CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

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March 9, 1993

To: NES Board of Overseers

From: Laura Stoker

Re: New items on the 1993 Pilot Study

The 1993 Pilot Study survey carried a series of questions designed to probe the self- and group-interest basis of policy opinions and candidate evaluations. Each respondent was first asked a set of eight basic questions about national health care, and then asked a parallel set of questions either about the use of federal funds to finance private and parochial schools (school funding) or about affirmative action policies for blacks; random assignment determined whether respondents were questioned about school funding or affirmative action. Given this split-ballot design, the study provides full-sample data on questions pertaining to national health care, and half-sample data on questions pertaining to school funding and affirmative action.[1]

The core set of eight questions included (A) a question asking respondents to provide an overall opinion of the policy under consideration (whether national health care/insurance, school funding, or affirmative action); (B) a question asking respondents to indicate whether the policy would have (national health care, school funding) or has had (affirmative action) either positive or negative consequences for themselves personally; (C) a set of five questions asking respondents to indicate whether the policy would have, or has had, either positive or negative consequences for five groups in society: the middle-class, poor, wealthy, whites, and blacks; and (D) a question again asking about the perceived consequences of the policy, this time with respect to society overall. The order in which these questions were asked was experimentally varied in each case, as depicted below.

First Form:	*Second Form:*
policy question	policy question
consequences for oneself	consequences for society
consequences for middle-class	consequences for middle-class
consequences for poor	consequences for poor
consequences for wealthy	consequences for wealthy
consequences for whites	consequences for whites
consequences for blacks	consequences for blacks
consequences for society	consequences for oneself

[1] This design was used in order to expand the number of issues asked about, paid for at the expense of sample size.

Each policy question followed a branching format yielding responses that ranged from strongly opposed to strongly favorable toward, in turn, the introduction of a government-sponsored national health insurance plan, the use of federal funds to support private and parochial schools, and affirmative action job programs for blacks. Each interest question asked respondents to indicate whether they thought the policy would have or has had very negative, somewhat negative, somewhat positive, very positive, or no consequences -- for themselves personally, society in general, and the five class and race groups. Prospective wording was used for the national health care and school funding; these policies were treated as policy initiatives under consideration. Retrospective wording was used for affirmative action.

In addition, the Pilot Study carried a series of other questions that might help us explain opinions in each of the three issue areas. For example, people were questioned about whether they had children or grandchildren attending private or parochial schools, and about whether they thought affirmative action programs had affected whites' job chances.

Responses to all of these questions provide a rich and extensive set of data that pertains to central theoretical and empirical issues in public opinion research. As I argued in my original proposal, these include the self- and group-interested basis of policy opinions and candidate evaluations; the relationships among self-interest, group-interest, and group-identity, and the circumstances under which group-identity becomes politicized; and the role of interest-calculations in shaping the electoral significance of different political issues.

I have not had time to investigate all of these questions, certainly not with any depth. I have, however, pursued one question in some detail -- how an analysis of the Pilot Study data, which included questions that represent a new approach to measuring self-interest, alters our sense of the role of self-interest in shaping political attitudes. My arguments, and the associated findings from the Pilot Study data, are reported in a recently prepared conference paper that I have appended to this memo, titled "A Reconsideration of Self-Interest in American Public Opinion." Even this effort, however, is limited by the fact that it makes almost no use of the group-interest questions (in a narrowing effort, not because they are unimportant or uninformative). This paper does provide a general overview of the data, briefly discussing the marginals of the full policy and interest series, and the intercorrelations among the interest items.

The analysis in the paper centers on the Pilot Study questions asking people to the evaluate the consequences of each policy for themselves, that measure what I refer to in the paper as self-interest conceived subjectively. As I argue in the paper, I hope persuasively, we have been misled by previous research on self-interest that has relied on objective measures that distinguish among those who stand to benefit and to lose from a given policy, even those that allow for individual differences in perceptions of the extent to which some objectively defined interest has been, is being, or will be promoted or threatened by the policy. Not uncommon are conclusions like this one: "The general public thinks about most political issues, most of the time, in a disinterested frame of mind."[2] Using the measure of self-interest drawn from the Pilot Study, one finds self-interest to play a much more significant role than virtually all of the previous research would suggest.

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[2] Sears, David O. and Carolyn L. Funk. 1990. "Self-Interest in Americans' Political Opinions." In *Beyond Self-Interest*, ed. Jane J. Mansbridge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Page 170.

