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Abstract

Peffley and Hurwitz discuss the performance of the items in the 1987 Pilot Study designed to tap the more general and abstract foreign policy postures of respondents. The authors argue that such items should be a more appropriate tool to gauge foreign policy attitudes than traditional measures because they better reflect the public's cognitive foreign policy decision-making process and allow for the continuous study of foreign policy attitudes, independent of changing events. Peffley and Hurwitz find: (1) The three specific posture scales constructed from the Pilot Study items -- militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism -- perform well and have strong discriminate reliability, even though the militarism and anti-communism scales are highly correlated. (2) The militarism and anti-communism measures have a strong effect in predicting a wide range of specific policy positions. The impact of the isolationism scale is more narrow, though it emerges as an important predictor of positions on virtually all policies involving direct U.S. involvement abroad. (3) Overall, foreign policy postures do a poor job of predicting retroactive assessments of international conditions. (4) In this sample, postures were only indirectly related to evaluations of Reagan. However, the relative importance of postures and policies in shaping political evaluations is likely to vary across political contexts. Peffley and Hurwitz conclude that the general posture items perform as expected, and should be included in future surveys. The authors also prepared a supplement to this report in which they respond to questions raised by the NES staff. They argue that the militarism and anti-communism scales are distinct, albeit not orthogonal, constructs. Despite the fact that the two scales are correlated, they function quite differently as predictors of policy positions and have different sets of demographic and value orientation determinants. The authors also make specific recommendations for deletion of foreign policy posture survey items, in the event that all proposed items can not be included in future surveys.

To: NES Board of Overseers
From: Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz
Re: Report on Foreign Policy Items, 1987 Pilot Study

I. INTRODUCTION

In the proposal which we submitted to the NES Pilot Study Committee (which it reviewed at its February, 1987 meeting), we expressed skepticism about some of the traditional findings pertaining to the role of foreign affairs in mass politics. The conventional wisdom holds that the mass public has little information about, or interest in, international politics. Further, the citizenry is assumed to hold poorly structured (or unconstrained) foreign policy attitudes, unstable foreign policy attitudes, and foreign policy attitudes which lack political impact (which are, in other words, relatively independent of presidential evaluations or the vote choice).

As we stated in that proposal,

. . . while we agree that the ordinary citizen operates under considerable uncertainty in attempting to make sense of foreign affairs, we take strong exception to earlier conclusions that, in the face of this uncertainty, the public is unable to connect its foreign policy attitudes together or to its political behavior. Rather, following the literature on social cognition and schemata, we assume that people cope with this uncertainty much the same way they do in other policy content domains--by relying on their general beliefs to guide the processing of more specific information.

It is our contention that it is important to differentiate between cognition which takes place at the general, abstract level--foreign policy postures--and specific policy attitudes. Given the complexity and ambiguity of international politics, it seems likely that individuals conceptualize foreign policy primarily at the general level, where details are less important than values and broad beliefs. Thus, while it may be true that citizens' specific foreign policy attitudes are not stable, highly structured, or antecedents of political decisions, we believe that such findings do little to demonstrate the political unimportance of foreign policy thinking. Rather, we expect broad foreign policy orientations to play a substantially stronger role in political decision making.

On the basis of a series of local probability samples (Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN [1984]; Lexington, KY [February, 1986; May, 1986]), we presented the following findings:

Attitude Constraint. Although others have found foreign policy attitudes to be essentially random (e.g., Converse, 1964), we found impressive linkages between foreign policy postures (such as militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism), on the one hand, and specific foreign policy

attitudes--e.g., nuclear weapons, military involvement, defense spending, and anti-terrorism policies--on the other hand. Such policy attitudes, we maintain, are constrained by more abstract orientations. Moreover, in a series of regression equations, we found general foreign policy predispositions (postures) to be significant predictors of more specific policy attitudes, even when controlling for the effects of partisanship and ideological self-placement. The militarism and anti-communism postures, in particular, were estimated to be powerful determinants of defense spending, nuclear arms, military involvement, and other policy attitudes--more powerful, even, than partisanship and conventional ideology. As well, militarism predispositions at Time 1 were found to be significant predictors of anti-terrorism policies at Time 2, again outweighing the effects of partisanship and ideology.

Retrospective Evaluations. Upon examining the impact of postures on retrospective assessments of international conditions, we determined a significant impact of the former on the latter. Those who reject a tough, militaristic approach to foreign affairs were much more likely to perceive the threat of war as having worsened over the preceding year, for instance.

Presidential Support. In part because of the effect of postural orientation on retrospective evaluations, we also found foreign policy postures to play a major role in presidential evaluations. In the first place, we found a direct effect of postures on evaluation such that those with more "tough-minded" or militaristic postures were significantly more likely to approve of Ronald Reagan's performance as President (controlling for ideology, partisanship, and economic attitudes), presumably because such individuals are more likely to approve of the President's methods of international policy-making. And in the second place, we also found an indirect impact of posture on evaluation: because such militaristic persons are more likely to be optimistic about the results of the administration (i.e., they perceive improvement in our chances of staying out of war), they are also more likely to reward the President for his results.

Based on the findings from local surveys, we requested that the NES include a battery of foreign policy items (at both the postural and specific policy levels) on the 1987 Pilot Study. In this report, we summarize our findings of the 1987 Pilot data regarding the success of these items. Our basic contention throughout this report is that current NES instrumentation is inadequate for the purpose of investigating foreign policy attitude structure, if not foreign policy attitude content. In the first place, NES interviews typically contain too few items

germane to the foreign policy domain. Second, items which are germane tap attitudes toward specific policies (e.g., defense spending); while we advocate retaining (and supplementing) these specific policy items, we argue that a number of survey items are needed which assess more general, abstract foreign policy orientations (postures) as well as retrospective items measuring evaluations of international outcomes. General-level postures are more powerful than specific-level instruments for, as noted, postures provide an important heuristic which individuals can use to make sense of world events. Foreign policy rhetoric and cognition, consequently, takes place at this general level. Thus, we expect responses to postural questions to be stronger predictors of political behaviors and evaluations, as well as to exhibit considerable consistency within mass belief systems.

Moreover, we maintain that it is more parsimonious to emphasize the general-level, rather than the specific-level, survey items. In domestic politics, certain policies (e.g., taxation, abortion, affirmative action, etc.) remain on the political agenda year after year. In the foreign policy domain, however, changing world conditions and new technologies constantly shift the focus and salience of specific policies. Over the past decade, discussion of an Anti-Ballistic Missile System has been replaced with discussion of a Strategic Defense Initiative, and we now debate involvement in Nicaragua rather than in Afghanistan. But general-level concerns, such as a predisposition to favor military solutions or to avoid foreign entanglements, transcend specific circumstances and are perennially relevant as a result. To the extent that questionnaire item continuity is beneficial, therefore, postural questions have a great deal to recommend them.

In sum, we will advocate: 1) increasing the number and range of specific policy items in the foreign policy domain; 2) adding a battery of foreign policy postural items; and 3) improving our ability to examine the importance of foreign policy outcomes to the mass public by including several foreign policy retrospective judgment items. In order to support this request, we will address the following topics:

Part II: Reliability of items and scales composed of such items

A: Reliability of posture items

B: Reliability of policy items

Part III: Foreign policy postures as antecedents of concrete foreign policy attitudes

Part IV: Foreign policy postures as antecedents of retrospective evaluations

Part V: Predicting presidential support from foreign policy attitudes

Part VI: Conclusions and recommendations

II. ITEM ANALYSIS

The NES 1987 Pilot Study (Wave II) contained three foreign policy posture scales (militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism) and five specific foreign policy attitude scales (nuclear policy, military involvement policy, defense spending policy, trade policy, and anti-terrorism policy). It is not possible to contrast directly these scales with extant foreign policy scales inasmuch as current NES surveys do not contain equivalent batteries of foreign policy items. We can, however, shed some light on the performance of the indicators used on the 1987 Pilot.

A: General Foreign Policy Attitudes (Postures)

Due to the complexity of the foreign policy domain, cognitive heuristics, or informational short-cuts, should be of great importance in explaining how people evaluate specific foreign policy proposals. Yet, the standard mechanisms used to simplify domestic politics-- partisanship, liberalism - conservatism, self-interest, and social class-- have consistently been found to be irrelevant to foreign policy considerations (Converse, 1964; Pomper, 1975; Erikson, et al., 1980; Gamson and Modigliani, 1972). In short, we presently lack an adequate understanding of the antecedents and correlates of foreign policy issue positions.

Rather than import domestic constructs into the foreign domain, our research has focused on various foreign policy postures which, we believe, organize mass thinking in foreign affairs. Postures are defined as general orientations toward the world, including orientations towards other nations and orientations pertaining to our relationships with other nations. Thus, when individuals think at the postural level, they define other nations as friendly or threatening and, as well, develop normative beliefs concerning the general stance that the government should adopt in its interactions abroad. Unlike policy positions, which are specific preferences for or against a given policy, postural positions are general enough to transcend any specific application. An individual with an isolationist posture, for example, has a general predisposition to avoid any foreign entanglement, regardless of the part of the world. By relying on such general prescriptions to render more specific preferences, citizens are able to categorize and evaluate economically a wide variety of concrete policies on the basis of whether those policies are consistent with their more general postures.

Three foreign policy postures should be particularly important in guiding mass reactions to foreign affairs: militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism. Our selection of these postures has been motivated by the work of Kegley and Wittkopf (1982), Schneider (1984), and others who contend that foreign policy choices for the mass public are guided by questions concerning: 1) the extent to which the United States

should become involved with other nations (i.e., isolationism); 2) whether involvement, if desired, should be militaristic or non-militaristic (i.e., militarism); and 3) the appropriate stance of our government toward the primary targets of U.S. involvement abroad--the Soviet Union and communist-bloc countries (i.e., anti-communism).

The three global postures of militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism are especially attractive as interpretive aids for several reasons. First, placing oneself on such general dimensions assumes no deep familiarity with foreign policy events and information. Second, postures should be relatively easy dimensions to use in light of the fact that most public rhetoric in the area of foreign policy is pitched at the general, symbolic level rather than at the specific, policy level. Finally, we believe these broad dimensions underlie much of the public discourse in the international sphere, especially during the Reagan Administration of the last six years.

Our definition and operationalization of each posture are described below; please refer to Table 1 for survey items used to construct the indices and the statistics generated from item analyses.

 Table 1 About Here.

Militarism. This dimension is anchored, on the one end, by a desire that the government assume an assertive, militant foreign policy posture through military strength, versus a desire for a more flexible and accommodating stance through negotiations, on the other end. The six items used to tap this dimension are presented in Section A of Table 1. The first two items are five-point branching scales posing a trade-off between "toughness" and "flexibility" in dealing with other countries (V5229) and between emphasizing military strength or negotiation as the preferred method of keeping peace (V5232).¹ The next three items are five-point Likert scales which measure the extent to which respondents agree that we should go to the brink of war to preserve our country's military dominance (V5249); the only way to resolve disputes with other countries is through negotiations (V5250);

¹It should be noted that we did not use the NES summary variables, which coded respondents volunteering a centrist option ("both/neither") as missing data, to represent the foreign policy branching items in our analysis. Rather, we recoded these volunteered responses to the mid-point of the branching scales (position 3 on a 5-point scale), along with "uncertain" respondents. It seems reasonable that those who are uncertain or who select both options (or neither option) are ambivalent individuals; consequently, they are appropriately placed at the center of the continuum.

and the U.S. should use military force only as a last resort (V5235). The final item, a four-point scale, asks how important it is that the U.S. is militarily strong enough to get its way with its adversaries (V2245).

In Table 1 we present the results of the item analyses of the militarism scale. For the most part, responses to the individual items appear to be balanced, with the mean response tending to fall in the middle three categories of the five-point scales. A notable exception is the fifth item, to which fewer than seven percent disagreed and more than sixty percent strongly agreed. With responses heavily skewed toward agreement, this question failed to scale with the other items; consequently, it was dropped from the militarism index.

The remaining five items form an acceptable scale (Cronbach's alpha = .63). In addition, the overall scale appears to be well-balanced: the mean of the scale, which ranges from 5 to 24, is 15.3

Anti-Communism. Individuals who represent the anti-communist pole of this dimension view communism, and its primary practitioner (the USSR), with a great deal of apprehensiveness because of its perceived threatening nature; their consequent predisposition is to advocate a "hard-line" strategy in our dealings with communist nations, especially if their intention is to expand its boundaries. Those anchoring the other end of the spectrum, while not necessarily approving of communist rule, are relatively more moderate in their distrust of it and less preoccupied with arresting the spread of Soviet-bloc influence.

