

Black Threat and Christian Fundamentalist Threat:
A National Election Study 1997 Pilot Study Report

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During the Summer of 1997, the NES Pilot Study carried a battery of questions about group threat. A group of scholars developed these questions out of my initial proposal¹ hoping to contribute to our understanding of American politics in several areas:

- Previous writing on threat in the USA has focused on relations between blacks and whites.² This study included batteries representing threat from two groups: blacks and christian fundamentalists. The comparison of the reactions to threatening proposals between the two groups will hopefully help scholars begin to understand more about the function of threat in group conflict more generally in the USA.³
- Theories of “black threat” suggest that white prejudice toward blacks in the South is largely a function of whites’ feeling threatened/perceiving blacks to pose a threat to white welfare. The placement of multiple items gauging prejudice, policy opinion, and stereotypes *after* the threat batteries will allow us to see if exposure to high threat versus low threat proposals has any impact on prejudice.
- In the current design, respondents are randomly assigned to either a high or a low threat battery of questions. Within each battery respondents answer whether or not they favor three proposals (one for each type of threat – cultural, political, and economic). One goal of this study is to learn about the extent to which different types of respondents “receive” more of a given threatening stimulus than others. (In a sense this is similar to a medical experiment where researchers care most to examine the impact of a new drug on a given health outcome, but simultaneously must learn about the ways in which different bodies absorb different quantities of the drug, in different ways, even when all subjects are administered an equal amount.) I take a stab at evaluating this issue at the end of this report.
- Threats can be directed against the economic well-being of one’s group, against the political influence of one’s group, or against the social position of one’s group. This study aimed to answer questions such as: “What type of group threat is most important to political behavior?”
- Theories of “black threat” state that racial context determines discriminatory political attitudes and behavior among whites. The individual-level operationalization of threat in this study will allow us to test whether the interaction of threat and context influence prejudice and hostility.

This report has five main parts: First, I will present a little of the theoretical background for this project. Second, I will describe the basic experimental finding. In this section, I will assess the performance of the randomization, the high/low threat manipulation, and the cohesion of the responses to items within each condition. Third, I will gauge the impact of threat on prejudice and policy attitudes, using two different methods. One focuses on exposure to the high threat proposals (vs. exposure to the low threat proposals). The second focused on reactions to the high threat

¹The group included Jake Bowers, Wendy Rahn, Virginia Sapiro, Laura Stoker, Cara Wong and among numerous others affiliated with the NES.

²Except, see Bobo and Hutchings 1996

³My initial proposal focused exclusively on black threat. When the proposal was accepted we added “christian fundamentalist threat” after considering “feminist threat” among other options.

proposals (vs. reactions to the low threat proposals). Fourth, I will assess the utility of these items as measures. Are these items as powerful in explaining public opinion on racial issues, or party and ideological identification or vote choice as some of our traditional measures? Fifth, I will offer a preliminary test of the theories about “black threat” and black population density which inspired the development of this battery in the first place. I will end the report with a summary and a list of recommendations.

1 Background

Throughout the social sciences, scholars have invoked ideas about threat to explain a wide range of phenomena. In particular, the concept of threat has been used to explain white racial attitudes and prejudice⁴, political intolerance⁵, group and partisan identity among whites⁶, the occurrence of lynchings and intergroup conflict between whites and blacks⁷, and the David Duke vote.⁸ Also, the use of threat by whites to deter the political participation of blacks has occurred frequently in the history of black-white relations in the United States. Specifically, the use of physical threats to instill fear and quiescence was a staple of the pre-Voting Rights Act disenfranchisement of blacks in the southern United States.⁹ More recently, the perception of racial threat has been used to explain black intolerance of racists and political mobilization.¹⁰

Much of the initial literature on threat in American politics responded to V.O. Key’s influential study of southern politics in which he initially linked ideas about threat to racial density. In the introduction to *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, he observes that, “It is the whites of the black belts [areas in which blacks constitute above 40% of the population] who have the deepest and most immediate concern about the maintenance of white supremacy” (5). Subsequent researchers developed theories connecting the aggregate variable of black population to the political attitudes and behaviors of individual whites. In particular, Herbert Blalock formulated the “power-threat” hypothesis in 1967, which distinguished between two kinds of perceived threats (economic and political) that could influence discriminatory behavior in a majority group, and which could apply to the “propensity of whites to perceive threats and therefore to engage in lynching behavior” (Blalock 1989). Elaborations of this theory included the idea that threats to the cultural and social dominance of majority groups could also motivate prejudice and discriminatory behavior.¹¹ Empirical tests of this theory have generated dozens of articles including two multi-article controversies: one about lynching in *Social Forces* in March 1989, and one about the David Duke vote in *The Journal of Politics* in November 1996.

It makes sense that the existence of a large black population could be perceived as a threat to the political, social, and economic well-being of whites. It is easy to see how whites in the

⁴Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Giles 1977; Glaser 1994; Key 1949; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Quillian 1996

⁵Feldman and Stenner 1994; Shamir and Sullivan 1983

⁶Giles and Evans 1985; Giles and Hertz 1994

⁷Olzak 1992, 1996; Tolnay and Beck 1989; Tolnay and Beck 1995

⁸Giles and Buckner 1993,1996; Voss 1996

⁹Keech and Sistrof 1994; McAdam 1982; Tolnay and Beck 1995

¹⁰Green and Waxman 1987; Bowers 1997

¹¹See in particular Green et al. (1995, 1996a, 1996b) for application of these ideas in the realm of contemporary hate crime. And see Citrin et al. 1997 in the case of immigration.

black belt might assess the proximity of many blacks as potentially very harmful if not controlled and, therefore, worthy of anger or fear. When blacks are numerous, they possess the ability to harm whites in several serious ways (e.g. refusing to work for whites, physically rebelling from the continuing political, economic, and social control of whites, inter-marrying with whites and therefore blurring the boundaries between the races, etc.) What is more, it is reasonable to suppose that 1) blacks possibly intend to harm whites given their past treatment at the hands of whites or 2) that the goals of blacks include controlling the political and economic resources of the towns and cities where they live – thus taking at least some control away from whites. In this way, it is plausible to think that threat may operate between majority and minority groups at the aggregate level. The theories of threat that have grown from Blalock’s work, however, only really make sense at the individual level.¹² Individual whites participate in lynchings, or vote for David Duke. The theories of black threat describe the manner in which the behavior of individuals is related to the context in which they live. However, researchers cannot extract any meaningful information about the ways in which individuals translate context into action or attitudes from census information about the “density of black population” in a given county. Aggregate level measures thus are not enough to help us understand what is going on between blacks and whites in the black belt of the South, or anywhere else in the USA for that matter.

2 Operationalization and Design

The proposal to this Pilot Study suggested that an adequate, face valid measure of threat must include a source, a target, and a promise of harm. The proposed harm may be directed against either the social/cultural, the political, or the economic status, control, and privileges of the target group. The battery in this study, represented two sources of threat: “blacks” and “christian fundamentalists”. The most obvious targets of proposal for harm from these two groups are “whites” and “secular” or “unreligious” respondents. Each respondent received three proposals to increase the well-being of blacks, and three proposals to increase the well-being of christian fundamentalists. Although there is nothing necessarily threatening about hearing a proposal to increase the well-being of blacks or christian fundamentalists, the specific proposals obviously did take away from other groups even as they gave to blacks and christian fundamentalists.¹³ The idea, in any case, is that members of the target group would find the high threat condition proposals more threatening than the low threat condition proposals, which would result in (1) greater opposition to the high threat proposals than to the low threat proposals (if the manipulation was successful) and possibly, (2) greater prejudice in the high threat condition than the low-threat conditions, as a response to the threat manipulation and greater opposition to racially egalitarian policies, (3) greater impact of threat responses (as gauged by evaluation of the proposals) on prejudice, policy attitudes, and general political attitudes in the high threat condition than the low. These, among other questions will be evaluated below.

¹²See also Gurr’s “relative-deprivation theory” (1970) and Hibbs’ empirical test of theories of mass political violence (1973) for extensions of these kinds of efforts in comparative politics. Also see Salamon and Van Evera(1973) and Matthews and Prothro(1966) for investigations of the impact of violence and fear on black voting turnout in the South.

¹³The proposal also noted a further concern about the conceptualization of threat: it is not clear whether an individual’s reaction to threat should be seen as an emotion or a judgment. Although the proposed module represented both of these reactions, the actual data collected do not allow us to differentiate between emotion and judgment.

Respondents were randomly assigned into one of two threat conditions which varied according to the severity of the harm proposed. Since these two batteries were asked sequentially in the questionnaire, the order of the “black threat” and the “christian fundamentalist threat” batteries was also randomized. Within the three threat questions for each group, the order of the three questions (cultural, political, economic) was also randomized. In section 2.2, I present the results of the randomization in detail.

2.1 Question Wording

The questions in the threat batteries convey proposals to decrease the power and control that target groups have over their communities in each of three subject domains: culture (operationalized here as the content of education), politics (operationalized here in terms of group representation), and economics (operationalized here as as benefits for christian schools or black employment). Respondents were asked whether they favored or opposed each proposal; these evaluations represent their perceptions of threat. This operationalization assumes that respondents will oppose proposals that they feel will harm themselves or their group, though they also may come to oppose such proposals on other grounds. For this reason the effect of threat must be gauged by making comparisons across conditions.¹⁴ The wording for the various threat items is given in Tables 1 and 2.

¹⁴Specifically, one can focus on the direct effect of condition, or on the differences across conditions in the effect of evaluations of the proposals each condition specifies. Ideally, the proposals vary across conditions only their threatening quality. I return to this issue below.

Table 1: Black Threat Question Wording

CULTURAL	
Low Threat	High Threat
Some leaders in the Black community feel that American youth should be able to learn about black history in school. To remedy this, it has been proposed that high school courses include some information on African-American history. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?	Some leaders in the black community feel that American youth should be educated about black history. To remedy this, it has been proposed that high schools require students to take a course in African-American history. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?
POLITICAL	
Some Black leaders are worried that the government does not pay enough attention to the opinions of Blacks. To remedy this, it has been proposed that governors do more to find out about the opinions of Black citizens. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?	Some Black leaders are worried that the government does not pay enough attention to the opinions of Blacks. To remedy this, it has been proposed that governors be required to appoint more Blacks to public office. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?
ECONOMIC	
Studies show that Blacks have a much higher unemployment rate than Whites. To remedy this, it has been proposed that large businesses try to hire more Blacks. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?	Studies show that Blacks have a much higher unemployment rate than Whites. To remedy this, it has been proposed that large businesses be required to hire at least 15% Blacks. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?

Table 2: Christian Fundamentalist Threat Question Wording

CULTURAL	
Low Threat	High Threat
Some Christian Fundamentalist leaders feel that American youth should be more aware of the role of Christians in American history. To remedy this, it has been proposed that high school courses include some information about the role of Christians in American history. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?	Some Christian Fundamentalist leaders feel that American youth should understand that this is a Christian nation. To remedy this, it has been proposed that high schools require students to take a course that shows how Christians and Christian principles were responsible for the founding of our country. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?
POLITICAL	
Some leaders of Christian groups are worried that the government does not pay enough attention to the concerns of Christian Fundamentalists. To remedy this, it has been proposed that governors do more to find out the opinions of Christian Fundamentalists. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?	Some Christian Fundamentalist leaders are worried that the government does not pay enough attention to the opinions of Christian Fundamentalists. To remedy this, it has been proposed that governors be required to appoint more Christian Fundamentalists to public office. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?
ECONOMIC	
Some Christian Fundamentalist leaders have become concerned about the financial well-being of Christian schools. To remedy this, it has been proposed that Christian schools not have to pay property taxes. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?	Some Christian Fundamentalist leaders are concerned about the financial well-being of Christian schools. To remedy this, it has been proposed that Christian schools receive money from local property taxes, just like the public schools. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?

