EVALUATION OF THE NEW RELIGIOUS ITEMS ON THE NES 1997 PILOT STUDY:

A REPORT TO THE NES BOARD

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In response to requests from the user community and prompted by the growing salience of cultural appeals in American electoral politics, the ANES has gradually expanded the content and sophistication of its religious measures. Thanks to revisions in the core interview schedule that have appreciably reduced measurement error, scholars are now better able to construct valid and reliable measures of the religious identity and behavior of respondents. With the addition of items about the salience of religion, devotional practices and theological orientations, it is possible to assign respondents to religiously and politically meaningful religious traditions. Armed with significantly improved independent variables, scholars are better equipped to explore religious impact on vote choice, political participation, and political attitudes.

The three new religious batteries piloted in 1997 were conceived as mediating forces, translation mechanisms that convert and intensify the impact of religion on a range of political dependent variables. Recognizing the contingent nature of the linkage between religious forces and political thinking, several major theoretical approaches to religion as an electoral factor have posited the significance of mediating factors. Such translation mechanisms are the means by which respondents connect or separate their religious commitment and their political attitudes and behavior. From a range of theoretical traditions--cognitive models, contextual approaches, the "framing" assumption in social movement theory--it is plausible to hypothesize that persons who regard religion as properly a matter for individuals and private behavior are unlikely to act on their religious convictions in the public sphere. Conversely, respondents who do perceive their faith in an all-encompassing manner should exhibit much tighter linkage between religious sentiment and political behavior.

The current NES interview schedule does not provide such measures. The closest approximation, a measure of general religious salience (V960571-2), asks respondents about the importance of religion in their lives and, for those who indicate some significance, inquires further about the degree of daily guidance they derive from religion. These items have proven extremely helpful in separating respondents by levels of religious commitment but do not gauge directly whether citizens perceive the political relevance of religion and are thereby amenable to political mobilization by religious appeals. The three piloted batteries attempt to explore that issue.

This report examines the new question sets by describing the new items, reporting on their distribution and measurement properties, and then considering what each contributes to clarifying our understanding of religious impact on political behavior. The value of the new items will be assessed in terms of (a) ability to discriminate among respondents across diverse religious traditions and (b) predictive power above and beyond the existing set of religious items in the NES core.

Political Salience of Religion: V970325-V970326
Church and State: V970327-V970329

The 1997 NES Pilot contained two items, modeled on the existing measures of general religious salience, that sought direct measurement of the *political salience* of religious belief. The first

item (V970325) asked, "Do you consider religion to be an important part of your political thinking, or not?" Those who answered positively were then asked (V970326), "Would you say that your religion provides some guidance in your political thinking, quite of bit of guidance, or a great deal of guidance in your political thinking?"

Table 1 displays the distribution for a four-point composite measure of political salience created by combining the two new items and the distribution for the parallel scale of general religious salience from the 1996 pre-election survey. The index created from V970325 and V970326 will be referred to as a measure of the political salience of religion. Compared to the general salience measure, the composite indicator of political salience is more highly skewed toward the "no influence" end.

<div align="center">(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)</div>

The Pilot contained a second battery of three items, beliefs on the proper relationship between church and state, that were also intended to clarify the cognitive elements that mediate the relationship between religion and politics:

V970327   Which of the following two statements comes closer to your view: "Organized religious groups of all kinds should stay out of politics" or "It is important for organized religious groups to stand up for their beliefs in politics."

V970328   Which comes closer to your view: "The government should take special steps to protect America's religious heritage" or "There should be a high degree of separation between church and state."

V970329   Which comes closer to your view: "The influence of religion on American politics threatens to divide us as a country" or "Religious people must take political action in order to protect their rights."

As is evident from the distributions in Table 2 (below), the public was deeply divided on these dichotomous questions. A majority of 60% held that we should have a high wall of separation between church and state, and 43% thought that organized groups should stay out of politics, while a similar number (42%) held that the influence of religion and politics threatens to divide us as a country. Thus majorities appear to want separation of church and state, while allowing religious groups to attempt to influence government.

