

GENDER CONSCIOUSNESS AND GENDER POLITICS IN THE 1991 PILOT STUDY:
A REPORT TO THE ANES BOARD OF OVERSEERS

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During the 1980s the discovery of the "gender gap" in voting and policy preferences drew attention to the role of gender in shaping public opinion and political participation (Conover 1988a, Gilens 1988; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Wirls 1986). Ten years later, campaign strategists continue to keep an eye on possible gender differences in responses to their clients. Discussion of issues such as the "feminization of poverty" has focused attention on the extent to which many of our social policies may be gender biased. There is thus reason to believe that gender may help shape public responses to the political world in key ways, especially if the relevant social movements continue to be successful in fostering gender-based political consciousness, at least in some sectors of the public (Sapiro 1990, 1991).

Unfortunately, survey research had not kept up with the state of theory sufficiently to allow exploration of the gender basis of public responses to political leaders, policies, or organizations either within or outside the electoral context. Although many surveys contain items measuring attitudes toward women, women's roles and personality, and some related issues, our review has not uncovered adequate measures of the gender concepts of key relevance to scholarly political analysis, especially in light of the sophistication of more theoretical and historical analysis of gender and politics (e.g. see the inventory in Beere 1990).

The primary questions repeated over the years in the National Election Studies and used frequently by researchers on gender politics are the feeling thermometer on the women's movement and the equal roles measure asking respondents to place themselves on a 1-7 continuum ranging from an assertion that men and women should play equal roles in running business, industry, and government to one that "woman's place is in the home." The NES 1991 Pilot Study project on gender consciousness responded to a widespread felt need, evidenced in part by the large number of proposals on this theme to the Board of Overseers. In this memo, we report on new questions used in the NES 1991 Pilot Study intended to measure the concepts of gender equality and gender consciousness. We begin with a discussion of gender consciousness, then turn to an examination of the specific empirical components available in this study.²

I. GENDER CONSCIOUSNESS

In recent years, gender consciousness has been offered as an important conceptual tool for understanding political mobilization and public opinion centered around "women's issues". Accordingly, it has been the focus of research of a number of researchers (e.g. Gurin 1985; Klein 1984; Miller et al. 1981; Sapiro 1990; Sigel and Welch 1986; Tolleson Rinehart 1988). One reason for the focus on gender consciousness is that consensus has developed

²Note that because of time constraints we are not discussing all of the experimental questions equally, although we will assess all these questions at the end.

that the relevance of gender to politics is not lodged simply in mere existence as a male or female, but depends on the subjective experience of gender and the particular configuration of gender-based social roles and institutions in which individuals find themselves (Sapiro 1983). The appeal of this concept is also due to the increasing attention devoted to social cognition and problems of group consciousness and group identity within the study of mass politics.

Previous treatments of gender consciousness (and, indeed, group consciousness more generally) have produced a proliferation of definitions of the component parts of gender consciousness. Moreover, it has been difficult to identify adequate empirical measures, especially in data sets widely used in secondary analysis. Notwithstanding these problems, researchers are agreed that gender consciousness is a politicized form of social identity: at its core, it is a form of social attachment that incorporates a conscious political component. Researchers also agree that gender consciousness -- this politicized social identity -- is a complex or "umbrella" concept necessarily embracing interrelated elements that must each be tapped distinctly if we are to move toward more fruitful research on gender politics. Obviously, then, the key to an adequate conceptualization lies in a defensible identification of the components of gender consciousness.

Gender consciousness is a psychological concept forged out of the combination of distinct cognitive and emotional elements. An important part of the emotional content of gender consciousness is identity itself, the sense of relationship to a social and, for our purposes as political scientists, political group. The cognitive elements provide the political basis for gender consciousness while the emotional elements provide its social basis. The majority of the experimental items were designed to tap either the cognitive or emotional aspects of group consciousness. What follows, therefore, is a discussion of each of these kinds of elements, and their measures.

II. COGNITIVE COMPONENTS

Most researchers focusing on gender consciousness emphasize as its cognitive core an awareness of and sensitivity to the unequal and gendered nature of society and an ideological commitment to ending or perpetuating the inequalities. We will use the shorthand terms "empirical equality" to refer to individuals' perception of the gender basis of society, and "normative equality" to refer to their preferences and attitude the situation of women and men.

So conceived, our conceptualization of the cognitive component of gender consciousness makes no assumption about its ideological content. Feminists may perceive gender inequities in society and wish to eliminate them; anti-feminists may perceive the same inequities and wish to preserve them. Indeed, different individuals may see the same situation and differentially define it as equal or unequal. This, after all, is a source of contention in any discussion of "separate [or different] but equal" social roles. But the politics of both groups may be motivated by their sense of

gender consciousness.

Most research on gender consciousness considers only its "feminist" side but scholars in history and anthropology, for example, are increasingly noting the importance of gender consciousness as a basis for political mobilization among women that could be interpreted as anti-feminist (e.g. Ginsburg 1989). Our measures allow assessment of both forms of the cognitive components of gender consciousness.

Generally speaking, the concept of gender consciousness has received more explicit attention from survey researchers than has the concept of gender equality. We begin, therefore, with a general discussion of gender equality, followed by more specific exploration of the measures included here.

IIA. GENDER EQUALITY

At least three dimensions of gender equality must be distinguished in any adequately theoretically-grounded attempt to devise measures of the concept. First, gender equality may be conceptualized in terms of both people's attachment to the value of gender equality (normative gender equality) and their perception of the status quo (empirical gender equality). Second, gender equality may be conceptualized at either a general or domain-specific level (e.g. home, work, or government). And third, gender equality may be conceptualized in terms of equality of opportunity or outcome (Kirp et al., 1985).

The normative-empirical distinction is critical. Even if a majority of Americans now claim to believe in the principle of equality, they are likely to be more divided in their perceptions of whether equality does, in fact, exist (see Simon and Landis, 1989). Although survey treatments of gender equality seem to assume that attachment to the principle of equality is sufficient as a measure of gender ideology, and thus sufficient to explain policy preferences and political behavior, there is reason to be more empirically careful. Prejudice is part of an automatic cognitive process (Devine 1988) that may make people see political equality or inequality where it does not exist (Sapiro 1981-82). The long train of public opinion research suggests a considerable slippage between principles and behavior. The disparity between normative expectations and empirical reality may be an important factor in explaining such slippage. Thus, questions tapping both normative and empirical gender equality were included in the NES Pilot Study.

The second distinction, between general and domain-specific measures of equality, is also critical. While in the past the tendency has been to focus on general measures, domain-specific measures are essential to more sophisticated research. We need to know what is in people's minds when they respond to questions about equality in general. What domains figure into their calculations and how? There is no reason to believe that people find gender equality in business, government, the family, or any other socio-institutional domain equivalent in any respect. One may desire to see gender equality in one domain but not another; it is possible for a relative degree of equality to exist in one domain but not another.

Moreover, general measures of gender equality or those referencing several domains at once (such as the old NES "equal roles" question) probably create a significant degree of noise and offer only the bluntest of analytical instruments. If there are relationships in equality across domains, it is always possible to construct general measures from domain specific measures. These overall summary measures would no doubt be less "noisy" than the single general measures we usually employ. One cannot, however, work backwards from a single general measure to domain specific measures.

With these points in mind, the NES Pilot Study used domain- specific measures relating to the three social arenas that are arguably the most relevant to the politics of gender: government and politics, business and industry, and the family. These three domains correspond to the major foci of domestic policy proposals. These domains are not just different; taking them as a trio we can see them arranged on a conceptual continuum ranging from the most "public" to the most "private". Also importantly, whereas government, business, and industry have been understood as part of "men's sphere" in the past, the family has been seen as "women's domain," despite the conventional designation of men as "heads of households." These will allow probing the problem referred to in the historical and theoretical literature as the "separate spheres," often seen as central to understanding women's modern political history (Evans 1989).

In assessing gender equality, a third critical distinction is between equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes (Kirp et al., 1985). Equality of opportunity is generally regarded as a more central and widely held tenet of liberal democracy within the American legal and political culture. Often labelled "procedural democracy", equality of opportunity asks whether different individuals under similar conditions would have similar opportunities to achieve their goals. Equality of outcomes is a harder test. It asks whether, all things considered, different social groups indeed are in similar conditions or are similarly placed with regard to valued resources such as jobs and influence. Thus, the distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome is a considerable one.

Although all three dimensions of gender equality should be taken into account in measurement efforts, the most feasible project led us to focus primarily on the first two dimensions: the normative vs. the empirical, and the global vs. the specific. Specifically, the Pilot Study includes a series of questions tapping normative and empirical gender equality in three different domains (government, the family, and business and industry), and framed in terms of equality of outcomes rather than equality of opportunity. Equality of outcomes was chosen for two reasons. First, the distinction between equality of opportunity versus equality of outcomes can be regarded as a difference of degree: how severe is the test for democracy? Equality of outcomes is the more severe test and consequently, it is probably more controversial and thus likely to produce more variance than equality of opportunity. Second, we expected a greater disparity between normative and empirical assessments of equality of outcomes, and it is this disparity that may be critical in stimulating political activity and shaping public policy preferences. With this mind, let us begin by considering the normative questions.

IIB. NORMATIVE GENDER EQUALITY

The Pilot Study asked respondents about their normative preferences concerning the power and influence of men and women in government and politics, in families, and in business and industry. These questions appear in the 1991 Pilot Study as

J13 People ... differ about how much power and influence they think women ought to have compared to men. Thinking about how you would like things to be in government and politics today, do you think men should have more power and influence, OR that men and women should have equal power and influence, OR that women should have more power and influence?