Five items were used to compose the anti-communist index. Three Likert items were employed to assess agreement with the goal of containing communism (V5251), the goal of restricting the spread of Soviet influence (V5252), and belief that communist nations are, by nature, threatening to the United States (V5253). In addition, we included a two-sided question asking whether the U.S. should be tougher or more cooperative with the U.S.S.R. (V5235) and an item measuring the degree to which the respondent feels that the Soviet Union represents a threat to this country (V5238).

Item analysis statistics can be found in Table 1, Section B. It can be seen that, although Item 1 responses are somewhat skewed, overall responses are variable and, on the five-point scales, fall away from the extreme end-points. The mean score of the index is 12.5 on a scale ranging from 5 to 24; clearly, anti-communism runs high among the American public. Together, these five items form a scale with impressive reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .69), with all items substantially correlated with the full scale. This scale should prove useful not only for examining this important foreign policy posture, but also for monitoring fear of Soviet-bloc nations and anti-communist sentiment over time.

Isolationism. The isolationism posture is defined by a

general desire that the government avoid any ties or entanglements with other nations, regardless of the nature of the relationship (i.e., political, military, economic, or diplomatic). Responses to two Likert statements comprise the isolationism index: 1) a standard NES item expressing the view that the U.S. would be better off by not becoming involved abroad (V5254); and 2) an item which we recommended (V5255). As indicated in Table 1, Section C, responses to these two items are closely related (Pearson's $r = .672$).

To shed additional light on the content and meaning of the postures in the 1987 Pilot, we present (see Table 2) Pearson correlations from a matrix containing the three postures and assorted domestic orientations (partisanship, liberal-conservative ideological self-placement, equality of opportunity, and moral traditionalism). Partisanship and ideology were measured by the traditional seven-point scales used in the 1986 study (split-half experiments with these items rendered them unusable in the Pilot data). Attitudes regarding equality of opportunity were measured by the six-item battery in the 1986 study (V626, V702 to V706), and moral traditionalism was estimated using the six-item index found in the Pilot survey (Wave I, V2192 to V2197).

 Table 2 About Here.

Focusing first on the correlations between the three postures, several comments are in order. First, the isolationism dimension is largely orthogonal to the militarism and anti-communism dimensions (Pearson r 's = $-.15$ and $-.22$, respectively). This finding is predictable on theoretical grounds: while the isolationism dimension asks whether the U.S. should become involved with other countries in any fashion, while the other dimensions ask what the nature of U.S. involvement should be.

Second, it should be noted that militarism and anti-communism are strongly correlated ($r = .52$). To some extent, this relationship is to be expected, for the Soviet Union and communist-bloc countries represent the principal adversaries of the United States in world affairs and, doubtless for many respondents, when questions refer to relations with our adversaries (as two items in the militarism scale do), the implicit reference is to the U.S.S.R.

The major problem, however, lies with the anti-communism scale--specifically with the modified NES item (B.3: Some people believe we should be much more cooperative with Russia, while others feel we should be much tougher in our dealing with Russia.). This item is correlated at $r = .45$ with the militarism scale, while the other four items are correlated at about $r = .30$ with militarism. This finding is not surprising for, as we noted in our initial proposal, the NES item very probably confounds the toughness component of militarism with attitudes

toward Russia in a way that the other four items do not. Our recommendation, therefore, will be to exclude Item B.3 from the scale (unless the Board decides not to include a militarism posture scale). When only the remaining four items (B.1, B.2, B.4, B.5) are scaled, reliability drops only slightly (Cronbach's alpha = .67). Moreover, the predictive power of the anti-communism scale decreases only marginally--the four item scale predicts specific policies and presidential approval just as well as the five item scale (which included the NES item).

Turning to the upper portion of the matrix in Table 2, we note that the correlations between the three postures and domestic orientations are relatively low, even at the zero-order level. We underscore this finding in order to demonstrate the discriminant validity of the postural scales. For example, there is no direct theoretical link between partisanship and the foreign policy postures and the data confirm that such a relationship does not exist empirically.

The most notable bivariate relationships are between ideology and militarism ($r = .20$), ideology and anti-communism ($r = .26$), equal-opportunity and militarism ($r = .218$), and moral traditionalism and anti-communism ($r = .32$). It is not puzzling to find ideological self-placement to be associated with two of the postures; the ideological dimension has such broad range that many individuals (correctly) place themselves on the liberalism-conservatism spectrum, at least in part, based on their foreign policy beliefs as well as their domestic views. In addition, there are logical explanations for the relationship between moral traditionalism and anti-communism, for the values of the most traditional respondents are strongly at odds with those promoted within the Soviet system (at least as it is stereotypically perceived by the western world). While we acknowledge our inability to account for the equal-opportunity/militarism relationship, the overriding pattern of Table 2 provides strong evidence of discriminant validity. The three postural scales, in other words, are essentially independent of the constructs to which they should not be theoretically linked, while they are modestly related to other constructs in theoretically predictable ways.

B: Specific Foreign Policy Attitudes

Although our primary concern has been to construct adequate measures of general postures, for several reasons we recommend including a variety of specific foreign policy issue items: 1) to demonstrate that the three postures are capable of explaining a wide range of issue preferences; 2) to explore the direct impact of individuals' issue preferences on political evaluations (such as retrospective judgments and presidential approval); and 3) to monitor this important opinion domain over time.

We are aware of the numerous studies which demonstrate low levels of information on foreign policy issues and a lack of crystallized opinion on such topics. Yet, we believe that much of this public ignorance is due to the very specific level at which

survey questions are often written. Consequently, our intention is to suggest items which measure a respondent's level of support for a specific government reaction to a foreign policy problem, yet in a way which does not require the respondent to understand much jargon or definition.

The survey questions measuring specific foreign policy attitudes, as well as item analysis statistics, are presented in Table 3.

 Table 3 About Here.

Nuclear Policy Attitudes. Concern with nuclear weaponry can only increase in the future, as political and technological developments raise new questions and problems each year. During the Reagan Administration, featuring debate about the Strategic Defense Initiative, a Reagan-Gorbachev summit, and expectations of an intermediate-range missile treaty, public awareness of nuclear arsenals appears to have been heightened.

In assembling questions for a nuclear policy attitude scale, we sought a balance between relatively "permanent" items which should be applicable for many years, on the one hand, and items specifically tied to items on the current foreign policy issue agenda. Three items were included on the second wave of the 1987 Pilot study: two Likert items measured support/opposition for building more nuclear weapons (V5239) and the development of a "Star Wars" system (V5241), as well as a two-sided question on whether it would be better to negotiate with the Soviets as soon as possible or only after we built up our nuclear arsenal (V5240).

It can be seen that, overall, the items in the nuclear policy index scale well; although the scale contains only three items, estimated reliability is quite satisfactory (Cronbach's alpha = .64). The only substantial problem, to be discussed further below, is item A.3 which asks about the best way to achieve an arms agreement with the Soviets. Although it is correlated with the scale, responses are strongly skewed, perhaps because there now appears to be a consensus (joined even by President Reagan) on the importance of negotiating very soon with the U.S.S.R.²

Military Involvement Policy Attitudes. Easily the most visible version of foreign policy is military involvement abroad. It is, as well, the most controversial and consequential of foreign policy initiatives. Thus, it is important to gain some understanding of the circumstances under which the mass public would support military involvement. To this end, three five-point

²In addition, future versions of this item would be improved by using a five-point branching format.

Likert-type items were included on the second wave of the 1987 Pilot; these inquired about support for sending U.S. troops to Central America to stop the spread of communism (V5242), to the Middle East to preserve our supply of oil (V5243), and to Poland if the Soviets invaded that nation (V5244). Additionally, two items appeared on the first wave of the Pilot, one asking whether the U.S. should become more or less involved in the internal affairs of the Central American countries (V2246), and the other inquiring about whether the funding for the Nicaraguan Contras from the U.S. should be increased, held constant, or decreased (V2277). Two scales have been constructed from these five items: the first is a Central America military involvement policy scale which includes items B.1, B.2 and B.3, and the second is a more general military involvement policy scale which includes items on sending troops to Poland (C.1) and to the Middle East (C.2) as well as the three items which constitute the Central America military involvement scale.

The three items constituting the Central American index scale quite well, reflected in an impressive alpha coefficient (.65) for a three item scale. All three questions are approximately equally correlated with the scale. The general military involvement policy scale, as well, is quite reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .72).

We noted above that we are skeptical of the utility of using survey questions containing jargon because of the bias against respondents with crystallized attitudes who, nonetheless, cannot respond to an item because of an unfamiliar stimulus. Fortunately, such a problem does not appear to be present with the Contra funding item (B.3), nor with the Star Wars item (A.2), for the frequency of missing responses is not appreciably higher for these questions than for others. Apparently, the substantial news coverage given to both arms control and the Contra issue has provided information to individuals necessary to answer these questions.

Defense Spending Policy Attitudes. We see no reason to change the defense spending item currently used by the NES. In telephone interviews, we recommend using the same branching format as used in 1980, in which respondents were asked whether defense spending should be increased, held constant, or decreased; a follow-up question then inquired about whether spending should be increased/decreased "a lot" or "a little."

Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes. No issue has received more attention in recent years than methods to combat terrorism. This is clearly a salient issue to the mass public, both because of its dramatic nature and because individuals often believe that they can be affected personally if they travel abroad or if terrorists cross U.S. borders.

In the second wave of the Pilot study, respondents were asked a battery of five-point Likert-type questions about the extent to which they would approve or disapprove of the U.S.

responding to terrorist acts by cutting off trade with countries supporting terrorists (V5257), assassinating leaders of countries supporting terrorists (V5258), bombing nations supporting terrorists (V5259), and invading countries supporting terrorists (V5260).

The first item (F.1), which proposes a diplomatic response (ending trade), did not scale well with the other, more militant, options. We assume that this problem is caused, in large part, by the response distribution, which is quite heavily skewed in the direction of approval of ending trade. When this item is dropped from the anti-terrorism index, coefficient alpha improves dramatically from .60 (with four items) to .73 (with three items). We recommend substituting the option "attacking suspected terrorist camps" (which we had initially proposed) for the option "attacking suspected terrorist camps"; in the Lexington survey opinion was evenly distributed with regard to this response to terrorism.

Question Format. As a parenthetical point, we note that we are sensitive to the general problem of response-set bias when using Likert-type questions to assess approval for specific foreign policy proposals. Such a problem is particularly likely when individuals lack information and crystallized attitudes and, consequently, will tend to "favor" policies mentioned in the survey item. In general, we have found response-set bias not to be a significant problem in the foreign policy items; measures of dispersion and skewness of Likert-format items compare favorably with those of non-Likert-format items. In large measure the success of the Likert-type questions can be attributed to the NES practice of presenting these items separately rather than as parts of very large batteries.

An exception can be found among the anti-terrorism Likert items, in which the degree of skewness is among the worst in Table 3. Closer inspection, however, indicates that the problem lies with certain items rather than with the format in which the items are presented. Consider the two most badly skewed options--F.1 (trade) and F.2 (assassination). Both of these are extreme proposals which generate little variation in responses. While very few individuals disapprove of the trade option (mean = 1.65), very few approve of assassination (mean = 4.05). It is likely, in other words, that responses are skewed because of the valid measurement of public opinion rather than because of a high level of non-random measurement error.

A split-half experiment performed in the NES Pilot study offers an opportunity to explore further the potential effects of response-set bias in batteries of Likert-type questions. The half of the respondents which was interviewed using Form A was presented with the four anti-terrorism options in the order listed in Table 3 (i.e., cut trade, assassinate leaders, bomb countries, and invading countries), while the other half, which responded to Form B, was given the items in reverse order. If response-set bias is affecting responses, the same option should receive higher approval rates when they are presented later in

the battery rather than near the top of the list.

 Table 4 About Here.

Mean approval of the four anti-terrorism items is listed in Table 4, with Form A and Form B results in the first and second columns, respectively. (Higher approval rates are reflected in lower mean scores for a particular item.) Order of presentation does, indeed, affect responses, as mean approval differs between forms on three of the four items. Yet, these differences are quite modest (approximately .20 on a five-point scale). More importantly, it should be noted that approval of items, rather than becoming more likely if the option is presented lower in the battery, actually becomes less likely. In each of the three cases, options receive less support when they are presented later in the battery (Form B for the trade and assassination options; Form A for the invasion item) rather than earlier. Thus, as respondents progress through the battery, a reactance against military options appears to emerge rather than a yea-saying bias.