<div align="center">(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)</div>

The three items in Table 2 are correlated: the first and final items which deal with the role of religious groups in politics are correlated at .51, while the (recoded) middle item correlates at .40 and .43 with the other two. Together, the items form a scale with a reliability (alpha) of .71. For

convenience, we refer to this scale as Church-State I or CHSTATE1.

Yet the middle item seems to add a political slant to the scale – liberal mainline Protestants and some Catholics might support a high wall of separation but still favor an active role for groups in politics. Ideally, we would want a scale that mediates politics and religion for all religious traditions equally. Therefore, we constructed a second scale from the first and third items (Church-State II or CHSTATE2). *For both scales, high scores indicate greater support for the role of religion in politics.*

In an initial test of the validity of these three new measures, Table 3 presents the distributions of each composite measure by the major religious traditions.[1] The new composite measure of the political salience of religious conforms to expert judgment about the level of politicization among different segments of the electorate. Evangelical and black Protestants reported the highest levels of political salience, substantially higher than mainline Protestants and Catholics, and seculars reported the lowest level. These patterns lend plausibility to V970325-V970326 as valid indicators of the sentiment they were intended to measure. Both church-state scales vary pretty similarly across the major traditions in the survey. The patterns for these measures also make good substantive sense, conforming to earlier scholarly work and suggesting that they do indeed measure what was intended. Black Protestants are the most supportive of an active church in politics, which is not surprising given the long history of civil rights activism in the church. Members of white evangelical churches are also disproportionately supportive – reflecting nearly two decades of mobilization by the Christian Right. Catholics are the least supportive of religious members, perhaps because of the hierarchical nature of their church, and seculars are the least supportive of religious involvement.

(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)

How do the church-state scales correlate with other measures of religiosity and religious views? If they simply recapitulate the religious measures that are part of the NES core, there is scant justification for including them on the production studies. Table 4 (below) reports the correlation between the political salience measure and the church-state scales with various indicators of religious behavior and identification from the 1996 NES: a measure of evangelical doctrine (a dummy variable that equals 1 if respondents describe themselves as born-again and regard the Bible as inerrant, zero otherwise), the general religious salience measure from 1996, a church attendance measure and a private devotionalism index constructed from items about frequency of prayer and Bible reading.

(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE)

As would be expected, the table consists exclusively of positive correlations. Nonetheless, the three new scales show some important differences. Compared with the new political relevance of religion composite, the two church-state scales are less highly correlated with religious salience, church attendance, private devotionalism, and evangelical doctrine. The average correlation

(Pearson R) between the new political salience composite and the four items from the 1996 wave was 0.467. For the two new church-state measures, the equivalent correlations drop to 0.380 (scale I with 3 items) and 0.330 (scale 2 with 2 items). This finding suggests both that the church-state battery offers new information not captured by existing religious items and, if correlated with political dependent variables, will draw less explanatory power away from items already in the core interview schedule.

Do the three new measures correlate with political attitudes and behaviors? Table 5 (below) reports correlations between four religious measures--the three scales created from the new batteries and the existing measure of religious salience--and a mixture of social and economic issues: relative affect (on feeling thermometers, adjusted for individual central tendencies) toward the Christian Coalition and toward gays and lesbians, moral conservatism, attitudes toward abortion and the "partial birth" abortion ban, women's role ideology, attitude to spending for the homeless and poor people, partisanship and ideology. The final item is an additive index of non-voting political participation. The correlations were run for all respondents and separately for each of the major religious traditions.

(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE)

These correlations affirm the broader applicability of the two new church-state measures over the new composite measure of the political salience of religion. If we just look at the first panel of correlations for the entire sample, there would appear to be little to choose between the two new question batteries. The political relevance composite is significantly related to eight of the eleven socio-political items and all relationships are in the conservative/Republican direction. The longer version of the church-state scale is similarly related to the same eight variables and also explains one additional item, attitudes to the poor. None of the scales created from the new batteries appears to offer any new patterns beyond the existing measure of religious salience from the 1996 ANES.