J16 In their families, do you think men should have more power and influence, OR that men and women should have equal power and influence, OR that women should have more power and influence.

J18 In business and industry, do you think men should have more power and influence, OR that men and women should have equal power and influence, OR that women should have more power and influence.

Each question was followed by a probe asking, "Do you feel strongly or not so strongly about this?"

As we expected, most Americans claim a commitment to gender equality; in fact, the distributions for all three questions are badly skewed in the direction of equality (Table 1). Of course, it would be quite surprising if this were not the case. Among those respondents who do not support gender equality, virtually all of them prefer a world in which men have more power and influence. In effect, therefore, these questions have basically two response categories. At the same time, it is important to note that we cannot simply collapse the "anti-egalitarians" for all purposes. Although support for gender equality is strong across all three domains, there are domain-specific differences. The commitment to gender equality is higher for the private domain of the family than for the two more public domains (government and business); 86% prefer equality in the family as compared to 77% for the more public domains.

Preferences for equality in different domains are related to one another although perhaps not as strongly as one might expect. The distinctiveness of the family as a domain for which to discuss equality is once again clear. Preferences for equality in government and business are correlated at the .43 level; the correlation between preference for equality in the family and government is .32 while the correlation between preferences for equality in the family and business and industry is .29. In sum, as expected, there is a strong commitment on the part of Americans to the idea of gender equality. Nonetheless, domain specific measures do reveal differences in these normative preferences across social arenas.

TABLE 1
NORMATIVE GENDER EQUALITY

	Government (v2723)	Business (v2731)	Family (v2727)
Men should have more influence	20.0	20.7	12.7
Equal influence	77.6	78.3	85.5
Women should have more influence	2.4	1.1	1.7
TOTAL (N)	100.0% (454)	100.1% (463)	99.9 (460)

What are the correlates of normative equality? We will offer a preliminary sketch of the possible origins and political significance of gender equality preferences. For this analysis, we created four new variables that take advantage of follow-up questions tapping the strength of preference: three domain-specific measures each of which ranges from (1) a strong commitment to inequality (either male or female dominant) in the relevant domain; to (2) a weak commitment to inequality; to (3) a weak commitment to equality; and finally, to (4) a strong commitment to equality. The fourth measure gauges the respondent's overall commitment to equality across all three domains; it ranges from zero, indicating a preference for inequality in all three domains to 6, indicating a strong preference for equality in all three domains. Presented in Table 2 are the correlations of these four variables with background, political and gender-related variables.³

Looking at the demographic and social correlates, gender is unrelated to our basic measures of normative equality. Age is inversely related to preference for economic equality, and African-Americans express less preference for gender equality in government than do whites.⁴ Education and income are positively related to normative equality in all domains (and in summary), and church attendance is associated with a preferences for less equality in all domains.

³Because of the nature of this report we are emphasizing simple bivariate correlations to offer a first sense of the data. We are aware of the inadequacies of bivariate reports as well as the use of the correlation coefficients in some of these cases.

⁴Throughout this report race has been recoded as (1)white, (2) black, leaving others as MD.

TABLE 2
CORRELATES OF NORMATIVE GENDER EQUALITY

	GOVERNMENT	FAMILY	BUSINESS & INDUSTRY	ALL DOMAINS
I. BACKGROUND				
Gender (+fem)	-.06	.04	.08	.03
Age	-.07	.06	-.17**	-.07
Race (+Afr.-Am)	-.11*	-.07	-.04	-.07
Education	.15**	.18**	.16**	.18**
Church Attending	-.10*	-.15**	-.08	-.13**
Income	.15**	.13**	.10*	.14**
II. POLITICAL				
General Equality	.24**	.17**	.24**	.32**
Moralism	-.20**	-.14**	-.17**	-.21**
Patriotism	.02	.00	-.06	.00
Party Identification (Rep)	-.05	-.02	-.03	-.07
Liberalism-Conservatism	-.12**	-.18**	-.14**	-.21**
III. GENDER RELATED				
FT: Women's Movement .	.26**	.19**	.29**	.34**
FT: Feminists	.22**	.11**	.21**	.25**
FT: Housewives	.11*	.08	.20**	.17**
Equal Role (v438)	.43**	.31**	.47**	.48**
Women's news (v2701)	.07	.07	.14**	.16**
Eq oppy (v2716, male dom.)	.07	.12*	.01	-.09
Same/Different (v2719)	-.04	.04	.04	.04
Focus Home/Work (v2715)	.16**	.13**	.16**	.19**
Draft Women (v2709)	.16**	.16**	.14**	.19**
Maternity Leave (v2712)	.04	.01	.07	.07
Abortion (v479 lib. pos)	.20**	.20**	.17**	.20**
Law protecting women (v460)	.18**	.13**	.28**	.25**

NOTE: Relationships in this table have been arranged to reflect the concept rather than the actual coding of the variable in order to facilitate reading this report; thus, despite the original and well-known coding of v438 (equal role), a positive sign indicates a positive relationship between favoring equal roles and favoring normative gender equality.

*p<.05 **p<.01

Turning to the political correlates, we find that normative equality in all domains is independent of patriotism⁵ and party identification. However, as one might expect, a commitment to general equality⁶ is positively related to all the measures of normative gender equality. Traditional moralism⁷ and political conservatism are negatively related to gender equality in all domains. Indeed, discussions of political mobilization around gender-related issues has suggested that moralism has played a key role, especially but not only because of the prominence of abortion politics (Conover and Gray 1983; Marshall 1991).

Finally, the third section of Table 2 is useful for sorting out the meaning of these new measures vis-à-vis the "old" and "new" measures. The domain-specific measures are all related to the traditional feeling thermometer measures and the standard equal roles question, but there is a clear and consistent difference across domains. The old measures are correlated most strongly with business and industry (economic) equality, and least with family equality. This makes sense if one considers that the most persistent and well-publicized equality claims of the contemporary era focus on economic issues, especially "equal pay for equal work" and equal access to jobs. Thus, while our overall measure of normative gender equality correlates strongly with the old equal roles question and moderately with the feeling thermometers, it is likely a more valid measure because it gives stronger emphasis to equality in government and especially the family.⁸

Turning to the relationship between normative equality and other new gender items, normative equality is unrelated to definitions of equality (whether equality requires women and men to have the same roles or whether they can be different), and attitudes towards maternity leave.⁹ Preferences

⁵PATRIOTISM is constructed of Pilot V2417 American Flag and 2418 Love for Country.

⁶ EQUALITY is constructed of v2703 A/D Treat Equally and v2705 A/D Gone Too Far.

⁷MORALISM is constructed of v2702 Adjust Views and v2704 Newer Lifestyles.

⁸ The responses to v438, Equal Roles (N=439/MD=28) in the Pilot Study are:

	Equal						Women in home
Value	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
%	45.6	12.3	10.3	17.1	7.3	2.5	5.0

⁹The question asking for definition of equality is intriguing but we cannot do justice to discussion of it here. The text is: "Some people say that the only way for men and women to be equal in society is if they play the same kinds of roles in government, business, and the family. Others say that equality can exist even if men and women play very different kinds of

for gender equality are, however, related to support of the draft of women, a personal focus on work as well as the home,¹⁰ pro-choice attitudes on abortion, and laws protecting women.

IIC. EMPIRICAL GENDER EQUALITY

We have some sense of what the public claims to prefer in terms of gender equality, but when they look at their society, what do they see? The battery of questions on domain-specific empirical gender equality consisted of three questions:

J13 People have different opinions about how much power and influence women have in society compared to men. Thinking about the actual situation of men and women in government and politics today, do you think men have more power and influence, OR that men and women have equal power and influence, OR that women have more power and influence?

J15 Thinking about the actual situation comparing men and women in their families, do

roles. Which would you say...." A follow-up asked whether they felt strongly or not so strongly. The frequencies for the summary variable v2721 (N=442/MD=25) are:

	<u>Same Roles</u>		<u>Different</u>	
	<u>Strong</u>	<u>Not Str.</u>	<u>Strong</u>	<u>Not Str.</u>
Value	1	2	3	4
%	9.5	5.2	25.6	59.7

¹⁰Although we have looked at this question in some detail this report will not discuss it thoroughly. The question wording is, "In society today some people focus their attention mostly on making a home and caring for their families. Others focus their attention mostly on work outside the home. Still others focus their attention about equally on both home and work. Which comes closest to how you see yourself?" This question was intended to tap self-identity in relation to gender roles. the frequencies for v2715 (N=458/MD=9) are:

	<u>Mostly Home</u>	<u>Equal</u>	<u>Mostly Work</u>
Value	1	2	3
%	26.2	63.1	10.7

Gender is not highly correlated with this variable ($r=-.08$). For women, marital and employment status is; the correlation between v2715 and a variable coded (1) not married, (2) married and not a homemaker and (3) married and a homemaker is $-.21$ ($p<.01$). For men, the employment status of a their wives is related; the correlation between v2715 and a variable coded (1) not married; (2) married to a woman who is not a homemaker, (3) married to a woman who is a homemaker is $-.23$ ($p<.01$).

you think men have more power and influence, OR that men and women have equal power and influence, OR that women have more power and influence?

J17 Thinking about the actual situation comparing men and women in business and industry, do you think men have more power and influence, OR that men and women have equal power and influence, OR that women have more power and influence?