2.2 Research Design

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental conditions in the following manner:

Random Threat Condition Respondents were randomly assigned to a high or low threat condition independently for each group.

Random Group Placement The order in which respondents were asked about “black threat” or about “christian fundamentalist” was randomly assigned.

Random Question Order Respondents were asked about “cultural”, “political” and “economic” threat in random order within threat condition.

In what follows, I will describe in some detail the distribution of cases across conditions.

Random Threat Condition

Each respondent answered batteries about black threat and christian fundamentalist threat. Table 3 shows the distribution of respondents across the high and low threat conditions. Random assignment would lead one to expect that approximately 25% of the sample should fall in each of the cells of this table. Unfortunately, the distribution of cells in this table departs substantially from uniformity – mainly due to the difference in cases between the High Black-High Fundamentalist cell (32%) and the High Black-Low Fundamentalist cell (21%).¹⁵ In fact, a chi-square test leads us to reject the hypothesis that the two variables are independent ($p=.007$). The marginals for this table suggest that the problem lies more in the random assignment between high and low threat for the Christian Threat battery (a 10 percentage point difference) than for the Black Threat battery (a 6 percentage point difference).

Table 3: Threat Manipulation

		Black Threat		
		Low	High	Row Total
Fundamentalist Threat	Low	132 (24%)	117 (21%)	249 (45%)
	High	125 (23%)	177 (32%)	302 (55%)
Column Total		257 (47%)	294 (53%)	551

Note: Cell entries are counts and percents of sample N (551)

¹⁵At various times throughout this proposal I use the term “Fundamentalist Threat” to refer specifically to “Christian Fundamentalist Threat”. I do this only for the sake of convenience.

Random Group Placement

Table 4 details the distribution of cases across the threat conditions and group placement. Roughly half of the respondents were asked about blacks and then fundamentalists (n=296, 54%) and about half received the reverse order (n=255, 46%). However, the respondents are not evenly distributed across the cells of this table either. For example, while 43 respondents were asked the low christian fundamentalist threat question and the low black threat question in that order, about twice as many respondents (89) were asked the same questions in the reverse order. Luckily, I did not find much of a substantive distinction in responses between early and late threat battery placement during the analysis for this report. For the rest of this report, I will aggregate across the early/late cells.

Table 4: Threat Manipulation by Group Order Manipulation

	Group Order					
	Black / Christian Fundamentalist			Christian Fundamentalist / Black		
	Black Threat	High	Total Fundamentalist Threat	Black Threat	High	Total Fundamentalist Threat
Low Fundamentalist Threat	89 (16%)	107 (19%)	196 (36%)	43 (8%)	10 (2%)	53 (10%)
High Fundamentalist Threat	27 (4%)	73 (13%)	100 (18%)	98 (18%)	104 (19%)	202 (37%)
Total Black Threat	116 (21%)	180 (34%)	296 (54%)	141 (26%)	114 (21%)	255 (46%)

Total Sample Size is 551. Cell entries are counts and percent of the total sample. Every respondent was asked one Black Threat battery and one Fundamentalist Threat battery.

Random Question Order

We designed this experiment to avoid systematic influence by items which ask about one type of threat on subsequent items which ask about another type. To achieve this goal, the order of the three types of threat questions was randomized within each battery. For example, of the respondents asked the black high cultural threat question before the fundamentalist threat battery, 29% were asked this question before the political and economic threat items, 34% were asked this item second, and 37% were asked it third.

Overall, the randomization here worked as expected in two ways:

1. Chi-square tests showed no significant relationships between the favor/oppose responses within

the threat batteries and the question order.

2. On average, across the 24 different threat items, each question was asked first, second, and third exactly 33% of the time.¹⁶

2.3 Summary

We can see that the randomization built into the research design did not ensure equal groups. Despite much work by Kathy Cirksena to track down the source of this problem it remains unclear whether we should consider these inequalities to be the result of a programming error, or just as a fluke of probability, no matter how unlikely that seems. For the remainder of this report, I will ignore these departures from what was expected of the randomization.

3 Basic Experimental Results

The sources of threat in these batteries are clear: blacks and christian fundamentalists. In order to proceed with the analysis, however, we need targets. If these batteries presented threats, then we should see large differences between source and target groups in opposition to the proposals they contained. That is, I would expect blacks to express little opposition to any of the proposals on the black threat batteries. I would also expect whites to express more opposition than blacks, and to express much more opposition in response to the high threat conditions than to the low threat conditions. The same kind of logic should hold with christian fundamentalists and the targets of christian fundamentalist threat.

3.1 Black Threat Manipulation Check

The targets of black threat are relatively easy to identify as whites. However, we can refine this target group a bit more by differentiating between whites who do not identify as whites and whites who mention that they feel “close to” other whites. There is evidence that white identifiers are apt to experience group conflict and to act with group favoritism more than whites who do not explicitly identify as such (Stoker 1997). This makes sense since a person who does not identify whites as a reference group, but who cares a lot about the distribution of resources between the elderly and the young, for example, might not care so much about benefits accruing to blacks.

In the Pilot Study, there were 496 whites and 45 blacks. Out of the 496 whites, 186 (about 38%) stated that they felt “close to” whites but did not mention closeness to blacks in one of the two closed-ended “group-closeness” questions that came before the threat batteries in the questionnaire. Of those who felt close to whites, a few also felt close to blacks. In order to examine the threat manipulation, I will display values for all three groups – blacks, “white non-identifiers” (whites who either 1) did not say they felt “close” to whites or 2) said that they felt close to BOTH whites and blacks), and “white identifiers” (whites who mentioned whites as a close group, but did not

¹⁶See Appendix A for a table detailing the randomization patterns of the threat questions.

mention blacks as a close group). After this section, however, I will concentrate mainly on the white identifiers as those who are the clearest targets of black threat.

It is clear from Table 5 that the threat manipulation had a large impact on the sample as a whole. These results are encouraging in that items which we intended to reflect “high black threat” were much more likely to receive “oppose” responses than “low black threat” items. For example, only 16% of all respondents opposed the proposal that “high-school courses include some information on African-American history” but 51% opposed the proposal that “high schools require students to take a course in African-American history.”

Table 5: Black Threat Manipulation for the Entire Sample

	Black Threat Domain					
	Cultural		Political		Economic	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Early						
% Oppose	16	49	39	64	68	69
Valid N	N=112	N=173	N=109	N =177	N =108	N=177
Late						
%Oppose	17	54	37	75	54	75
Valid N	N=139	N=109	N=133	N=106	N=133	N=109
Total						
% Oppose	16	51	38	68	60	71
Valid N	N=251	N=282	N=242	N=283	N=241	N=286

The differences between high and low threat among blacks, white non-identifiers, and white identifiers in Table 6 are even more striking. For example, only 5% of blacks opposed the low cultural threat proposal, while 13% of white non-identifiers and 22% of white identifiers opposed this proposal.¹⁷ Similarly, the difference between low and high threat conditions also also large for the white non-identifier and white identifier respondents, but small for the black respondents. Interestingly, the white non-identifiers show the largest differences between low and high threat on this table, although their overall opposition rate is never more than that of the white identifiers. This is because the white identifiers are much more likely to oppose low threat proposals than the white non-identifiers. As expected, blacks show little change in response to the high versus low threat manipulation. In either case, black respondents are presented with a proposal that is aimed to benefit their racial group, which they tend to support.

Another way to see if the threat manipulation had its expected impact is to see if the number of “oppose” responses across the high and low threat conditions differed. Table 7 shows that members of the target group – Whites who say they are close to whites but not to blacks, oppose more black threat proposals than whites who do not clearly identify as whites, and certainly than blacks. On average, white identifiers oppose 2.01 out of three items in the high threat condition, but about

¹⁷I decided not to display the early vs. late manipulation for blacks because of the small sample size.

Table 6: Black Threat Manipulation by Race and Group Identity

		Black Threat Domain					
		Cultural		Political		Economic	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
BLACKS							
Total							
	% Oppose	5	15	16	15	21	26
	Valid N	N=19	N=26	N=19	N=26	N=19	N=23
WHITE NON-IDENTIFIERS							
Total							
	% Oppose	13	55	32	72	56	73
	Valid N	N=138	N=158	N=132	N=160	N=130	N=163
WHITE IDENTIFIERS							
Total							
	% Oppose	22	53	50	76	74	80
	Valid N	N=91	N=91	N=88	N=90	N=89	N=93
Total for Whole Sample							
	% Oppose	16	51	38	68	60	71
	Valid N	N=251	N=282	N=242	N=283	N=241	N=286

In this table “Blacks” refers to African-Americans; “White Non-Identifiers” refers to Whites who either are not “close” to whites, or are “close” to both blacks and whites; “White Identifiers” refers to Whites who are “close” to whites but not to blacks

1.39 items in the low threat condition. Meanwhile, blacks, on average, express opposition toward less than one proposal for both low and high threat. This table provides yet more evidence that the high threat/low threat manipulation was effective in provoking the kinds of responses one would expect.

In sum, the large differences among whites in opposition to high versus low threat proposals lends credibility to the claim that the manipulation succeeded in having an impact on the respondents. The large difference in results between blacks and whites supports the view that what is generating different responses across conditions is the perception of black threat.

3.2 Christian Fundamentalist Threat Manipulation Check

The targets of christian fundamentalist threat are people who are secularists, atheists, or for whom religion is not an important aspect of their lives. I identified targets of christian fundamentalist threat with two variables:

Seculars These are people whose religious denominations are “Agnostic”, “Atheist”, “Non-religious”, or “(Just)Christian” or “Non-denominational Protestant” or “Unitarian” or “Reformed Jewish”. Catholics, Greek or Russian orthodox, orthodox or conservative jews, and muslims are excluded from the analysis. The “seculars” are contrasted with conservative or evangelical christians, and mainline protestants.

Unreligious These are people who pray or read the bible once a week or never, and who attend religious services no more than a few times a year.¹⁸ These least active people are contrasted with people who pray and read the bible multiple times per day, and who attend religious services multiple times per week.

The low and high threat conditions for Christian Fundamentalists did not have an appreciable impact when examined in the aggregate. Table 8 shows little change in % oppose between low and high threat conditions for Economic Threat, and for respondents who were asked the early Political Threat battery. In fact, the difference between low and high threat for the Early Economic Threat battery is counter-intuitive – one would expect more people to oppose the high threat proposal than the low threat proposal. The differences between high and low are a bit larger for Cultural Threat in general, and for Political Threat asked after the Black Threat battery. Overall, this pattern is at best weak evidence that this manipulation succeeded.

However, when I divided the sample into target and source groups, somewhat more sensible differences emerged. These results are shown by Tables 9 and 10 and 11.

The “fundamentalist threat” proposals in the cultural and political domains successfully differentiated between target and source groups. The large differences in level of opposition among members of target groups suggests that secular and unreligious respondents perceive more potential harm to themselves/their group from the high than from the low threat proposals. Secular

¹⁸One might think that individuals who pray or read the Bible once a week should not be considered unreligious. However, without these slightly religious respondents, the sample size of the “unreligious” subcategory would be too small for analysis.