Upon closer inspection of the specific religious traditions, however, the two new batteries produce strikingly different patterns and diverge from the general salience measure. The composite measure of political salience works extremely well among evangelical Protestants, producing significant correlations for 9/11 dependent measures. It is significantly linked to only 5/11 items among Catholics, and accounts for virtually no political or social attitudes among mainline Protestants and black Protestants. Because evangelicals and Catholics are the largest two religious traditions in the sample, their patterns largely account for the strong showing of the new political salience composite among the entire sample. But even that pattern is vitiated when we recognize that the new political salience item produces almost the identical pattern of correlations with political and social attitudes as the old measure of general salience of religion.

By contrast, the two measures of church-state attitudes demonstrate more substantial and differentiated relationships with political attitudes and behavior. Among evangelicals, church-

state attitudes mediate political orientations to the same degree and in the same manner as the composite political salience measure. For all the major religious groups, the two measures constructed from the church-state battery strongly mediate attitudes toward Christian Coalition. But unlike the political salience measure, the church-state items work in a variety of ways among the different religious traditions. Among black Protestants, for example, a belief in the integration of religion and politics produces both a powerful surge of moral conservatism **and** the participatory political ethos that the literature recognizes in African-American Christianity. (The political and religious salience measures were unrelated to both items.) Among the Protestant mainline, church-state attitudes explain moral conservatism, support for the partial birth abortion ban, attitudes to the poor and gender role ideology. Again, the two religious salience measures failed to do so. For Roman Catholics, the existing measure of religious salience explains only moral conservatism and abortion issues. The church-state item mediates both those orientations but also attitudes to the Christian Coalition and gender role ideology. This suggests that the church-state battery is not distinctively tied to any one religious tradition and is, in fact, a general orientation to the linkage of religion and politics.

A multivariate analysis confirms these patterns, suggesting that the church-state battery both adds explanatory value to our understanding of political attitude formation and does so in a much more powerful way than does the new political salience measure or the existing general religious salience indicator. Table 6 (below) reports the OLS equations for four dependent measures: attitudes to the Christian Coalition, abortion, the partial birth abortion ban, and gender role ideology. The equations include the full set of religious predictors from both the 1996 survey (religious tradition, evangelical doctrine, church attendance, private devotions, religious salience) and the 1997 pilot (political salience of religion and the three-item scale of church state attitudes). Religious traditions are coded as dummies, with mainline Protestants the excluded category. The equations also include sex, age, education, region, party identification, general ideology, and moral conservatism. (None of these coefficients are shown.) Entries are unstandardized, then standardized, coefficients.

(TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE)

These equations are difficult tests of the new models, both because the independent variables include a wide range of powerful predictors and because the tests ask if the new items have predictive capacity above and beyond a set of conceptually related religious orientations. In these challenging equations, as Table 6 shows, the patterns from earlier bivariate analysis were replicated. The church-state scale does quite well compared with other religious (and non-religious) items. For three of the four dependent variables, a belief in the integration of religion and politics produced the predicted positive association with conservative values. Only on the quite skewed women's role scale does CHSTATE1 not achieve statistical significance and then only by a whisper (p<.07). If either general or religious salience is omitted from the equation, CHSTATE1 is statistically significant for even that dependent measure. By contrast, the existing religious salience measure contributed substantially to just one of the four equations and the new

composite measure of political salience never achieved significance.

Given these findings, we cannot recommend the addition of the new political salience of religion battery (V970325-V970326) to the production study. At this time, the measure does not add much to the existing measures of religiosity as a predictor of political attitudes and does not show a substantial intensifying impact for those same predictors. It could well be that a more sensitive measure of political salience, one especially attuned to moderate or liberal religious views, would produce better results in an interactive model. Analysis of religious attendance items from the 1989 Pilot Study showed the possibility of developing measures of religious activity that worked equally well across religious traditions. The new salience items piloted in 1997 should be revised along such lines.