The distribution of response on the empirical equality items is much more sensitive to domain differences than was true of normative equality (Table 3). The majority of respondents clearly believe that men currently have more power and influence in public life (e.g. government and economy); only a handful think that women have more power and influence in either of these domains. There is much more difference of opinion concerning power in the family. Almost half of the people (47%) see men and women as having equal power and influence in the family; 32% think men have more power; and 22% believe that women have more influence in the family. Thus the differences across domains are even more striking when we consider empirical gender equality as compared to normative equality.

TABLE 3
EMPIRICAL GENDER EQUALITY

	Government (v2722)	Business (v2730)	Family (v2726)
Men have more influence	76.6	83.5	31.8
Equal influence	20.7	15.6	46.7
Women have more influence	2.6	0.9	21.6
TOTAL (N)	99.9% (464)	100.0% (461)	100.1 (450)

The distinctiveness of the three domains is especially evident when we consider the intercorrelations among perceptions of equality in each domain. There is no relationship between assessments of equality in the family and those of equality in government (.05) and business and industry (.05), and although perceptions of equality in government and the economy are related, the correlation (.28) is only moderate. Once again, then, there is evidence favoring domain-specific measures.

Finally, we examined some of the correlates of empirical gender equality. For this analysis, we created two additional summary variables. The first, "perceived male dominance", runs from 0 to 3; scores on this variable represent the number of domains in which the respondent perceives that men have more power and influence. The second measure, "perceived equality", also runs from 0 to 3; scores on this variable represent the number of domains in

which the respondent perceives that women and men have equal influence and power. Presented in Table 4 are the correlations for these two measures and the three domain specific measures with various background, political and gender-related variables.

Background factors are generally not strongly related to empirical equality, especially in the case of the family, where only age plays a role. Education and income are positively related to perceptions of inequality and male dominance in all domains except the family. Age is also inversely related to perceptions of inequality in government and families but not business and industry.

To the extent empirical assessments of gender equality are associated with political variables, this would suggest that ideology "informs" or "biases" perceptions. There is only slight evidence of this. A commitment to equality in general is associated with perceptions of male dominance in the economy and government, but not the family. And high patriotism is linked with perceptions of equality in government but not business and industry, and not families. But perceptions of equality are independent of party identification and liberal-conservative identifications.

Finally, in the third part of Table 4, we see that empirical perceptions of gender equality have considerably lower correlations with the traditional NES measures than do the new normative measures of gender equality, and again, there are differences across domains: While seven of the other gender-related variables are associated with empirical government equality, only two are in the case of the family, including the general empirical equality question referring to opportunity. It is also important to note that this general empirical opportunity question is less related to the family than to other domains.

Perceptions of inequality in government and the economy are related to positive feelings towards feminists and a desire for equal roles; the women's movement feeling thermometer is related to empirical governmental equality. Unlike normative preferences for gender equality, empirical assessments are related to the attention people pay to women's issues in the news and their perceptions of equal opportunity. But by and large, empirical assessments are unrelated to most policy preferences with the exception of abortion. Another observation emerging from Table 4 is that in comparing the two summary measures, one tapping perceptions of equality, the other tapping perceptions of male dominance, the latter is more closely related to a wider range of variables. These two variables are not symmetrical because of their different treatment of those who see women as having more power than men.

TABLE 4
CORRELATES OF EMPIRICAL GENDER EQUALITY

	SEES MALE DOMINATION IN				
	GOVERNMENT	FAMILY	BUSINESS & INDUSTRY	ALL DOMAINS	ALL DOMAINS
	(v2722)	(v2726)	(v2730)	(sees equality)	(sees male domination)
I. BACKGROUND					
Gender (+fem)	.06	-.06	-.07	.04	-.06
Age	-.11*	-.11*	-.01	.05	-.14**
Child [#]	.10*	.05	.00	-.06	.10*
Race (Afr.-Am)	.04	-.07	.06	-.10*	.03
Education	.21**	.08	.25**	-.21**	.28**
Church attend	.00	-.04	.01	.00	.00
Income	.14*	.04	.14**	-.18**	.21**
II. POLITICAL					
General Equality	.11*	.02	.10*	-.15**	.16**
Moralism	-.04	-.07	.09*	-.07	.01
Patriotism	-.16**	-.04	-.08	.08	-.12**
Party ID (Rep.)	.01	-.06	.05	.05	-.02
Liberalism- Conservatism	-.02	.01	.04	.04	.01
III. GENDER RELATED					
FT: Women's Movement	.13**	.08	.09	-.09	.15**
FT: Feminists	.19**	.01	.15**	-.14**	.17**
FT: Housewives	.01	-.05	.02	-.06	.02
Equal Role (v438)	.18**	-.02	.19**	-.18**	.20**
Women's news (v2701)	.12**	-.01	.10*	-.18**	.17**
Eq.oppy (v2716, male domin.)	.27**	.16**	.32**	-.25**	.35**
Same/Diff. (v2719)	-.04	-.06	.01	-.01	-.04
Focus Home/Work (v2715)	.08	-.03	.09	-.09	.09
Draft Women (v2709)	-.01	.02	.04	-.01	.03
Matern. Leave (v2712)	-.05	-.10*	-.09	.09	-.12*
Abortion (v479 lib. pos)	.18**	.09*	.16**	-.14**	.21**
Law protecting women (v460)	.19**	.03	.02	-.08	.12*

NOTE: Relationships in this table have been arranged to reflect the concept rather than the actual coding of the variable in order to facilitate reading this report.

[#] "Child" is coded (1) No children at home (2) Children ≥ 6 at home (3) Children < 6 at home

*p<.05 **p<.01

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL GENDER EQUALITY

Because the Pilot Study includes measures of both normative and empirical gender equality, it is possible to determine not just what respondents prefer, but whether they think their preferences exist or not. In effect, we are able to create measures of the difference between respondents' preferences concerning gender equality and their perceptions of reality. Specifically, for each domain, a measure of difference was created by recoding the normative and empirical measures in the following fashion: -1, female dominance; 0, equality; 1, male dominance. Then, for each domain, empirical equality was subtracted from normative equality to produce a measure ranging from -2 to +2 where negative scores indicate that women have more power than desired, positive scores indicate that men have more power than desired, and zero scores indicate that empirical reality corresponds with normative preferences. The great advantage of these measures is that they alleviate the difficulty of knowing most people "want" equality, but not knowing whether they think what we've got is equality. With that in mind, presented in Table 5 are the distributions for these three new variables.

TABLE 5
DIFFERENCES IN NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL GENDER EQUALITY

<u>Level of Difference</u>	<u>Government</u>	<u>Family</u>	<u>Business and Industry</u>
-2 (women too dom.)	0.4	3.1	0.0
-1	7.0	20.8	3.1
0 (appropriate)	30.1	50.7	31.8
1	60.7	25.0	64.3
2 (men too dom.)	1.7	0.4	0.9
TOTAL	99.9%	100.0%	100.1%
(N)	(458)	(448)	(456)

Again we find that the pattern of responses differs across domains. For each of the two more public domains (government and business and industry), only around 30% of the public report that their perceptions of empirical reality match their normative preferences; most of the remaining respondents perceive that men have too much power and influence in these domains. Thus, most citizens desire equality between the sexes in both government and the economy; and most of them also perceive that men still have too much power and influence in these public arenas. Consequently, public policies that seek to shift the distribution of power in government and the economy towards women should meet with more support than opposition.

The more private arena of the family presents a considerable contrast. Fully half of the public reports that the current distribution of power and influence within the family matches their normative preferences. The remainder of the public, however, is split evenly between those who think that men have too much power in the family and those who think that women already have too much power. This pattern of responses makes clear the quandary that law-makers must face when considering legislation that affects the distribution of power

and influence within the family. Half of the public is satisfied with the status quo, and thus would presumably oppose legislation that might change it; the remainder is split in terms of the direction in which change is sought. Thus by considering normative and empirical gender equality jointly, we are in a better position to understand the pressures for change and stability that exist in society today.

The distinctiveness of the domains is especially clear when we consider the intercorrelations among these measures of difference. The disparities between normative preferences and empirical reality in government and business and industry are quite highly correlated; Pearson's r equals .48. But the difference measure for the family is only modestly correlated with the comparable measures in the other domains: .19 for family and government, and .15 for family and business and industry.

Finally, we can examine the correlates of the domain specific difference measures. In addition, by summing the three domain-specific difference measures, we created an additional summary variable ("overall difference") that taps the level of disparity across domains. Theoretically, this measure might range from -6 to +6. But because very few respondents perceived that women have more power than desired, we collapsed their negative scores to zero thus producing a measure, ranging from 0 to 6, that summarizes the extent to which men have more power and influence than desired. Presented in Table 6 are the correlations for the overall difference measure and the three domain specific difference measures with various background, political, and gender-related variables.

Among the background factors, as we should expect by now, education emerges as a strong correlate of both differences in each domain and the overall assessment that men have too much power. Other background factors exhibit domain specific effects as well as modest correlations with the overall measure of undesired male dominance. Church attenders are less likely to see what they define as an overabundance of male dominance in the family; the same is true of African-Americans compared with whites. Younger people and those of higher income see more unwanted male dominance in government and business and industry than do others.

The political factors excepting party identification and liberal-conservative identification, are significantly related to the overall measure of undesired male dominance, although the relationship to different domains differs. Finally, if we look at the gender related items, we find that the earlier patterns of correlation reemerge. Specifically, there are clear differences across domains for most of the variables. And generally, the disparity between normative expectations and empirical reality for the family tends to have lower correlations for most (but not all) items than do the difference measures for the other domains. Finally, it should be noted that the overall measure of difference correlates more consistently and strongly with the gender-related policy items than either the normative or empirical equality summary measures.