Table 7: Average Opposition to All Three Proposals: Black Threat

		Low Threat	High Threat
Blacks	Mean	.36	.61
	Valid N	N=22	N=23
White Non-Identifiers	Mean	.94	2.01
	Valid N	N=158	N=152
White Identifiers	Mean	1.39	2.09
	Valid N	N=99	N=87
Total	Mean	1.05	1.92
	Valid N	N=279	N=262

Note: Cell entries are counts and mean number of “oppose” responses out of a possible 3.

Table 8: Group Placement by Threat Domain by Threat Manipulation: The Whole Sample
Christian Fundamentalist Threat Domain

	Cultural		Political		Economic	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Early						
% Oppose	40	53	62	67	68	58
Valid N	N=50	N=190	N=47	N=188	N=47	N=193
Late						
% Oppose	47	56	58	76	63	69
Valid N	N=192	N=98	N=185	N=95	N=179	N=97
Total						
% Oppose	45	54	59	70	64	61
Valid N	N=242	N=288	N=232	N=283	N=226	N=290

Table 9: Christian Fundamentalist Threat Manipulation by Religious Involvement

		Christian Fundamentalist Threat Domain					
		Cultural		Political		Economic	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
MOST RELIGIOUS							
Total							
	% Oppose	31	33	42	50	33	48
	Valid N	N=39	N=52	N=36	N=52	N=33	N=54
MODERATELY RELIGIOUS							
Total							
	% Oppose	47	51	58	72	66	61
	Valid N	N=157	N=181	N=154	N=177	N=149	N=181
UNRELIGIOUS							
Total							
	% Oppose	52	84	76	81	82	76
	Valid N	N=46	N=55	N=42	N=54	N=44	N=55
Total for Whole Sample							
	% Oppose	45	54	59	70	64	61
	Valid N	N=242	N=288	N=232	N=283	N=226	N=290

Table 10: Christian Fundamentalist Threat Manipulation by Denomination

		Christian Fundamentalist Threat Domain					
		Cultural		Political		Economic	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
CONSERVATIVE, EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS							
Total							
	% Oppose	34	37	38	46	50	48
	Valid N	N=77	N=90	N=73	N=90	N=68	N=91
MODERATE CHRISTIANS							
Total							
	% Oppose	44	56	66	82	78	75
	Valid N	N=55	N=64	N=53	N=62	N=51	N=63
SECULARS							
Total							
	% Oppose	67	86	81	88	85	80
	Valid N	N=33	N=44	N=32	N=43	N=33	N=44
Total for Whole Sample							
	% Oppose	45	54	59	70	64	61
	Valid N	N=242	N=288	N=232	N=283	N=226	N=290

Table 11: Average Opposition to All Three Proposals: Christian Threat

		Low Threat	High Threat
RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT			
Most Religious	Mean	1.07	1.21
	Valid N	N=46	N=48
Moderate	Mean	1.52	1.86
	Valid N	N=185	N=167
Unreligious	Mean	1.85	2.42
	Valid N	N=52	N=53
Total	Mean	1.51	1.85
	Valid N	N=283	N=268
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION			
Evangelical and Conservative Protestants	Mean	1.09	1.29
	Valid N	N=91	N=83
Mainline Protestants	Mean	1.67	2.09
	Valid N	N=67	N=58
Secular	Mean	2.20	2.56
	Valid N	N=35	N=43
Total	Mean	1.49	1.84
	Valid N	N=193	N=184

Note: Cell entries are counts and mean number of “oppose” responses out of 3 possible. Catholics, Muslims, Orthodox are excluded from the analysis.

and unreligious respondents did not oppose items that we intended measure high economic threat more than what we intended to be low threat versions of these items. In fact, the only group that opposed the high economic threat more than the low economic threat proposals were the most religious respondents! At this point, it is not clear exactly why the high economic threat items failed to elicit the same response patterns as the other items.

Over both the black threat and the fundamentalist threat batteries we can see that the items we intended to measure/stimulate threat succeeded in creating sensible distinctions among the respondents. The economic fundamentalist threat items did not conform to this pattern — on average, secular and unreligious respondents did not seem to find the “high threat” version of these items more worthy of opposition than the low threat version. That aside, these results show that these items pass an initial test: if target groups didn’t show differing levels of opposition between the high and low threat conditions, then we would be hard pressed to make any argument about these items measuring threat.

3.3 Inter-Item Relationships

In order to believe that these items all present something in common called “threat”, we need to see evidence of strong associations among the responses. Factor analysis of Pearson correlation matrices is one of the most common methods of marshalling this evidence. Unfortunately, the experimental design of these batteries prevents me from examining more than three items at a time, and thus from running factor analyses that provide more insight than the “ocular” analysis of correlation matrices would provide.

The threat items did show reasonable inter-item cohesion across the threat domains. The following tables show the correlations between the items for target groups only. Because all of these items are dichotomous, I present here both Pearson’s r as well as tetrachoric correlation coefficients.¹⁹

The average inter-item correlation among the threat variables is moderate, ranging between .22 and .78. For both black and fundamentalist Threat, the high threat items show slightly more coherence than the low threat items. This pattern of results is virtually the same for all of the “threatened” groups (i.e. white identifiers, seculars, and unreligious respondents). The inter-item correlations are also higher for the fundamentalist threat items than for the black threat items.

These correlations show us that we can be reasonably confident that all three of the items within a given threat battery are all measuring at least parts of the same underlying phenomenon.²⁰ I cannot look at correlations between the high and low threat items because of the random assignment, so there is no way to tell directly if the common variance of the high threat batteries is related to, or is part of, the common variance within the low threat batteries. However, the fact that the

¹⁹The calculation of tetrachoric correlation coefficients requires us to assume that the standard bivariate normal distribution underlies the joint mass function of the two dichotomous variables. I think that this is a reasonable assumption in this case since “favor” and “oppose” may be seen as ends of a continuous scale and since I imagine that, were respondents to use a scale of finer gradation, we would mainly see clumping toward the middle of the scale rather than toward the tails.

²⁰I also calculated the eigenvalues for each of these matrices in order to provide another perspective on this glance at the correlations. In the end the summaries of structure represented by the eigenvalues did not tell us any more than our eyes can see here, so I do not include them in the report.

Table 12: Correlations Among Black Threat Items For White Identifiers Only

	Low Threat			High Threat		
	Culture	Politics	Economics	Culture	Politics	Economics
Culture	-	.11	.43	-	.51	.19
Politics	.06	-	.65	.31	-	.75
Economics	.20	.41	-	.11	.51	-
Average Pearson Inter-correlation			0.22	0.37		
Average Tetrachoric Inter-correlation			0.31	0.48		

Upper diagonals contain tetrachoric correlation coefficients. Lower diagonals contain Pearson correlation coefficients

Table 13: Correlations Among Fundamentalist Threat Items For Target Groups Only

Unreligious Respondents

	Low Threat			High Threat		
	Culture	Politics	Economics	Culture	Politics	Economics
Culture	-	.80	.44	-	.90	.42
Politics	.52	-	.57	.68	-	.67
Economics	.25	.34	-	.24	.43	-
Average Pearson Inter-correlation			0.37	0.45		
Average Tetrachoric Inter-correlation			0.60	0.66		

Secular Respondents

	Low Threat			High Threat		
	Culture	Politics	Economics	Culture	Politics	Economics
Culture	-	.70	.57	-	.76	.79
Politics	.46	-	.66	.48	-	.79
Economics	.37	.44	-	.57	.50	-
Average Pearson Inter-correlation			0.42	0.52		
Average Tetrachoric Inter-correlation			0.64	0.78		

Upper diagonals contain tetrachoric correlation coefficients. Lower diagonals contain Pearson correlation coefficients

high threat batteries showed more cohesion than the low threat batteries could be interpreted as evidence for the idea that these two batteries differ in terms of the threat they present. The high threat items are more similar than the low threat items in that they each present a significant threat. One would expect, on that basis, to find more inter-item correspondence, as was found here.

3.4 Comparing Cultural, Political and Economic Threat



The previous two subsections have shown that 1) patterns of “oppose” responses are congruent with our expectations about reactions to threat and 2) that the items within each battery seem to measure something in common. Throughout this analysis, however, we have assumed that cultural, political, and economic proposals pose equal amounts of threat to respondents. This, however, may not be the case. In fact, some types of items may be easier to oppose than others. Besides offering us more insight into the function of these batteries, information about the relative difficulty of these items has substantive value. For example, certain theories about group conflict and politics place economic conflicts at the center, as most threatening, while others place cultural/symbolic conflicts as most important among the various domains of human competition.

One method for conducting such investigations attempts to gauge the “difficulty” of individual items relative to one another. The figures on the following pages graph the percent of people “opposing” a given item by the total percentage of “oppose” responses given to all three items. For example, the top panel of Figure 1 shows this relationship for the three low black threat items. We can see that, of the people who only opposed one of these three items, approximately 80% opposed the economic threat item in contrast to the less than 10% that opposed the cultural threat item. Within this 3 item battery, then, that it was much “easier” for respondents to oppose the economic threat item than to oppose the political threat item or the cultural threat item. One could say that, on the low black threat battery, economic threat was clearly more threatening than political threat, which in turn was more threatening than cultural threat. In fact, this chart shows that these three items form an additive scale.²¹ The additivity in the low black threat scales is very surprising given the content. There is no good reason to believe that cultural, political, and economic threat should be increasingly difficult or easy.

In fact, the remaining charts for the batteries of high black threat and fundamentalist threat are not additive scales. Take the high black threat items for example: among people who opposed only one of the high black threat items, economic threat was most threatening, with cultural threat next most threatening, and political threat least threatening. However, among people who opposed two or more of the items, the rank of the different threat domains shifts: political threat edges out economic threat as most threatening, with cultural threat as least threatening. More generally, the


²¹There is a whole body of psychometrics concerned with additive conjoint measurement and Rasch modeling. These graphs are one type of diagnostic used for Rasch models – which are a type of additive conjoint model. I won’t engage in any statistical tests of the additivity of these scale in this report. If we see patterns such as those among the items in the low black threat battery, then we can actually create a numeric “threat” scale by the paired comparisons of the items which is independent of the ability, or “propensity to feel threatened” of the respondents – in much the same way that psychometricians create “verbal” and “math” ability scales. (See Andrich 1988 for a simple proof of this claim about the independent assessment of “difficulty” of test items and the “ability” of the test takers.)

Figure 1: Opposition to Black Threat: White Identifiers Only



Total Number of "Oppose" Responses Across All 3 Items by Percent Opposing Each Item

Figure 2: Opposition to Fundamentalist Threat: Seculars and Unreligious Only



Total Number of "Oppose" Responses Across All 3 Items by Percent Opposing Each Item

economic item was more threatening (more easily opposed) than the culture item – except in the case of high fundamentalist threat.

Although I will not present more of this kind of analysis here, these kinds of investigations into the scaling of items are potentially useful in helping us understand the limits of these particular wordings and in helping us develop alternate items.

3.5 Summary

The threat batteries were effective in provoking more opposition to high threat than to low threat proposals and higher opposition to threatening proposals from respondents who are members of “target” groups than from respondents who are members of “source” groups. The inter-item correlations were higher in the high-threat condition as would be expected if each presents a common stimulus (“threat”). The early versus late placement of these questions shows no appreciable differences in the patterns of responses here. In order to keep this report to a manageable length, for the rest of the time I will focus the analysis mainly on members of the target groups: white identifiers for black threat, and the unreligious and secular respondents for fundamentalist threat.