By contrast, the three items in the church-state battery (V970327-V970329) do warrant inclusion in the 1998 production study. When combined, the items form a reliable scale that seems to tap general attitudes to the role of religion in political life. Unlike the political salience index, the scale formed from these items appears to work across different religious traditions and contributes significantly in both bivariate and multivariate analysis to a range of political dependent variables. It does so over and above the impact of a number of religious measures, some added to the NES core in 1980, others in 1990.

Does the superior performance of the new items call into question retention of the existing religious salience measure? We strongly support retention of that measure. Apart from their predictive power, these items (V960571-2 in the pilot data file) are necessary to construct meaningful and reliable religious tradition variables. Although the NES coding protocol has been significantly improved since 1990, the availability of the general religious salience index, along with views of the Bible, born-again status and like, are still required to make finer distinctions than are permitted by the denominational codes alone. The daunting complexity of religious affiliation has been intensified by the rapid growth in "non-denominational" and "independent" Christian churches, organizations with members who are extremely easy to misclassify without recourse to the detailed religious items that are now part of the NES core.[2] Absent the religious indicators, we are likely to return to the pre-1990 status quo when the NES measure of religious identity was afflicted by massive measurement error

Congregational Priorities: V970330-V970331

As part of an attempt to test mediating influences on the link between religion and politics, the 1997 Pilot study also contained two items reflecting what might be termed "congregational priorities."[3] Following the seminal work of Ronald Inglehart on postmaterialism, these items asked respondents to select the most important and second most important goal for religious groups from among the following alternatives:

1. Give their members a place of shelter from the burdens of life.

2. Encourage their members to become active in politics.

3. Protect their members from the false teachings of other religious groups.

4. Encourage their members to form social groups within the congregation.

The rationale for these items (V970330-V970331) was to distinguish respondents whose faith commitments encouraged them to engage in the secular world (options 2 and 4) from those whose faith suggested the importance of withdrawal from the "sinfulness" of the secular sphere (options 1 and 3). The forced choice format resulted from the finding that religious respondents often do not perceive tradeoffs between valued goals, producing what in other contexts has been described as an indiscriminate pro-religiosity. To avoid that kind of measurement morass, this battery required respondents to select among competing ministerial goals.

The distribution of responses to these items is shown in Table 7. As these data show, "giving shelter" is far and away the most popular church priority, with nearly half of the respondents offering this alternative as their first choice. "Forming social action groups" was the second most popular first choice, and a clear leader among second choices. One suspects that the relative popularity of the latter alternative can be attributed to its ambiguity. "Social action" might mean politically motivated action, such as demonstrations at abortion clinics, or relatively consensual activities such as supporting a community shelter for the homeless, or might even refer to evangelism for the purpose of converting the "unchurched."

(TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE)

The choices offered in these items do not scale in any obvious or simple fashion. As Table 8 shows, "social action" is the second choice of a plurality of respondents choosing any of the other options as first priorities. "Politics" is the least popular second choice among respondents whose first priority was "shelter," and the second choice for those who valued "protection" or "social action" as first choices.

(TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE)

This complex pattern of responses suggested that there were several possible ways of conceptualizing the congregational priority items. One could simply impose a unidimensional structure, by positing certain combinations of first and second choices as "engaged," "neutral" and "withdrawal." This was done in two different ways. First, a simple typology was computed, with three categories. "Engaged" respondents chose the "politics" and "social action" responses as first and second choices in any combination. "Withdrawn" respondents selected some combination of "shelter" and "protection," while "mixed" respondents selected any other combination. This is analogous to the protocol followed by Inglehart in his post-materialism battery. Second, a more complex typology" was computed, with five categories: "Pure engaged" respondents chose options 2 and 4 in any combination. "Limited engagement" respondents

selected options 2 or 4 (politics or social action) as a first choice, and shelter as a second. A "Neutral" category combined a first choice of "shelter" with a second choice of "social action"-- the modal response for the sample as a whole. "Limited withdrawal" combined "shelter" with a second choice of "politics," while "pure withdrawal" combined the "protect" and "shelter" options in any combination. The distribution of these two typologies is indicated in Table 9 below.

(TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE)

A second strategy involved foregoing any assumption about the dimensionality of the four choices, and computing separate variables for each priority. For example, if a respondent listed "politics" as her first choice, she was given a score of "2" on a "politics" variable. If she listed "politics" as a second choice, the politics score was 1, and a zero was scored for any respondent who did not list politics as a first or second choice. Similar variables were computed for "shelter," "protect," and "action." This procedure examines each priority separately, without making any judgment about the correct order or combination of church goals.

As an exercise in construct validity, Table 10 contains the zero-order correlations between each of the six resulting congregational priority variables and the other new religious items piloted in 1997. As these data indicate, the variable measuring the priority the respondent attaches to "politics" has the strongest relationship to the church-state measures, and to the political importance of religion variable. The "shelter" variable also exhibits strong, significant and negative relationships with these items. This pattern, and the fact that the politics and shelter variables exhibit a strong, negative relationship (r=-.52) suggests that these items may tap a single "involvement-withdrawal" dimension. Neither typology performs as well as these two variables, and the effects of the "protect" and "social action" variables are quite weak as well.

Substantively, the importance of the congregational priority variables seems most likely to be as an amplifier of the effects of membership in a particular denomination or religious tradition. A great deal of research suggests that adherents of different religious traditions are exposed to quite different political cues; one would expect that these effects would be strongest among those who hold relatively "engaged" church priorities, although the specific effects would vary across denominational families. For example, we might expect that engaged evangelical Protestants might take very conservative positions on issues of gay rights, while similarly engaged mainline Protestants might exhibit effects in the opposite direction. To test this possibility, interaction terms were computed between four religious variables (identification with an evangelical, mainline, or catholic congregation, and evangelical orthodoxy. The latter scored respondents as "orthodox" who held an inerrant view of the Bible and had reported a "born-again" experience) and each of the six congregational priority variables (the two typologies and the four individual priority measures). The effects of these interaction terms on a variety of independent variables were compared with the effects of each simple religious variable. For example, it is possible to compare the simple effects of membership in an evangelical denomination with those of belonging to such a denomination, and holding political involvement as a strong religious

priority.

The findings of this analysis (not shown) can be summarized quite easily: In virtually all cases, the simple religious variable has greater explanatory power than the same variable in interaction with *any* measure of congregational priorities. The exceptions to this generalization are relatively rare, and are uniformly trivial. In no instance does the interaction between a religious variable and any priority measure outperform the simple religious measure by more than .03.

Thus, the results of the 1997 Pilot are not strong enough to recommend adoption of the congregational priority battery. The items do not seem to have scaled as anticipated and do not, individually or as a composite index, measurably improve our ability to account for variation in manifestly political variables, such as vote choice, turnout, group-based or issue attitudes. That said, we would not want to abandon developmental work on this approach. These items clearly measure something quite genuine, and do not represent nonattitudes. The politics/shelter contrast seems particularly promising, and suggests the possibility of further work. **Indeed, it may be prudent to reconstruct this measure in a forced-choice format as a fourth item in the church-state battery discussed above.** Thinking about the proper role of religion in political affairs (or, more precisely, the proper role of politics in religious affairs) does seem to force respondents to confront a choice between two different models of religion--religion as comfort vs. religion as challenge. This choice confronts respondents from all religious traditions, another criteria that should loom large in assessing potential religious items for inclusion in production studies.

Table 1

Distribution of Political and General Salience of Religion

	Political Salience of Religion (V970325-6)	General Salience of Religion (V960571-2)
A great deal of guidance	14.6%	35.2%
Quite a bit of guidance	9.7	24.2
Some guidance	16.8	17.1
Not important	58.9	23.5

Table 2

Distribution of Church-State Items

Which of the following two statements comes closer to your view:

"Organized religious groups of all kinds should stay out of politics" 42.6%

"It is important for organized religious groups to stand up for their beliefs in politics." ...57.4

Which comes closer to your view:

"The government should take special steps to protect America's religious heritage".........38.8%

"There should be a high degree of separation between church and state."..........................61.2%

Which comes closer to your view:

"The influence of religion on American politics threatens to divide us as a country" 41.8%

"Religious people must take political action in order to protect their rights."....................58.2%