In making the (new) case for self-interest's importance, I develop a series of arguments about why we would be misled by the conventional strategy for investigating self-interest, even if people's ideas about how they would stand to benefit or lose (or had benefitted or lost) were fully rooted in the tangible, material circumstances of their lives. The open-ended responses, despite being asked of only 39 pilot respondents and 22 pretest respondents, were extremely useful in this context. Because the open-ended responses almost invariably referred to people's tangible, material lives, I was able to at least illustrate some of my arguments about why we would be getting a more accurate picture of self-interest's effect when using the subjective measure contained in the Pilot Study interest-battery. The rest of the case is made by analyzing self-interest using the subjective measure in ways that are comparable to the analysis strategies commonly used in previous investigations. The subjective measure of self-interest bears a very strong relationship to policy opinions even after controlling for all sorts of demographic and predispositional variables (a hard test), as well as responses to the societal-interest question from the interest battery (a harder test).

This does not mean we should immediately abandon the conventional wisdom about self-interest. One question that haunts me concerns the causal direction that flows between the policy opinions and the subjective self-interest responses. I raise this and other issues at the end of the paper. Two kinds of evidence would help us address this issue: panel data replicating the pilot study questions so as to allow more complex modeling of influence flows; a full set of open-ended responses probing what people were thinking about when they offered their closed-ended personal cost/benefit response. As my paper might make clear, I found the open-ended responses much more important and useful than I had anticipated in advance (thanks drk).

As mentioned above, I have barely scratched the surface in analyzing the data, and have not produced a polished set of results or arguments on the other questions they might be used to address, about group-interest or group-conflict, for example, or about issue voting. Furthermore, given the time constraints under which I am operating, unfortunately (I am two hours from getting on a plane to go deliver the aforementioned conference paper), I will not be able to give much attention to the other analyses I have prepared. I append, however, a set of tables presenting some fairly self-explanatory descriptive analyses of the group-interest questions:[3]

Table 1a-2c: Descriptive Statistics on Self- and Group-Interest, by Income
Table 2a-2c: Descriptive Statistics on Self- and Group-Interest, by Race

And I will say something more explicit about the form experiment that was implemented in the study. This discussion will make more sense once you have read or skimmed the attached paper, and thus been more thoroughly introduced to the data.

As noted above, in the first form the assessment of personal consequences immediately followed the policy item, and the societal consequences question came last in the series. In the second form these positions are reversed. In evaluating this experiment I focused on four possible effects, which I will consider in the following order: (1) Differences by form in the variable means (Table 3); (2) Differences by form in the association between the policy opinion and the personal/societal cost/benefit variables (Table 4); (3) Difference by form in the percentage of people identifying the policy as personally consequential (Table 5); (4) Differences by form in the relationship between perceived group costs/benefits and the perceived costs/benefits for oneself (Table 6).

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[3] I will soon prepare an additional memo that discusses the group-interest questions explicitly.

Mean Differences by Form. Although it is possible to imagine reasons for why the ordering manipulation would alter the variables' averages, one would expect, to the contrary, that this not be the case. Table 3 presents the mean difference findings for five variables in each issue area: (1) the policy opinion (scored 0 to 1), to provide a baseline for comparison;[4] (2) personal consequences (scored -1 to +1); (3) societal consequences (scored -1 to +1); and (4 and 5) two recoded group variables: the difference between the cost/benefit assessment for whites and blacks, and the difference between the cost/benefit assessment for wealthy and poor people (each of which range from -2 to +2).

With respect to national health care, the consequences for oneself were judged slightly more positively (.11 vs. .04, p=.07) when the self-interest question was placed last in the series, and the policy was judged slightly less advantageous to the poor (-.72 vs. -.84, p=.05), and blacks (-.17 vs. -.24, p=.03). These differences are slight, but either approach or attain statistical significance at conventional levels, and occur despite the nearly identical policy opinion averages obtained across the groups (.66 vs .67). Thus it appears they are driven by the ordering manipulation.