4 Effects of Threat

Theories of black threat explain that whites support David Duke, or otherwise express hostility toward blacks, out of prejudice fueled by feelings of threat. In the Pilot Study, we attempted a small test of the hypothesis that threat influences prejudice by randomly assigning respondents to one of two batteries in which they heard proposals that differed (we hoped) only by the amount of threat represented. Each experimental condition presented the respondents with a series of three policy proposals, and after each one, the interviewers asked the respondents to answer whether they favored or opposed the proposal. Immediately following each threat battery, the questionnaire presented each respondent with two questions gauging prejudice toward blacks and christian fundamentalists. Random assignment ensured that any differences in responses to the prejudice questions could only be due to the difference between the two experimental conditions. The test, then, is simple: if we observe statistically significant differences in prejudice between respondents who were exposed to the high threat versus the low threat conditions, then we will have supported an important claim made about prejudice - that threat matters. If threat matters, then, it is possible to enrich, and complicate, our traditional understanding of prejudice as a socialized predisposition versus a contextual reaction. I will present the results of this analysis in section 4.1. Before I do so, however, I should fore-shadow some complications.

Exposure to threat is not the same as perceiving threat or feeling threatened. I mentioned earlier that I expect “oppose” responses to the high threat items to be directly related to the threat respondents perceive. It is also reasonable to believe, however, that respondents could voice opposition to these proposals for a variety of reasons besides their threatening quality. Thus, a sensible model of responses to these items would include the perception of threat as well as a variety of other variables that traditionally influence racial and religious attitudes. The general model of opposition to these proposals would look like this:

$$O_i = \beta_z Z_i + \beta_t T_i + u_i$$

That is, opposition to proposals is a function of the Z (many characteristics of respondents such as education, or prior prejudice) plus $\beta_t T_i$ (perception of threat, T_i , weighted by the extent to which this perception influences opposition to the proposal, β_t). In this formulation, we can observe Z and O but not T .

For example, I expect that prejudiced whites are more apt to feel threatened by blacks than non-prejudiced whites. Figure 3 illustrates the impact of prejudice on willingness to oppose proposals by presenting “oppose” responses regressed on the difference between feeling thermometer ratings of whites and blacks. The solid line represents the regression for respondents in the low black threat condition ($\hat{\beta}=.01$, $p=.00$). The dashed line represents the regression for respondents in the high black threat condition ($\hat{\beta}=.02$, $p=.00$). For a change of 50 points on the feeling thermometer (from the most pro-black response of -50, for example, to the popular neutral response of 0), the high threat equation predicts 1 more “oppose” response (out of a possible 3) while the low threat equation predicts .5 more “oppose” responses. At a given level of prejudice (represented here by the feeling thermometer difference) we can think of the vertical distance between the two regression lines as representing the impact of threat on the willingness of respondents to oppose proposals. Because no single respondent was asked both the high and low black threat battery, the two lines on this graph represent two non-overlapping groups of respondents. So, it is not possible to estimate directly the reaction to threat on the responses of a single individual.

In section 4.2 I will take a stab at extracting $\beta_t T_i$ from opposition to the proposals.²² Then I will use this “adjusted threat score” in another attempt to estimate the effects of threat on prejudice.

4.1 Exposure to Threat


Table 14 shows that simple exposure to the “high black threat” condition had no discernible impact on the prejudice of respondents as measured by two items from the Racial Resentment or Symbolic Racism scale labeled here as “Try Harder” and “No Favors”. I also tested the influence of the high threat condition on two other measures of racial attitudes asked after the black threat battery: black stereotypes (trustworthiness, intelligence, and tolerance) and “Govt Help”.²³ Exposure to the high black threat battery did not lead to different responses on these two measures either.

Table 15 shows similar results for the difference between the high and low fundamentalist threat condition. Note, however, that secular and unreligious respondents who were exposed to high fundamentalist threat were more likely to agree that: “Religious leaders are pushing too hard to have their beliefs written into law.” Although this response is surprising given the predominant patterns of Table 15, it is also sensible: All of the items in these batteries were framed as proposals from “Christian Fundamentalist” leaders. One can easily imagine even a non-prejudiced respondent

²²I will not be able to empirically distinguish between β_t and T_i because they are latent variables. I can, however, make conceptual distinctions between the two: β_t represents the “reaction” to threat, i.e. the extent to which perception of threat influences action and T_i , represents the “perception” of threat – the extent to which the respondent judges that threat exists in a given situation.

²³The complete wording for all of these dependent variables can be found in Appendix C.

Figure 3: Prejudice and Opposition to Threatening Proposals: Whole Sample



(← High Black Affect) White-Black Feeling Thermometer (High White Affect →)

Note: To show density, each point has been “jittered” by a tiny uniform random number.

Table 14: Effects of Exposure to Black Threat on Prejudice and Policy Opinions: White Identifiers Only

	Prejudice and Policy Opinions			
	Try Harder	No Favors	Govt Help	Stereotypes
Exposed to High Threat	-.04	.02	.00	-.01
N Respondents	185	185	166	182

Table entries are OLS bivariate $\hat{\beta}$'s. $p < .01$ *** $p < .05$ ** $p < .10$ *

All of the variables in these equations run from 0 to 1. For the dependent variables 1=most prejudice/most anti-black opinion. For the independent variables 1=exposed to high threat.

Table 15: Effects of Exposure to Threat on Prejudice and Policy Opinions: Unreligious and Secular Respondents Only

	Prejudice and Policy Opinions				
	Too Pushy	Be Peaceful	Religion in Politics	Church vs State	Stereotypes
			<u>Unreligious</u>		
Exposed to High Threat	.10**	-.02	.14	.01	-.01
N Respondents	104	104	103	104	97
			<u>Seculars</u>		
Exposed to High Threat	.13**	.06	.01	.06	-.04
N Respondents	76	78	75	76	70

Table entries are OLS bivariate $\hat{\beta}$'s. $p < .01$ *** $p < .05$ ** $p < .10$ *

All of the variables in these equations run from 0 to 1. For the dependent variables 1=most prejudice/most anti-religious opinion. For the independent variables 1=exposed to high threat.

agreeing that “Religious leaders are pushing too hard to have their beliefs written into law.” after hearing three questions in which Christian Fundamentalist leaders push to change public schools, state government, and local property taxes. Thus, the one strong relationship, in Table 15 is not good evidence for a relationship between exposure to threat and prejudice towards christian fundamentalists. Rather it seems to capture a psychological phenomenon more akin to priming.

In section 3, I showed that the threat manipulation produced markedly different responses between conditions and between target and source groups. Despite the differences in propensity to oppose proposals, I found no strong relationship here between exposure to the high threat condition and the expression of prejudice.

4.2 Extracting Threat from Opposition

The goal of this section is to estimate the impact of threat on prejudice. In order to achieve this goal, I will develop a model of what we actually observe from the respondents (their level of opposition to the proposals) in terms of threat (which we do not observe), as well as other characteristics that I imagine might cause a person to oppose racial or religious proposals. After presenting the model, I will then use it to estimate “adjusted threat scores” for each respondent in the high threat condition. Then I will use these new variables, hopefully now purged of all confounding factors, to predict prejudice and policy opinions as well as vote choice, ideology, and party identification.

4.2.1 The Model

The model which represents how respondents decide to oppose or favor a given proposal is best written as two general equations, one for each threat condition:

$$O_{h_i} = \beta_z Z_i + \beta_{h_t} T_{h_i} + u_i \quad (1)$$

$$O_{l_i} = \beta_z Z_i + \beta_{l_t} T_{l_i} + u_i \quad (2)$$

These equations use the same notation I introduced at the beginning of section 4: O_{h_i} and O_{l_i} stand for the “oppose” or “favor” responses of individual respondents; $\beta_{h_t} T_{h_i}$ and $\beta_{l_t} T_{l_i}$ represent the reactions to (β_t) and perceptions of (T_i) threat; $\beta_z Z$ represents a host of characteristics of respondents that might also influence their racial and religious opinions (where Z is a matrix of observations, and β_z a vector of coefficients); and the u 's represent everything not accounted for by this model. Notice that neither u nor $\beta_z Z$ have an h or l subscript. I assume that the non-threat factors (both those included in the model and those left in the error term) that influence opposition to proposals, such as prejudice and education, are the same on average, regardless of threat condition.

Once we have these two equations, we can estimate $\beta_{h_t} T_{h_i}$, the impact of high threat on opposition to proposals by subtracting equation 2 from 1.²⁴ If we refine these equations by scaling the latent threat variable so that perception of threat in the low condition is zero, the result of the subtraction is merely $\beta_{h_t} T_{h_i}$.²⁵

$$O_{h_i} - O_{l_i} = (\beta_z Z + \beta_{h_t} T_{h_i} + u_i) - (\beta_z Z + 0 + u_i) \quad (3)$$

$$= \beta_{h_t} T_{h_i} \quad (4)$$

In an ideal case, every respondent would answer both a low and a high threat battery. As equation 4 shows, simple subtraction would leave us with the part of the observed responses that is due to threat for each respondent. We could then use this new variable to represent “threat” in testing theories about threat and prejudice.

Unfortunately, our situation is more complicated than that. Because of our experimental design, we cannot estimate both equations 2 and 1 for the same respondent. Although the split sample design complicates the model, it is not a flaw in the research design of this study. It would be near

²⁴The example of Figure 3 also suggests that there are many variables in Z which cause both T and β_t to vary. In other words, prior prejudice could affect perception of threat (T) or effect of threat (β_t). I cannot distinguish between these two effects here.

²⁵Setting T_{l_i} to equal zero implies that the only aspect of the items which varies between conditions is the magnitude of threat. However, our threat manipulation here does more than just vary the level of threat applied: the words in the questions change, and the high and low threat scenarios differ in other ways as well. Unfortunately, I have neither the time nor the space to deal adequately with the full complexity of this model although I hope to do so in the future. For now, I will proceed with the analysis as best as I can given the constraints of space and time.

impossible to ask both low and high threat batteries of the same individual within the same 30 minutes without risk of one battery substantially contaminating the responses to the other.

As one possible solution, I estimated an equation relating the information about how personal characteristics and prior prejudice are related to “oppose” responses for the low threat condition respondents.²⁶

$$O_{l_i} = \hat{\beta}_z Z_i + (\beta_{l_t} T_{l_i} + u_i) \quad (5)$$

where, i = only respondents in the low threat condition and where $(\beta_{l_t} T_{l_i} + u_i)$ is the error term. Then, I used these coefficients $(\hat{\beta}_z Z_i)$ to generate information about how respondents in the high threat condition (with similar personal characteristics and prior prejudice, Z) would have reacted to the low threat condition had they been exposed to the low threat condition directly. In other words, I used the Z variables for the respondents in the high threat condition, and generated \hat{O}_{l_i} for them using the $\hat{\beta}_z$'s from equation 5:

$$\hat{O}_{l_i} = \hat{\beta}_z Z_i + \varepsilon_i \text{ where, } \varepsilon_i = \beta_{l_t} T_{l_i} + u_i = 0 + u_i \quad (6)$$

and where i = only those respondents assigned to the high threat condition, and where $\hat{\beta}_z$ is that which I estimated using the Z 's for the respondents in the low threat condition in equation 5. After that, we can proceed with the subtraction that I described above:

$$\hat{O}_{h_i} - \hat{O}_{l_i} = (\hat{\beta}_z Z_i + \beta_{h_t} T_{h_i} + u_i) - (\hat{\beta}_z Z_i + \varepsilon_i) \quad (7)$$

$$= (\hat{\beta}_z - \hat{\beta}_z) Z + \beta_{h_t} T_{h_i} + u_i - \varepsilon_i \quad (8)$$

$$= \beta_{h_t} T_{h_i} + u_i - \varepsilon_i \quad (9)$$

$$\text{and, } E[\hat{O}_{h_i} - \hat{O}_{l_i}] = \beta_{h_t} T_{h_i}$$

This allows us ultimately to extract an estimate of the part of opposition to the proposals that is due to threat in our particular sample: $\widehat{\beta_{h_t} T_{h_i}}$. We can then use $\widehat{\beta_{h_t} T_{h_i}}$ as an “adjusted threat score” in equations predicting prejudice and policy opinions.

