-.05 level; no asterisk = significant at .01 level or better

Figure 4. Partisan Alienation Effects on Absolute Perot Support



Chi Square


$\chi^2 = 21$ 44.74

$P = .002$

GOF = .986

RMSR = .035

Figure 5. Partisan Alienation Effects on Comparative Perot Support



Chi Square


df = 29 64.42

p = .000

GOF = .982


RMSR = .039

Figure 6. General Political Alienation Effects on Absolute Perot Support



Chi Square
 $\chi^2 = 59$ 313.83
 $p = .000$
 $GOF = .932$
 $RMSR = .069$

Figure 17. General Political Alienation Effects on Comparative Perot Support



Chi Square
 $\chi^2 = 71$ 441.97
 $p = .000$
 $GOF = .916$
 $RMSR = .071$

PEROT STUDY VARIABLES.

Note: For many variables that are summed or averaged to form an index, they are described below as having been "standardized across the sample". This was done when several variables measured on different scales were combined into a single index. The variables were transformed into z-scores by subtracting each respondent's answer by the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation for that question. Where possible, "don't know" responses (= 8) were generally coded as the middle or neutral value, instead of as missing data. All variable numbers (for example, "v8220") are from the 1993 Panel Study release of the 1992-1993 National Election Study.

- PEROT Dummy variable for 1992 vote: 1=Perot; 0=Other.
- PEROTV1 Perot support -- 3-point scale based on vote choice in 1992 Pre (v3805), 1992 Post (v5609, v5634), and 1993 Panel (v7161).
 0 = Never supported Perot.
 1 = Supported Perot at one point, but not consistently.
 2 = Supported Perot at more than one point.
- PEROTVX Perot support -- 9-point additive scale, with respondents scored 1 point each for: not voting for Perot but considering him (v5619), vote preference for Perot in 1992 Pre (v3805), vote preference for Perot in 1992 Post (v5609, v5634), vote preference for Perot in 1993 Panel (v7161), voting for Perot and never considering voting for Bush or Clinton (v5617), voting for Perot and reporting strong preference for him (v5610), considering self a supporter of Perot or UWSA (v7313), and paying membership dues to UWSA (v7314).
- FTPEROT1 Feeling thermometer Perot, 1992 Pre-election.
- FTPEROT2 Feeling thermometer Perot, 1992 Post-election.
- FTPEROT3 Feeling thermometer Perot, 1993 Panel survey.
- PEROTC2 FT Perot ('92 post) - FT Clinton ('92 post).
- PEROTB2 FT Perot ('92 post) - FT Bush ('92 post).
- PEROTC3 FTPerot ('93 panel) - FT Clinton ('93 panel).

PTRAIT Mean of candidate trait variables for Perot from 1993 Panel: honest, leadership, caring, knowledgeable, gets things done. (v7231, v7232, v7233, v7234, v7235).
High score = Most positive evaluations of Perot.

PEMOTN Sum of positive candidate emotion variables (hopeful, proud) for Perot minus negative emotion variables (angry, afraid) (v7272 + v7274 - v7271 - v7273).
High score = Most positive evaluation of Perot.

PEMOPOS Sum of positive candidate emotion variables only (hopeful, proud).
High score = Most positive emotional evaluation of Perot.

PEMONEG Sum of negative candidate emotion variables only (angry, afraid).
High score = Most negative emotional evaluation of Perot.

PCTRAIT Mean of difference between five measures of Perot and Clinton trait variables (v7226 through v7235), scored so that higher values represent positive comparative evaluations of Perot relative to Clinton.
High score = Most positive evaluations of Perot relative to Clinton.

PCEMOTN Mean of difference between five measures of Perot and Clinton emotion variables (v7267 through v7274), scored so that higher values represent positive comparative evaluations of Perot relative to Clinton.
High score = Most positive evaluations of Perot relative to Clinton.

EMOTRAIT Mean of PCTRAIT and PCEMOTN.
High score = Most positive overall evaluation of Perot relative to Clinton.

FTGOVT Mean of FT federal government (v5325) + FT Congress (v5337) + FT lawyer (v5330).
High score = Highest thermometer ratings of government, Congress, and lawyers.

POLTRST Sum of v6121 (government wastes money) + v6122 (big interests run government) + v6120 (trust government) + v6123 (crooks in government), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Most distrustful of government.

EXTEFFIC Sum of v6102 (no say in government) + v6103 (officials don't care).
High score = Lowest level of confidence in government, officials.

ECONANX Sum of v6149 (economy future) + v6151 (taxes future) + v6152 (unemployment future), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Most pessimistic about economic issues.