Table 3
Political Salience and Church-State Scales by Religious Tradition

	Great deal	Quite a bit	Some	Church-None	Church--State I	Church--State II
Protestant:						
Evangelical	26.3	16.8	21.9	35.0	3.65	3.94
Mainline	11.7	4.9	18.4	65.0	3.16	3.42
Black	25.0	35.7	14.3	25.0	4.03	4.26
Catholic	12.5	8.6	17.1	61.8	2.93	3.16
Secular	1.1	0.0	6.8	92.0	2.00	2.95

Table 4
Correlations Among Religious Items

	Evangelical Doctrine	Religious Salience	Political Salience	Church Attendance	Private Devotions	Church-State I	Church-State II
Evangelical Doctrine	1.000	.359	.398	.359	.500	.337	.298
Religious Salience	.359	1.000	.514	.580	.656	.393	.344
Political Salience	.398	.514	1.000	.457	.499	.466	.412
Church Attendance	.359	.580	.457	1.000	.632	.373	.330
Private Devotions	.500	.656	.499	.632	1.000	.418	.362
Church-State I	.337	.393	.466	.373	.418	1.000	.925
Church-State II	.298	.344	.412	.330	.362	.925	1.000

Table 5
Correlation between New Religious Batteries and Social-Political Attitudes

	Church-State I	Church State II	Political Salience	Religious Salience	
All Respondents					
Christian Coalition	.43**	.40**	.33**	.33**	
Gays and lesbians		-.26**	-.22**	-.22**	-.18**
Moral conservatism	.34**	.29**	.32**	.36**	
Abortion	.32**	.28**	.31**	.30**	
Partial birth abortion	.21**	.19**	.13**	.11**	
Women's role	.24**	.20**	.29**	.23**	
Homeless	.01	.02	-.03	.01	
Poor people	-.08*	.08	-.01	-.01	
Participation	-.06	-.06	.00	.03	
Party Identification	.13**	.11**	.13**	.06	
Ideology	.26**	.23**	.26**	.21**	
Evangelicals Protestants					
Christian Coalition	.35**	.28**	.37**	.29**	
Gays and lesbians		-.28**	-.23**	-.17**	-.20**
Moral conservatism	.38**	.35**	.46**	.44**	
Abortion	.33**	.30**	.32**	.28**	
Partial birth abortion	.30**	.24**	.16*	.09	
Women's role	.22**	.21**	.33**	.20**	
Homeless	-.07	-.08	-.18*	-.17*	
Poor people	.02	-.01	.04	.05	
Participation	-.06	-.09	-.03	.05	
Party Identification	.32**	.26**	.27**	.28**	
Ideology	.36**	.34**	.37**	.39**	
Mainline Protestants					
Christian Coalition	.48**	.41*	.16	.20	
Gays and lesbians		-.11	-.06	-.07	.03
Moral conservatism	.23**	.16**	.06	.05	
Abortion	.17	.15	.21*	.24*	
Partial birth abortion	.24*	.20*	.09	.01	
Women's role	.14	.08	.18	.26*	
Homeless	-.03	-.02	-.07	-.11	
Poor people	.18*	.11	-.00	.03	
Participation	-.01	-.05	-.01	-.04	
Party Identification	.01	.11	-.07	-.15	
Ideology	.05	.07	.01	-.04	

(Continued)

(Table 5 continued)

	Church-State I	Church State II	Political Salience	Religious Salience	
Black Protestants					
Christian Coalition	.45**	.51**	.24	.47**	
Gays and lesbians		.16	.05	.04	.00
Moral conservatism	.54**	.49**	.17	.32	
Abortion	-.03	-.04	.02	.04	
Partial birth abortion	.07	.09	.22	.05	
Women's role	.24	.23	.31	.25	
Homeless	.04	-.05	-.07	.20	
Poor people	-.28	-.21	-.10	.08	
Participation	.53**	.48**	.05	.19	
Party Identification	-.07	-.06	.05	-.28	
Ideology	.08	.14	.26	.10	
Catholics					
Christian Coalition	.29**	.29**	.18*	.15	
Gays and lesbians		-.15	-.10	-.15	-.09
Moral conservatism	.20**	.15*	.25**	.23**	
Abortion	.24**	.20**	.26**	.30**	
Partial birth abortion	.14	.17	.19*	.11	
Women's role	.27**	.20	.19**	.10	
Homeless	.02	.08	-.03	-.03	
Poor people	-.05	-.03	-.10	-.02	
Participation	.04	.10	-.08	-.11	
Party Identification	.05	.00	.08	.01	
Ideology	.15	.14	.07	.06	