Yet the pattern obtained for national health care is not replicated across the other two policy areas. With respect to school funding, second form respondents saw poorer consequences for society overall than did first form respondents (-.08 vs. .04, p=.06), but they were also less supportive of the policy overall (.29 vs. .36, p=.09). This pattern supports a sampling interpretation of the apparent differences. For affirmative action, the second form respondents are marginally more supportive of the policy (.26 vs. .20, p=.10), and viewed the policy as substantially more advantageous to poor people than did the first form respondents (-.38 vs. -.14, p=.001). Further analysis shows that almost all of this effect is driven by a mean difference in the assessment of how affirmative action affects wealthy people. The latter is the only really sizeable mean difference to emerge across all of the results. Given the characteristics of the form manipulation, it is hard to come up with a plausible explanation of this finding, and I am inclined to view it as a statistical anomaly. Nevertheless, the bottom line here is that some mean differences occurred.

Differences in the Association between the Policy Opinions and the Personal/Societal Cost/Benefit Assessments. In one form the policy opinion is immediately followed by the personal cost/benefit question and in the other it is followed by the societal cost/benefit question. Following a simple proximity logic, one would expect that the policy opinion--cost/benefit correlation would be enhanced when the items were presented contiguously, and diminished as the number of items that intervene between them increases. As Table 4 shows, however, if anything the opposite is the case. Regardless of the issue, self-interest bears a more powerful relationship to the policy opinion when it was asked last in the series rather than when it was asked immediately following the policy opinion. This is also true regardless of whether the association is measured by bivariate correlation or regression coefficients (see first column of each set), or by the regression coefficients obtained in an equation that controls for societal cost/benefit assessment (see third column of each set). The form difference is smallest for national health care (Rs of .27 vs. .24, bivariate Bs of .76 vs. .74, multivariate Bs of .46 vs .34), moderately larger in the school funding case, and quite strong for affirmative action (Rs of .24 vs. .05, bivariate Bs of .93 vs. 44, and multivariate Bs of .68 vs. .24).

At the same time, the relationship between the societal cost/benefit assessments and the policy opinion tends to be either identical across forms or also enhanced in the second form condition. Thus the greater predictive power of self-interest in the second form does not come at the expense of the

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[4] Randomization leads us to expect no differences across forms in the policy opinions, but such differences might, of course, still emerge by chance.

power of societal assessments.[5] As such, the second-form multivariate equations all exhibit a higher R-squared coefficients than do the first-form equations. Here again, these effects are weakest with respect to the national health care issue and strongest with respect to affirmative action.

We are seeing, then, some pretty clear signs that the group-interest questions are providing a priming context for self-interest. This interpretation is strengthened by an analysis of form differences in the percentage of people identifying each policy as have consequences for themselves, personally (Table 5). In two of three cases, we see that when the personal cost/benefit question comes last in the series people are more likely to identify the policy as having consequences for themselves. This is true for national health care (72% vs 67%), although this difference is not statistically significant, and, especially, for affirmative action (32% vs 20%). These, are also the issues which these respondents perceived as having clear class (national health care) and race (affirmative action) gradients (Tables 1a-1c in paper, attached). There are no differences for school funding (49% vs. 48%), an issue which people did not view as involving class or racial cleavage (Table 1b).

One further comment about the affirmative action results. The form differences in the relationship between one's policy opinion and one's sense of the personal consequences at stake are largest for this issue than for the others (Table 4), but those differences might be interpreted in light of the form effects evident in Table 5. Not only is the first-form sample size small in the affirmative action case (n=148), but only about 30 of those people identified affirmative action as having any consequences for themselves personally. This restriction in the variance of the self-interest variable is of some consequence for the precision of the correlation and regression estimates found in Table 4.

Differences in the Association between Group and Personal Cost/Benefit Assessments. If the group-interest questions prime responses to the self-interest question, this should be evident in the pattern and strength of their associations. One way to evaluate this question involves examining how well the group-interest questions predict the self-interest responses within each form's half-sample. Toward this end, I estimated a regression model relating self- and group interest by form. Since the full-sample results are of some interest, I have appended them, and included a description of the model (Table 7). I will not, however, present the full set of results by form here. For the present purposes it is sufficient to note the general findings about how well the set of group variables predicts the self-interest assessments (Table 6). What we see in each case the R-squared is greater in the second form equations than in the first. These differences are not all that large (ranging from a high of .37 vs .27 for school funding, to a low of .25 vs. .23 for affirmative action), although they are in the right direction for each policy area. Furthermore, the differences are larger in the case where we would expect smaller effects (school funding) and smaller in the cases where we would expect larger effects (the other two issues).