TABLE 6
CORRELATES OF MEASURES OF NORMATIVE-EMPIRICAL DISPARITY

	GOVERNMENT	FAMILY	BUSINESS & INDUSTRY	PERCEPTION OF MALE DOMINANCE
I. BACKGROUND				
Gender (+fem)	.01	-.03	.01	.02
Age	-.15**	-.08	-.12**	-.16**
Child	.07	.04	.05	.07
Race (Af.Am)	-.01	-.13**	.00	-.06
Education	.27**	.13**	-.29**	.29**
Church Attend	-.08	-.12**	-.05	-.13**
Income	.18**	.07	.15**	.17**
II. POLITICAL				
General Equality	.19**	.10*	.19**	.25**
Moralism	-.17**	-.13**	-.05	-.19**
Patriotism	-.16**	-.02	-.12*	-.12**
Party ID (Rep.)	-.02	-.07	-.04	-.05
Liberalism-Conservatism	-.07	-.06	-.06	-.08
III. GENDER RELATED				
FT: Women's Movement	.25**	.14**	.25**	.29**
FT: Feminists	.25**	.07	.22**	.24**
FT: Housewives	.06	-.01	.11*	.08
Equal Role (v438)	.42**	.11*	.44**	.39**
Women's news (v2701)	.11*	.01	.10*	.12**
Eq. oppy (v2716, male dom.)	.25**	.20**	.22**	.29**
Same/Different (v2719)	-.08	-.06	-.02	-.05
Focus Home/Work (v2715)	.16**	.02	.16**	.15**
Draft Women (v2709)	.13**	.06	.13**	.16**
Matern.Leave (v2710)	-.07	-.10*	-.14**	-.13**
Abortion (v479, lib. pos)	.26**	.18**	.22**	.28**
Law protecting women (v460)	.23**	.10*	.15**	.23**

NOTE: Relationships in this table have been arranged to reflect the concept rather than the actual coding of the variable in order to facilitate reading this report.

*p<.05 **p<.01

To summarize, let us compare the aggregated measures of empirical, normative, and empirical-normative disparity already discussed. Table 7 offers the comparison of the correlates of these measures, suggesting their different meanings and uses. Theoretically and intuitively, the disparity measure should be the most politically powerful measure of cognitions regarding equality because it takes in both assessment of the empirical situation and people's assessment of that situation. In this light Table 7 offers some interesting comparisons.

Certainly normative equality has more clear connections than the empirical measure. The most interesting comparisons are between the normative and disparity columns because both suggest the correlates of public preferences. As we might expect, in some cases the correlations are stronger in the disparity column, most notably with regard to age, patriotism (presumably picking up on the element of discontent), and perception of equal opportunities. The clearest case in which the NORMATIVE column shows a larger connection is with respect to self-placement on the liberal-conservative continuum, suggesting that without including the empirical element simple statements of preference for equality may show attitudes or even rhetoric consistent with more general ideology without a distinct cognitive base.

TABLE 7
CORRELATES OF AGGREGATED DOMAINS OF GENDER EQUALITY

	NORMATIVE	EMPIRICAL (sees male domination)	DISPARITY
I. BACKGROUND			
Gender (+fem)	.03	.04	.02
Age	-.07	.05	-.16**
Race (Af. Am)	-.07	-.10*	-.06
Education	.18**	-.21**	.29**
Church Attend	-.13**	.00	-.13**
Income	.14**	-.18**	.17**
II. POLITICAL			
General Equality	.32**	-.15**	.25**
Moralism	-.21**	-.07	-.19**
Patriotism	.00	.08	-.12**
Party Identification (Rep)	-.07	.05	.05
Liberalism-Conservatism	-.21**	.04	-.08
III. GENDER RELATED			
FT: Women's Movement	.34**	-.09	.29**
FT: Feminist	.25**	-.14**	.24**
FT: Housewives	.17**	-.06	.08
v438: Equal Roles	.48**	-.18**	.39**
v2701 Women's news	.16**	-.18**	.12**
v2716: Eq. oppy (male dom.)	-.09	-.25**	.29**
v2719: Same/Different	.04	-.01	-.05
v2715: Focus Home/Work	.19**	-.09	.15**
v2709 Draft Women	.19**	-.01	.16**
v2710: Matern. Leave	.07	.09	-.13**
v479 Abortion (lib. pos)	.20**	-.14**	.28**
v460 Law protecting women	.25**	-.08	.23**

NOTE: Relationships in this table have been arranged to reflect the concept rather than the actual coding of the variable in order to facilitate reading this report.

*p<.05 **p<.01

III. EMOTIONAL COMPONENTS

Like other forms of group consciousness, gender consciousness is not purely political or cognitive; it is not simply an ideological stance toward a particular social group or issues of relevance to that group. It is more personal and "deeper" or less purely cognitive than that, for gender consciousness flows from social identity itself (Conover 1988b; Sapiro 1990). Thus, we argue that gender-related identities are a necessary precondition for the development of gender consciousness. In the past, gender-related identities have been measured in the NES in a variety of ways: feeling thermometers; the group closeness battery; and in the 1985 Pilot Study, a battery of questions asking how often women thought of themselves in various gender relevant terms (e.g. housewife, feminist etc.).

The notion of gender identity is very difficult to get at in a mass survey devoted primarily to politics. On the face of it perhaps the most likely question ever used in the NES was the "closeness" item. Certainly some researchers have voiced discontent with this battery in general, but in the case of "women" (or "men") the possible interpretations were more likely to engender sniggers than serious scholarship. How, then, do we tap gender identity?

We begin by focusing on an important outcome of identity for which we have adequate measures: a sense of psychological interdependence with the group, in this case defined by one's gender. It is this sense of a collective bond or psychological interdependence that gives gender consciousness its social nature by making personally relevant the status of other women (or men). Thus, for example, for women there is a sense of pride or happiness when other women (qua women) do well in society; and anger, frustration, and discontent when other women (qua women) are treated badly (Conover 1984; 1988b). It is no coincidence that this sense of psychological and emotional interdependence was defined as critical to the success of the "consciousness-raising groups" that were so crucial in mobilization of women in the early days of the women's movement.

Previous NES attempts to measure gender interdependence have focused on women and their objective or material interdependence with one another. But it is emotional interdependence rather than objective interdependence, that lies at the core of gender consciousness.¹¹ The 1991 Study includes several questions that assess the emotional interdependence of women with women. Two are very direct:

J7 How often do you find yourself feeling a sense of pride as a woman in the accomplishments of other women? Most of the time, some of the time, occasionally, or almost never?

J8 How often do you find yourself angry about the way women are treated in society?

¹¹Of course emotional or psychological interdependence may flow from or be shaped by the realities of material or functional interdependence.

Most of the time, some of the time, occasionally, or almost never?

Although the PRIDE question was asked only of women, the ANGRY question was also asked of men to tap feelings of sympathy and empathy towards women.¹²

A third question is less direct. Placed as a follow-up to a to the general empirical equality question asking overall, whether men or women have more opportunity in society, it asks respondents whether they are pleased, bothered or indifferent about the situation as they see it. Responses were coded into three categories: pro-women, indifferent, pro-men. Presented in Table 8 are responses to these questions.

Women are diverse in the extent to which they take pride in the accomplishments of other women: while 35% report that they often feel such pride, 31% claim that they only occasionally or almost never have such feelings. Similarly, there is considerable variation among respondents in the extent to which they experience anger over women's treatment in society. And, perhaps surprisingly, women are only slightly more likely than men to report feeling angry. Finally, although many people see women as disadvantaged in society their emotional reactions to their perceptions are split almost evenly between those who are indifferent and those who exhibit emotions sympathetic to the plight of women. In sum, American women differ among themselves considerably in their sense of emotional interdependence with other women; American men differ considerably in their empathy and sympathy towards women.

These three measures of emotional interdependence are related to one another, and consequently reliability analyses were run on them. The first two (v2713, v2714) form the most reliable scale (coefficient alpha = .58 for women). For women, therefore, the responses for these two questions were added together to form a single measure, emotional bond. For men, their responses on v2714 (anger) were simply doubled to form a measure (emotional bond) of comparable range.

In addition to these emotion-based questions the 1991 Pilot Study also included a question directly touching on identity that might be relevant to either men or women: that of "feminist". Specifically, respondents were asked "do you think of yourself as a feminist?" Those respondents who answered positively were also asked, "do you think of yourself as a strong feminist or a not so strong feminist?" Combining the responses to these questions creates the frequency distribution displayed in Table 9. There we see that, as expected, responses are skewed toward the non-feminist side with three-quarters of the public stating that they are not feminists. Still, almost 20% of the public identify themselves as feminists. Moreover, while women are more likely to identify themselves as feminists than are men, the differences are

¹²It is also possible for this question to tap antipathy, as in the case of those who are angry at the preferential treatment they believe women receive. Theoretically, of course, it is possible that some women responded this way as well. This possibility needs to be explored more.

not as great as many might have expected: 15.7% of the men identify themselves as feminists while 22.8% of the women do so.