Moreover, responses to items appearing later appear to be more thoughtful, for there are stronger and more significant linkages to the postural variables when the options are regressed on the three postures and several domestic orientations. These equations are presented in Table 5.³ It can be seen that, with the single exception of the assassination question, more variance is explained in the responses to the anti-terrorism policy option when the item is presented lower, rather than earlier, in the battery. In conclusion, at least in this instance, there is little evidence that a short battery of Likert items measuring approval of specific foreign policy options produces all of the maladies associated with Likert scales; rather, there is some indication that a four-item battery is better than, say, a single Likert-type question.

³The following equations have been estimated:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Specific Issue Preference} = & b_0 + B_1 (\text{Militarism}) \\ & + B_2 (\text{Anti-Communism}) \\ & + B_3 (\text{Isolationism}) \\ & + B_4 (\text{Patriotism}) \\ & + B_5 (\text{Partisanship}) \\ & + B_6 (\text{Ideological Self-Placement}) \\ & + B_7 (\text{Moral Traditionalism}) \\ & + B_8 (\text{Equality of Opportunity}) \end{aligned}$$

(Patriotism is assessed by the six-item scale in Wave I of the Pilot. The Militarism Scale omits item A.5. All other variables are operationalized as above. All variables are coded with lower values indicating the conservative and more militaristic responses.)

 Table 5 About Here.

III. POSTURES AS DETERMINANTS OF SPECIFIC POLICY POSITIONS

The motivation behind our initial proposal to the Board was that foreign policy has not been appropriately measured by most analysts. It has been our contention that we should pay substantially more attention to broad, abstract orientations (which we have been calling postures), for these serve as the powerful heuristics which individuals use to organize their more specific attitudes on foreign policy issues.

To document this assumption, we examine the impact of postures by regressing specific issue positions on the foreign policy postures and several important domestic orientation variables, and present these equations in Table 6. (Please refer to note 3 for an explanation of these equations.)⁴

 Table 6 About Here.

One general finding, which is consistent across almost all of the equations, is the poor predictive power of the domestic orientation variables in the models. In only three instances are the coefficients (standardized) for partisan and ideological identifications, equality, and moral traditionalism significant predictors of foreign policy preferences, and in these instances the coefficients are quite modest.

Two of the three significant non-foreign coefficients are noteworthy because the direction of the relationship is unexpected. For example, when controlling for a host of international orientations, Republicans are found to be less willing to approve increasing the nation's nuclear arsenal than Democrats are; this outcome may be a reflection of a Republican support for the anticipated arms agreement between Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev on limiting intermediate-range missiles. A second surprise is that "moralists" are less supportive of the President's Star Wars program than are others. In fact, in a number of equations, when morality is stripped of foreign policy orientations by controlling for postures, moralists are often found to be less supportive of more militant options (though the negative coefficients are generally quite small). The only other significant coefficient among the non-international orientations runs in the expected direction, such that conservatives are more likely to approve of the bombing of countries which support

⁴The Anti-Terrorism Policy Scale contains only three items (excluding the trade option [F.1]).

terrorists.

Despite these few exceptions, however, our basic finding is that the domestic orientations play only a very small role in explaining attitudes toward specific foreign policy initiatives. Instead, the predictors of international issues are domain-specific, with the explanatory strength of the various foreign policy postures varying with the specific issue. The linkages between postures and policies (as reflected by the beta coefficients) are often quite strong and, equally important, a substantial proportion of the variation in policy preferences is explained by the postures. For instance, over thirty percent of the variance in the nuclear policy and Central American policy indices is explained. And even in the single-indicator equations the postures play an impressive role, explaining a great deal of the variance in defense spending, for example.

In the majority of policy equations, the two important predictor variables are militarism and anti-communism, with the relative importance of these two predispositions varying across different types of issues. It is clear that, as might be expected, militarism plays a predominant role in shaping preferences on military-type issues. Those favoring a tough, assertive international stance (as opposed to a more accommodating orientation) are especially likely to favor increased defense spending (beta = .46), more nuclear weapons (beta = .33), augmenting the nation's arsenal as a better way to achieve an arms treaty (beta = .33), and the development of Star Wars (beta = .15). Militarism is the single most important predictor of respondents' position on the nuclear policy index (beta = .31). It should be noted that anti-communism also plays a large role in defense spending and nuclear policy equations, although the magnitude of the coefficients is somewhat lower than those associated with the militarism posture, appearing significant in all but the arms treaty equation.

The same general pattern is evident in the anti-terrorism policy equations, perhaps because most of the options presented to respondents included mention of some type of military (or quasi-military) response (bombing, invading, and assassinating). Specifically, those with more militaristic predispositions are significantly more likely to support bombing (beta = .31), invading (beta = .18), and assassinating leaders of nations supporting terrorists (beta = .19); as well the militarism posture is the strongest single predictor of the anti-terrorism index responses (beta = .28). The anti-communism measure yields the expected results, though the coefficient is significant only as a determinant of approving invading terrorist nations (beta = .19) and of the anti-terrorism index (beta = .16).

The relative importance of militarism and anti-communism are usually reversed in decisions to involve the United States in military conflicts around the world. Though militarists are often significantly more likely to approve of proposals for some form of military involvement, anti-communists are especially likely to approve of sending U.S. troops to Central America (beta = .46),

increasing spending for the Contras (beta = .19), becoming more involved in the internal affairs of Central American countries (beta = .15), and sending U.S. troops to Poland (beta = .23) and the Middle East (beta = .36). In part, the prominence of the anti-communist posture variable results from the explicit or implicit mention of communism in the question. Two of the dependent variables which are most strongly predicted, in fact, contain direct mention of communism (sending troops to Central America and to Poland). Still, anti-communism also has a large impact on the Mideast question--a question which omits any reference (even implicit) to communists.

Understandably, anti-communism is the best predictor of approval of increasing trade with the Soviet Union (beta = .32), though even in this instance a preference for a militant U.S. stance in world affairs is associated with disapproval of resumed trade between the two superpowers (beta = .14). Anti-communists and militarists are also more likely to agree that the U.S. should have the "biggest say in the United Nations" (V2174).

The impact of isolationism is more narrow, though it emerges as an important predictor in theoretically predictable circumstances. Isolationists, for instance, are more likely to oppose trade with the Soviet Union (beta = -.30) and tend to be in disagreement with the statement concerning America's enlarged role in the United Nations (beta = -.22). Moreover, as expected isolationists express more disapproval of U.S. military involvement than do non-isolationists. Specifically, the former are less likely to support involvement in Central America (beta = -.18), spending for the Contras (beta = -.14), and sending troops to Poland (beta = -.12). Although the effects of isolationism are neither as pervasive nor as strong as those of the other two postures, it must be remembered that the relationships in Table 6 are those which exist independently of an individual's posture toward communist countries and independent of one's militarism posture. Further, it is significant (in a theoretical sense) that the isolationism posture emerges as a determinant of virtually all policies which represent direct U.S. involvement abroad, including various forms of military involvement as well as trade with the Soviets and participation in an international forum.

IV. DETERMINANTS OF RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATIONS

As we noted in our initial proposal, including several retrospective evaluations on the Pilot would create an opportunity to examine the relationship between postures and individuals' evaluations of international outcomes. There is a theoretical basis for the expectation that one's interpretation of a very complex situation (such as the health of U.S. international relations), where very few firm and objective standards are available to help the perceiver make an accurate judgment, will be dependent upon the perspective which the individual brings to the situation. We might expect, for instance, that those with a more militaristic orientation toward

foreign policy would evaluate the international successes of the Reagan administration in a fundamentally different way from those with a more accommodationist predisposition.

On the other hand, there is evidence that economic retrospective judgments are largely independent of individuals' economic general orientations (e.g., Conover, Feldman, and Knight, 1986). Are foreign policy outcomes similar to economic outcomes, or are they more susceptible to bias resulting from prior general beliefs because, if anything, the international scene is even more complex and difficult to decipher objectively than is the economic world?

In order to examine the antecedents of international retrospective judgments, three items were placed on Wave II of the Pilot study:

1. Over the last few years, do you think our chances of getting into a war have increased, decreased, or haven't they changed? (If "increased" or "decreased," asked "Would you say that they have increased/decreased a lot or little?")

2. Over the last few years, do you think relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have gotten much better, somewhat better, stayed about the same, become somewhat worse, or much worse?

3. During the past year, would you say that the United States' position in the world has grown weaker, stayed about the same, or has it grown stronger?

It should be noted, first, that our proposal in this area was fairly modest considering the lengthy battery of performance questions used to measure economic assessments. Second, we point out that, because we use single indicators and because we avoided questions asking about approval of the president's handling of foreign policy (which are quite susceptible to rationalization), we have "stacked the deck" against finding retrospective judgments to be influenced by general foreign policy beliefs.

The three retrospective items have been regressed on the same eight variables used to predict specific issues (Table 6), resulting in the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Retrospective Evaluation} &= b_0 + B_1 (\text{Militarism}) \\ &+ B_2 (\text{Anti-Communism}) \\ &+ B_3 (\text{Isolationism}) \\ &+ B_4 (\text{Patriotism}) \\ &+ B_5 (\text{Partisanship}) \\ &+ B_6 (\text{Ideological Self-Placement}) \\ &+ B_7 (\text{Moral Traditionalism}) \\ &+ B_8 (\text{Equality of Opportunity}) \end{aligned}$$

Variables are defined in the same manner as in the prior set of equations. Table 7 contains the standardized beta coefficients.

 Table 7 About Here.

Overall, the postures do a poor job of predicting assessments of international conditions. Of the three retrospective evaluations, only assessments of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union are shaped by foreign policy orientations. Isolationists, or those who are suspicious of any ties with other countries, are more pessimistic than non-isolationists in their appraisals of trends in relations between the two superpowers (beta = $-.20$). And those who are more patriotic have a greater tendency to see U.S.-Soviet relations as deteriorating over the past year than do others (beta = $-.18$). Otherwise, foreign policy beliefs do not explain retrospective judgments, at least not at conventional levels of significance.

The consistently poor showing of the postures is, to some extent, a product of the overlap between militarism and anti-communism. As can be seen in Table 7, while the coefficients are in the expected direction, they simply are not sufficiently large to reach thresholds of significance. In fact, when militarism is dropped from the equation predicting U.S.-Soviet relations, anti-communists are found to be significantly more optimistic in their assessments of superpower relations (beta = $.18$).

The fact remains, however, that international retrospective evaluations come close to economic retrospective assessments in their independence from general beliefs (Conover, Feldman, and Knight, 1984). Prospective judgments in foreign affairs may rely more on general (postural) attitudes, just as they do in the economic domain.

IV. PREDICTING PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT FROM FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES

Although the impact of foreign policy attitudes on presidential support has been seldom studied, we have argued (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987) that there are at least two reasons to expect one's international orientations to influence his or her assessments of presidents. First, a direct relationship between an individual's foreign policy attitudes (both postural and specific) and presidential support may exist because those who are, for example, more militaristic are likely to praise a president who pursues a militaristic foreign policy. And second, there are also reasons to expect foreign policy predispositions to exert an indirect influence over presidential support to the degree that postural orientations influence retrospective judgments about international situations which, in turn, may affect judgments about presidents.

In each of the three waves of the NES panel, respondents were asked whether they strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president. In Wave II of the Pilot, we have the variables necessary to estimate a fully specified model of Reagan approval, including domestic orientations, foreign policy postures, specific foreign policy preferences, and international retrospective evaluations.

The following model of Wave II Reagan approval has been estimated:

Reagan Approval = $B_0 + B_1$ (Militarism)
 B_2 (Anti-Communism)
 B_3 (Isolationism)
 B_4 (Patriotism)
 B_5 (Partisanship)
 B_6 (Ideological Self-Placement)
 B_7 (Moral Traditionalism)
 B_8 (Equality of Opportunity)
 B_9 (U.S. World Position Retrospective
Evaluation)
 B_{10} (Chance of War Retrospective
Evaluation)
 B_{11} (Central American Policy Index)
 B_{12} (Nuclear Policy Index)

All variables are measured as in prior equations.

Although we include no measures of specific domestic attitudes in the equation (split-half experiments on the Pilot precluded using such items), the four non-international orientations (partisanship, ideology, morality, and equality) should adequately represent the domestic side of policy attitudes. Neither have we included any economic retrospective attitudes for these, too, were not available from the Pilot. Nonetheless, the effects of the foreign policy variables should not be significantly biased if, as we expect, economic assessments are not related to foreign policy attitudes.