In sum, the form experiment demonstrates that question-order might matter here, but the effects are mostly small and inconsistent across analyses. If one had to choose one ordering strategy, the form two strategy is most advisable.

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[5] The National Health Care case is a partial exception here. The bivariate Bs relating societal consequences to the policy opinion are identical across forms, but both the correlation and multivariate regression coefficient is smaller in the second form.

To conclude, I would judge this Pilot Study investment a huge success. This might be the kind of judgment only a parent can have about her own child, but I think not. The data are rich, provocative, and flexibly suited to addressing numerous questions of significance to public opinion and electoral analysts -- more, however, than I have been able to illustrate in this memo.

I think this is an area of instrumentation that deserves to be considered for inclusion in future NES studies, particularly in 1994. Researchers would benefit from a replication of the health care series and a full-sample replication of the affirmative action questions, for a number of reasons. In general, panel data would enable one to model more complex causal relationships among the interest and policy opinion items, as I mentioned above. Furthermore, replication of the health care series would enable one to follow the development of opinion on this highly salient issue through data that extend from 1992 through 1994. A full-sample replication of the affirmative action series would be useful in order to more fully explore questions of race; my efforts to use these data to analyze racial differences of opinion were consistently stymied by the tiny numbers of blacks in the sample. Finally, I would advocate that the open-ended probe be used, for at least a random subset of the respondents. As mentioned above, responses to this probe in the pilot survey proved to be a very valuable aid to interpretation. I realize that it is completely unrealistic to think that all of this would be done. But if the Board remains interested, I would be happy to offer a more specific set of recommendations that fit within the constraints Board members foresee.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics on Self and Group-Interest, by Income

A. National Health Care

	Low Income Whites (n=104)	Medium Income Whites (n=271)	High Income Whites (n=131)
self average	.30	-.02	-.19
wealthy average	.00	-.15	-.25
poor average	.71	.70	.69
self-wealthy difference[a]	.30	.13	.06
self-poor difference[a]	-.41	-.72	-.88
wealthy-poor difference[b]	-.71	-.84	-.94
self-wealthy correlation	-.15	.28	.44
self-poor correlation	.39	.31	.29
wealthy-poor correlation	-.39	.09	.06
society-wealthy correlation	-.19	.29	.37
society-poor correlation	.51	.51	.49
policy-wealthy correlation	-.23	.23	.26
policy-poor correlation	.30	.32	.36

[a] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to the self.
[b] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to wealthy people.

Table 1 -- Continued
Descriptive Statistics on Self and Group-Interest, by Income

B. Public Funding of Private and Parochial Schools

	Low Income Whites (n=56)	Medium Income Whites (n=152)	High Income Whites (n=72)
self average	.11	-.03	-.09
wealthy average	.26	.16	.14
poor average	.16	.03	-.02
self-wealthy difference[a]	-.15	-.19	-.23
self-poor difference[a]	-.05	-.07	-.07
wealthy-poor difference[b]	.10	.13	.16
self-wealthy correlation	.28	.21	.41
self-poor correlation	.36	.44	.31
wealthy-poor correlation	.01	.20	.09
society-wealthy correlation	.26	.30	.33
society-poor correlation	.53	.71	.60
policy-wealthy correlation	.25	.19	.36
policy-poor correlation	.32	.53	.40

[a] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to the self.
[b] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to wealthy people.

Table 1 -- Continued
Descriptive Statistics on Self and Group-Interest, by Income

C. Affirmative Action

	Low Income Whites (n=47)	Medium Income Whites (n=129)	High Income Whites (n=53)
self average	-.06	-.06	-.17
wealthy average	.02	-.07	-.05
poor average	.34	.18	.17
self-wealthy difference[a]	-.09	.02	-.12
self-poor difference[a]	-.40	-.24	-.34
wealthy-poor difference[b]	-.32	-.25	-.22
self-wealthy correlation	.32	.14	.38
self-poor correlation	.08	.25	.51
wealthy-poor correlation	.06	.22	.39
society-wealthy correlation	.26	.18	.37
society-poor correlation	.30	.30	.30
policy-wealthy correlation	.24	.03	.29
policy-poor correlation	.13	.21	.21

[a] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to the self.
[b] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to wealthy people.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics on Self and Group-Interest, by Race

A. National Health Care

	Whites (n=517)	Blacks (n=66)
self average	.02	.31
white average	.29	.43
black average	.51	.50
self-white difference[a]	-.27	-.12
self-black difference[a]	-.49	-.19
white-black difference[b]	-.22	-.07
self-white correlation	.58	.34
self-black correlation	.39	.09
white-black correlation	.70	.50
society-white correlation	.66	.45
society-black correlation	.53	.50
policy-white correlation	.49	-.02
policy-black correlation	.35	.00

[a] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to the self.
[b] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to white people.