TABLE 8
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION:
MEASURES OF EMOTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE

	ANGER			PRIDE
	Men	Women	All	Women
Most of the time	8.9	14.6	11.9	36.4
Some of the time	35.3	39.3	37.4	33.5
Occasionally	39.7	30.1	34.8	20.9
Almost never	16.1	15.9	16.0	9.2
TOTAL	100.0%	99.9%	100.1%	100.0%
(N)	(224)	(239)	(463)	(239)

Emotional Reactions to Equal Oppy			
	Men	Women	All
Pro-male dominance	7.3	4.6	5.9
Neutral	49.8	40.6	45.0
Anti-male dominance	42.9	54.8	49.1
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(219)	(239)	(458)

TABLE 9
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: FEMINIST IDENTITY (BY GENDER)

	Men	Women	All
Not a Feminist*	84.3	76.2	80.6
Weak Feminist	8.5	14.1	11.4
Strong Feminist	7.2	8.7	8.0
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(223)	(234)	(464)

*Includes those who reject using these terms at all.

Some problems with this question should be noted. Because there is no explicit "non-feminist" category (not to mention "anti-feminist"), responses to this question do not provide a clearcut basis for measuring gender consciousness on the political right. We need to be able to judge whether individuals have an identity that revolves around notions of feminism, not just whether they lack an identity as feminists. We can alleviate this problem to some extent, and thus improve at least the face validity of this measure by breaking the large group of non-feminists into two groups: those whose

responses to a feeling thermometer indicate they are sympathetic towards feminists and those who are hostile or indifferent. Doing this produces a four- category measure: (1) anti-feminist, 43.8%; (2) non-feminist, 36.9%; (3) weak feminist, 11.4%; and (4) strong feminist, 8.0%.

Problems still remain, however, with even this measure of identity. First, although it has obvious gender related content, some might argue that the term "feminist" cannot serve as the basis for a gender as such identity since either men or women may label themselves as a feminist. Second, "feminist" is an ideological term derived specifically from political organization and shaped through political history (Cott 1987). It can therefore be said to be an explicitly politicized identity rather than a "gender" identity pure and simple. Third, the term "feminist" is so emotionally charged that some people may have been reluctant to attach the label to themselves even though ideologically and emotionally they may, in fact, be feminists.]

Despite these problems we believe working with the feminist identity questions serves some useful functions in research on gender consciousness. Most specifically, it is useful as a measure of politicized social identity; it suggests not an attitude toward a social group or political organization but an indication of integration of self-identity with a socio-political category. This measure of identity is related to the emotional interdependence variables although at a modest level. It is associated with pride ($r = -.21$), anger ($r = -.28$), and to an even lesser extent, emotional reactions to the perceived structure of opportunities for women ($r = .16$).

Finally, let us examine the correlates of these measures of the emotional components of gender consciousness, presented in Table 10. Looking at the background factors first, we find that the emotional bond measure is positively related to gender, age and race. Thus, women, older respondents, and blacks express a stronger sense of emotional interdependence with women. Feminist identity is also related to age and race, and inversely related to family income. It is also notable that pride and anger can express different relationships to women as a group; the correlates are somewhat different. Notably, education and church attendance are related to pride and not anger.

Among the political variables, party identification, liberal conservative identification and equality are all clearly correlated with both the identity and emotional bond measures. Adherents to traditional morality are less identified with feminism but makes no difference to emotional bonding with women. Lastly, patriotism is unrelated to all the emotional component measures despite its own emotional resonance.

Turning to the gender-related variables, we find that both identity and emotional bond are correlated with the feeling thermometers. This is to expected, of course, given that both sets of measures involve affective responses and that the identity measure actually incorporates the feeling thermometer for feminists. But both the identity and emotional bond measures are also strongly related to those measures tapping cognitive effects: namely, attention to women's issues and perceptions of equal opportunity. This

TABLE 12
CORRELATES OF THE EMOTIONAL COMPONENTS OF GENDER CONSCIOUSNESS

	FEMINIST IDENTITY	PRIDE	ANGER	EQ. OPP	EMOT. BOND
I. BACKGROUND					
Gender	.07	--	.08	.12**	.24**
Age	.12*	.07	.08	-.06	.16**
Child	-.01	.06	-.02	.07	-.02
Race	.13**	.18**	.19**	.02	.21**
Education	-.01	.19**	-.07	.20**	-.03
Church attend	-.07	.15**	.01	-.06	.06
Family Income	-.11*	.11	-.13		.10*
II. POLITICAL					
Equality	.28**	.27**	.20**	.27**	.23**
Morality	-.14**	.05	.05	-.09*	.01
Patriotism	-.06	.13	.00	-.06	.04
Party Id (Rep.)	-.24**	-.07	-.26**	-.08	-.22**
Liberal-Conservatism	-.24**	-.20**	-.15**	-.16**	-.18**
III. GENDER-RELATED					
FT-Women's Movement	.45**	.32**	.30**	.35**	.33**
FT-Feminists	.58**	.24**	.17**	.26**	.22**
FT-Housewives	.08	.08	.20**	.16**	.20**
Equal role (v438)	.18**	.21**	.09	.31**	.10*
Women's news (v2701)	.27**	.43**	.34**	.26**	.37**
Percept. eq. oppy (male)	.16**	.15**	.19**	.23**	.21**
Same/Diff. (v2721)	-.10*	.09	.05	-.01	.07
Draft Women (v2709)	.11**	.12	.08	.10*	.06
Focus Home/Work (v2715)	.08	.08	.09	.09	.07
Abortion (v479)	-.02	-.04	.05	.14**	-.06
Law Prot. Women (v460)	.18**	.24**	.10*	.19**	.13**

NOTE: Relationships in this table have been arranged to reflect the concept rather than the actual coding of the variable in order to facilitate reading this report.

*p<.05 **p<.01

supports the notion that gender consciousness involves the development of an affectively loaded self-schema that then influences the perceptual process. The feminist identity measure is also related to many of the policy questions (although not abortion) as is the emotional bond measure. These patterns of correlations strength our confidence that these new measures are, indeed, valid indicators of the emotional components of gender consciousness. Notably, feminist identity seems to be the one variable related to definitions of equality regarding sameness or difference of roles.¹³

IV. INTEGRATING THE COMPONENTS OF GENDER CONSCIOUSNESS

Before considering the political effects of gender equality and identity, it is useful to examine briefly how the various components of gender consciousness relate to one another. Recall, our argument is that gender consciousness is composed of both cognitive components (gender equality) and emotional components (identity and interdependence). Presented in Table 11 are the correlations between our measures of these components of gender consciousness.

The emotional components correlate most strongly with the normative gender equality measures. Once again, we find that the correlations are strongest for the economic domain and weakest for the family domain. Although further investigation is needed, this raises the possibility that the emotional elements of gender consciousness are more closely linked to public rather than private activity.

In contrast, there are no significant relationships between the emotional components and the empirical indicators of gender equality. Thus assessments of empirical equality are not biased by one's gender identity or sense of interdependence with other women. Finally, the overall disparity between normative preferences and empirical reality is correlated with the identity measure although not the emotional bond measure.

Taken together, these findings indicate that the cognitive and emotional components of gender consciousness, although related, are clearly distinct. Some people may have a commitment to gender equality but lack any sort of emotional identity or sense of interdependence with women. Alternatively, some

¹³A good possibility for improving the feminist identity measure is suggested by the 1991 SUNY-Stony Brook Gender and Politics Survey, provided to us by Leonie Huddy. Following an initial question, "Do you consider yourself a feminist or not?" those who responded affirmatively were asked, "Would you describe yourself as a strong feminist or not so strong feminist?" Those who responded negatively were asked, "Would you describe yourself as strongly opposed to feminists, somewhat opposed to feminists, not at all opposed to feminists?" Of 292 valid answers, 10.6% were strong feminists, 18.8% not strong feminists, 37.3% not feminists but not opposed; 28.4% somewhat opposed, and 4.8% strongly opposed. They followed up with questions about the meaning of feminism.

people may have a strong sense of interdependence or empathy with women and yet lack a well-developed ideology about gender equality. Only those individuals who develop both components can be said to have a sense of gender consciousness.

Finally, we will turn briefly to multivariate analysis, looking at the effects of some of our new constructions on a alimited range of political and policy variables, while also taking into account background and political variables known to be shapers of political attitudes. Our interest in these analyses is two-fold. First, what is the impact of the components of gender consciousness on political attitudes and second, what is the utility of our new measures compared with the questions previously available on the NES and other surveys, namely the equal role question and feeling thermometers on the women's movement? Tables 12A and 12B show the results of this analysis by comparing two different equations. In each case we included the background variables of education, race, gender, age, religiosity, and family income. In each case we also used a

TABLE 11
INTERCORRELATIONS OF EMOTIONAL AND COGNITIVE COMPONENTS
OF GENDER CONSCIOUSNESS

COGNITIVE COMPONENTS	EMOTIONAL COMPONENTS	
	IDENTITY	EMOTIONAL BOND
I. <u>Normative</u> (Prefers equality)		
Government	.11*	.10**
Family	.10*	.06
Business and Industry	.16**	.13**
Overall Commitment to Equality	.18**	.18**
II. <u>Empirical</u> (Sees male dominance)		
Government	-.01	-.01
Family	.02	-.02
Business and Industry	.04	.04
Overall Perception of Male Dominance	.04	.06
III. <u>Disparity Measures</u> (Sees too much male dominance)		
Government	.05	.05
Family	.08	-.01
Business and Industry	.10*	.08
Overall Disparity	.13**	.09*

*p<.05	**p<.01	

general measure of egalitarianism, moralism, patriotism as well as party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement. But we assessed each dependent variable alternatively using normative equality, identity, and emotional bonding as the new construction, and equal roles and the feeling thermometer to show what would presumably be available without this Pilot Study. Of course, one must take care in making comparisons across these two sets of regressions as they differ in blocks of variables rather than just a single variable. Still, they do provide some insight into the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two sets of gender measures. A lack of space and time dictate against a presentation and discussion of all these regressions. Instead, we have selected six pairs of regressions for illustrative purposes

Focusing first on the two evaluations of President Bush, clearly partisanship and patriotism play key roles. In the overall assessment, Bush has more support from those with lower education, younger people, and higher income. People who attend religious services frequently give higher evaluations of Bush's job in foreign affairs than those who attend less. For our purposes of gender analysis, we note that although gender itself is unrelated to evaluations of the President, emotional interdependence with women is related: those more emotionally sympathetic to women are less supportive of the President. If we look at the equations that include only the old gender variables we see no relationship with either the feeling thermometer or the equal role question. Thus we have further evidence that the emotional bond measure is tapping something quite different from the traditional equal roles question and especially the feeling thermometers.