We included in the equation only two of the three foreign policy retrospective items (omitting relations with the Soviet Union) and only two of the several specific foreign policy variables (omitting, for example, defense spending and anti-terrorist attitudes) because preliminary analysis indicated that the omitted foreign policy variables have little effect on Reagan approval, even at the zero-order level. With eight foreign policy variables already in the equation, the criterion of parsimony led us to leave these "less important" predictors out of our analysis.

Table 8 About Here.

Regression results are presented in the first column of Table 8. As can be seen, several of the foreign policy attitudes are significantly associated with approval of President Reagan in the second wave of the Pilot study. Reagan approval is more solid among respondents who feel that America's position in the world has become stronger (beta = -.11), among those feeling that the chances of war have decreased (beta = -.10), among individuals who favor U.S. military involvement in Central America (beta = .27), and among persons opposing attempts to reduce America's nuclear arsenal (beta = .16). On the other hand, none of the three postures are found to be significantly related to

presidential support. Rather, the influence of these postural variables on approval works only indirectly, by shaping attitudes toward specific issues (see Table 6) and, to a lesser extent, retrospective judgments (see Table 7).

Clearly, these results differ from those obtained from our February, 1986 Lexington study, which showed militarism (along with nuclear policy and retrospective foreign policy judgments) to be significantly tied to support for the President. It is our view that the poor showing of the postures in the present analysis can be attributed to the greater importance of specific issues in the last two waves of the NES panel. Certainly, the issues of nuclear policy and, especially, Central American policy were much more important in April, 1987 (when the Pilot data were collected) than they were in February, 1986. With the Reykjavik meeting, that anticipation of a Reagan-Gorbachev summit, the debate surrounding the Strategic Defense Initiative, and, especially, the daily revelations of "Irangate," these two issues doubtless penetrated public awareness to a degree that is unusual for specific foreign policy issues.

One way to demonstrate this point is to utilize the survey data collected in the 1986 post-election study. Since many of the essential variables in the Reagan approval equation were also asked in the 1986 study, it is possible to determine whether Central American policy became more important over time. In the last three columns of Table 8, we estimate the following equations of Reagan approval, measured in the post-election 1986 Wave, as well as Waves I and II of the Pilot (in columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Reagan Approval} = & B0 + B1 (\text{Militarism}) \\ & B2 (\text{Anti-Communism}) \\ & B3 (\text{Isolationism}) \\ & B4 (\text{Partisanship}) \\ & B5 (\text{Ideological Self-Placement}) \\ & B6 (\text{Moral Traditionalism}) \\ & B7 (\text{Equality of Opportunity}) \\ & B8 (\text{U.S. World Position Retrospective} \\ & \quad \text{Evaluation}) \\ & B9 (\text{Central American Policy Index}) \end{aligned}$$

Ideally, all of the variables would be measured in each of the three waves of the panel and only the variables measured in that panel would be used to predict Reagan approval. Unfortunately, however, in some cases we were forced to use a variable from one panel to predict a variable from a different panel. The 1986 approval equation, consequently, includes measures of morality and the three postures that were measured in the Pilot study, and the Pilot study approval equation includes domestic orientations measured during the 1986 study. This unfortunate, albeit inevitable, "mixing-and-matching" of the general orientations should not be a large problem if we can assume that these variables tend to be fairly stable over time.

For the other two variables in the analysis, period-appropriate measures do exist. Respondents were asked to make retrospective judgments of the United States' position in the world in 1986 and then again in the second wave of the Pilot. And they were also asked two of the Central American policy questions (spending for the Contras and the extent of U.S. involvement in Central America) in 1986 and again in the first wave of the Pilot study.

From the regression results in Table 8, it is clear that the issue of U.S. involvement in Central America became increasingly important from one wave of the panel to the next, as the salience of this issue was, no doubt, raised by the events noted above. In 1986, the unstandardized coefficient is only .04 and is not significant. By the first wave of the Pilot, the coefficient is .14 and significant beyond the .01 level; it increases to .19 by the time of Wave II. Interestingly, though the Central American policy items were assessed in the first wave of the panel, these same attitudes are more powerfully tied to Reagan approval assessed in the second wave.

The essential conclusion from this analysis is that the relative importance of postures and policies in shaping political evaluations is likely to vary across different political conditions. If no single issue dominates the public's attention, such as Central American policy, or if public attitudes on such issues have not yet galvanized, then political evaluations may depend more on the general postures pursued by the government than on any specific policies. When policies become more salient, however, postures are likely to play a more indirect role in shaping more immediate political evaluations.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A: General Foreign Policy Attitudes (Postures)

We have attempted to make the argument that, if the NES is concerned with the measurement and analysis of foreign policy attitudes, it should give first priority to items specifically designed to assess foreign policy thinking at the postural level. Our contention rests essentially on two bases. First, those who use Consortium data frequently are appreciative of continuity; only if the same questions are asked periodically can they chart fluctuations in mass beliefs over time. But foreign policy is not like some of the domestic policy domains, which are often characterized by agenda issues which are constant over long periods of time. Issues such as minority aid, unemployment and jobs, and taxation are almost timeless in the sense that they are always appropriate to include on broad range questionnaires. In the foreign policy domain, on the other hand, specific issues (with only a few exceptions [e.g., defense spending]) rarely remain on the agenda very long. The foreign policy postures which we have recommended, however, should remain entirely relevant for quite some time, for they are specifically designed to transcend specific circumstances. Thus, postural items, much more than specific policy items, will advantage the time series aspect of

the NES instruments.

Second, we believe that researchers are "missing the boat" if they attempt to analyze public opinion in the foreign policy domain by examining responses to specific issue items. Rather, we have argued that citizens, in the face of great uncertainty and ambiguity, rely on broad, abstract orientations to anchor their more specific attitudes. Postures, in other words, serve as heuristics for most individuals. And because it is quite easy for most persons to take a position on a posture without having a great deal of information, most individuals will find it quite convenient to resort to such general beliefs when thinking about foreign policy--a tendency which is reinforced by the tendency of political elites to pitch rhetoric at the postural level.

We have described three specific postures--militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism--and would recommend including measures of all three on the NES survey. If forced to choose, we would probably endorse most strongly the militarism and anti-communism dimensions, both of which have an enduring quality. Communist-bloc nations have been the primary target of U.S. foreign policy for the entire post-war era. These countries are also familiar objects of public opinion that exist in a domain where actors and issues change constantly. Moreover, anti-communist beliefs are rooted in strong, affective orientations, adding to the richness of the dimension. Many of these same points can be made of the militarism posture. Differences between militarists and accommodationists over military preparedness and the willingness to use military might have been at the heart of much of the bitter conflict in public debate since the Vietnam War.

In our various analyses, both of these postures proved to be excellent predictors of public preferences on a range of specific policy issues in foreign affairs. Despite the overlap between the two postures, when it comes to predicting specific preferences, discriminant validity is impressive, with anti-communism being a good predictor of public approval of policy options requiring U.S. involvement in various areas of the globe (e.g., Central America, Poland) where the rationale for participation is the prevention of Soviet or communist expansion. Militarism, on the other hand, is the better predictor of attitudes toward defense spending, nuclear policy, and military involvement issues where containment of communism is not an issue--such as approval of militant anti-terrorism proposals and intervention in the Middle East.

Isolationism appears to be a useful predictor of primarily diplomatic issues (trade and participation in the United Nations), but these are less likely to assume center stage in driving mass political reactions than are military-type issues. And while isolationism has long-standing historical roots in mass attitudes in foreign affairs, the attitude itself--rejecting any ties between the United States and foreign countries--may be somewhat anachronistic in light of developments in foreign affairs in the post-war era. In the present study, only about a

quarter of the respondents agreed with the isolationist sentiment expressed in either of the two Likert items tapping this dimension. And most of the variation in responses was in the intensity with which people rejected isolationism as a general proposition.

On the other hand, isolationism performed quite well in the non-military equations and, as well, in several of the military involvement equations, predicting willingness to become involved in Central America, support the Contras, and send troops to Poland. Still, if forced to choose, we would recommend including militarism and anti-communism rather than isolationism.⁵

The performance of the postures in explaining retrospective evaluations and presidential support was not nearly as impressive as it was in our two local surveys in Lexington (February, 1986) and the Twin Cities (Fall, 1984). In the case of retrospective evaluations, postures were no more successful than domestic orientations in explaining different perceptions of international conditions (although anti-communism was significant when militarism was dropped from one of the equations). In the case of presidential support, of the three postures, only anti-communism is significantly tied to approval for President Reagan, and this is true in only two of the three waves of the panel.

Neither of these "non-findings," however, vitiates the importance of postures in explaining mass beliefs. If retrospective judgments are truly independent of postures, we then conclude simply that such retrospective evaluations are an important independent influence of presidential support. Moreover, as we noted above, the role of postures in influencing political evaluations is likely to fluctuate over time. When specific policies are salient--as they were during the frame of the NES panel--postures may only exert an indirect effect (through specific issues) in shaping presidential support. Yet, the salience of the Central American and nuclear weapons issues during the time of the study is unusual. Under normal circumstances, when specific foreign policy issues are less salient and crystallized, postures should be more important in driving political evaluations, as they proved to be in our local studies. If specific issues are salient, and public attitudes on the issue are galvanized, and researchers are lucky enough to design questions to tap these attitudes appropriately, then postures would be unimportant for predicting political evaluations. The low probability of meeting all of these conditions, however, means that postures should be the primary focus of NES efforts in developing instruments to tap foreign policy attitudes.

If these two postures are included, how should they be measured? Ideally, the five-item indices presented in Table 1 (militarism: A.1-4, A.6; anti-communism: B.1-5) should be

⁵We will also be working to develop new isolationism items which are more appropriate in an interventionist era.

employed, but if space limitations are prohibitive, the number of items for each scale could be reduced.

Of the anti-communism items, the NES question asking whether the United States should be cooperative or tough with Russia could be dropped from the index, for several reasons. First, of the five items presented in Table 1, it has the lowest item-total correlation coefficient, and dropping it from the index reduces the alpha coefficient only slightly (from .69 to .67). In addition, as noted above, this item is in large part responsible for the substantial overlap between anti-communism and militarism; when it is dropped from the index, the correlation between anti-communism and militarism decreases from .52 to .42. Finally, and most convincingly, after dropping this item, the loss to the predictive power of the anti-communism index is marginal. The four remaining items predict specific policies and Reagan approval just as well as does the five-item scale that includes the NES question (results not shown). Therefore, to reduce the number of items in the anti-communism index and to improve the discriminant validity of this scale alongside militarism, our recommendation is to drop the NES item from the anti-communism scale.

The militarism scale could be reduced to the three items in Table 1 with the highest item-total correlations: A.1 (V5229), A.2 (V5232), and A.6 (V2245). Coefficient alpha for this three-item scale is .59, only slightly less than the .61 coefficient for the five-item scale. In addition, when this new militarism index is used to predict specific policy preferences, the standardized regression coefficients are not, with few exceptions, significantly reduced.

After reviewing our initial proposal, the NES Board expressed some reservations about the two branching items ("toughness" and "the best way to peace") because, it was pointed out, some respondents might view both alternatives--being tough and being flexible, emphasizing military strength and negotiations--as being desirable. We have maintained that the poles of the militarism continuum are represented by two very different postures--one tough and assertive, the other flexible and accommodating. While it is certainly true that some people may value both approaches to foreign policy, our analysis clearly indicates that the relative emphasis that most people attach to the poles of the continuum is extremely important. In fact, the correlations between the two branching items and the militarism scale are among the highest in Table 1, and the correlations between the specific policy scales and these two items are consistently greater than those obtained with other items in the militarism scale. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, the choices which respondents make in selecting one option over the other are meaningful choices which reflect underlying beliefs. Further, we maintain that people who volunteer "both/neither" responses to these branching items are entirely analogous to individuals who select the fourth point of a seven-point scale--i.e., they are legitimately ambivalent or uncertain about their preferences.

B: Specific Policy Attitudes

One consistent finding to emerge from both our local surveys and the three waves of the NES panel is that specific foreign policy attitudes play an important role in affecting presidential support. In the present study, attitudes toward nuclear armament and U.S. military involvement in Central America were important predictors of approval of President Reagan, especially by the April wave of the panel. Whether the political impact of these issues is due to an unusual and not-to-be repeated combination of short-term political forces such as "Irangate" remains to be seen. What seems clear, however, is that these and other specific issues deserve a great deal more sustained attention from public opinion analysts than they have received in the past.