The procedure I just described is inspired by one that Charles Franklin developed, called Two-Stage Auxiliary Instrumental Variables Estimation (2SAIV). In this method, the instrumental variable is entered directly into a second stage, structural equation. In a 1989 article, Franklin proved that entering the instrumental variable as an independent variable in 2SAIV produced consistent estimates of regression coefficients and standard errors as long as “the primary and auxiliary data sets are samples from the same population” (Franklin 4). This assumption is an easy one to fulfill for this situation: the “auxiliary data set” in this case are the low threat condition

²⁶It might also be possible to compare the results of the two regressions from equations 1 and 2. However, I think that the procedure that I propose here is more clear about distinguishing the effects of the threat manipulation.

respondents, who are a random sub-sample from the same population as the “primary data set”, (i.e. the high threat condition respondents). However, I am also not sure if his results about consistency of estimates and corrections for the standard errors, would also apply to this situation, in which the 2nd stage structural equations are estimated with a variable which is the difference between an instrument (estimated from applying the coefficients from an auxiliary regression onto the primary data set) and a variable which is actually observed in the primary data set. ²⁷

So, here is the procedure I used:

1. Estimate a model predicting opposition to the low threat battery (number of oppose responses) based on as many relevant independent variables as possible for the half of the sample exposed to the low threat condition.
2. Use the coefficients from step #1 to create predicted values of opposition to low threat proposals for the respondents in the high threat condition.
3. Subtract the estimated amount of opposition to the low threat condition (\hat{O}_{l_i}), as gauged in step 2, from the observed amount of opposition to the high threat proposals (O_{h_i}) to generate an “adjusted threat score.”
4. Use the adjusted threat score in a series of equations to test whether prejudice and policy opinions asked after the threat batteries (as well as vote choice, party identification, and ideology) are significantly related to perception of threat.

4.2.2 Results

For each dependent variable, I estimated two OLS regressions. In each case, the first regression is bivariate, the second multivariate. The independent variables in the second regression are those which I used to create \hat{O}_{l_i} in the first stage of this estimation process. In essence, the first, bivariate, model contains the variables from the second model, but their coefficients are constrained by the measurement equations. That is, these variables only predict prejudice and policy opinions as a sum weighted by their predicted influence on opposition to the proposals:

$$\text{Prejudice}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\widehat{\beta}_h T_{h_i}) + \varepsilon_i \quad (10)$$

$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1(O_{h_i} - \hat{O}_{l_i}) + \varepsilon_i \quad (11)$$

$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \left[(\beta_z Z_i + (\beta_{h_t} T_{h_i} + u_i)) - \left(\hat{\beta}_z Z_i + (\beta_{l_t} T_{l_i} + u_i) \right) \right] + \varepsilon_i \quad (12)$$

In the second model, I allow each of the variables in Z to independently influence the dependent variables. This is a more stringent test of the adjusted threat score since β_1 here will only capture

²⁷Franklin also showed that in small samples, sized 33-100, the estimated standard error tended to be 7-13 percent too large (Franklin, 16). This makes 2SAIV a conservative estimator for my purposes. Although he does present the formula used to correct the traditional OLS standard errors, I do not correct the standard errors in the following results because I am not sure to what extent the 2SAIV correction is appropriate for this situation.

the impact of the part of our adjusted threat measure that is independent of all of the components that we used to create it.

$$\text{Prejudice}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\beta_h \hat{T}_{h_i}) + \beta_2 z_1 + \dots + \beta_k z_k + \varepsilon_i \quad (13)$$

In the previous section, I created an adjusted threat score for each respondent which, at least in theory, eliminates all possible causes for opposition to the threat proposals except for perception of threat. That given, it is surprising to see the results in table 16.

An increase across the range of the adjusted threat variable leads, on average, to increasing prejudice as measured by agreement with the proposition that “if Blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as whites.” Although the magnitudes of the predicted relationships are not huge, they are statistically significant at $p < .05$ and the coefficients do not lose strength when I include many other variables that commonly explain racial attitudes in general. Similar results occur for the variable I label “No Favors,” which captures strength of agreement with the statement: “Irish, Italian, and Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.” The lack of relationship with black stereotypes makes sense given the powerful effect of stereotypes measured in 1996. What is more surprising, however, is that both Liberal-Conservative self-placement and Vote for Clinton in 1996 are also strongly related to the adjusted threat score.

The adjusted threat score is not nearly as powerful a predictor of prejudice towards fundamentalists and opinions about church and state. I present the results of these equations in table 17 and in Appendix B (Table 23). These tables show that the adjusted threat variable has no or little influence, with or without the component variables included in the equation. The main exception to the general pattern was estimated for the variable labeled “Religion in Politics”, which captures the the attitude that “Organized religious groups of all types should stay out of politics (vs. It is important for organized religious groups to stand up for their beliefs in politics).” An increase of the adjusted threat score is predicted to increase the propensity of the respondent to say that religious groups should stay out of politics.

4.3 Summary

The simple test of exposure to threat had no positive results. I could not detect any influence from exposure to the high threat condition on prejudice or policy opinions for either the black threat or the fundamentalist threat batteries. In a more complicated test, I attempted to extract the part of opposition to proposals that is due to perceptions of threat from that part that is due to prior prejudice or other personal characteristics such as education. The adjusted threat score in the context of high black threat was a powerful predictor of racial attitudes, and even of voting for Clinton in 1996. In the context of fundamentalist threat, however, the adjusted threat score showed small, non-significant relationships with prejudice towards fundamentalists. However, one large relationship did emerge from Table 17—that perception of threat from fundamentalists led respondents to think that religious groups should stay out of politics.

Table 16: Adjusted Black Threat Score: Whites Only

	Try Harder	No Favours	Black Stereotypes 97	Govt Help
Adjusted Threat Score	.06 **	.07 ***	.08 ***	.04 **
Black Stereotypes 96	.14	.18	.33 ***	.20 **
Egalitarianism Index	.17	.31 ***	.05	.21 ***
White-Black FT 97	.31 **	.31 **	.15*	.14
Cons-Libs FT 98	.07	.07	.03	.15 **
Welfare FT 97	-.24 **	-.17	-.04	-.09
Education	-.34 ***	-.15 **	-.04	-.04
Personal Finance	.23 **	.28 ***	.07	.28 ***
Family Income	-.05	-.06	-.06	.08
Adjusted R-sq	.03	.30	.06	.31
			-.01	.19
			.03	.33

	Party Id	Ideology	96 Pres Vote
Adjusted Threat Score	.06*	.11 ***	.07 **
Black Stereotypes 96	.24*	.11	-.07 **
Egalitarianism Index	.19	-.04	.02
White-Black FT 97	-.01	.41 **	-.42 **
Cons-Libs FT 98	.67 ***	.90 ***	-.11
Welfare FT 97	.21*	.29*	-.82 ***
Education	.05	-.03	.01
Personal Finance	.16	.11	-.13
Family Income	.20 **	.11	.05
Adjusted R-sq	.02	.47	-.17
		.04	.45
		.04	.45

$p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 ***$

Cells contain OLS $\hat{\beta}$'s. Constants were estimated, but are not displayed. Sample size ranges from X to Y. All variables are coded 0 to 1 with 1=most anti-black, most conservative, most republican except for Vote 96 where 1=vote for Clinton, Age (range 18-91 years), and Adjusted Threat Score (range -1.60 to 2.33).

Table 17: Adjusted Fundamentalist Threat, Prejudice and Public Opinion

	Too Pushy		Be Peaceful		Christian Stereotypes	
Adjusted Threat Score	.02	.05	.01	.02	.00	.00
Age		.00		.00		.00
Welfare FT 97		-.19		.31		.03
Gays FT 97		-.02		-.36		-.08
Abortion FT 97		.11		.15		-.02
Fundamentalist FT 97		-.56 *		-.70 **		-.24
Education		.01		.23		.01
Gender		-.10		-.17 *		.03
Personal Finance		.09		.39 *		.01
Cons-Libs FT 96		-.29		.20		-.05
Egalitarianism Index		.03		.12		-.02
Christian Coalition FT 96		.02		.20		-.24 *
Feminists FT 97		.02		.58 *		-.17
Adjusted R-sq	-.01	.15	-.02	.04	-.03	.19

Cells contain OLS b's. p<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01***

	Church vs. State		Religion in Politics		School Prayer	
Adjusted Threat Score	.12 **	.12	.21 **	.32 ***	.03	.07
Age		.00		.01		.00
Welfare FT 97		-.06		-.95 **		-.07
Gays FT 97		-.07		.47		.01
Abortion FT 97		-.04		-.10		.30 *
Fundamentalist FT 97		-.35		-.68		-.11
Education		.07		-.25		-.22
Gender		-.07		-.10		-.01
Personal Finance		-.09		-.63 *		.19
Cons-Libs FT 96		-.21		-.53 *		-.01
Egalitarianism Index		-.11		-.22		.40 *
Christian Coalition FT 96		-.22		.34		-.01
Feminists FT 97		.07		-.54		-.05
Adjusted R-sq	.09	.10	.18	.43	.00	.19

5 Cultural, Political and Economic Dimensions of Group Conflict

Whether or not these items measure “threat”, it is easy to think of them as eliciting opinions about racial or religious policies in at least three specific contexts. We designed the items to present proposals which would clearly benefit either blacks or christian fundamentalists in the domains of culture, politics or economics. Given that the wording of the items changes between high and low threat condition, it may even make sense to think of these batteries as containing six different proposals that we are asking respondents to assess. In this section I will explore the extent to which these items hold up as strong predictors of, other, more general political attitudes when compared with the current NES complement.

Commonly, research which considers threat looks at proposals for harm in at least three domains: culture and society, politics, and economics. So the question now is which domain seems to matter more in predicting political attitudes and behavior. These kind of questions bear on a larger literature which seeks to find the roots of group conflict in either economic interests (ex. Tolnay and Beck’s contention that the Cotton Economy can be related directly back to the cycle of lynchings in the South, 1880-1930) or more symbolic/cultural interests (ex. Green et al.’s re-analysis of Tolnay and Beck’s data plus their other work on hate crimes). As an experiment, this design is not well suited to answer these kinds of questions because we can’t compare across the low and high threat conditions. However, I aggregated across the low and high threat conditions and regressed these new variables on a variety of political variables. In a sense, this is an attempt to examine the different dimensions of group conflict in American politics.