MISANTH Sum of v6140 (people are helpful) + v6139 (trust people).
High score = Least trustful in people.

WARANX Sum of v3606 (worry about nuclear war) + v3607 (worry about war).
High score = Most worried about war.

UNRESP Sum of v6124 (government responsive) + v6125 (government attention).
High score = Least confident in government responsiveness.

ECONOMIC Sum of v3540 (economic future) + v3427 (economic future) + v3601 (US world strength) + v3537 (economic future).
High score = Believe economy will get worse.

PTYFEEL Sum of FT Democrats (v3317) + FT Republicans (v3318).
High score = Highest rating of both political parties.

CHANGE Country needs big changes (v7308).
High score = Agree strongly that country needs big changes.

ANTISOC Sum of v6138 (do volunteer work) + v6141 (talk with neighbors) + v6144 (joined organization) + v6145 (contribute to charity).
High score = Do not claim to engage in any social activities.

CONGRESS Strength of disapproval of Congress (v5950).
High score = Strong disapproval of Congress.

SPECINT Special interests have too much power (v7306).
High score = Strongly agree special interests too powerful.

ANTIPTY Sum of inverted FT political parties + (minus) not need parties (v7305), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Most negative feelings about political parties.

PARDIFF Sum of: 1) perceived policy differences between parties [= sum of absolute value of difference between v3704 and v3705, v3710 and v3711, v3721 and v3722] + 2) believe parties differ (v5901), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = See clear differences between the parties.

UNSTABLE Extent of change in self-reported party identification between 1992 and 1993. Computed as absolute value of difference between party ID 1992 (v3634) and party id 1993 (v7370). For example, a change from strong Democrat to weak Democrat would equal 1. If respondent self-reported (in either 1992 or 1993) was other party (not D, R, or I), this variable equals 0.
High score = Largest change in self-reported party id (most "unstable").

INDEPEN Sum of FT independents (v7143) + Strength of self-reported independence (derived from v7295 and v7296), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Strongest self-reported political independents.

WRNGTRK Country going in wrong track (from 1993 panel) [v7236] minus country going in wrong track (from 1992 pre) [v3526].

High score = Country is getting worse: see country on worse track in 1993 than in 1992.

INTEFFIC Internal efficacy score: sum of v6105 + v6106 + v6107 + v6108.

High score = Low internal efficacy (strongly disagree with statements).

PTYAFFIL Strength of partisan affiliation (either party) -- a folded measure of v3634.

High score = Strong partisan identifier.

RELIGION Sum of v3820 (religion important) + v3821 (religion guides) + v3822 (how often pray) + v3823 (how often read Bible) + v3824 (literalness of Bible) + v3825 (religion on TV) + v5945 (school prayer), with each standardized across the sample.

High score = Religion most important to respondent.

GAYRITES Sum of v5926 (gays in military) + v5924 (anti-discrimination laws for gays) + v6007 (men more power than women) + v3801 (women's rights), with each standardized across the sample.

High score = Most supportive of gay rights.

PATRIOT Sum of v6131 (love of country) + v6130 (pride in flag).

High score = Most patriotic.

FEMINIST Sum of four questions on feminism/women's rights (v6005 + v6001 + v6006 + v6002), with each standardized across the sample.

High score = Most supportive of feminist views.

MORAL Mean of three questions on conventional morality (v6117 + v6118 + v6119) and one question on importance of getting ahead on one's own, with each standardized across the sample.

High score = Believe strongly should get ahead on own, country should stress family ties, new lifestyles leading to social breakdown.

FEMEQUAL Mean of three questions on sexual harassment (v3743, v3741, v3744).

High score = Believe more should be done on sexual harassment.

TRADVAL Sum of v6115 (morality) + v6116 (morality) + v6004 (women stick together) + v3815 (environmental protection), with each standardized across the sample.

High score = accepting of new values, women should stick together, increase environmental funding.