Having said that specific issues are likely to be important determinants of political evaluations, however, recommendations concerning what particular items to use must remain tentative and general because the focus of foreign policy issues is likely to be constantly changing, even more so than domestic issues. On the basis of our analysis, we can suggest the following general guidelines in developing specific foreign policy items. First, and most generally, it is important to steer a middle course between items that tap more enduring, general issues and items that tap specific foreign policy issues (such as involvement in current conflicts or support for new military technologies). If the public is aware of very specific foreign policy issues and is energized by them, then more specific questions are likely to tap the full power of the connections between these issues and political evaluations. On the other hand, the more specific the issue, the more transient its relevance on the political agenda, and the more narrow its currency among the mass public. Some balance, consequently, is necessary.

Second, if possible, the items should avoid esoteric jargon, such as "Contras" or "Star Wars," unless accompanied by explanation for those respondents who have opinions on the issue but are not well-versed in terminology. For example, rather than ask whether the U.S. should "support the Contra rebels . . . to help them in their fight to overthrow the Sandanista government in Nicaragua," as the NES item now reads, a better question might ask about spending for the "Contras, who are fighting to overthrow the communist government in Nicaragua." As another example, the Star Wars item in the Pilot asks about approval for a "space-based Star Wars system intended to protect against a nuclear attack," rather than just referring to "S.D.I." or "Star Wars."

Third, if space is available, a two-sided format is desirable, since individuals may not have easy, quick access to both sides of an issue in their working memory. For example, a more general and two-sided form of the Contra question is:

Some people think that the United States should cut off military aid to forces fighting against the communists in Central America so that we do not become involved in

another war. Others think that we should continue military aid to prevent the spread of communism in that region. What about you?

In the absence of a two-sided format, multiple Likert items asking the extent to which respondents approve or disapprove of various proposals are recommended. If some proposals are "liberal" and some are "conservative," response-set bias should be held to a minimum. And, by using multiple indicators, the deficiencies of any particular question will not be so severe.

While long batteries of Likerts are not recommended, for obvious reasons, our analysis of responses to the battery of anti-terrorist items did not find attitudes generated by these questions to be plagued by response-set bias. In fact, our conclusion was that responses to the items at the end of the four-item battery were more thoughtful, and more closely tied to general orientations, than items presented earlier in the battery. Thus, when used sparingly, batteries of easily (and quickly) administered Likert-type policy questions may hold important advantages.

More specifically, we recommend:

1. Among the nuclear policy items, the Star Wars question, while not one which will remain relevant for long, is useful for tapping opinion on a very important current issue. Item V5240 (Should the U.S. negotiate with the Soviets as soon as possible or, instead, build up our nuclear arsenal), on the other hand, is already dated. As noted above, responses are badly skewed due to the virtual consensus on the importance of negotiating quite soon--an opinion even shared by President Reagan. We recommend substituting one of the following, which we have used successfully on a recent Lexington survey:

- A. Some people feel that if the Soviet Union agrees to stop testing nuclear weapons the United States should do the same. Others feel that we should not stop testing nuclear weapons, even if the Soviets do, because we can't trust the Soviets to keep their word.

- B. Some people think that the United States should cut back its nuclear arsenal on its own to encourage the Soviets to make similar cuts. Others think this would be a mistake because the Soviets would take advantage of us and increase their own nuclear arsenal.

These items should remain viable regardless of what happens in the foreseeable future with respect to arms control agreements.

2. As we indicated in the proposal, the current NES item asking whether the U.S. should become more or less involved in the internal affairs of Central American countries (V2246) should be replaced with a substitute, such as the item cited above ("Some people think that the United States should cut off military aid to forces fighting against the communists in Central America. . . ."), which we have used with good success in various local surveys. "Involvement" is an ambiguous cue which can be interpreted as military, economic aid, or diplomatic involvement.

3. The defense spending item, of course, should be retained. It assesses opinion on a central policy area and, as well, is a very good extension of militarism at the concrete level.

4. We are ambivalent about the Soviet trade item. On the one hand, we are able to explain an acceptable proportion of variance in attitudes about trade, and it is one of the few non-military policy questions on the questionnaire. Thus, it serves to "round out" the domain. On the other hand, it is a policy which is, at best, only peripheral to the concerns of respondents. Thus, we expect opinion on this issue to exhibit the properties of non-attitudes. Clearly, this item is not high on our list of priorities.

5. The anti-terrorism battery, if possible, should be retained. Although it is a somewhat "temporary" issue in the sense that opinions have only crystallized recently, it is also an extremely important area of concern. Moreover, the battery can be administered quickly, and the items form a good scale. As indicated earlier, however, the option of cutting off trade with nations supporting terrorism should be replaced with "attacking suspected terrorist camps" in order to generate more variation of opinion.

C. Retrospective Evaluations

In each of the three waves of the NES panel and in our two local surveys, presidential approval has been found to be affected by retrospective assessments of international conditions. In the present study, approval for President Reagan was significantly tied to perceptions of whether the chances of the U.S. getting into a war had increased or decreased, and whether the position of the U.S. in the world has become weaker or stronger over the last few years, even when both retrospective evaluation items were included in the same equation. Obviously, a great deal more can and should be done to investigate retrospective evaluations in foreign affairs. At a minimum, analysts could follow the development of questions used to tap retrospective judgments of economic conditions, by asking about future as well as past assessments of international conditions (e.g., "do you expect relations between the Soviet Union and the United States to get better or worse over the next year or so?") and by using multiple indicators of retrospective evaluations (e.g., to supplement the U.S. position in the world question, ask: "the amount of respect that other countries in the world have for the United States,").

We would recommend against asking questions of the form: "Do you approve of the way Ronald Reagan is handling _____?", Such items encourage rationalization on the part of respondents.

We might have discovered more substantial political effects of retrospective evaluations if we had included a follow-up question to assess responsibility for world affairs, by, for example, asking people who felt that the chances of war had increased (decreased), "how much do you blame Ronald Reagan for not decreasing the chances of the U.S. getting into a war?". In the Twin Cities study, we found that retrospective judgments alone had little impact on presidential support, but when these judgments were weighted by attributions of responsibility, they were politically quite powerful,

APPENDIX

FOREIGN POLICY ITEMS ON 1987 NES PILOT STUDY

I. FOREIGN POLICY POSTURE ITEMSA. Militarism

1. *Some people feel that in dealing with other nations our government should be strong and tough. Others feel that our government should be understanding and flexible. Which comes closer to the way you feel--that our government should be strong and tough or understanding and flexible?

2. *Which do you think is the better way for us to keep peace--by having a very strong military so other countries won't attack us, or by working out our disagreements at the bargaining table?

3. **The U.S. should maintain its position as the world's most powerful nation, even if it means going to the brink of war.

4. **The only way to settle disputes with our adversaries is to negotiate with them, not by using military force.

5. **When dealing with adversaries, the U.S. should use military force only as a last resort.

6. How important is it for the U.S. to have a strong military force in order to get our way with our adversaries? Is it extremely important, very important, somewhat important, or not at all important? (Wave I)

B. Anti-Communism

1. **The United States should do everything it can to prevent the spread of communism to any other part of the world?

2. **The U.S. should not worry so much about trying to stop the spread of Soviet influence everywhere in the world.

3. *Some people believe we should be much more cooperative with Russia, while others believe that we should be much tougher in our dealings with Russia. Which comes closer to the way you feel?

4. How much of a threat do you think the Soviet Union is to the vital interests and security of the United States--extremely threatening, very threatening, somewhat threatening, or not at all threatening?

5. **Any time a country goes communist, it should be considered a threat to the vital interests and security of the United States.

C. Isolationism

1. **This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.

2. **We shouldn't risk our nation's happiness and well-being by getting involved with other nations.

II. SPECIFIC FOREIGN POLICY ITEMS

A. Nuclear Policy

1. Would you strongly favor, not so strongly favor, not so strongly oppose, or strongly oppose the U.S. building more nuclear weapons?

2. Would you strongly favor, not so strongly favor, not so strongly oppose, or strongly oppose the United States developing a space-based Star Wars system intended to protect against nuclear attack?

3. Most people think that we must prevent nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union by reaching a nuclear arms agreement. Some people think the best way to do this is to negotiate with the Soviets as soon as possible; others think that the best way is first to build up our nuclear arms so that we can then negotiate from a position of strength. Which do you think is the better way to prevent nuclear war--negotiate as soon as possible, or first build up our nuclear arms?

B. Military Involvement Policy

1. Would you strongly favor, not so strongly favor, not so strongly oppose, or strongly oppose sending U.S. troops to Central America to stop the spread of communism?

2. Some people think the United States should become much less involved in the internal affairs of Central American countries. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point 1. Others believe that the U.S. government should become much more involved in this part of the world. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some

people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?

3. If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, would you like to see spending for aid to the Contras in Nicaragua increased, decreased, or kept about the same?

4. Would you strongly favor, not so strongly favor, not so strongly oppose, or strongly oppose sending U.S. troops to the Middle East to keep our supply of oil from being cut off?

5. Would you strongly favor, not so strongly favor, not so strongly oppose, or strongly oppose sending U.S. troops to Poland if that country were invaded by the Soviet Union?

C. Defense Spending Policy

1. Some people believe we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. How strongly do you feel that we should spend less? Do you feel strongly or not very strongly? (How strongly do you feel that defense spending should be increased? Do you feel strongly or not very strongly?)

D. Soviet Trade Policy

1. Would you strongly favor, not so strongly favor, not so strongly oppose, or strongly oppose promoting increased trade between the United States and the Soviet Union?

E. Anti-Terrorism Policy

I'd like to read you a list of different ways the United States could respond to terrorist acts and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you would strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove of our government undertaking them. The first is. . .

1. Cutting off trade to countries supporting terrorists?
2. Assassinating leaders of countries supporting terrorists?
3. Bombing countries supporting terrorists?
4. Invading countries supporting terrorists?

III. RETROSPECTIVE PERFORMANCE JUDGMENT ITEMS

1. Over the last few years, do you think our chances of getting into a war have increased, decreased, or haven't they changed? (If "Increased" or "Decreased": Would you say that they have increased/decreased a lot or a little?)

2. Over the last few years, do you think relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have gotten much better, somewhat better, stayed about the same, become somewhat worse, or much worse?

3. During the past year, would you say that the United States' position in the world has grown weaker, stayed about the same, or has it grown stronger? (If "weaker" or "stronger": Has it grown much weaker/stronger or only somewhat weaker/stronger?)

*Indicates a five-point branching scale where respondents were asked to choose the position that was closer to their own, and then asked whether they felt strongly or not so strongly about that position, with uncertain at the midpoint of the scale.

**Indicates a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree, not so strongly agree, uncertain, not so strongly disagree, and strongly disagree.

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Table 1
Item Analysis of Responses to Postural Survey Questions

A. Militarism	Mean	S.D.	Skew	Item-Total Correl.
1. *Some people feel that in dealing with other nations our govt. should be strong and tough. Others feel that our govt. should be understanding and flexible. (V5229)	2.86	1.67	.122	.405
2. *Which do you think is the best way for us to keep the peace--by having a very strong military so other countries won't attack us, or by working out our disagreements at the bargaining table? (V5232)	1.27	1.67	.553	.456
3. **The U.S. should maintain its position as the world's most powerful nation, even going to the brink of war if necessary. (V5249)	3.04	1.49	.029	.358
4. **The only way to settle disputes with our adversaries is to negotiate with them, not by using our military force. (V5250)	2.10	1.19	.895	.315
5. **When dealing with our adversaries, the U.S. should use its military force only as a last resort. (V5235)	1.55	.877	2.06	.110
6. How important is it for the U.S. to have a very strong military force to get our way with our adversaries--extremely, very, somewhat, not important? (V2245)	1.94	.866	.405	.425
			Alpha (6-item) = .605	
			Alpha (5-item) = .628 (excludes item 5)	
<hr/>				
B. Anti-Communism				
1. *The United States should do everything it can to prevent the spread of Communism to any other part of the world. (V5251)	2.25	1.26	.865	.488
2. *The U.S. should not worry so much about trying to stop the spread of Soviet influence everywhere in the world. (V5252)	3.13	1.44	.051	.393
3. **Some people believe we should be much more cooperative with Russia, while others feel we should be much tougher in our dealing with Russia. (V5235)	2.67	1.65	.303	.360
4. How much of a threat do you think Russia is to the vital interests and security of the United States--extremely, very, somewhat, or not at all threatening? (V5238)	2.43	.837	-.423	.431
5. **Any time a country goes Communist, it should be considered a threat to the vital interests and security of the United States. (V5253)	2.36	1.28	.629	.516
			Alpha = .689	

Table 1 (Cont'd)

Item Analysis of Responses to Postural Survey Questions

C. Isolationism	Mean	S. D.	Skew
1. **This country would be much better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world. (V5254)	3.82	1.37	-.892
2. **We shouldn't risk our happiness and well-being by getting involved with other nations. (V5255)	3.56	1.36	-.534

Pearson = .672

Note: The following items have been recoded so that lower values correspond to the more conservative position on the scale: A4, A5, and B2.