Tables 18 and 19 summarize the results of the multivariate regressions. Appendix D contains the full regression results in Tables 24-26 for whites in the context of cultural, political, and economic benefits for blacks²⁸ and Tables 27-29 for secular and mainline protestant respondents in the context of christian fundamentalist benefits.²⁹

Table 18 shows that respondents who oppose economic benefits to blacks differed significantly from respondents who favored economic benefits for blacks on all dependent variables except stereotypes. Only egalitarianism and education could compete with the opposition to economic benefits as the most powerful predictors of racial policy attitudes (see Table 26 in Appendix D for more details). Opposing the teaching of african-american history in public schools (i.e. cultural benefits) had the weakest effects of these three items—except in predicting vote for Clinton in 1996, when an “oppose” response to either the high or low threat cultural threat item decreased the probability of voting for Clinton, on average, by about 16%. Opposing political benefits for blacks was strongly related to to everything except, surprisingly, Party ID and Vote Choice (and also for stereotypes, which none of these variables predicted well once 1996 Stereotypes were in the equation.)³⁰

Tables 19 presents the results for the items which propose benefits for fundamentalists. Of all

²⁸I also ran this analysis for white identifiers and achieved similar results. I present the information for “all whites” mainly to add power to my statistical tests, especially since the multivariate analysis takes up so many degrees of freedom.

²⁹I depart from my narrow definitions of target groups here for two reasons 1) the results are very similar for both these broader groups and the narrow target groups and 2) the sample sizes are much more acceptable after listwise deletion of missing values in the multivariate regressions.

³⁰Since 1996 Stereotypes are included as an independent variable in this equation, the model is predicting change in views about stereotypes (before the threat battery, in 1996, and immediately after the threat battery, in 1997).

Table 18: Opposition to Cultural, Political, and Economic Benefits for Blacks and Public Opinion: Whites Only

	Prejudice		
	Try Harder	No Favors	97 Stereotypes
Cultural Benefits for Blacks	.06 **	.08 ***	.01
Political Benefits for Blacks	.08 ***	.13 ***	.01
Economic Benefits for Blacks	.09 ***	.13 ***	.02
	Policy		
	Government Help	Affirmative Action	Fair Job Treatment
Cultural Benefits for Blacks	.03	.04	.06
Political Benefits for Blacks	.08 ***	.08 ***	.13 ***
Economic Benefits for Blacks	.11 ***	.21 ***	.23 ***
	General Politics		
	Party ID	Ideology	96 Pres Vote
Cultural Benefits for Blacks	.06 *	.07 *	-.16 ***
Political Benefits for Blacks	.04	.09 **	-.09 *
Economic Benefits for Blacks	.09 ***	.09 *	-.21 ***

Cells contain OLS b's. All prejudice and policy variables are coded 0 to 1 where 1=most anti-black. Also: 96 Pres Vote (1=Clinton,0=Bush), Ideology (1=strong conservative), and Party ID (1=strong republican) p<.10 *, p<.05 **, p<.01 ***

Table 19: Opposition to Cultural, Political, and Economic Benefits for Fundamentalists and Public Opinion: Secular and Mainline Protestants Only

	Prejudice			
	Too Pushy	Be Peaceful	Stereotypes	
Cultural Benefits for Fundamentalists	.02	.03	.04	
Political Benefits for Fundamentalists	.08	-.02	.06 **	
Economic Benefits for Fundamentalists	.05	-.11 **	.02	
	Policy			
	School Prayer	Religion in Politics	Church vs. State	Divide Nation
Cultural Benefits for Fundamentalists	.09 ***	.26 ***	.27 ***	.29 ***
Political Benefits for Fundamentalists	-.01	.39 ***	.36 ***	.16 *
Economic Benefits for Fundamentalists	.03	.11	.14 *	.12
	General Politics			
	Party ID	Ideology	96 Pres Vote	
Cultural Benefits for Fundamentalists	-.04	-.05	.04	
Political Benefits for Fundamentalists	.06	.03	-.19 **	
Economic Benefits for Fundamentalists	.08	.04	-.11	

Cells contain OLS b's. All prejudice and policy variables are coded 0 to 1 where 1=most anti-religious. Also: 96 Pres Vote (1=Clinton,0=Bush), Ideology (1=strong conservative), and Party ID (1=strong republican) p<.10 *, p<.05 **, p<.01 ***

the items proposing benefits to fundamentalists, the political proposals were the most powerful in predicting a wide range of prejudice, stereotypes, the vote, and attitudes about religion and politics. In fact, respondents who opposed political benefits were more likely to express anti-religious views about “Church vs. State” and about “Religion in Politics” than respondents who favored political benefits for fundamentalists. This effect was stronger even than egalitarianism or education.³¹ Also, we can see that opposition to cultural benefits for fundamentalists was powerful in its own right especially in predicting attitudes about religion and politics. In general opposing economic benefits for fundamentalists was not very powerful in predicting these attitudes. Surprisingly the cultural items were not powerful in predicting prejudice or stereotypes nor did they play a large part in predicting party identification ideology or vote choice. Judgments about cultural and political benefits for fundamentalists were the most powerful in predicting policy opinions such as attitudes about school prayer, about religion and politics, and about the division between church and state.

Overall, regardless of threat condition, judgments about benefits for blacks and christian fundamentalists are significant factors in explaining the political attitudes of members of target groups (whites, and non-fundamentalists). However, not all of the dimensions of benefits for blacks and fundamentalists are equal. In the context of race, opinions about cultural benefits were slightly weaker and opinions about economic benefits stronger in predicting racial attitudes and political identification. In the context of religion, assessments of fundamentalist economic benefits were much weaker, across the 10 dependent variables, than evaluations of cultural or political benefits in explaining religious attitudes and political identification. In the context of attitudes about religion and vote choice, opposition to proposals that increase the political power of christian fundamentalists had the greatest effect, while opposition to fundamentalist economic benefits had the second greatest impact. In the context of racial politics, proposals to convey economic benefits to blacks had the greatest impact across all dependent variables, with political benefits second (except in the case of vote choice, where cultural threat was second most powerful).

Although more analysis should certainly be done on these items, it is clear that attitudes about specific proposals to convey benefits to certain groups are good predictors of a wide range of racial and religious attitudes, as well as vote choice in 1996. These results support the concept of “group interested behavior” in so far as opposition to proposals to help fundamentalists or blacks was positively related to other policy opinions or even voting decisions for candidates or policy alternatives. These results also show that the economic sphere is clearly not the only dimension of public debate that drives group conflict. Common sense tells us that different groups in society compete with each other in different domains depending on their primary concerns. These results support this view: certainly much competition between blacks and whites is cast in economic terms these days along with the popularity of the rhetoric of “reverse discrimination”; also the religious/moral competition over “the soul of the nation” is not about economic power (at least not openly) but about culture. These results are intriguing, however, in that opposition to benefits for blacks did not have anything to do with responses to the black stereotypes item, nor did opposition to cultural benefits for blacks play as large a role as would have been expected given the recent publicity about “ebonics” and “diversity” in general.

³¹It is also interesting to note that education was a powerful predictor of all of the racial attitudes, including prejudice, but that education is not a significant predictor of attitudes about religion and politics or about fundamentalists. See Appendix D for more details about the role of education, egalitarianism, and other variables.

6 Black Threat and Black Population Density

One of the purposes of this Pilot study was to develop measures to assess a series of hypotheses generated by variants of Blalock's "power threat" theory. This theory explains the prejudice and hostility of whites toward blacks in terms of the "threat" that whites are assumed to feel or perceive by virtue of living as a racial minority in areas of high black density in the South. Although this theory was developed to explain lynchings and pre-Voting Rights Act white supremacy, the recent candidacies of David Duke in Louisiana have begged for explanation – and this theory, at first glance, seems to fit rather well. A recent series of papers has taken up the the challenge to understand the relative success of David Duke, and to gauge the components of his support (e.g. Voss, Giles). These papers have produced contradictory results so far, with Giles showing support for Duke at its highest in largely black parishes and Voss showing that Duke support has been concentrated in all white suburbs as well as a few largely black, but rural, parishes. With this Pilot Study data I was able to run a preliminary analysis to see if the individual measures of black threat are related to black population density among the white identifiers in this sample.

Table 20 shows the results of an attempt to predict opposition to the threat items for white identifiers based on the black population at the county level. Overall, this table shows that both percent black and the ratio of black to white population have substantial effects on white identifiers' opposition to threatening proposals in the case of high cultural and political threat. We have argued previously that differences in opposition to proposals are a function of threat. The results here are consistent with this position. That is, one would expect that much more of the variance in the high threat condition occurs due to perception of threat than in the low threat condition (where we hope that nearly none of the variance occurs due to threat). Table 21 repeats this analysis, only this time with the adjusted threat score that I created in section 4.2. The coefficients are still large: a move from zero percent black to the maximum (of 55%) increases adjusted threat by about half its scale. However, neither of these coefficients is significantly different from zero at conventional levels.

Obviously, much more analysis must be done relating racial context to racial threat. For example, it is possible that contextual variables such as "percent black" are really proxies for some other personal characteristics of the respondents such as education or ideology. And, although context was estimated to have a large impact on the adjusted threat measure, the results were not statistically significant. For now, however, these results are rather exciting in that they seem congruent with historic hypotheses about race relations in this country.

Table 20: Black Population Density and Opposition to “Black Threat” Among White Identifiers
Black Threat Domain

	Cultural		Political		Economic	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
OLS						
Percent Black 1990	.38	.87**	-.78	.69**	-.26	-.03
Ratio Blacks/Whites 1990	.26	.60**	-.45	.52**	-.09	-.03
LOGIT						
Percent Black 1990	2.05	3.70*	-3.21	4.25*	-1.30	-.15
Ratio Blacks/Whites 1990	1.37	2.73**	-1.88	3.55**	-.43	-.16
N RESPONDENTS	91	91	88	90	89	93
N COUNTIES	56	56	55	56	55	57

Table entries are bivariate $\hat{\beta}$'s. Hypothesis tests were calculated from Huber's robust t-statistics to account for non-independence caused by clustering within counties.

All of the threat variables in these equations run from 0 to 1. Percent Black 1990 goes from 0 to 42%. Ratio of Blacks to Whites in 1990 goes from 0 to .79.

Table 21: Black Population Density and Adjusted Black Threat Among White Identifiers
Adjusted Threat Score

Percent Black 1990	1.06
Ratio Blacks/Whites 1990	.62
N RESPONDENTS	94
N COUNTIES	57

Table entries are bivariate OLS $\hat{\beta}$'s. Hypothesis tests were calculated from Huber's robust t-statistics to account for non-independence caused by clustering within counties.

Adjusted Threat goes from -1.60 to 2.33 among White Identifiers who were exposed to the High Threat Condition. All of the threat variables in these equations run from 0 to 1. Percent Black 1990 goes from 0 to 42%. Ratio of Blacks to Whites in 1990 goes from 0 to .79.

7 Recommendations

The threat manipulation clearly spurred whites and secular/unreligious respondents to oppose proposals which benefit blacks and christian fundamentalists, respectively. Also, the adjusted threat score predicted prejudice and racial policy attitudes, even controlling for prior prejudice, egalitarianism, and education, among other variables.

I think that it makes sense to carry a few items measuring threat from blacks into the future. Perceptions of threat depend on the situations presented and the context in which the situations occur. Although it is still not clear to what extent we are measuring mainly emotions or judgments, these items may give us a better handle on racial conflict as it forms and changes than items which focus on long socialized values that we don't expect to change. That is, the black threat battery allows us to measure aspects of politics that do change: Judgments about whether or not certain groups should receive benefits are based partially on long socialized values, but also are based partially on calculations and intuitions about potential harm to oneself or one's group. In this way, further analysis of the black threat items will add to our understanding of the group-oriented versus self-oriented nature of political judgment, as well as the nature of racial conflict. Given the difficulties in pulling "perception of threat" from an oppose/favor response, I would recommend that we continue the split sample — low versus high threat design — with modifications of the questions to enhance the differences between them (to bring low threat closer to zero threat, and high threat away from zero threat). I would also recommend expanding the response options from a dichotomy to a five-point strongly favor/strongly oppose scale.