Table 2 -- Continued
Descriptive Statistics on Self and Group-Interest, by Race

B. Public Funding of Private and Parochial Schools

	Whites (n=283)	Blacks (n=34)
self average	-.02	.13
white average	.15	.21
black average	.14	.15
self-white difference[a]	-.17	-.07
self-black difference[a]	-.16	-.02
white-black difference[b]	.02	.06
self-white correlation	.54	.14
self-black correlation	.46	.15
white-black correlation	.75	.46
society-white correlation	.70	.31
society-black correlation	.68	.68
policy-white correlation	.45	.02
policy-black correlation	.44	.33

[a] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to the self.
[b] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to white people.

Table 2 -- Continued
Descriptive Statistics on Self and Group-Interest, by Race

C. Affirmative Action

	Whites (n=250)	Blacks (n=27)
self average	-.08	.09
white average	-.20	.13
black average	.40	.43
self-white difference[a]	.13	-.04
self-black difference[a]	-.48	-.33
white-black difference[b]	-.60	-.30
self-white correlation	.34	-.24
self-black correlation	.10	.50
white-black correlation	.07	-.09
society-white correlation	.49	.14
society-black correlation	.21	.48
policy-white correlation	.37	.21
policy-black correlation	.06	.19

[a] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to the self.
[b] Positive numbers indicate a relative advantage to white people.

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics on Policy and Interest Variables, by Form

	National Health Care		
	Form One: Self before Society	Form Two: Society before Self	p-value
policy opinion 0 (oppose) to 1 (favor)	.67 (.43)	.66 (.43)	.70
consequences for oneself -1 (neg) to +1 (pos)	.04 (.56)	.11 (.60)	.07
consequences for society -1 (neg) to +1 (pos)	.32 (.63)	.29 (.61)	.53
consequences for (wealthy-poor) -2 (poor adv) to +2 (wealthy adv)	-.84 (.82)	-.72 (.75)	.05
consequences for (whites-blacks) -2 (black adv) to +2 (white adv)	-.24 (.47)	-.17 (.43)	.03
	Public Funding of Private and Parochial Schools		
	Form One: Self before Society	Form Two: Society before Self	p-value
policy opinion 0 (oppose) to 1 (favor)	.36 (.44)	.29 (.41)	.09
consequences for oneself -1 (neg) to +1 (pos)	.04 (.48)	-.03 (.49)	.19
consequences for society -1 (neg) to +1 (pos)	.04 (.67)	-.08 (.62)	.06
consequences for (wealthy-poor) -2 (poor adv) to +2 (wealthy adv)	.14 (.89)	.07 (.92)	.43
consequences for (whites-blacks) -2 (black adv) to +2 (white adv)	.00 (.47)	.07 (.53)	.17
	Affirmative Action		
	Form One: Self before Society	Form Two: Society before Self	p-value
policy opinion 0 (oppose) to 1 (favor)	.20 (.30)	.26 (.37)	.10
consequences for oneself -1 (neg) to +1 (pos)	-.05 (.30)	-.04 (.38)	.70
consequences for society -1 (neg) to +1 (pos)	-.02 (.55)	-.04 (.57)	.60
consequences for (wealthy-poor) -2 (poor adv) to +2 (wealthy adv)	-.14 (-.63)	-.38 (.65)	.001
consequences for (whites-blacks) -2 (black adv) to +2 (white adv)	-.56 (.77)	-.56 (.74)	.97

Note: Entries are sample means with standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 4
The Relationship between Policy Opinions
and Personal, Societal Cost/Benefit Assessments, by Form