**Indicates a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree, not so strongly agree, uncertain, not so strongly disagree, and strongly disagree.

*Indicates a five-point branching scale where respondents were asked to choose the position that was closer to their own and then asked whether they felt strongly or not so strongly about that position, with uncertain at the midpoint of the scale. "Both/neither" responses were recoded to the mid-point of the scale.

Table 2

Pearson Correlations between Foreign Policy Postures
and Domestic Orientations

	PID	L-C	EQO	MT	ISO	MIL	COM
Party Id	—	.33	.31	.11	-.13	.14	.15
Liberal- Conservatism		—	.30	.35	-.06*	.20	.26
Equal Opportunity			—	.20	.01*	.218	.14
Moral Traditionalism				—	-.01*	.11	.32
Isolationism					—	-.15	-.22
Militarism						—	.52
Anti-Communism							—

Note: Entries are Pearson Correlation Coefficients

* $p > .05$

Table 3

Survey Questions and Item Analysis of Specific Policy Preferences

	Mean	S.D.	Skew	Item-Total Correl.	3-Item- Total Correl.	5-Item- Total Correl.
<u>A. Nuclear Policy (Alpha = .64)</u>						
1. [Favor or oppose] building more nuclear weapons. (V5239)	3.83	1.38	-.906	.361		
2. [Favor or oppose] developing a space-based Star Wars system intended to guard against nuclear attack? (V5241)	2.73	1.61	.284	.431		
3. Some people think the best way [to reach an arms agreement] is to negotiate ...as soon as possible; others think the best way is to build up...so that we can negotiate from a position of strength. (V5240)	1.21	.411	1.42	.412		
<u>B. Central American Policy (Alpha = .65)</u>						
1. [Favor or oppose] sending U.S. to Central America to stop the spread of Communism? (V5242)	3.50	1.50	-.512	.402	.526	
2. [Should the United States become less involved in the internal affairs of Central American countries or more involved?] (V2246)	3.90	1.74	-.059	.465	.448	
3. [Spend more, same, or less on] aid to the Contras in Nicaragua. (V2267)	2.51	.697	-.411	.490	.400	
<u>C. Other Military Involvement</u>						
1. [Favor or oppose] sending U.S. troops to the Middle East to keep our supply of oil from being cut off? (V5243)	2.93	1.54	.100		.563	
2. [Favor or oppose] sending U.S. troops to Poland if the Soviet Union invaded that country? (V5244)	3.66	1.65	-.029		.468	
	Alpha (5-items) = .720					
<u>D. Defense Spending</u>						
1. Some people feel we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel defense spending should be greatly increased. (V5246)	2.69	1.46	.310			

Table 3 (Cont'd)

Survey Questions and Item Analysis of Specific Policy Preferences

E. Soviet Trade	Mean	S.D.	Skew	Item-Total Correl.
1. [Favor or oppose] increased trade between the U.S. and the Soviet Union? (V5248)	2.36	1.44	.713	
<u>E. Anti-Terrorist Attitudes</u>				
[Approve or disapprove of the different ways the U.S. could respond to terrorist acts]				
1. Cutting off trade with countries supporting terrorists? (V5257)	1.65	1.07	1.89	.093
2. Assassinating leaders of countries supporting terrorists? (V5258)	4.05	1.31	-1.29	.445
3. Bombing countries supporting terrorists? (V5259)	3.60	1.39	-.618	.579
4. Invading countries supporting terrorists? (V5260)	3.51	1.39	-.506	.527

Alpha (4-item) = .600

Alpha (3-item) = .729

Table 4

Mean Approval of Anti-Terrorist Proposals Given Alternative Question Orderings

Anti-Terrorist Proposals	Form A (order)		Form B (order)		Difference
Cut Off Trade	1.54	(1)	1.78	(4)	-.24
Assassinate Leaders	3.96	(2)	4.15	(3)	-.19
Bomb Countries	3.60	(3)	3.61	(2)	-.01
Invade Countries	3.61	(4)	3.43	(1)	+.18
N	180		179		

Table 5
Question Order and Regressions of Anti-Terrorist Attitudes on General Orientations

Anti-Terrorist Attitudes

General Orientations	Cut Off Trade (A: 1st)	Cut Off Trade (B: 4th)	Assass Leaders (A: 2nd)	Assass Leaders (B: 3rd)
Militarism	-.003(.02)	.02(.03)	.06(.03)*	.06(.03)*
Anti-Communism	-.005(.02)	-.02(.03)	.02(.06)	.04(.03)
Isolationism	.01(.03)	.08(.03)*	-.08(.05)	-.04(.04)
Patriotism	.03(.02)	.07(.02)**	.03(.03)	-.05(.03)
Party ID	.07(.04)	.04(.05)	-.08(.06)	.03(.05)
Ideology	-.01(.05)	.08(.06)	.07(.07)	-.04(.06)
Morality	-.00(.02)	-.00(.02)	-.03(.02)	.01(.02)
Equality	-.02(.02)	-.00(.02)	-.01(.03)	.03(.09)
R2	.05	.16	.09	.09
Adj R2	.00	.11	.04	.04
N	158	156	158	156

Anti-Terrorist Attitudes

General Orientations	Bomb Countries (A: 3rd)	Bomb Countries (B: 2nd)	Invade Countries (A: 4th)	Invade Countries (B: 1st)
Militarism	.08(.02)*	.11(.03)**	.05(.02)*	.05(.03)
Anti-Communism	.03(.03)	.02(.03)	.08(.03)**	.05(.03)
Isolationism	.01(.04)	.04(.07)	-.02(.04)	-.07(.05)
Patriotism	.05(.02)*	-.01(.03)	.04(.03)	-.01(.03)
Party ID	-.08(.05)	.09(.06)	-.08(.05)	.03(.06)
Ideology	.16(.06)*	.03(.07)	.10(.06)	-.05(.07)
Morality	-.03(.02)	-.00(.02)	-.02(.02)	.01(.02)
Equality	.02(.02)	.04(.03)	-.01(.02)	.02(.03)
R2	.25	.22	.21	.09
Adj R2	.21	.17	.17	.04
N	158	156	158	156

*p < .05, **p < .01

Table 6
Regressions of Specific Foreign Attitudes on General Orientations
Defense and Nuclear Policy Attitudes

General Orientations	Defense Spending	Increase Nuclear Arsenal	Arms Treaty	Starwars	Nuclear Policy Index
Militarism	.46**	.33**	.33**	.15**	.31**
Anti-Communism	.23**	.15*	.11	.22**	.22**
Isolationism	.03	.00	-.01	.03	.02
Patriotism	.03	.04	-.01	.17**	.03
Party ID	-.02	-.15**	-.01	.09	-.03
Ideology	-.04	.07	-.01	.06	.07
Morality	.02	-.01	.01	-.12*	.02
Equality	.06	.10	.06	.05	.09
R2	.41	.24	.16	.22	.31
Adj R2	.39	.22	.14	.20	.30
N	315	316	314	316	314

Military Involvement Policy Attitudes

General Orientations	Send U.S. Troops to Central America	U.S. Involvement in Cent. America	Spending for Contras	Central America Index	Send U.S. Troops to Poland	Send U.S. Troops to Mideast
Militarism	.09	.15*	.15*	.19**	.10	.12*
Anti-Communism	.46**	.15*	.19**	.33**	.23**	.36**
Isolationism	.09	.18**	.14**	.18**	.12*	-.03
Patriotism	.03	.12	.02	.08	-.04	-.02
Party ID	.09	.02	.09	.10	.08	.08
Ideology	-.03	.07	.06	.03	-.12	-.08
Morality	-.06	-.01	.02	-.02	.03	-.02
Equality	.01	.07	.00	.06	-.09	.01
R2	.31	.20	.17	.37	.12	.17
Adj R2	.29	.18	.15	.35	.09	.15
N	316	280	316	268	301	316

*p < .05, **p < .01

Table 6 (Cont'd)

Regressions of Specific Foreign Attitudes on General Orientations

Approval of Actions Against Terrorists

General Orientations	Bomb Countries Supporting Terrorists	Invade Countries Supporting Terrorists	Assassinate Leaders Supporting Terrorists	Cut Off Trade	Anti-Terrorism Index
Militarism	.31**	.18**	.19**	.01	.28**
Anti-Communism	.07	.19**	.09	-.03	.16*
Isolationism	.05	-.08	-.11	.11	-.06
Patriotism	.07	.06	-.04	.21**	.03
Party ID	.01	-.04	-.04	.11	-.03
Ideology	.12*	.02	.02	.06	.07
Morality	-.07	-.02	-.02	-.03	-.05
Equality	.08	.00	.01	-.04	.05
R2	.20	.12	.06	.08	.17
Adj R2	.18	.10	.04	.06	.15
N	316	316	316	316	316

Soviet Trade and Nationalism Policy Items

General Orientations	U.S. Trade with Soviets	U.S. Biggest Say in U.N.
Militarism	.14*	.14*
Anti-Communism	.32**	.26**
Isolationism	-.30**	-.22**
Patriotism	-.06	.01
Party ID	.05	-.06
Ideology	-.05	.11
Morality	-.03	.04
Equality	-.08	-.08
R2	.18	.18
Adj R2	.16	.15
N	316	316

*p < .05, **p < .01

Table 7
Regressing Foreign Policy Retrospective Evaluations on Genral Orientations

General Orientations	U.S.-Soviet Relations	U.S. Position in the World	Chance of War
Militarism	.10	-.09	-.05
Anti-Communism	.13	-.03	-.02
Isolationism	-.20**	-.03	-.08
Patriotism	-.18**	.02	-.02
Party ID	-.11	-.04	-.08
Ideology	-.05	.00	-.01
Morality	.11	.16**	.19**
Equality	-.07	-.05	-.09
R2	.11	.04	.06
Adj R2	.09	.01	.03
N	316	316	316

*p < .05, **p < .01

Table 8
Regressing Reagan Approval on General Orientations, Retrospective
Evaluations, and Specific Policies

General Orientations	Reagan Approval Wave II	Reagan Approval 1986	Reagan Approval Wave I	Reagan Approval Wave II
Militarism	-.02 (.02) [-.05]	-.00 (.02) [-.002]	.01 (.02) [.03]	.01 (.02) [.02]
Anti-Communism	.01 (.02) [.02]	.04 (.02)* [.11]	.05 (.02)* [.14]	.041 (.021) [.11]
Isolationism	.02 (.03) [.04]	.04 (.03) [.07]	.05 (.03) [.07]	.03 (.03) [.05]
Patriotism	.02 (.02) [.04]	---	---	---
Party ID	.26 (.04)** [.34]	.32 (.04)** [.41]	.32 (.04)** [.39]	.28 (.04)** [.36]
Ideology	-.04 (.05) [-.05]	.02 (.05) [.02]	-.06 (.05) [-.06]	-.04 (.05) [-.04]
Morality	.01 (.02) [.02]	.01 (.02) [.02]	.00 (.02) [.01]	-.001 (.02) [-.004]
Equality	.02 (.02) [.06]	.03 (.02) [.08]	.06 (.02)** [.15]	.03 (.02) [.09]
Retro: U.S. Position	-.22 (.10)* [-.11]	-.44 (.10)** [-.20]	-.22 (.10)* [-.11]	-.27 (.10) [-.14]
Retro: Chance of War	-.16 (.08)* [-.10]	---	---	---
Central American Policy	.14 (.03)** [.27]	.04 (.05) [.05]	.14 (.04)** [.18]	.19 (.04)** [.26]
Nuclear Policy	.10 (.04)** [.16]	---	---	---
R2	.36	.37	.37	.36
Adj R2	.38	.34	.35	.34
N	263	316	275	275

*p < .05, **p < .01

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses and standardized regression coefficients in brackets.

Lower values on the above scales indicate the more conservative position.

FILE w/ 1987
Presiding
Reports

To: Steven Rosenstone, NES
From: Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley
Re: Foreign policy items
Date: March 11, 1988

This memo is in response to four questions which you raised during our telephone conversation several weeks ago:

- 1) Can we provide evidence to support the discriminant validity of the Militarism and Anti-Communism Postures? Do they predict different sets of policies?
- 2) In the event that all twelve postural items (five Militarism, five Anti-Communism, and two Isolationism) cannot be included on the survey, what would we recommend? Would it be preferable to shorten the two larger scales, eliminate one of the scales entirely, or some other strategy?
- 3) Are there other items (not included on the NES Pilot Study) which are not redundant with the recommended postural items?
- 4) By eliminating one or more items from the postural scales, would we be damaging the explanatory power of the measures? If not, which items appear to be superfluous?