Furthermore, I think that adding a question about an anger or fear response to the policy proposal would help us differentiate between at least two very different types of political judgments — one, presumably based on an appreciation that harm is possible from the proposal, and another presumably based on a more visceral fight or flight reaction. Both of these reactions, by the way, can occur whether the respondent is acting in self- or group-interested ways. I think that this measurement of the emotional side of threat only needs one additional item per proposal. That is, each item should have both an assessment (favor/oppose) and a feeling (angry/not angry, fearful/not fearful) associated with it.

I recommend that we drop the early versus late randomization in the future unless we are absolutely sure that it will not overly complicate the CAPI/CATI programming.

I feel strongly that the NES should continue to try to construct measures which capture threats felt by liberals. However, I don't think that we understand the context of fundamentalist threat well enough yet to justify continuing with the fundamentalist threat battery. For example, the questions we intended to measure economic threat did not successfully differentiate among respondents assigned to the low and high threat conditions. It is possible that applying categories developed for black threat in the South is not appropriate. We do know that the christian right is a good group to pursue — in that we see people ready to fight fiercely to defend abortion clinics even as we see others ready to bomb them. I also like the christian right as a source group because it intersects with many other current political debates. However, I think it is worth generating a new list of groups that are possible threats to liberals. I also think that, if the Board decided to pursue fundamentalist threat, then much more work on question development must be done — probably including some kinds of pilot testing in the general population.

In sum, the black threat battery, but not the christian fundamentalist threat battery, should be repeated on the Election Study in 1998. This will allow us a larger sample size of blacks and white identifiers to study and enable further testing, via replication, of the hypotheses and problems considered in this report. These items may be useful not only for studying questions concerning threat, but also more generally for understanding the cultural, political, and economic dimensions of racial group conflict in the United States.

Appendix A: Question Order Randomization

Table 22: Question Order Within Threat Batteries

	First Item		Second Item		Third Item		Total	
	Count	Pct	Count	Pct	Count	Pct	Count	Pct
BLACK / FUNDAMENTALIST								
Black Threat								
High Culture	53	29%	61	34%	66	37%	180	100%
High Political	69	38%	56	31%	55	31%	180	100%
High Economic	58	32%	63	35%	59	33%	180	100%
Low Culture	43	37%	41	35%	32	28%	116	100%
Low Political	35	30%	34	29%	47	41%	116	100%
Low Economic	38	33%	41	35%	37	32%	116	100%
Fundamentalist Threat								
High Culture	63	31%	79	39%	60	30%	202	100%
High Political	69	34%	75	37%	58	29%	202	100%
High Economic	70	35%	48	24%	84	42%	202	100%
Low Culture	17	32%	18	34%	18	34%	53	100%
Low Political	17	32%	15	28%	21	40%	53	100%
Low Economic	19	36%	20	38%	14	26%	53	100%
FUNDAMENTALIST / BLACK								
Black Threat								
High Culture	43	38%	34	30%	37	32%	114	100%
High Political	34	30%	51	45%	29	25%	114	100%
High Economic	37	32%	29	25%	48	42%	114	100%
Low Culture	49	35%	43	31%	49	35%	141	100%
Low Political	44	31%	46	33%	51	36%	141	100%
Low Economic	48	34%	52	37%	41	29%	141	100%
Fundamentalist Threat								
High Culture	46	46%	25	25%	29	29%	100	100%
High Political	23	23%	39	39%	38	38%	100	100%
High Economic	31	31%	36	36%	33	33%	100	100%
Low Culture	73	37%	70	36%	53	27%	196	100%
Low Political	62	32%	56	29%	78	40%	196	100%
Low Economic	61	31%	70	36%	65	33%	196	100%
Mean	45.9	33%	45.9	33%	45.9	33%	137.8	
Stdev	17.4	0.04	18.1	0.05	18.1	0.05	49.7	

Appendix B: Adjusted Threat Tables

Table 23: Adjusted Fundamentalist Threat, Prejudice and Public Opinion (cont.)

							96	
	Divide Nation		Party Identification		Ideology		Presidential Vote	
Adjusted Threat Score	.03	.02	-.06	-.03	-.12 *	-.08	.12	.03
Age		.01 *		.00		.00		.00
Welfare FT 97		-1.06 **		.01		.59		.27
Gays FT 97		.16		.07		-.78 **		.00
Abortion FT 97		-.27		-.08		.33		.54
Fundamentalist FT 97		.00		-.23		-.43		-.78
Education		.10		.04		-.42		.13
Gender		.04		.11		-.13		-.14
Personal Finance		-.35		-.16		-.04		.51
Cons-Libs FT 96		-.33		.85 ***		.62 **		-.70
Egalitarianism Index		-.36		.51 *		.78 **		-.68
Christian Coalition FT 96		-.28		.01		-.47		.19
Feminists FT 97		.16		.26		.52		1.00
Adjusted R-sq	-.02	.15	.01	.34	.04	.43	.02	.28

Cells contain OLS b's. p<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01***

Appendix C: Dependent Variable Question Wording

Prejudice

TRY HARDER (V970181) Please tell me how much you agree with the following statement: "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as Whites." (1=agree strongly/0=disagree strongly)

NO FAVORS (V970182) Please tell me how much you agree with the following statement: "Irish, Italian, and Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors." (1=agree strongly/0=disagree strongly)

TOO PUSHY (V970184) Please tell me how much you agree with the following statement: "Religious leaders are pushing too hard to have their beliefs written into law." (1=agree strongly/0=disagree strongly)

BE PEACEFUL (V970185) Please tell me how much you agree with the following statement: "Catholics, Jews, and most Protestants have overcome their prejudices and have lived peacefully together without demanding that everybody should adopt their beliefs. Christian Fundamentalists should do the same." (1=agree strongly/0=disagree strongly)

Stereotypes

V970186 Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale (trustworthy)?

V970187 Where would you rate Christian Fundamentalists in general on this scale (trustworthy)?

V970188 Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale? (intelligent)

V970189 (Where would you rate) Christian Fundamentalists (in general on this scale)? (intelligent)

V970190 Do people in these groups tend to be 'tolerant' or do they tend to be 'intolerant'?

Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale? (tolerant)

V970191 (Where would you rate) Christian fundamentalists (in general on this scale)?(tolerant)

Policies

GOVERNMENT HELP (V970193) Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help Blacks because they should help themselves. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

0 ... Government should help blacks

1 ... Blacks should help themselves

SCHOOL PRAYER (V970192) Which of the following views comes closest to your opinion on the issue of school prayer?

- 1 ... by law, prayers should not be allowed in public schools.
- .67 ... the law should allow public schools to schedule time when children can pray silently if they want to.
- .33 ... the law should allow public schools to schedule time when children, as a group, can say a general prayer not tied to a particular religious faith.
- 0 ... by law, public schools should schedule a time when all children would say a chosen christian prayer.

RELIGION IN POLITICS (V970327) Religion has had an increasing impact on the political views of many Americans. Which of the following two statements comes closer to your view:

- 1 ... Organized religious groups of all types should stay out of politics
- 0 ... It is important for organized religious groups to stand up for their beliefs in politics

CHURCH VS. STATE (V970328) Which comes closer to your view:

- 0 ... the government should take special steps to protect america's religious heritage
- 1 ... there should be a high degree of church/state separation

DIVIDE NATION (V970329) Which comes closer to your view:

- 1 ... The influence of religion on american politics threatens to divide us as a country
- 0 ... Religious people must take political action in order to protect their rights

Appendix D: Cultural, Political, and Economic Dimensions of Group Conflict

Table 24 ... Black Cultural Threat and Public Opinion

Table 25 ... Black Political Threat and Public Opinion

Table 26 ... Black Economic Threat and Public Opinion

Table 27 ... Fundamentalist Cultural Threat and Public Opinion

Table 28 ... Fundamentalist Political Threat and Public Opinion

Table 29 ... Fundamentalist Economic Threat and Public Opinion

Table 24: Black Cultural Threat and Public Opinion

	Try Harder		No Favors		97 Stereotypes	
Cultural Threat	.13 ***	.06 **	.14 ***	.08 ***	.03 **	-.01
96 Stereotypes		.13		.11		.38 ***
97 Wh-Blk FT		.27 ***		.17 **		.17 ***
Egalitarianism Index		.27 ***		.38 ***		.05
Education		-.40 ***		-.25 ***		-.09 ***
Gender		-.05 **		-.02		-.03 *
Personal Finance		.08		.06		.07 *
Natl Economy		.03		.05		.01
Family Income		.08		.10 *		.03
Age		.00 ***		.00		.00 *
adj r2	.04	.26	.05	.21	.01	.25
n	472	232	474	232	450	232

	Government Help		Affirmative Action		Fair Job Treatment	
Cultural Threat	.07 ***	.03	.08 ***	.04	.14 ***	.06
96 Stereotypes		.20 ***		.12		.17
97 Wh-Blk FT		.07		.06		.03
Egalitarianism Index		.46 ***		.45 ***		.94 ***
Education		-.12 ***		-.02		-.25 ***
Gender		-.02		-.02		.04
Personal Finance		.09 *		.01		.04
Natl Economy		-.05		.04		.10
Family Income		.04		.04		.15 *
Age		.00 **		.00 *		.00
adj r2	.02	.23	.02	.11	.03	.31
n	424	232	452	232	299	232

	Party ID		Ideology		96 Pres Vote	
Cultural Threat	.10 ***	.06 *	.17 ***	.07 *	-.23 ***	-.16 ***
96 Stereotypes		.06		.19		-.09
97 Wh-Blk FT		-.01		.11		.15
Egalitarianism Index		.57 ***		.71 ***		-.98 ***
Education		.13 **		-.19 **		-.16 *
Gender		-.04		-.15 ***		.05
Personal Finance		-.18 **		-.10		.38 ***
Natl Economy		.31 ***		.15		-.60 ***
Family Income		.08		.03		-.08
Age		.00		.00		.00
adj r2	.02	.17	.03	.16	.05	.26
n	475	232	475	232	340	232

Table 25: Black Political Threat and Public Opinion

	97					
	Try Harder		No Favors		Stereotypes	
Political Threat	.11 ***	.08 ***	.16 ***	.13 ***	.03 *	.01
96 Stereotypes		.12		.10		.38 ***
97 Wh-Blk FT		.27 ***		.18 **		.17 ***
Egalitarianism Index		.24 ***		.34 ***		.04
Education		-.40 ***		-.26 ***		-.09 ***
Gender		-.06 **		-.03		-.02 *
Personal Finance		.09		.07		.07 *
Natl Economy		.04		.06		.01
Family Income		.09		.10 *		.03
Age		.00 ***		.00 *		.00 *
adj r2	.03	.27	.08	.24	.01	.25
n	464	232	467	232	445	232

	Government Help		Affirmative Action		Fair Job Treatment	
Political Threat	.13 ***	.08 ***	.13 ***	.08 ***	.21 **	.13 ***
96 Stereotypes		.19 ***		.11		.16
97 Wh-Blk FT		.07		.06		.03
Egalitarianism Index		.42 ***		.42 ***		.89 ***
Education		-.12 ***		-.03		-.26 ***
Gender		-.02		-.03		.04
Personal Finance		.09 *		.02		.05
Natl Economy		-.04		.05		.11
Family Income		.05		.05		.15 *
Age		.00 **		.00		.00
adj r2	.07	.26	.05	.12	.08	.33
n	417	232	446	232	298	232