A dominant theme in contemporary feminist theory is the idea that gender consciousness promotes a pacifist mentality. Consequently, a second set of dependent variables that we considered were reactions to the Gulf war, including emotional reactions and the assessment of whether the war was worth the cost. In the latter case, neither the new nor the old gender variables proved to have a significant impact. For the emotional reactions to the war, however, there was a significant pattern of results. This pattern is represented by the results for the "worried feelings" variable that is a composite of responses to questions asking whether respondents felt "upset" or "worried" by the Gulf War. As illustrated by the example in Table 12A, the old gender variables had a fairly weak impact on most of the negative emotional reactions to the war (an exception to this is the sympathy for the Iraqi people variable, v2520). In contrast, the new emotional bond measure proved to be a powerful predictor of negative emotional reactions to the war.

A third set of dependent variables that we considered were policy questions that were not explicitly gender based, such as affirmative action for blacks (v2561), job services (v2700), and various spending priorities. Gender consciousness should influence preferences on such issues only to the extent that people perceive that the issue has some gender-relevant content (Conover 1988a,b). It is not surprising, therefore, that generally we found a sporadic pattern of impact for both the new and old variables on these dependent measures.

Still, there were some interesting cases, in particular the

question of preferential hiring for blacks (see Table 12B). Race has the expected effect on attitudes toward preferential hiring, and income is inversely related to favorable attitudes. The more supportive of general notions of equality the more supportive people are, and the more attached to traditional moral or nationalistic values the less supportive. Again, gender is not connected with the dependent variable, but emotional bonding with women is, as is feminist identity and normative equality. In the equation with the old variables the feeling thermometer has a significant effect on preferential hiring attitudes, but the old equal roles question does not. Curiously, the normative gender equality measure has a significant positive effect on the preferential hiring measure; as one's commitment to equality for women increases, support for affirmative action for blacks decreases. We imagine two possible explanations. At least some people see a tradeoff between pursuing equality between the sexes and advancing the cause of blacks. More likely, as the normative equality measure folds preference for more power for women or men into the same category in contrast to a preference for equality, we are picking up a public perception of a conflict between "preferential treatment" and notions of equality.

Finally, we considered as dependent variables various gender related policies. In general, one would expect that the gender consciousness measures would have their strongest and most consistent impact on such policies. But, in fact, this is not true in the case of either the new or the old gender measures. There are some policies where neither set of variables proves to have any significant impact, such as paid maternal leave (v2712). There are a few policies where one of the old gender measures proves to have a significant effect while none of the new variables do; for example, the old equal roles question has a significant impact on the question about drafting women (v2709), but none of the new gender variables does. And there are policies where both sets of gender variables have an impact (e.g. laws protecting women (v460), and strength of attitudes on abortion).

From a theoretical perspective, people who have a true sense of gender consciousness should also exhibit a cognitive bias for information about women and an understanding of the need for collective action. Thus gender consciousness should be especially related to the attention to women's news variable (v2701)¹⁴, and the preference for collective action variable (v2708). The regressions for these two variables are presented in Table 12B. Looking first at the old gender variables, we find that the equal roles

¹⁴This question was part of the Pilot project, asking, "When reading or listening to the news, how much attention do you pay to issues that especially affect women as a group? A lot, some, a little, or not at all. The responses to v2701 (N=466/MD=1) were:

	A lot	Some	Little	Not at all
Value	1	2	3	4
%	20.6	42.7	27.5	9.2

The relationship between this variable and the general question of how often respondents follow news about politics (gamma) is .31.

TABLE 12A
REGRESSION OF BACKGROUND, POLITICAL, AND GENDER VARIABLES
ON SELECTED POLITICAL AND POLICY VARIABLES

	BUSH EVAL. (v2115)		BUSH FOR. AFF. (V2123)		WORRIED ABOUT WAR	
	EQ.1	EQ.2	EQ.1	EQ.2	EQ.1	EQ.2
I. BACKGROUND						
Education	.13**	.13**	-.02	-.02	.04	.04
Race	.04	.07	-.08	-.04	-.01	.00
Gender	.00	.03	-.02	.01	.27**	.30**
Age	.09*	.12**	.07	.10*	-.17**	-.15**
Religious Attend	.07	.05	.12**	.11*	-.05	-.06
Family Income	-.10*	-.12**	-.05	-.07	.00	.00
II. POLITICAL						
Equality	.05	.08	.02	.04	-.02	-.02
Morality	-.09*	-.08	-.10*	-.09	-.03	-.02
Patriotism	-.27**	-.26**	-.23**	-.21**	.04	.05
Party ID	-.26**	-.28**	-.20**	-.23**	-.04	-.06
Liberal-Conserv.	-.00	-.03	-.04	-.05	-.03	-.04
III. GENDER						
Normative Equality	-.01	--	-.09	--	-.03	--
Identity	.02	--	-.04	--	-.00	--
Emot. Bond	.17**	--	.19**	--	.16**	--
FTs	--	-.03	--	-.08	--	.06
Equal Role	--	-.05	--	-.04	--	.03
Adj. Rs	.31	.29	.19	.16	.10	.08

entries are beta weights; *p<.05 **p<.01

TABLE 12B

	PREF.HIRE. (v2561)		ATTN WOM. NEWS (V2701)		COLLECTIVE ACT (V2708)	
	EQ.1	EQ.2	EQ.1	EQ.2	EQ.1	EQ.2
I. BACKGROUND						
Education	.07	.09	-.16**	-.17**	-.12**	-.13**
Race	-.21**	-.24**	-.08	-.09*	-.00	.00
Gender	-.03	-.05	.12**	.05	-.10*	-.07
Age	.02	-.01	-.08	-.14**	.10*	.13**
Religious Attend	.05	.06	.06	.08	.00	-.02
Family Income	.12**	.15**	.01	.04	-.03	-.05
II. POLITICAL						
Equality	-.15**	-.11*	-.03	-.03	.07	.05
Morality	.12**	.09*	.06	.02	-.08	-.06
Patriotism	.10*	.10*	-.03	-.05	.00	.00
Party ID	.05	.07	.01	.03	-.11*	-.13**
Liberal-Conserv.	.01	.01	-.04	-.01	-.03	-.03
III. GENDER						
Normative Equality	.14**	--	-.06	--	.14**	--
Identity	-.13**	--	-.15**	--	.12*	--
Emot. Bond	-.13**	--	-.31**	--	.19**	--
FTs	--	-.12**	--	-.30**	--	.18**
Equal Role	--	.01	--	.02	--	.07
Adj. Rs	.24	.21	.20	.15	.14	.10

 entries are beta weights; *p<.05 **p<.01

question does not have a significant impact in either case. But the combined feeling thermometer measure performs better; it has a significant impact in both cases. Like the feeling thermometers, the emotional bond question has a strong impact in producing both attention to the news and a stronger preference for collective action. The identity measure has a similar although weaker impact. Finally, the normative preference for gender equality has a significant impact only on the collective action question. And interestingly, its impact is negative suggesting that as people's commitment to equality increases so does their sense that individual effort is enough. These findings suggest that it is the emotional side of gender consciousness, and not the cognitive side, that is primarily responsible for increasing people's cognitive attention to women's issues. The inclination to collective action, however, seems to require both a cognitive and emotional component, which is consistent with the predominant arguments in research on gender politics.

These observations, of course, offer only a preliminary look at the potential value of the new measures we have tested. But in summary, these regressions suggest several things. First, their differing patterns of effect illustrate clearly that the old and new measures are tapping something somewhat different. Second, they suggest that the new measures of the emotional components of gender consciousness are potentially quite valuable; this is especially true for the emotional bond measure. Third, we find that the cognitive side of gender consciousness generally has a weaker effect in a variety of areas. No doubt, this is, in part, due to the fact that these equations included a general measure of equality. This general measure of equality seems to carry more explanatory power than the more specific gender measure. Still, there are some cases, such as affirmative action for blacks, where an overall commitment to equality may be at odds with the more specific commitment to gender equality. In those cases, it is quite useful to have the measure of gender equality.

V. GENDER POLICY

One of the notable changes that has occurred in mass level politics over the last decade and more is the increasing attention to and conflict over a number of issues that might once have been dismissed as "women's issues" of special interest to a relatively small segment of the population. Certainly the availability and regulation of abortion has become central to political debate in the U.S. as, indeed, it has in many other countries. But economic and other developments during the 1980s also mean that child care and parental leave issues are also the subject of considerable public discussion. Indeed, gender equality policies of many types are widely discussed and debated including the idea of an integrated military and gender-neutral recruitment policies. The last issue, of course, gained special prominence during the Gulf War. These issues continue to be "about" gender and thus important to the study of gender and politics, but they are increasingly "about" a number of other important things as well such as the nature of the welfare state and the range of services available -- and to whom.