In this memo we will address directly the first and fourth of these questions. Because the answers to the second and third questions depend largely on the answer to the fourth question, they will be addressed indirectly.

I. DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY OF MILITARISM AND ANTI-COMMUNISM POSTURES

We firmly believe that Militarism and Anti-Communism are two distinct, albeit not orthogonal, constructs. Consequently, we would argue that every effort should be made to measure each posture adequately when considering which items should, and should not, be included on the survey.

We base our conclusion largely on evidence which we presented in our last report to the NES Board, much of which we attach to this memo as Table 1. The data come from regression equations in which we regress a series of foreign policy attitude responses (both single indicator items and scaled items) on Militarism, Anti-Communism, Isolationism, Patriotism, Party Identification, Ideological self-placement, Morality, and Equality. For ease of presentation, only the two coefficients of concern--Militarism and Anti-Communism--are included in the Table. (Please refer to the Report, Sections II and III, for justifications of the model specification and measurement descriptions.)

Despite the fact that the Militarism and Anti-Communism scales are correlated ($r = .52$), it can be seen that they function quite differently as predictors of policy positions.

More importantly, they function in ways which are fully expected and, indeed, theoretically plausible.

Consider, for instance, the top tier of Table 1, where we have regressed defense spending and three nuclear weapons items on the independent variables. We fully expected Militarism (defined as a general predisposition to support militaristic solutions to international problems) to be a more powerful predictor of these policy attitudes than Anti-Communism. We certainly would not expect Anti-Communism to be independent of these policy attitudes, for Communist nations have been the primary catalysts of weapon system development and the defense dollars on which they depend. Nonetheless, we would not expect the Anti-Communism Posture to be as powerful a determinant of these policy positions as the Militarism Posture, for the policies clearly transcend the issue of Communism.

Consistent with our expectations, in three of the policy equations (as well as the nuclear policy scale), Militarism clearly does outperform the other posture. The only exception is the "Star Wars" equation, where the Anti-Communism scale coefficient is actually slightly greater than that associated with Militarism. But even this outcome is easily explainable in that the Strategic Defense Initiative has been "pitched" essentially as a defensive weapon to discourage Soviet aggression. Thus, it is not at all surprising to find individuals' views about the Russians to be stronger determinants of this policy item than their general tendencies to endorse militaristic strategies.

The second tier of the table contains a series of dependent variables in which respondents are asked about their support for a) sending U.S. troops to Central America "to stop the spread of Communism"; b) becoming less (or more) involved in the "internal affairs of Central American countries"; c) monetary aid for the Contras in Nicaragua; (the Central American Index includes all three of these items); d) sending U.S. troops to Poland "if the Soviet Union invaded that country"; and e) sending U.S. troops to the Middle East "to keep our supply of oil from being cut off."

The results of these equations are somewhat more complex; nonetheless, they are largely consistent with our conceptual understandings of the two postures. In the second and third Central America items (U.S. involvement and Contra spending) both postures assume approximately equal importance in explaining respondents' policy positions. This result, rather than suggesting poor discriminant validity of the postures, underscores the ambiguity of the questions. In the first place, while knowledgeable respondents may know that the conflicts in Central America are being fought over the issue of Communism, the questions do not explicitly include reference to Communism. And secondly, while U.S. involvement "in the internal affairs of Central American countries" and spending on "aid to the Contras in Nicaragua" may be interpreted by some individuals as militaristic in nature, the policies are vaguely defined and, as such, may or may not involve U.S. military involvement. In short,

there is no prior expectation that one posture should play a more important role than the other in these equations.

Importantly, though, when the reference to Communism is made explicit in the policy questions, the Anti-Communism coefficient increases dramatically (relative to the Militarism coefficient). Specifically, we refer to the impressive role of Anti-Communism as a predictor of policy attitudes toward "sending U.S. troops to Central America to stop the spread of Communism" and "sending U.S. troops to Poland if the Soviet Union invaded that country."

Finally, on the bottom Tier of Table 1 we include equations in which three miscellaneous policy attitudes (toward anti-terrorist policies, U.S. trade with the Soviet Union, and whether or not the U.S. should have the "biggest say" in the United Nations) are regressed on the same set of independent variables. Here, too, the results are fully consistent with our expectations. Militarism serves as a more powerful predictor of the anti-terrorism policy scale than does Anti-Communism, an outcome which is not surprising inasmuch as, first, the index consists of a series of militaristic actions (e.g., bombing and invading countries), and second, terrorist nations are most often non-aligned (i.e., not closely affiliated with the U.S.S.R.) countries. And Anti-Communism is more important than Militarism in the trade and United Nations equations, a result which makes perfect sense given that neither policy includes the use of the U.S. military and, further, both policies are clearly associated with U.S.-Soviet relations.

The only counter-intuitive result in Table 1 is the question regarding sending U.S. troops to the Mideast, a result which we cannot explain. Nevertheless, we find the rest of the evidence to overwhelmingly confirm the discriminant validity of the two postures, and gives us confidence in our understanding that the postures tap quite different general beliefs. Individuals can, indeed, be intensely anti-Communistic without being militaristic (a mentality which doubtless makes many Americans uneasy about the current events in Nicaragua without making them supportive of U.S. military involvement in that region of the world). And, by the same token, individuals can be strongly militaristic without an accompanying sense of anti-Communism (we assume that at least some Americans promoting a U.S. invasion of Iran to secure the release of American hostages during the 1970s were not strongly antagonistic to Communism).

We conclude this section by noting briefly one final set of results. While we will not report the specific results, we predicted respondents' Militarism and Anti-Communism beliefs using a set of demographic variables and value orientations (such as religious fundamentalism, moral traditionalism, morality, and ideology). It was found that the two postures clearly have a different set of determinants. While Anti-Communism beliefs were significantly predicted by age, religious fundamentalism, morality, and moral traditionalism, none of these independent variables was found to have a significant impact on Militarism. It makes sense to us that, while there are generational

differences between respondents because of the waxing and waning of cold war sentiment, no such age-related effects should exist with respect to Militarism (until, perhaps, very recent years). And, in addition, a strong sense of anti-Communism has been considered a central part of modern religious fundamentalism and conventional morality. In short, regardless of whether we conceptualize the postures as independent or dependent variables, they are clearly related to different constructs--constructs which are fully consistent with theoretical expectations.

II. SCALE SIZE AND EXPLANATORY POWER

Another question which members of the Board raised is whether our postural scales would suffer if reduced by one or more scale items. Specifically, can certain items be eliminated from the scales without damage to the empirical quality of the indices? In order to address this question, for each of the postures we regress a series of specific policy attitudes on a host of more general beliefs (including the posture). In each equation, we delete one item from the posture index until it is measured with only a two-item scale. In this way we can assess the marginal benefit gained by including each additional item in the postural indices.

Militarism

In Table 2, for instance, we estimate the impact of Militarism on specific policy attitudes using three different Militarism indices (a two-, three-, and four-item index) and compare the coefficients of the Militarism variable, as well as the R^2 value of the model, across the three different equations. In this way we can determine whether a scale item can be omitted without a substantial loss of explanatory power.

For each policy attitude, the following equation was estimated:

$$\text{Policy} = a + \text{Morality} + \text{Equality} + \text{Ideology} + \text{Partisanship} + \text{Isolationism} + \text{Anti-Communism} + \text{Militarism},$$

where Militarism is either a four-item indicator (V5232 [KEEPPEAC] + V2245 [GETWAY] + V5249 [MAINTAIN] + V5229 [TOUGH]), a three-item indicator (V5232 [KEEPPEAC] + V2245 [GETWAY] + V5249 [MAINTAIN]), or a two-item indicator (V5232 [KEEPPEAC] + V2245 [GETWAY]).¹ Please refer to Table 1 in the Report for the

¹We followed a systematic procedure to determine the order by which the items should be removed from the different Militarism scales. To assess the explanatory power of each of the individual indicators, we estimated the following equations:

$$\text{Policy Attitude} = \text{Morality} + \text{Equality} + \text{Ideology} + \text{Partisanship} +$$

specific wordings of these items.

The cell entries in Table 2 refer, first, to the standardized beta values of the corresponding Militarism scale and, second, to the adjusted R² of the equation. Based on these data, we make the following recommendations:

1. In most cases, the beta coefficients and the adjusted R² values of the models do not decline when V5229/TOUGH is eliminated (compare the four- and three-item scales). In fact, in most cases, there is a slight increase in explanatory power of the scales when TOUGH is dropped. The exceptions are in the Trade and Nuclear Policy Index equations. However, the Soviet Trade item does not seem like the best issue by which to gauge the criterion-related validity of TOUGH, and the coefficient for the Nuclear Policy Index is quite high even without TOUGH. Thus, V5229 can be eliminated from the Militarism scale.

2. In comparing the three- and two-item indices, it can be seen that including or omitting V5249/MAINTAIN does not appreciably affect the results of the equations. There are a few instances where the Militarism variable loses a small amount of explanatory power (Defense Spending, Troops to Central America, Troops to Poland, the four terrorism items, and Soviet Trade), but there are also several equations in which the model is actually improved when MAINTAIN is eliminated (Nuclear Policy Index and Contra Spending).

3. On the other hand, reliability analyses tell a different story:

Four-item scale (V5232, V2245, V5249, V5229): Alpha = .642

Three-item scale (V5232, V2245, V5249): Alpha = .576

Two-item scale (V5232, V2245): Alpha = .448/r = .365

4. We therefore recommend retaining V5232/KEEPPEAC, V2245/GETWAY, and V5249/MAINTAIN, for two reasons: First, measurement reliability declines substantially (from .576 to .448) when MAINTAIN is removed from the scale; and second, MAINTAIN taps a very important dimension of Militarism--the

Patriotism + Isolationism + Anti-Communism + V5232 + V2245 + V5249 + V5229 + V5250

where the last five variables are the single indicators which, together, constitute the full Militarism scale. The number of policy variables on which the separate indicators of Militarism emerge as significant predictors of the policy attitudes reveals, in a rough way, which indicators are redundant and which make an independent contribution to the overall explanatory power of the index. We eliminated V5250 from further analyses because it was not significant in a single equation. As a result of this analysis, we determined the relative order of importance of the remaining four Militarism indicators: V5232, V2245, V5249, and V5229. We consequently removed them from the indices in the reverse order. An analogous procedure was used to determine the order for removing items from the Anti-Communism scale.

belief that U.S. strength is such a paramount goal that we should be willing to risk the consequences in order to attain such a position of world power.

Anti-Communism

In Table 3 we perform a comparable analysis to determine which items, if any, can be removed from the Anti-Communism scale.² For each policy attitude, the following equation was estimated:

$$\text{Policy} = a + \text{Morality} + \text{Equality} + \text{Ideology} + \text{Partisanship} + \text{Isolationism} + \text{Militarism} + \text{Anti-Communism},$$

where Anti-Communism is either a four-item indicator (V5251 [PREVCOMM] + V5253 [GOCOMM] + V5235 [RUSCOOP] + V5252 [STOPSPRD]), a three-item indicator (V5251 [PREVCOMM] + V5253 [GOCOMM] + V5235 [RUSCOOP]), or a two-item indicator (V5251 [PREVCOMM] + V5253 [GOCOMM]). Please refer to Table 1 of our report for precise wordings of these items.

The results presented in Table 3 lead us to the following conclusions:

1. It can be seen, by comparing the 4-item and 3-item Anti-Communism scales, that V5252/STOPSPRD is a dispensable component of the index. In only a few of the equations (e.g., U.S. troops to Central America, Contra Spending, Bombing Terrorist Countries) does the Anti-Communist beta coefficient decline when STOPSPRD is removed, and the proportion of variance explained is virtually identical across the two equations.

2. We are slightly more ambivalent about V5235/RUSCOOP. On the one hand, the 3-item scale (which includes RUSCOOP) clearly outperforms the 2-item scale. In the defense spending, nuclear policy, several military involvement (U.S. troops to Central America and Poland), and Soviet trade equations the loss of predictive power is noticeable.