	National Health Care					
	Form One: Self before Society (n=364)			Form Two: Society before Self (318)		
Consequences of policy for oneself	.74 (10.68)	--	.34 (4.50)	.76 (10.95)	--	.46 (6.31)
Consequences of policy for society	--	.80 (14.06)	.63 (9.34)	--	.81 (12.35)	.58 (8.15)
Adjusted R^2	.24	.35	.38	.27	.32	.40
	Public Funding of Private and Parochial Schools					
	Form One: Self before Society (199)			Form Two: Society before Self (178)		
Consequences of policy for oneself	.63 (5.22)	--	.23 (1.96)	.71 (6.32)	--	.35 (3.13)
Consequences of policy for society	--	.72 (9.20)	.64 (7.40)	--	.76 (9.42)	.64 (7.18)
Adjusted R^2	.12	.30	.31	.18	.33	.36
	Affirmative Action					
	Form One: Self before Society (148)			Form Two: Society before Self (162)		
Consequences of policy for oneself	.44 (2.87)	--	.24 (1.58)	.93 (7.19)	--	.68 (5.03)
Consequences of policy for society	--	.41 (4.95)	.36 (4.25)	--	.62 (6.84)	.42 (4.59)
Adjusted R^2	.05	.14	.15	.24	.22	.32

Table 5
Percentage Viewing the Policy as having Consequences for Themselves, by Form

	Form One: Self before Society	Form Two: Society before Self	p-value
National Health Care	66.8%	71.8%	.17
School Funding	47.9%	48.8%	.87
Affirmative Action	19.7%	32.1%	.02

Table 6
How Well the Group Cost/Benefit Assessments Account for Variation in the Personal Cost/Benefit Assessments, by Form

National Health Care	
Form One: Self before Society (n=291)	Form Two: Society before Self (261)
.40	.43
Public Funding of Private and Parochial Schools	
Form One: Self before Society (167)	Form Two: Society before Self (134)
.27	.37
Affirmative Action	
Form One: Self before Society (125)	Form Two: Society before Self (138)
.23	.25

Note: Entries are R-squared coefficients obtained from regressing personal cost/benefit assessments on race, cost/benefit for whites, cost/benefit for blacks, race*cost/benefit for whites, race*cost/benefit for blacks, income, cost/benefit for wealthy, cost/benefit for poor, income*cost/benefit for wealthy, and income*cost/benfit for poor.

Table 7
The Relationship between Self and Group-Interest

	Health Care (n=546)		School Funding (n=300)		Affirmative Action (n=269)	
	Without controls	With controls	Without controls	With controls	Without controls	With controls
Race 0 (whites), 1 (blacks)	.42 (3.25)	.36 (2.75)	.26 (2.56)	.26 (2.49)	.08	.00
Consequences for whites 0 (neg) to 1 (pos)	.28 (10.06)	.25 (9.02)	.16 (4.23)	.16 (4.13)	.08 (3.57)	.07 (3.05)
Consequences for blacks 0 (neg) to 1 (pos)	-.01	.00	.00	.03	.01	.01
Race * Consequences for whites	-.40 (-2.34)	-.32 (-1.86)	-.34 (-1.94)	-.35 (-1.97)	-.29 (-2.91)	-.32 (-3.15)
Race * Consequences for blacks	-.06	-.09	.02	.03	.21 (1.57)	.20 (1.48)
Income 0 (high) to 1 (low)	.23 (1.41)	.12	.18 (1.51)	.16 (1.34)	.04	.07
Consequences for poor 0 (neg) to 1 (pos)	-.03	-.02	.02	.02	.06 (1.80)	.06 (1.83)
Consequences for wealthy 0 (neg) to 1 (pos)	.08 (2.29)	.06 (1.86)	.07 (1.79)	.06 (1.68)	.03	.04
Income * Consequences for poor	.22 (1.42)	.20	.03	.06	-.08	-.12
Income * Consequences for wealthy	-.36 (-2.51)	-.29 (-1.96)	-.22 (-1.47)	-.21 (-1.39)	.06	.07
Adjusted R^2	.41	.42	.27	.27	.17	.20

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. T-statistics less than 1.3 are not printed. Columns labeled "With Controls" contain results from equations that also included the predictors of self-interest found in Tables 3A, 4A, and 5A from the conference paper, respectively.

Model: Personal Costs/Benefits (0 to 1) = β_1 Race (0=white, 1=black)
+ β_2 Consequences for whites
+ β_3 Consequences for blacks
+ β_4 Race * consequences for whites
+ β_5 Race * consequences for blacks
+ β_6 Income (0=highest to 1=lowest)
+ β_7 Consequences for whites
+ β_8 Consequences for blacks
+ β_9 Income * consequences for whites
+ β_{10} Income * consequences for blacks + ϵ