The 1991 Pilot Study in combination with the 1990 Election Study

includes a set of seven issue questions we have briefly investigated as part of our initial assessment. Three abortion-related issues, included in the 1990 wave, were investigated at an earlier date.¹⁵ One asked for respondents' opinions on the conditions of availability of abortion, one asked about parental consent for abortions in the case of minors, and one asked about public funding of abortion. We will supplement the earlier probes of these questions by reporting here on the gender associations now available through the Pilot Study.

Of the four other issues we will review, two were included in the 1990 post-election study: one asking whether laws are needed to protect working women and one asking whether the government should provide child care. The Pilot Study included two further questions:

J5 Recently there has been a lot of debate about the role women should play in the military. Although there is no draft right now, if we needed a draft to get enough people into military service, do you think men and women should both be subject to the draft or do you think only men should be drafted?

J6 Do you think that businesses should be required to give women at least 10 weeks of paid leave to take care of a new baby or not? J6a Do you feel strongly or not so strongly about this?

As Table 13 shows, the majority are in favor of allowing abortion, at least under some circumstances, in favor of parental consent for their teenagers' abortions, and extremely divided over the question of government funding. The majority is also in favor of laws protecting women, and in favor of required maternity leave. The public is more divided about provision of child care and an equal draft. Perhaps not surprisingly, women seem more in favor of child care assistance than men and less in favor of being drafted.

Finally, we turn to a brief look at the correlates of the gender policy questions. In each case we have included an array of background and demographic variables, political variables, and gender-relevant variables including many of those discussed above. Turning first to the abortion questions, the correlations show all three abortion questions connected with education and religiosity, with family income additionally connected to a degree with abortion policy and funding. In terms of political connections it is not surprising to see abortion issues associated with liberal-conservative self-placement or morality, but all three issues -- especially regarding funding -- are also connected with egalitarian attitudes. Consent and funding are both connected with evaluations of President Bush and the 1988 presidential vote. It is also not surprising to see the funding issue related to attitudes toward provision of government services.

¹⁵Maria Antonia Calvo and Steven J. Rosenstone, "The Re-Framing of the Abortion Debate," 20 February 1990.

TABLE 13
POLICY QUESTIONS

	Men	Women	Total
ABORTION			
Never permitted	8.6	11.6	10.2
Rape, incest, life endangered	32.9	29.0	30.9
If need established	11.7	17.0	14.5
Personal choice	45.0	40.2	42.5
Other	1.8	2.1	1.9
(N/MD)	(222)	(241)	(463/4)
PARENTAL CONSENT			
Strongly favor	77.1	78.3	61.1
Not strongly favor			16.6
Not strongly oppose			7.9
Strongly oppose	22.9	21.7	14.3
	(218)	(235)	(467)
GOV'T FUND ABORTION			
Strongly favor	23.0	26.8	25.0
Not strongly favor	26.3	18.6	22.3
Not strongly oppose	14.7	13.4	14.1
Strongly oppose	35.9	41.1	38.6
(N)	(217)	(231)	(448)
PROTECT WOMEN			
strongly favor	64.7	68.5	66.7
not strongly favor	23.5	24.6	24.1
neither/both	1.4	0.4	0.9
not strongly oppose	5.9	3.9	4.9
strongly oppose	4.5	2.6	3.5
(N/MD)	(221)	(232)	(453/14)
GOV'T PROVIDE CHILD CARE			
Yes	48.4	60.2	54.5
MATERNITY LEAVE			
Strongly favor	50.2	59.7	55.1
Not strongly favor	21.2	11.6	16.2
Not strongly oppose	13.8	13.3	13.6
Strongly oppose	14.7	15.4	15.1
(N)	(217)	(233)	(450/17)
DRAFT			
Both men and women	63.1	46.0	54.3
Don't believe in draft	1.8	1.7	1.8
Only men drafted	35.1	52.3	44.0
(N/MD)	(222)	(235)	(457/10)

As expected, abortion attitudes are connected with a wide range of the gender variables. Abortion policy and funding are related to empirical and normative equality, but the normative-empirical disparity measure has a stronger connection with abortion attitudes, matched by the equal roles variable. Interesting, emotional bonding with women shows no association with abortion policy, although positive feelings toward feminists and the women's movement are connected with more liberal abortion stands. This is especially true of the funding issue, which has been a focus of considerable attention within the women's movement.

Two measures of salience are included in this analysis not mentioned earlier in this report. One, listed as "Salience-Equality," is the summed score of the number of gender equality questions to which respondents claimed to have strong opinions, regardless of what those opinions were. Likewise, "Salience-Abortion" is the summed score of abortion questions to which respondents claimed to have strong opinions (regardless of the substance of those opinions), plus two items indicating whether respondents placed themselves on the top or bottom twenty-five degrees on the feeling thermometers about abortion proponents and opponents. The results show that the more strongly respondents feel about gender equality issues, the more in favor of funding for abortion they are. This table also shows that those who conservative or restrictive views of abortion policies tend to feel more strongly in general about abortion policy than others do.

Finally, let us turn to the remaining four gender issues displayed in Table 14B. African-Americans are more favorable toward maternity leave and child care provision than whites. Not surprisingly, younger people and those with children are more favorable toward child care provision. Education and income are positively correlated with preferring and integrated draft, while religiosity is associated with more opposition.

These policy issues, excepting the draft, are connected with a range of political variables in the expected direction. Interestingly, not only is the draft issue less widely connected with other political issues; it is also more connected with moralism than are the other gender issues, suggesting that the problem for integration may be a fear of too much mixing in the armed forces. It should be noted that these questions were asked while the newspapers were still running stories highlighting the significance and impact of women being involved on the front lines in the Gulf War.

These policy issues are also associated with a number of the gender variables we included in analysis. Gender equality of all sorts discriminates much less on the issue of maternity leave than on other issues. Separate analysis reveals a clear gender difference; for men but not women attitudes toward maternity leave are connected to the 1988 vote, liberal-conservative self-placement, patriotism, and assessment of Congress. Other than the draft, higher emotional bonding with women and greater concern with gender equality is connected with these policy views. Feminist orientations and support for the women's movement is also related to these issues.

TABLE 14A
GENDER POLICY QUESTIONS

	<u>Liberal Position on ABORTION:</u>		
	POLICY	PARENTAL CONSENT	FUNDING
I. BACKGROUND			
Gender	-.02	-.03	-.03
Race (Afr.-Am)	-.05	-.04	.11*
Education	.20**	.23**	.21**
Age	-.08	.00	-.05
Children	.01	-.09	-.02
Religion important	-.28**	-.21**	-.24**
Family Income	.16**	.07	-.16**
II. POLITICAL			
1988 Vote (v167, Rep.)	-.10	-.17**	-.22**
1990 Liberal/-Conserv.	-.18**	-.19**	-.29**
Bush job (v2115)	-.04	-.23**	-.15**
Patriotism	-.07	-.16**	-.10*
Congress job 2303	-.06	-.10*	.01
1991 Liberal- Conservative 2450	-.16**	-.16**	-.16**
Govt Services 2700	.02	.08	.13*
MORALITY	-.26**	-.21**	-.30**
EQUALITY	.12**	.11*	.22**
III. GENDER			
Empirical Equality	-.14**	-.06	-.14**
Norm: Gov't Equality	.20**	.10*	.27**
Norm: Econ. Equality	.17**	.10*	.21**
Norm: Family Equal	.20**	.11*	.20**
Normative Equality	.20**	.12*	.28**
Norm.-Emp. Disparity	.28**	.17**	.36**
Equal Roles (v438)	-.31**	.15**	.32**
Salience: Equality	.01	.05	.17**
Salience: Abortion	-.29**	-.12**	-.20**
Emotional Bond	-.06	.08	.09
Feminist Identity	.01	.15**	.09
Individual-Collective (v2708)	-.03	.06	.02
FT-Women's Movement (v2239)	.13**	.20**	.30**
FT-Feminists (v2240)	.13**	.16**	.30**

*p<.05 **p<.01

TABLE 14B

	MATERNITY LEAVE	CHILD CARE	PROTECTIVE LAWS	DRAFT
I. BACKGROUND				
Gender	.04	.12*	.07	-.17**
Race	.15**	.26**	.07	.00
Education	-.06	.03	.10*	.11*
Age	-.09	-.22**	-.07	-.06
Children	.07	.14**	-.01	.04
Religion important	.04	-.05	-.06	-.12**
Family Income	-.01	-.07	.05	.16**
II. POLITICAL				
1988 Vote 167	-.14*	-.32**	-.15**	.05
1990 Liberal				
-Conservative	-.20**	-.30**	-.16**	-.06
Bush job 2115	.03	-.16**	-.13**	-.08
PATRIOT	.09	-.06	-.09*	.00
Congress job 2303	.08	.14**	.00	-.04
1991 Liberal-				
Conservative 2450	-.15**	-.19**	-.13**	-.05
Govt Services 2700	.26**	.38**	.18**	.04
MORALITY	-.07	-.11*	-.12**	-.27**
EQUALITY	.18**	.28**	.26**	.18**
III. GENDER				
Empirical Equality	-.06	-.05	-.08	.01
Norm: Gov't Equality	.01	.05	.18**	.17**
Norm: Econ. Equality	.02	.16**	.25**	.12**
Norm: Family Equal	.01	.06	.16*	.15**
Normative Equality	.01	.14**	.25**	.19**
Norm.-Emp. Disparity	-.01	.12**	.23**	.16**
Equal Roles (v438)	.08	.17**	.32**	.33**
Salience: Equality	.16**	.16**	.16**	.07
Salience: Abortion	.15**	.02	-.02	-.12*
Emotional Bond	.17*	.19**	.13**	.06
Feminist Identity	.09	.15**	.14**	.08
Individual-Collective				
(v2708)	.14*	.14**	.06	.03
FT-Women's Movement				
(v2239)	.12*	.29**	.31**	.25**
FT-Feminists (v2240)	.07	.21**	.24**	.14**

NOTE: Relationships in this table have been arranged to reflect the concept rather than the actual coding of the variable in order to facilitate reading this report.