3. We have several reservations about RUSCOOP, however. For one thing, reliability analyses indicate that including RUSCOOP in an index does not improve the reliability of the measure:

Four-item scale (V5251, V5253, V5235, V5252): Alpha = .632

Three-item scale (V5251, V5253, V5235): Alpha = .602

Two-item scale (V5251, V5253): Alpha = .663/r = .496

To the contrary, it can be seen that the reliability of the Anti-

²See Note 1 for an explanation of the procedure used to determine the order by which items were omitted from the Anti-Communism scale. The analysis revealed that one item used on the NES Pilot (V5238/RUSTHRET) did not significantly predict any of the policy attitudes and, consequently, was excluded from further analysis. The analysis also yielded the following order of the power of the indicators for the Anti-Communism scale: V5251/PREVCOMM, V5253/GOCOMM, V5235/RUSCOOP, V5252/STOPSPRD. We removed them from the indices in the reverse order.

Communism scale is actually higher when RUSCOOP is excluded. Further, we wonder if the item straddles both the Anti-Communism and the Militarism Postures.

4. Nonetheless, because of the predictive utility of RUSCOOP, as well as our desire to be attentive to this posture (Communism [and the U.S.S.R.] has clearly been the primary antagonist and the focus of U.S. foreign policy for the past four decades; moreover, the dimension is central emotionally as well as cognitively), we recommend retaining three Anti-Communism items: V5251/PREVCOMM, V5253/GOCOMM, and V5235/RUSCOOP.

5. In fact, we would also recommend an additional Anti-Communism item which we used successfully on a recent Lexington, Kentucky survey:

"The military power of the Soviet Union presents a real and immediate danger to the United States."

We found this to be a good independent predictor of Contra funding and several nuclear arms questions. Further, if, as we advise, you retain the three measures noted above, this additional item would provide a balanced scale in that two of the items would refer to Communism and two would make reference to the Soviet Union, with one indicator for each set referring to governmental posture and the other indicator in each set referring to threat.³

Isolationism

We perform a comparable analysis of the two Isolationism items in Table 4. The first equation in each tier includes both items (V5254/STAYHOME and V5255/INVOLVED); the second and third

³We understand that some Board members expressed reservations over the inconsistent references (i.e., "Russians," "Soviet Union," and "communism/communists") used in the Anti-Communism items. While we have no objection to referring consistently to the "Soviet Union" rather than to "Russia" (and have, consequently, altered the reference in Item 6 below), we also believe that it is important to retain the reference to "Communism" in several of the indicators. First, as explained in our earlier report, the Anti-Communism Posture is conceptualized as tapping reactions to both of these dimensions of the construct. Second, it should be recalled that we view postures as broad, abstract orientations which transcend specific circumstances and which have a universal meaning. For some individuals, one reference (e.g., Communism) will elicit more powerful responses than the other reference (e.g., the Soviet Union); further, one reference will be more salient than the other at certain points in time. Thus, in an effort to create a more generic scale applicable to all segments of the population, as well as a scale which should prove useful regardless of the historical changes which may temporarily alter the connotations of the terms, we argue that it is essential to include items referencing both the "Soviet Union" and "Communism."

equations include only items V5254 and V5255, respectively.

Our conclusion can be stated briefly: very little is gained with the inclusion of V5255. In our earlier report we found Isolationism to be a significant predictor of only a small set of policy attitudes (U.S. involvement in Central America, Contra spending, U.S. troops in Poland, and U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade). Here we find that V5254 (used as a single indicator) performs just as well in these equations as the two-item Isolationism scale, if not better.

As we stated in our earlier report, the Isolationism Posture was of limited utility in our analysis. It predicted, as noted, only a handful of (less salient) policy attitudes. Moreover, we argued that the concept of Isolationism may be anachronistic in the modern world where international behavior is a fact of life. We found virtually no true isolationists--only some who did not entirely endorse the doctrine of internationalism. Thus, while we would recommend retaining the one indicator (V5254), we would not recommend using both indicators at the expense of one of the other postural scales.

III. CONCLUSIONS

We have attempted to address in this memo the four questions noted on the first page. In Part II we believe we have demonstrated that Militarism and Anti-Communism are conceptually and empirically distinct constructs and, as such, should be operationalized with this distinction in mind.

In part II, we addressed the fourth of the questions, ultimately concluding that the following eight postural indicators should be retained:

Militarism

1. Which do you think is the best way for us to keep the peace--by having a very strong military so other countries won't attack us, or by working out our disagreements at the bargaining table? (V5232)

2. How important is it for the U.S. to have a very strong military force to get our way with our adversaries--extremely, very, somewhat, or not important? (V2245)

3. The U.S. should maintain its position as the world's most powerful nation, even going to the brink of war if necessary. (V5249)

Anti-Communism

4. The United States should do everything it can to prevent the spread of Communism to any other part of the world. (V5251)

5. Any time a country goes Communist, it should be considered a threat to the vital interests and security of the United States. (V5253)

6. Some people believe we should be much more cooperative with the Soviet Union, while others feel we should be much

tougher in our dealing with the Soviets. (V5235)

7. The military power of the Soviet Union presents a real and immediate danger to the United States.

Isolationism

8. This country would be much better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world. (V5254)

In the course of addressing the first and fourth of the questions posed by the Board, we have also indirectly responded to the second and third questions. By eliminating five of the original items,⁴ we have recommended that, if all twelve items cannot be incorporated onto the survey, we would much prefer shorter postural scales than merging the Militarism and Anti-Communism scales. The elimination of four items also weeds out some of the more redundant questions, thereby providing items which are more distinct from one another.

⁴We note, as well, that the majority of our recommended items use the Likert format and can, consequently, be administered very rapidly.

Table 1
Regressions of Specific Foreign Policy Attitudes on General Orientations

A. Defense and Nuclear Policy Attitudes

General Postures	Defense Spending	Increase Nuclear Arsenal	Arms Treaty	Star Wars	Nuclear Policy Index
Militarism	.46**	.33**	.33*	.15*	.31**
Anti-Communism	.23**	.15*	.11	.22**	.22*

B. Military Involvement Policy Attitudes

General Postures	Send U.S. Troops to Central America	U.S. Involvement in Cent. America	U.S. Spending for Contras	Central America Index	Send U.S. Troops to Poland	Send U.S. Troops to Mideast
Militarism	.09	.15*	.15*	.19**	.10	.12*
Anti-Comm.	.46**	.15*	.19**	.33**	.23**	.36**

C. Miscellaneous Policy Attitudes

General Postures	Anti-Terrorism Index	U.S. Trade with Soviets	U.S. Biggest Say in U.N.
Militarism	.28**	.14*	.14*
Anti-Communism	.16*	.32**	.26**

*p < .05

**p < .01

Note: This is a condensed version of Table 6 from the larger report. Please refer to that table for more complete results, including coefficients pertaining to other independent variables as well as sample size and R² levels.

Table 2
Explanatory Power of Militarism Indices across Foreign Policy Attitudes

A. Defense and Nuclear Policy Attitudes						
	Defense Spending	Increase Nuclear Arsenal	Arms Treaty	Star Wars	Nuclear Policy Index	
Militarism 4-item***	.53/.47	.38/.21	.40/.17	.20/.20	.46/.30	
Militarism 3-item**	.52/.47	.38/.22	.41/.18	.20/.20	.37/.30	
Militarism 2-item*	.50/.47	.39/.24	.40/.18	.21/.22	.39/.32	
B. Military Involvement Policy Attitudes						
	Send U.S. Troops to Central America	U.S. In- volvement in Cent. America	Spending for Contras	Central America Index	Send U.S. Troops to Poland	
Militarism 4-item***	.11/.29	.15/.17	.15/.14	.18/.23	.11/.09	
Militarism 3-item**	.13/.29	.19/.18	.20/.16	.22/.25	.14/.09	
Militarism 2-items*	.10/.29	.21/.19	.23/.17	.24/.26	.11/.09	
C. Anti-Terrorism Policy and Soviet Trade Policy Attitudes						
	Bomb Countries Support Terrorist	Invade Countries Support Terrorist	Assass. Leaders Support Terrorist	Cut off Trade	Anti- Terrorism Index	Soviet Trade
Militarism 4-item***	.35/.19	.18/.09	.27/.05	.05/.05	.31/.16	.13/.16
Militarism 3-item**	.38/.21	.18/.09	.25/.05	.04/.05	.31/.16	.08/.15
Militarism 2-item*	.34/.19	.15/.08	.22/.04	.02/.05	.27/.15	.05/.15

beta coefficient/adjusted R²

***4-item Militarism scale: V5232/KEEPPEAC, V2245/GETWAY, V5249/MAINTAIN, V5229/TOUGH

**3-item Militarism scale: V5232/KEEPPEAC, V2245/GETWAY, V5249/MAINTAIN

*2-item Militarism scale: V5232/KEEPPEAC, V2245/GETWAY

Table 3
Explanatory Power of Anti-Communism Indices across Foreign Policy Attitudes

A. Defense and Nuclear Policy Attitudes						
	Defense Spending	Increase Nuclear Arsenal	Arms Treaty	Star Wars	Nuclear Policy Index	
Anti-Communism 4-item***	.21/.47	.11/.21	.06/.17	.18/.20	.16/.17	
Anti-Communism 3-item**	.22/.47	.12/.22	.06/.17	.18/.20	.18/.17	
Anti-Communism 2-item*	.14/.45	.05/.21	.00/.17	.10/.19	.09/.29	
B. Military Involvement Policy Attitudes						
	Send U.S. Troops to Central America	U.S. Involvement in Central America	Spending for Contras	Central America Index	Send U.S. Troops to Poland	
Anti-Communism 4-item***	.44/.29	.12/.17	.18/.14	.16/.23	.22/.09	
Anti-Communism 3-item**	.39/.27	.11/.17	.11/.13	.15/.23	.30/.11	
Anti-Communism 2-items*	.32/.25	.14/.17	.12/.13	.18/.24	.21/.09	
C. Anti-Terrorism Policy and Soviet Trade Policy Attitudes						
	Bomb Countries Support Terrorist	Invade Countries Support Terrorist	Assass. Leaders Support Terrorist	Cut off Trade	Anti-Terrorism Index	Soviet Trade
Anti-Comm. 4-item***	.09/.19	.22/.09	.06/.05	.02/.05	.10/.15	.32/.16
Anti-Comm. 3-item**	.04/.19	.19/.09	.10/.05	.02/.05	.08/.16	.30/.16
Anti-Comm. 2-Item*	.03/.19	.20/.18	.09/.06	.03/.05	.13/.17	.17/.12

beta coefficient/adjusted R²

***4-item Anti-Comm. scale: V5251/PREVC0MM, V5253/G0C0MM, V5235/RUSC00P, V5252/ST0PSPRD

**3-item Anti-Comm. scale: V5251/PREVC0MM, V5253/G0C0MM, V5235/RUSC00P

*2-item Anti-Comm. scale: V5251/PREVC0MM, V5253/G0C0MM

Table 4
 Explanatory Power of Isolationism Indices across Foreign Policy Attitudes

A. Defense and Nuclear Policy Attitudes						
	Defense Spending	Increase Nuclear Arsenal	Arms Treaty	Star Wars	Nuclear Policy Index	
Isolationism 2-item	.07/.47	.02/.21	.01/.17	.04/.20	.04/.30	
Isolationism V5254/STAYHOME	.06/.47	.02/.21	.00/.17	.00/.20	.00/.30	
Isolationism V5255/INVOLVED	.06/.47	.05/.21	.02/.17	.04/.20	.06/.30	
B. Military Involvement Policy Attitudes						
	Send U.S. Troops to Central America	U.S. Involvement in Cent. America	Spending for Contras	Central America Index	Send U.S. Troops to Poland	
Isolationism 2-item	.11/.29	.19/.17	.15/.14	.22/.23	.14/.09	
Isolationism V5254/STAYHOME	.13/.29	.19/.17	.13/.14	.22/.23	.15/.10	
Isolationism V5255/INVOLVED	.07/.28	.18/.16	.14/.14	.19/.22	.08/.09	
C. Anti-Terrorism Policy and Soviet Trade Policy Attitudes						
	Bomb Countries Support Terrorist	Invade Countries Support Terrorist	Assass. Leaders Support Terrorist	Cut off Trade	Anti-Terrorism Index	Soviet Trade
Isolationism 2-item	.06/.19	-.06/.09	-.10/.05	.11/.05	.00/.16	.28/.16
Isolationism V5254/STAYHOME	.04/.18	-.06/.09	-.09/.05	.09/.05	.00/.16	.30/.17
Isolationism V5255/INVOLVED	.08/.19	.07/.09	-.08/.05	.09/.05	.00/.16	.22/.13

beta coefficient/adjusted R²