- ANTIMMIG** Sum of v6233 (English official language) + v6235 (reduce immigration) + v6236 (Hispanics hurt culture) + v6239 (Asians hurt culture) + v6237 (Hispanics cause higher taxes) + v6238 (Hispanics take jobs) + v6240 (Asians cause higher taxes) + v6241 (Asians take jobs) + v6242 (immigrant welfare benefits), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Most opposed to new immigrants.
- INEQUAL** Mean of six questions on general egalitarianism (v6024 + v6028 + v6029 + v6025 + v6026 + v6027).
High score = Most antiegalitarian.
- MATERIAL** Materialist (as opposed to post-materialist); computed from v6013 and v6014.
High score = Support maintaining order and fighting high prices.
- FTMILT** Feeling thermometer military (v5328).
High score = Most positive feelings about the military.
- FTPOLICE** Feeling thermometer police (v5340).
High score = Most positive feelings about the police.
- PARTYNDX** Sum of 1) difference between FT Republicans and FT Democrats + 2) party identification (v3634), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Strongest/most positive Republican.
- TRADNDX** Sum of FT feminists (v5317) + FT women (v5324) + FT gays (v5335) + FT environmentalists (v5329) - [minus!] FT Buchanan (v3315) - FT fundamentalists (v5338), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Most positive feelings about women, feminists, gays, and environmentalists.
- TOOBIG** Sum of v5729 (less government better) + v5731 (government too big) + v6023 (fund private schools).
High score = Favor less government, funding of private schools.
- ETHNIC** Sum of FT Hispanics (v5327) + FT illegal immigrants (v5331) + FT immigrants (v5336) + FT Asian-Americans (v5339), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Most positive feelings about ethnic minorities.
- BLACK** Sum of FT Blacks (v5323) + FT Jackson (v3316) + close to Blacks (v6205) - [minus!] close to whites (v6215) - v6222 (Blacks lazy) - v6226 (Blacks unintelligent) - v6230 (Blacks violent), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Most positive feelings about African-Americans.

CONSVNDX Sum of self-placed ideology (v3509) + close to conservatives (v6211) + FT conservatives (v5319) - [minus!] FT liberals (v5326) - close to liberals (v6203), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Most conservative.

TALKSHOW Sum of v3208 (politics-radio) and v3210 (politics talkshows), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Respondent listens to talk shows and politics on radio.

NEWS Sum of v5103 (watch campaign on TV) and v3202 (attention to news), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Respondent pays much attention to political news.

KNOWPOL Mean of correct responses to identification of Quayle (v5916), Rehnquist (v5917), Yeltsin (v5918), and Foley (v5919) and knowledge about Supreme Court (v5920), judicial nominations (v5921), and House and Senate majorities (v5951, v5952).
High score = Correctly answers political knowledge questions.

CONTRIB Sum of v5817 (contribution to parties) + v5819 (contribution to other) + v5827 (contacted about contributions) + v5821 (get mail requests) + v5824 (get phone requests).
High score = Politically active: contacted, made contributions.

POLINT Sum of v3101 (interest campaign-t1) + v5102 (interest campaign-t2) + v3106 (care who wins) + v5721 (interest in government), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Most interested in presidential campaign.

TURNOUT Sum of v7184 (recall [in 1993] voting 1992 election) + v3107 (recall voting in 1988 election) + v3804 (intend to vote [pre-election]) + v5601 (voted in 1992).
High score = Respondent reports consistently voting.

CIVDUTY Sum of v6101 (people should vote) + v3525 (duty serve military).
High score = Believe people should vote (even if don't care) and duty to serve in military (Vietnam)

GOPISSUE Mean of closeness to Bush and Republican party on cutting services (v3701, v3702, v3704), good jobs (v3718, v3719, v3721), and ideology (v3509, v3517, v3518).
High score = Respondent agrees most closely with Republican positions.

DEFICIT Mean of raise taxes to cut deficit (v7309), cut services to cut deficit (v7310) and importance of cutting deficit (v7316), with each standardized across the sample.
High score = Agree strongly should cut the deficit.

DEBTCUT Need to reduce federal deficit, even if it means spending less on health care and education (v7310).

High score = Strongly supports cutting deficit.

NAFTA Supports NAFTA (v7284, v7285).

High score = Respondent supports NAFTA.

CLINPER2 Respondent places self closer ideologically to Perot than to Clinton [1993 Panel] (v7204, v7209, v7220). "Do not know" responses coded as missing.

High score = Respondent closer to Perot than Clinton.

GOVPWER Government is getting too powerful (v6016).

High score = Respondent believes government too powerful.

WOMISSUE Mean of support for government funding of abortions (v3738) and women equality (v3801), with each standardized across the sample.

High score = Support for women's equality, abortion funding.

HEALTH2 Government should provide health insurance (v7373).

High score = Strongly support government health insurance.

NONPARTY Support non-partisan elections (v7311).

NEWPARTY Support growth of one or more new parties (v7311).

FTIND3 FT people who call themselves independents (v7143).

INDEP Strength of self-reported political independence.
 computed from v7295 and v7296.

Three-point scale

High score = Strong independent.