	Party ID		Ideology		96 Pres Vote	
Political Threat	.10 ***	.04	.16 ***	.09 **	-.19 **	-.09 *
96 Stereotypes		.06		.19		-.10
97 Wh-Blk FT		.01		.13		.08
Egalitarianism Index		.57 ***		.69 ***		-.98 ***
Education		.13 **		-.19 **		-.16
Gender		-.04		-.16 ***		.07
Personal Finance		-.18 **		-.09		.37 ***
Natl Economy		.32 ***		.17		-.63 ***
Family Income		.08		.03		-.08
Age		.00		.00		.00
adj r2	.02	.16	.03	.17	.03	.25
n	468	232	468	232	337	232

Table 26: Black Economic Threat and Public Opinion

	Try Harder		No Favors		97 Stereotypes	
Economic Threat	.08 **	.09 ***	.15 ***	.13 ***	.03	.02
96 Stereotypes		.13		.11		.38 ***
97 Wh-Blk FT		.28 ***		.20 **		.17 ***
Egalitarianism Index		.24 ***		.33 ***		.03
Education		-.42 ***		-.28 ***		-.09 ***
Gender		-.05 **		-.02		-.02
Personal Finance		.09		.08		.07 *
Natl Economy		.04		.06		.01
Family Income		.07		.08		.03
Age		.00 ***		.00 **		.00 *
adj r2	.01	.27	.05	.23	.00	.25
n	469	232	472	232	452	232

	Government Help		Affirmative Action		Fair Job Treatment	
Economic Threat	.15 ***	.11 ***	.24 ***	.21 ***	.29 ***	.23 ***
96 Stereotypes		.19 ***		.10		.16
97 Wh-Blk FT		.07		.05		.03
Egalitarianism Index		.40 ***		.35 ***		.83 ***
Education		-.14 ***		-.07		-.30 ***
Gender		-.02		-.01		.05
Personal Finance		.10 *		.03		.06
Natl Economy		-.05		.04		.10
Family Income		.03		.02		.12
Age		.00 *		.00		.00
adj r2	.09	.27	.14	.20	.13	.38
n	422	232	449	232	298	232

	Party ID		Ideology		96 Pres Vote	
Economic Threat	.18 ***	.09 ***	.17 ***	.09 *	-.35 ***	-.21 ***
96 Stereotypes		.05		.19		-.09
97 Wh-Blk FT		.01		.14		.09
Egalitarianism Index		.53 ***		.68 ***		-.91 ***
Education		.11 *		-.20 **		-.12
Gender		-.03		-.15 ***		.05
Personal Finance		-.17 **		-.09		.36 ***
Natl Economy		.31 ***		.16		-.62 ***
Family Income		.07		.02		-.05
Age		.00		.00		.00
adj r2	.06	.17	.03	.17	.10	.28
n	473	232	472	232	342	232

Table 27: Fundamentalist Cultural Threat and Public Opinion: Secular and Mainline Protestants Only

	Too Pushy		Be Peaceful		Stereotypes	
Fundamentalist Cultural Threat	.11 ***	.02	.06 *	.03	.07 ***	.04
96 Christian Coalition FT		-.14		.10		-.20 ***
97 Feminist FT		.18		.27 **		.04
97 Gay FT		-.09		-.08		-.09
Black		.03		-.04		.03
Abortion FT		-.12 **		-.10 *		-.08 **
97 Christian Fundamentalist FT		-.29 ***		-.22 **		-.09
Egalitarianism Index		.03		.15		.08
Education		-.02		-.05		-.04
Gender		-.03		-.01		.01
Personal Finance		.09		.20 **		.02
National Economy		.05		-.07		.10 *
Family Income		.14 *		.16 **		.03
Age		.00		.00 *		.00
adj r2	.04	.19	.01	.08	.05	.20
n	193	126	192	126	174	126

	School Prayer		Religion in Politics		Church vs. State		Divide Nation	
Fundamentalist Cultural Threat	.21 ***	.09 ***	.33 ***	.26 ***	.40 ***	.27 ***	.45 ***	.29 ***
96 Christian Coalition FT		-.23 **		-.11		-.40 **		-.18
97 Feminist FT		.05		.01		.31		.29
97 Gay FT		.19 **		.09		.09		.01
Black		.07		-.08		.03		.03
Abortion FT		-.01		-.15		-.12		-.25 **
97 Christian Fundamentalist FT		-.18 *		-.37 *		-.27		-.51 ***
Egalitarianism Index		.04		.32		.33 *		.11
Education		.11 *		.07		.00		.05
Gender		-.05		.03		-.17 ***		.01
Personal Finance		-.07		-.15		-.14		-.20
National Economy		.09		-.13		.05		-.03
Family Income		.03		-.12		-.16		-.16
Age		.00 ***		.00 **		.00		.00
adj r2	.15	.42	.10	.15	.18	.29	.19	.31
n	195	126	193	126	191	126	187	126

	Ideological					
	Party Identification		Identification		96 Presidential Vote	
Fundamentalist Cultural Threat	-.11 **	-.04	-.17 **	-.05	.12	.04
96 Christian Coalition FT		.04		.07		.05
97 Feminist FT		-.26 *		-.31		.43 *
97 Gay FT		-.05		-.23		.04
Black		-.26 *		-.19		.20
Abortion FT		.13 *		.10		-.10
97 Christian Fundamentalist FT		.22		.24		-.28
Egalitarianism Index		.39 ***		.40 **		-.71 ***
Education		.15		-.07		-.13
Gender		-.06		-.21 ***		.16 **
Personal Finance		-.22 *		-.28		.48 **
National Economy		.43 ***		.28 *		-.65 ***
Family Income		.12		-.02		-.12
Age		.00		.00		.00
adj r2	.02	.28	.02	.25	.01	.33
n	196	126	196	126	141	126

Table 28: Fundamentalist Political Threat and Public Opinion: Secular and Mainline Protestants Only

	Too Pushy		Be Peaceful		Stereotypes	
Fundamentalist Political Threat	.13 ***	.08	.01	-.02	.09 ***	.06 **
96 Christian Coalition FT		-.12		.09		-.19 ***
97 Feminist FT		.17		.28 **		.03
97 Gay FT		-.09		-.07		-.09
Black		.03		-.04		.03
Abortion FT		-.13 **		-.11 *		-.09 **
97 Christian Fundamentalist FT		-.27 **		-.24 **		-.09
Egalitarianism Index		-.01		.15		.05
Education		-.04		-.04		-.06
Gender		-.02		-.02		.02
Personal Finance		.10		.19 *		.01
National Economy		.03		-.06		.08
Family Income		.15		.16 **		.03
Age		.00		.00		.00
adj r2	.04	.20	-.01	.07	.05	.21
n	187	126	188	126	173	126

	School Prayer		Religion in Politics		Church vs. State		Divide Nation	
Fundamentalist Political Threat	.11 **	-.01	.45 ***	.39 ***	.49 ***	.36 ***	.30 ***	.16 *
96 Christian Coalition FT		-.23 **		-.03		-.33 *		-.16
97 Feminist FT		.06		-.02		.28		.29
97 Gay FT		.21 ***		.09		.10		.06
Black		.06		-.10		.01		.01
Abortion FT		-.02		-.22 **		-.19 **		-.30 ***
97 Christian Fundamentalist FT		-.22 **		-.35 *		-.27		-.59 ***
Egalitarianism Index		.03		.13		.15		.00
Education		.11		-.02		-.08		.01
Gender		-.06 *		.05		-.15 **		.01
Personal Finance		-.10		-.18		-.18		-.27
National Economy		.09		-.21		-.02		-.06
Family Income		.04		-.08		-.12		-.13
Age		.00 ***		.00 *		.00		.00
adj r2	.03	.39	.13	.18	.19	.30	.05	.25
n	189	126	187	126	186	126	183	126

	Ideological					
	Party Identification		Identification		96 Presidential Vote	
Fundamentalist Political Threat	.07	.06	.02	.03	-.23 **	-.19 **
96 Christian Coalition FT		.06		.08		.01
97 Feminist FT		-.27 *		-.32		.45 **
97 Gay FT		-.07		-.25		.08
Black		-.26 *		-.19		.20
Abortion FT		.12 *		.11		-.08
97 Christian Fundamentalist FT		.26 *		.28		-.37 *
Egalitarianism Index		.37 ***		.40 **		-.64 ***
Education		.13		-.07		-.09
Gender		-.04		-.20 ***		.13 *
Personal Finance		-.20		-.26		.45 **
National Economy		.42 ***		.27		-.61 ***
Family Income		.12		-.03		-.13
Age		.00		.00		.00
adj r2	.00	.28	.00	.25	.03	.35
n	190	126	190	126	136	126

Table 29: Fundamentalist Economic Threat and Public Opinion: Secular and Mainline Protestants Only

	Too Pushy		Be Peaceful		Stereotypes	
Fundamentalist Economic Threat	.14 ***	.05	-.05	-.11 **	.07 **	.02
96 Christian Coalition FT		-.14		.09		-.21 ***
97 Feminist FT		.17		.29 **		.04
97 Gay FT		-.08		-.08		-.08
Black		.03		-.05		.03
Abortion FT		-.11 **		-.13 **		-.08 **
97 Christian Fundamentalist FT		-.28 ***		-.26 **		-.11
Egalitarianism Index		.04		.11		.08
Education		-.02		-.06		-.04
Gender		-.04		-.01		.01
Personal Finance		.11		.16		.01
National Economy		.04		-.05		.09
Family Income		.14 *		.17 **		.03
Age		.00		.00 *		.00
adj r2	.04	.20	.00	.10	.03	.19
n	189	126	188	126	172	126

	Religion in							
	School Prayer		Politics		Church vs. State		Divide Nation	
Fundamentalist Economic Threat	.11 **	.03	.21 **	.11	.25 ***	.14 *	.31 ***	.12
96 Christian Coalition FT	-.23 **		-.12		-.41 **		-.20	
97 Feminist FT		.05	.01		.30		.29	
97 Gay FT		.21 ***	.16		.18		.10	
Black		.07	-.08		.02		.03	
Abortion FT		-.02	-.16		-.13		-.26 **	
97 Christian Fundamentalist FT		-.21 **	-.46 **		-.37 **		-.62 ***	
Egalitarianism Index		.04	.32		.33 *		.10	
Education		.11 *	.07		.01		.05	
Gender		-.06 *	.00		-.20 ***		-.02	
Personal Finance		-.09	-.19		-.17		-.25	
National Economy		.09	-.14		.04		-.04	
Family Income		.03	-.11		-.15		-.15	
Age		.00 ***	.00 *		.00		.00	
adj r2	.03	.39	.02	.10	.05	.23	.06	.25
n	191	126	188	126	188	126	181	126

	Ideological					
	Party Identification		Identification		96 Presidential Vote	
Fundamentalist Economic Threat	-.03	.08	-.12	.04	.04	-.11
96 Christian Coalition FT		.05		.08		.05
97 Feminist FT		-.27 *		-.32		.44 *
97 Gay FT		-.05		-.24		.04
Black		-.25 *		-.18		.19
Abortion FT		.15 **		.11		-.12
97 Christian Fundamentalist FT		.25 *		.27		-.32
Egalitarianism Index		.42 ***		.42 **		-.75 ***
Education		.15		-.06		-.14
Gender		-.06		-.21 ***		.16 **
Personal Finance		-.18		-.25		.44 **
National Economy		.42 ***		.27		-.63 ***
Family Income		.11		-.03		-.11
Age		.00		.00		.00
adj r2	.00	.28	.01	.25	-.01	.34
n	191	126	191	126	136	126

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