Table 6
Regression of Selected Dependent Variables on Full Set of Religious Predictors
with Controls for Standard Influences

	Christian Coalition		Abortion		Partial Birth Abortion		Women's Role	
Religious Tradition:								
Evangelical Protestant	.37	.01	.38	.14*	-.07	-.01	-.33	.10
Black Protestant	4.34	.04	.38	.06	-.29	-.02	-.37	-.04
Catholics	-1.47	-.03	.48	.19**	.46	.09	-.12	-.04
Other traditions	-10.3	-.10*	.25	.04	.47	.04	.03	.00
Secular	.16	.00	-.51	-.17**	-.34	-.06	.04	.01
Evangelical doctrine	7.59	.14**	.35	.11*	.34	.06	.14	.03
Church Attendance	-.99	-.08	.08	.12*	.12	.10	.08	.10
Private Devotionalism	.78	-.04	.03	.03	.22	.11	.19	.13
Political Salience of Religion	.92	.05	.06	.06	.01	.01	.14	.11
General Salience of Religion	2.10	.12*	.06	.06	.03	.01	.14	.11
Church-State I	3.13	.23**	.10	.13*	.24	.17**	.10	.12
Adjusted R^2	.43		.25		.16		.16	

Equations included predictors for age, sex, education, region, party identification, ideology and moral conservatism.

Table 7
Frequency distribution of Congregational Priorities
(White respondents only)

	1st priority	*2nd priority*
Give shelter	46.9	16.4
Encourage Political Activity	17.9	18.8
Protect members from heresy	14.6	18.8
Form social action groups	20.6	42.5
	480	463

Table 8
Crosstabulation of Congregational Priorities
(White respondents only)

1st Priority: 2nd Priority:

	Politics	Action	Protect	Shelter
Politics	-	68.3	15.9	15.9
Action	33.3	-	22.9	43.8
Protect	30.9	38.2	_	30.9
Shelter	16.9	57.2	25.9	-

Entries are row percentages

Table 9
Distributions of Alternative measures of Congregational Priorities
(White respondents only)

Simple Typology

Engaged 17.2
Mixed 75.3
Withdrawal 7.5

425

Complex Typology

Pure engagement 19.1
Limited engagement 8.9
Neutral 30.1
Limited withdrawal 33.5
Pure withdrawal 8.4

382

Table 10
Correlations between Congregational Priority Measures and
Other New Religious Items

	V970327 Stay out/ Stand up	V970328 Special Steps/ Separate	V970329 Rel. Divide Protect rights	V970325-6 Political. Salience
Politics	.28***	.26***	.21***	.26***
Social action	.06	.04	-.02	.03
Protect from Heresy	.02	.11*	.10*	.12**
Shelter -.18***	-.17***	-.19***	-.22***	
Simple Typology	-.11*	-.02	.09	.02
Complex Typology	-.18***	-.06	.10	.07

***significant at .001
**significant at .01
*significant at .05

Notes

1. The religious tradition variable was developed by Lyman Kellstedt from the new coding protocol on denomination first implemented in the 1990 ANES.

2. J. Tobin Grant, Stephen T. Mockabee, and Quin Monson, "Strategies for Measuring Religious Affiliation in Public Opinion Surveys," paper was presented at the 1997 Meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research.

3. When the 1997 Pilot first went into the field, it contained a third item that asked respondents to identify the least important congregational priority. As part of a general effort to reduce the length of the interviews, this item was dropped from the interview schedule in the early stages of fieldwork and is not analyzed here.