*p<.05 **p<.01

We conclude this section with a brief discussion of gender differences. For purposes of this report, we have only offered the most preliminary look at gender differences with regard to any of the questions asked. In most cases, as we expected, we uncovered little evidence of gender differences in the context of simple bivariate runs of gender against the other variables. With respect to the policy questions, we see simple gender differences only on the questions of the draft and child care. At the same time it is important to note that further analysis will provide more food for thought about gender differences in the sources, impact, and structure of thinking about gender-based political issues. Here we offer only a brief and first set of examples.

Consider the case of childcare, for which we found a gender difference in opinion. We also find that support for expanded social services (v2700) is considerably more related to support for childcare among men (.52**) than women (.20**), while the salience of gender equality issues is more important to women (.21**) than men (.09) as is also true of aggregated support for gender equality (.18** vs .09). In the case of abortion issues, for which we found no evidence of simple gender differences, we again find gender differences in the analysis of correlates, many of which should be explored further in the future. Age distinguishes abortion opinion (V479) among men (-.15*) but not women (-.01), while income distinguishes opinion among women (.26**) but not men (.02). Abortion opinion is also more related to moralism among men (-.40**) than among women (-.14). Both abortion opinion and parental consent were more connected to 1988 vote (v167) for women (.16*, .23** respectively) than for men (.03, .11 respectively).

If we organize this discussion of gender difference by correlates rather than by gender-based policy, we see hints of more interesting patterns to probe. Consider the two variables we constructed to tap salience first, of gender equality issues, then of abortion questions. As Table 15 suggests, the policy correlates of these two variables are different for women and men. The salience of equality has stronger connections with these policy views among women than men. The salience of abortion questions offers a more complex picture, but one in which gender difference plays an important role. Glancing at the column of signs, strength of feeling about abortion issues is inversely related to liberal positions on these policy questions among men with one exception: maternity leave. In contrast, strength of feeling on abortion issues is positively associated with liberal positions on maternity leave, child care, and laws protecting women from discrimination. Even bearing in mind that the latter two relationships do not reach standard levels of statistical significance, of considerable number of correlations we have reviewed (reported and unreported), such sign reversal was rare, leading us to guess the difference is "real." Finally, salience of abortion shows more stronger connections among men than women. The notable exception is maternity leave. Clearly, as a number of scholars in this field have been arguing, there is considerable room for discussion of gender differences in the sense of interactions and different structures of thinking even where we do not see simple differences of opinion.

TABLE 15
POLICY CORRELATES OF SALIENCE OF GENDER EQUALITY AND ABORTION:
GENDER DIFFERENCES

	Salience of Equality		Salience of Abortion	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Maternity leave	.26**	.05	.16*	.12
Child care	.21**	.09	.09	-.08
Laws protecting women	.29**	.04	.11	-.07
Drafting women	.14**	.05	-.04	-.15*
Abortion policy	.04	-.01	-.24**	-.34**
Parental consent	.10	.01	-.11	-.13**
Abortion funding	.18**	.17**	-.14	-.26**

NOTE: Pearsons r correlation coefficients express relationship of salience to liberal positions on the policy issues.

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section of the 1991 NES Pilot Study offers a first to move beyond the type of public opinion questions commonly included with major surveys in an effort to understand gender politics. Although part of the intention was to find better indicators of concepts scholars in this area have been working with for a long time (such as normative equality), and to identify a workable set of issue questions related to current policy problems in gender politics, the bulk of our effort was devoted to searching for a way to work empirically with a relative new conceptual framework that has been developing out of interdisciplinary work primarily in political science and psychology in the last decade. Thus, this report focuses more on our efforts to understand the meanings and interrelationships of the responses to these questions than to doing more explanatory work with them. We will be presenting papers devoted to those purposes on two occasions later this year.

In our assessment of these questions we have kept two things in mind. First, what is their potential utility for the study of gender politics; that is, the role that gender, gender ideology, and gender consciousness play in public discussion, debate and decision-making. But also, we are both concerned with the broader area of political cognition and group politics. Thus, we believe that as useful as many of these questions are to scholars of gender politics, they would become yet more useful if they were integrated into a battery of parallel questions that would focus on other groups and issues. For one example, we have found the item asking about attention to women's news (v2701) useful. It is related to the more general question of how often respondents follow what is going on in politics, but it is clearly not the

same thing. We could imagine a series of more focused "interest" questions that would help us identify the salience of groups in politics or the existence of different issue publics.

We also assessed these questions with the value of flexibility in mind. One of the ways a survey-using field can grow and develop is to develop innovative and creative ways of dealing with older variables in secondary analysis. One of the problems in the field of gender studies is that we have not had this flexibility. The old equal role question was the one available (other than the feeling thermometer on the women's movement) for tapping gender consciousness and almost any other political psychological concept. Beside the obvious problems of working with a single item measure (even if it is highly correlated with many interesting variables), there has been little room for creativity. Our report should suggest, among other things, the greatly enhanced flexibility derived from these batteries of questions. For example, the empirical and normative equality questions allow us to work within specific domains or aggregations, to work with absolute or relative measures. In addition, the "strength" questions allow us to avoid some of the social desirability problems that stem from asking people whether they believe in equality, and has also allowed us to develop some more purely affective measures (i.e. how strongly do people feel about these issues apart from what position they take) as well as cognitive.

With these points in mind, the following is our summary and recommendations regarding the variables included in the gender project on the Pilot Study, plus other relevant variables available through the 1990 post-election study.

RECOMMENDATIONS

FEMINISM, THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
 v158, v2239 FT: Women's Movement
 V2240 FT: Feminists
 V2706-v2707 Is R a feminist? A
 strong feminist?

Retain the FT-Women's movement in part for continuity; this is a better measure than the FT-Feminists. Although it is clear that a large proportion of the population rejects the term *feminist* even if they appear feminist by other measures, v2706-v2707 combined taps the important dimension of politicized identity. The FT-Feminists could be dropped if the other measures are retained, although this was helpful in constructing an identity variable. We would recommend amending the feminist identity question to conform to the questions used in the SUNY-Stony Brook study.

EQUALITY: EMPIRICAL
 V461: Women face job discrim?
 V2716: Opportunity of men and women
 v2722: Power in government
 v2726: Power in family
 v2730: Power in business and industry

We believe the domain-specific measures of equal power are useful, although primarily in combination with the domain-specific normative measures. Because of the relatively higher interrelationship of the government and business and industry measures, we could imagine moving to two items if necessary: one combining government, business, and industry, and one focusing on the family. We prefer this to a combined measure (such as 2716) because a single general measure is likely to reflect assessment of public life (government, business, and industry) but not the family situation.

EQUALITY: NORMATIVE
 v438 Equal roles (tradition NES)
 v2717: How does v2716 make you feel?
 v2723-v2724: Power in government; strong?
 v2727-v2728: Power in family; strong?
 v2731-v2732: Power in business and industry; strong?

We urge abandoning the traditional equal role measure in favor of domain-specific normative equality questions. The domains should parallel the empirical.

DEFINITION OF EQUALITY
 V2719-V2720: Equality require same/different roles? How strongly?

We have not had time to work with this thoroughly; by itself it is marginally useful although we will use it to help understand what people mean by equality. It should probably be dropped.

AFFECT/IDENTITY

v2701: Pay attention to women's news
 v2706-v2707: Is R a feminist? A strong feminist?
 v2713: Pride in being woman
 v2714: Angry at women's treatment
 v2715: Focus home/work

See above discussion of v2706-v2707.

V2713 and v2714 should be retained.

V2715 can be dropped, but we believe 2701 can be useful, especially if parallel questions are asked.

COLLECTIVE ACTION

V2708: Women work individually or collectively?

We recommend keeping this or developing a more generalized (i.e. not specific to women) measure. It is an improvement over older collective action questions that posed individual and collective action as alternatives. This one, more realistically, asks whether collective action is necessary in addition to individual effort.

POLICY QUESTIONS

V385: Fed Spending: Childcare
 v479: Abortion
 v480-v481 Parental consent abortion; how strong
 v482-v483 Abortion funding; how strong
 v488 Government provide child care
 v2709: Draft women
 v2710-v2711: Parental leave; how strong

For purposes of gender analysis the *abortion* issue is useful; we assume there has been adequate consideration of which items are most useful generally, although given the continuing importance of abortion politics, and the important differences among these questions, all three abortion issue questions are very useful.. We recommend retaining v488, v2709, and v2710-v2711 on child care, the draft, and parental leave.

ADDITIONALLY: For those interested in gender analysis information on parental status is important. The only information currently available is about those in the dwelling unit. A better measure should be constructed.

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